Market Action

August 2, 2017

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.25%, equivalent to 6.82% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield a little over 4.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 280bp, a sharp narrowing from the 295bp reported July 26.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.0862 % 2,444.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.0862 % 4,486.0
Floater 3.54 % 3.56 % 130,013 18.36 3 1.0862 % 2,585.3
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1333 % 3,062.3
SplitShare 4.70 % 4.37 % 54,379 1.38 5 0.1333 % 3,657.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1333 % 2,853.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.39 % 4.59 % 60,190 2.49 17 0.1206 % 2,784.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.25 % 69,476 14.95 20 0.1444 % 2,933.1
FixedReset 4.32 % 4.42 % 171,191 6.34 98 0.0952 % 2,412.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 5.40 % 111,710 6.11 30 0.1122 % 2,865.9
FloatingReset 2.60 % 2.95 % 41,946 4.26 9 -0.0657 % 2,640.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-02
Maturity Price : 14.60
Evaluated at bid price : 14.60
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
TD.PF.D FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-02
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
NA.PR.A FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-02
Maturity Price : 14.54
Evaluated at bid price : 14.54
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.O FixedReset 202,776 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 163,108 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
CM.PR.R FixedReset 161,237 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 129,325 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.38
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 102,017 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
TRP.PR.J FixedReset 98,373 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.55 – 26.25
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.5520

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 1.04 %

TRP.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 27.05 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %

BNS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 26.11 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1981

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-01-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.11
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 24.76 – 24.98
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1388

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 19.83 – 20.27
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3589

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.83
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %

PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.03 – 23.28
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1689

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-02
Maturity Price : 22.67
Evaluated at bid price : 23.03
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %

MAPF

MAPF Performance: July 2017

Returns to July 31, 2017
Period MAPF BMO-CM “50” Preferred Share Index TXPR*
Total Return
CPD – according to Blackrock
One Month +2.04% +1.71% +1.11% N/A
Three Months +5.52% +2.99% +2.24% N/A
One Year +27.83% +20.11% +16.92% +16.70%
Two Years (annualized) +9.45% +8.39% +6.82% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +2.29% +1.50% +0.34% +0.01%
Four Years (annualized) +4.02% +2.10% +1.43% N/A
Five Years (annualized) +3.60% +2.03% +1.23% +0.83%
Six Years (annualized) +3.47% +2.43% +1.73% N/A
Seven Years (annualized) +5.15% +3.89% +2.93% N/A
Eight Years (annualized) +6.39% +4.62% +3.55% N/A
Nine Years (annualized) +11.05% +4.83% +3.80% N/A
Ten Years (annualized) +9.09% +3.52% +2.53% +2.01%
Eleven Years (annualized) +8.77% +3.26%    
Twelve Years (annualized) +8.41% +3.24%    
Thirteen Years (annualized) +8.33% +3.38%    
Fourteen Years (annualized) +9.07% +3.57%    
Fifteen Years (annualized) +9.35% +3.75%    
Sixteen Years (annualized) +9.48% +3.76%    
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
The full name of the BMO-CM “50” index is the BMO Capital Markets “50” Preferred Share Index. It is calculated without accounting for fees.
“TXPR” is the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index. It is calculated without accounting for fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Income Fund (formerly Omega Preferred Equity) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.91%, +2.24% and +15.61%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +1.60%; five year is +2.23%
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Class Adv [into which was merged Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund)] (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.63%, +2.04% & +21.05%, respectively.

It will be noted that AIC Preferred Income Fund was in existence prior to August, 2009, but long term performance figures have been suppressed.

Figures for Horizons Active Preferred Share ETF (HPR) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +1.58%, +2.84% & +19.39%, respectively. Three year performance is +2.34%, five-year is +2.74%
Figures for National Bank Preferred Equity Fund (formerly Altamira Preferred Equity Fund) are +1.40%, +2.50% and +18.85% for one-, three- and twelve months, respectively. Three year performance is +1.31%.

According to the fund’s fact sheet as of June 30, 2016, the fund’s inception date was October 30, 2015. I do not know how they justify this nonsensical statement, but will assume that prior performance is being suppressed in some perfectly legal manner that somebody at National considers ethical.

The figures for the NAV of BMO S&P/TSX Laddered Preferred Share Index ETF (ZPR) is +22.07% for the past twelve months. Two year performance is +6.73%, three year is -2.05%.
Figures for NexGen Canadian Preferred Share Tax Managed Fund (Dividend Tax Credit Class, the best performing) are -%, +% and -% for one-, three- and twelve-months, respectively.
Figures for BMO Preferred Share Fund are +1.08% and +13.11% for the past three- and twelve-months, respectively. Three year performance is -0.40%.
Figures for PowerShares Canadian Preferred Share Index Class, Series F are +21.67% for the past twelve months. The three-year figure is +1.73%; five years is +1.36%
Figures for the First Asset Preferred Share Investment Trust (PSF.UN) are no longer available since the fund has merged with First Asset Preferred Share ETF (FPR)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Obviously, the last twelve months have been superb for both preferred shares in general and the fund in particular, but I think that there is still room for outsized gains. The Seniority Spread (the interest-equivalent yield on reasonably liquid, investment-grade PerpetualDiscounts less the yield on long term corporate bonds) is still quite elevated (chart end-date 2017-7-14):

pl_170714_body_chart_1
Click for Big

… and the relationship between five-year Canada yields and yields on investment-grade FixedResets is also well within what I consider ‘decoupled panic’ territory (chart end-date 2017-7-14):

pl_170714_body_chart_5
Click for Big

In addition, I feel that the yield on five-year Canadas is unsustainably low (it should be the inflation rate plus an increment of … 1%? 1.5%? 2.0%?),and a return to sustainable levels is likely over the medium term.

The second-quarter outperformance of PerpetualDiscounts over FixedResets sharply reversed itself in July with a sharp decline in PerpetualDiscount prices in the first half of the month met by opposite movement by FixedResets:

himi_indexperf_170731
Click for Big

Of course, it’s one thing to say that ‘spreads are unsustainable and so are government yields’ and it’s quite another to forecast just how and when a more economically sustainable environment will take effect. It could be years. There could be a reversal, particularly if Trump’s international trade policies cause a severe recession or even a depression. And, of course, I could be just plain wrong about the sustainability of the current environment. However, the increasingly hawkish tilt among global central banks has been widely remarked:

Two weeks of rhetoric from policy makers in Europe and North America has rewritten the outlook for markets, with the Bank of England and the Bank of Canada now seen as more likely than not to join the Federal Reserve in raising rates before the year is out, based on overnight index swap rates. Even the possibility of a European Central Bank hike, once seen as all but impossible, is slowly growing.

The prospect of four of the world’s five largest central banks moving to tighten policy at the same time is shocking traders after years of easing, with the dislocations in money markets also rippling through global bonds.

I think that a broad, sustainable rally in FixedResets will require higher five-year Canada yields (or a widespread expectation of them) … and although I’m sure this will happen eventually, it would be foolish to speculate on just when it will happen!

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.3240 0.3524
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.3240 0.3773
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.3240 0.3993
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.3240 0.3938
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.3240 $0.3993
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.3240 $0.4537
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.3240 $0.5571
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.3240 $0.5872
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.3240 $0.5855
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.3240 $0.5634
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.1141 $0.5549
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.1141 $0.5593
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.1141 $0.5681
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.1141 $0.5664
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0298 $0.5654
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0298 $0.6403
June 11.1194 5.87% 1.018 5.976% 1.0298 $0.6453
September 10.2709 6.10%
Note
1.001 6.106% 1.0298 $0.6090
December, 2011 10.0793 5.63%
Note
1.031 5.805% 1.0000 $0.5851
March, 2012 10.3944 5.13%
Note
0.996 5.109% 1.0000 $0.5310
June 10.2151 5.32%
Note
1.012 5.384% 1.0000 $0.5500
September 10.6703 4.61%
Note
0.997 4.624% 1.0000 $0.4934
December, 2012 10.8307 4.24% 0.989 4.287% 1.0000 $0.4643
March, 2013 10.9033 3.87% 0.996 3.886% 1.0000 $0.4237
June 10.3261 4.81% 0.998 4.80% 1.0000 $0.4957
September 10.0296 5.62% 0.996 5.643% 1.0000 $0.5660
December, 2013 9.8717 6.02% 1.008 5.972% 1.0000 $0.5895
March, 2014 10.2233 5.55% 0.998 5.561% 1.0000 $0.5685
June 10.5877 5.09% 0.998 5.100% 1.0000 $0.5395
September 10.4601 5.28% 0.997 5.296% 1.0000 $0.5540
December, 2014 10.5701 4.83% 1.009 4.787% 1.0000 $0.5060
March, 2015 9.9573 4.99% 1.001 4.985% 1.0000 $0.4964
June, 2015 9.4181 5.55% 1.002 5.539% 1.0000 $0.5217
September, 2015 7.8140 6.98% 0.999 6.987% 1.0000 $0.5460
December, 2015 8.1379 6.85% 0.997 6.871% 1.0000 $0.5592
March, 2016 7.4416 7.79% 0.998 7.805% 1.0000 $0.5808
June 7.6704 7.67% 1.011 7.587% 1.0000 $0.5819
September 8.0590 7.35% 0.993 7.402% 1.0000 $0.5965
December, 2016 8.5844 7.24% 0.990 7.313% 1.0000 $0.6278
March, 2017 9.3984 6.26% 0.994 6.298% 1.0000 $0.5919
June 9.5313 6.41% 0.998 6.423% 1.0000 $0.6122
July, 2017 9.7255 6.37% 0.994 6.408% 1.0000 $0.6232
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company (definition refined in May, 2011). These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: Seeking NVCC Status and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The same reasoning is also applied to FixedResets from these issuers, other than explicitly defined NVCC from banks.

Yields for September, 2011, to January, 2012, were calculated by imposing a cap of 10% on the yields of YLO issues held, in order to avoid their extremely high calculated yields distorting the calculation and to reflect the uncertainty in the marketplace that these yields will be realized. From February to September 2012, yields on these issues have been set to zero. All YLO issues held were sold in October 2012.

These calculations were performed assuming constant contemporary GOC-5 and 3-Month Bill rates, as follows:

Canada Yields Assumed in Calculations
Month-end GOC-5 3-Month Bill
September, 2015 0.78% 0.40%
December, 2015 0.71% 0.46%
March, 2016 0.70% 0.44%
June 0.57% 0.47%
September 0.58% 0.53%
December, 2016 1.16% 0.47%
March, 2017 1.08% 0.55%
June 1.35% 0.69%
July, 2017 1.65% 0.70%

Significant positions were held in NVCC non-compliant regulated FixedReset issues on March 31, 2017; all of these currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-31 (insurers and insurance holding companies) or on a different date (SplitShares) This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield, which also assumes that redemption proceeds will be reinvested at the same rate. It will also be noted that my analysis of likely insurance industry regulation as recently updated is not given much weight by the market.

I will also note that the sustainable yield calculated above is not directly comparable with any yield calculation currently reported by any other preferred share fund as far as I am aware. The Sustainable Yield depends on:
i) Calculating Yield-to-Worst for each instrument and using this yield for reporting purposes;
ii) Using the contemporary value of Five-Year Canadas to estimate dividends after reset for FixedResets. The assumption regarding the five-year Canada rate has become more important as the proportion of low-spread FixedResets in the portfolio has increased.
iii) Making the assumption that deeply discounted NVCC non-compliant issues from both banks and insurers, both Straight and FixedResets will be redeemed at par on their DeemedMaturity date as discussed above.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: July, 2017

Turnover eased from June’s high level to about 11% in July.

There is extreme segmentation in the marketplace, with OSFI’s NVCC rule changes in February 2011 having had the effect of splitting the formerly relatively homogeneous Straight Perpetual class of preferreds into three parts:

  • Unaffected Straight Perpetuals
  • DeemedRetractibles explicitly subject to the rules (banks)
  • DeemedRetractibles considered by me, but not (yet!) by the market, to be likely to be explicitly subject to the rules in the future (insurers and insurance holding companies)

This segmentation, and the extreme valuation differences between the segments, has cut down markedly on the opportunities for trading.

To make this more clear, it used to be that there were 70-odd Straight Perpetuals and I was more or less indifferent as to which ones I owned (subject, of course, to issuer concentration concerns and other risk management factors). Thus, if any one of these 70 were to go down in price by – say – $0.25, I would quite often have something in inventory that I’d be willing to swap for it. The segmentation means that I am no longer indifferent; in addition to checking the valuation of a potential buy to other Straights, I also have to check its peer group. This cuts down on the potential for trading.

And, of course, the same segmentation has the same effect on trading opportunities between FixedReset issues.

There is no real hope that this situation will be corrected in the near-term. OSFI has indicated that the long-promised “Draft Definition of Capital” for insurers will not be issued “for public consultation in late 2012 or early 2013”, as they fear that it might encourage speculation in the marketplace. It is not clear why OSFI is so afraid of informed speculation, since the constant speculation in the marketplace is currently less informed than it would be with a little bit of regulatory clarity. While the framework has been updated, the modifications focus on the amount of capital required, not the required characteristics of that capital. However, OSFI has recently indicated that it would support a mechanism similar to the NVCC rule for banks, so we may see some developments as the IAIS deliberations regarding insurance capital continue.

As a result of this delay, I have extended the Deemed Maturity date for insurers and insurance holding companies by three years (to 2025-1-31), in the expectation that when OSFI finally does provide clarity, they will allow the same degree of lead-in time for these companies as they did for banks. This had a major effect on the durations of preferred shares subject to the change but, fortunately, not much on their calculated yields as most of these issues were either trading near par when the change was made or were trading at sufficient premium that a par call was expected on economic grounds. However, with the declines in the market over the past nine months, the expected capital gain on redemption of the insurance-issued DeemedRetractibles has become an important component of the calculated yield.

Due to the footdragging by OSFI, I will be extending the DeemedMaturity date for insurance issues by another few years in the near future.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on July 31 was as follows:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2017-7-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 2.8% 4.43% 5.63
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 6.0% 5.33% 14.86
Fixed-Reset 71.2% 6.43% 7.18
Deemed-Retractible 1.1% 6.91% 6.17
FloatingReset 8.8% 7.87% 6.66
Scraps (Various) 9.6% 6.13% 12.78
Cash +0.6% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.37% 8.03
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 (banks) or 2025-1-3 (insurers and insurance holding companies), in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital, CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G: NVCC Status Confirmed and the January, February, March and June, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue.

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 1.65% and a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 0.70%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2017-7-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0
Pfd-1(low) 0
Pfd-2(high) 50.5%
Pfd-2 33.8%
Pfd-2(low) 5.6%
Pfd-3(high) 1.9%
Pfd-3 4.6%
Pfd-3(low) 2.3%
Pfd-4(high) 0%
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0%
Pfd-5(high) 0.7%
Pfd-5 0.0%
Cash +0.6%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
The fund holds a position in AZP.PR.C, which is rated P-5(high) by S&P and is unrated by DBRS; it is included in the Pfd-5(high) total.
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS, but has been included as “Pfd-3” in the above table on the basis of its S&P rating of P-3.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2017-7-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 26.1%
$50,000 – $100,000 26.6%
$100,000 – $200,000 40.8%
$200,000 – $300,000 5.9%
>$300,000 0%
Cash +0.6%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) (and other funds) as of August 31, 2012, and published in the October (mainly methodology), November (most funds), and December (ZPR) 2012, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a bit lower
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings
    • MAPF is less exposed to Straight Perpetuals (including DeemedRetractibles)
    • MAPF is less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is usually, but not currently, more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF is overweighted in FixedResets
Market Action

August 1, 2017

There’s some good news from S&P:

S&P said Monday that it would no longer consider companies with multiple share classes for its main U.S. stock indexes. The one that matters is the S&P 500, which is tracked by about $2.2 trillion worth of assets and which serves as a benchmark for more than $7.8 trillion of investments. The share structures S&P is targeting usually grant insiders control of the company by giving their shares far more votes than shares held by outside investors.

The shift mainly targets Silicon Valley, where companies from Facebook to Google and, most recently, Snap , have sold shares while giving investors virtually no say in how the companies are run. Snap, now down more than 20% from its IPO price, was seen as the tipping point because it gave investors no say at all. Companies already in the index will be allowed to stay.

With billions flowing into index funds every month, blocking these companies will likely reduce their potential valuation.

The rise of index funds, and companies such as Vanguard, BlackRock and State Street that dominate the business, has concentrated power in the hands of investors in a way never seen before. The three companies have long said they believe in one share, one vote. And they pay a lot of money to index providers like S&P to use their products. The fund managers, of course, are paid by investors.

It is regrettable that the dominant Canadian index firm is the Toronto Stock Exchange, which is owned by the banks, who also own fool service brokerage houses while running many index-linked ETFs and closet-indexing mutual funds; so don’t hold your breath waiting for participating debentures masquerading as equity to be out of our indices any time soon. Fortunately, we know that the oligopoly is wonderful and works in our favour, because many of the oligopoly’s future employees currently at the Canadian Securities Administrators say so.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0462 % 2,418.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0462 % 4,437.8
Floater 3.58 % 3.60 % 125,438 18.28 3 -0.0462 % 2,557.5
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0549 % 3,058.2
SplitShare 4.71 % 4.38 % 54,934 3.77 5 -0.0549 % 3,652.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0549 % 2,849.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.40 % 4.65 % 60,918 2.49 17 0.0813 % 2,781.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.31 % 70,581 14.93 20 0.2043 % 2,928.8
FixedReset 4.32 % 4.43 % 176,747 6.34 98 -0.0573 % 2,410.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 5.38 % 113,895 6.11 30 0.0735 % 2,862.7
FloatingReset 2.60 % 3.01 % 41,186 4.26 9 -0.1009 % 2,642.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
NA.PR.A FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 24.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 15.80
Evaluated at bid price : 15.80
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.S FixedReset 438,700 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
NA.PR.X FixedReset 286,861 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 197,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
BAM.PF.I FixedReset 116,080 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.83
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
W.PR.K FixedReset 100,523 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-01-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
TRP.PR.E FixedReset 91,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.55 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.6500
Average : 0.3897

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 1.03 %

HSE.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 24.23 – 24.72
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.3199

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.23
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %

POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.03 – 24.49
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3215

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.23 %

BMO.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 23.90 – 24.35
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3227

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-08-01
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 23.90
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

NA.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 26.12 – 26.54
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.2976

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 22.61 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2734

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

Issue Comments

DBRS Improves TD Senior Debt Trend to Stable

DBRS has announced that it:

has today confirmed the ratings of The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD or the Bank) and its related entities, including TD’s Long-Term Issuer Rating at AA and Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-1 (high). TD’s Long-Term Issuer Rating is composed of an Intrinsic Assessment (IA) of AA (low) and a Support Assessment (SA) of SA2, reflecting the expectation of timely, systemic support from the Government of Canada (rated AAA with a Stable trend by DBRS). The SA2 designation results in a one-notch uplift to the Long-Term Issuer Rating. The trends on TD’s short-term ratings, as well as the Long-Term Issuer Rating, Long-Term Senior Debt, Long-Term Deposits and older-style subordinated debt, have been revised to Stable from Negative, while other capital instruments whose ratings are notched down from the Bank’s IA remain Stable.

The revision of the trends to Stable reflects DBRS’s view that TD’s long-tenured track record of improving fundamentals points to an improving IA, which may offset the anticipated regulatory reform support-related downward pressure on the rating. Therefore, the expectation of a ratings downgrade following the removal of support is less likely.

DBRS continues to view that changes in Canadian banking legislation and regulation point to a declining potential for timely support for Canada’s systemically important banks. Eventually, this decline is expected to result in a change in DBRS’s SA to SA3 from SA2. Currently, for these banks, the SA2 results in an uplift of one notch above their IAs. This regime primarily affects the six big Canadian banks that have been designated as domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). While this bail-in regime is expected to come into force in H1 2018, the proposed new bail-inable debt will only begin to be issued by D-SIBs at that time and no existing debt will be subject to bail-in retroactively. Thus, DBRS considers that there would not be sufficient bail-inable debt initially to reduce the likelihood of systemic support from its current level in Canada. DBRS expects to maintain the current notch of support until the D-SIBs build up sufficient new bail-inable senior debt such that the likelihood of systemic support has declined to a level at which this uplift is no longer warranted. The timing of such action depends on the finalization of the bail-in regime and the extent to which the D-SIBs build up their bail-inable senior debt. Two factors pressuring the D-SIBs to issue new bail-inable senior debt are the maturing of their existing senior debt and their need to meet the newly established requirements for total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) by November 1, 2021. DBRS continues to evaluate the impact of the proposed regulations and will comment further as the proposals are finalized. For more detail, please see “DBRS Comments on Proposed Implementation of Bail-in Regime in Canada; Bank Negative Trends Unchanged” published July 11, 2017, on dbrs.com.

The paper DBRS Comments on Proposed Implementation of Bail-in Regime in Canada; Bank Negative Trends Unchanged states in part:

Under the CDIC Act, if a bank is determined to have ceased or is about to cease to be viable, the CDIC would be authorized to take temporary control or ownership to the bank and conduct the bail-in process. Existing CDIC resolution tools include liquidation, forced sale and creation of a bridge bank. Adding to these powers, the proposed Bail-in Regime permits the conversion of bail-inable liabilities into common shares to recapitalize the distressed bank. CDIC would establish the terms and conditions of the bail-in with the intent under this Act to recapitalize the bank, while respecting the relative hierarchy of the bank’s obligations. Under this approach, more senior obligations are treated better than more junior obligations, as compared to an absolute hierarchy whereby more junior obligations would be written off completely. Thus, senior bail-inable debt would receive more common shares than NVCC securities and all securities in the same class would receive the same treatment.

In its TLAC guideline, OSFI specified its proposed minimum requirements for TLAC for D-SIBs. Initially, there will be a minimum of at least 21.5% for the Risk-based TLAC ratio (TLAC Measure / Risk Weighted Assets). Focusing on the risks faced by a bank, this ratio is considered the primary basis for assessing a D-SIB’s TLAC. There is also a minimum of 6.75% for the TLAC Leverage ratio (TLAC Measure / Exposure Measure), with the framework for determining this exposure being provided in OSFI’s Leverage Requirements guideline. This ratio is considered an overall measure of a D-SIB’s TLAC. Subject to certain adjustments and exclusions, TLAC comprises common equity Tier 1, additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, and other TLAC instruments, principally bail-inable senior unsecured debt. OSFI considers that these minimums are consistent with the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) requirements for G-SIBs, thereby ensuring that Canada’s six D-SIBs are in a comparable position to G-SIBs globally and prepared if there is a change in the designation of one or more of these banks. The intent of the TLAC requirements is to require D-SIBs to have enough resources to be restored to viability after experiencing significant losses in a very stressed environment. D-SIBs will be expected to maintain buffers over the minimum requirements.

The original trend change was reported on PrefBlog in 2015 in the post DBRS: Bank Senior Debt On Trend-Negative Due to Government Support Uncertainty

Preferred shares were not affected by the trend opinion, but I considered the information to be material.

TD’s currently outstanding preferreds are: TD.PF.A, TD.PF.B, TD.PF.C, TD.PF.D, TD.PF.E, TD.PF.F, TD.PF.G, TD.PF.H, TD.PF.I, TD.PR.S, TD.PR.T, TD.PR.Y, TD.PR.Z.

Issue Comments

DBRS Improves RY Senior Debt Trend to Stable

DBRS has announced that it:

has today confirmed the ratings of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC or the Bank) and its related entities, including RBC’s Long-Term Issuer Rating at AA and Short-Term Issuer Rating at R-1 (high). RBC’s Long-Term Issuer Rating is composed of an Intrinsic Assessment (IA) of AA (low) and a Support Assessment (SA) of SA2, reflecting the expectation of timely, systemic support from the Government of Canada (rated AAA with a Stable trend by DBRS). The SA2 designation results in a one-notch uplift to the Long-Term Issuer Rating. The trends on RBC’s short-term ratings, as well as the Long-Term Issuer Rating, Long-Term Senior Debt, Long-Term Deposits and older-style subordinated debt, have been revised to Stable from Negative, while other capital instruments whose ratings are notched down from the Bank’s IA remain Stable.

The revision of the trend to Stable reflects DBRS’s view that RBC’s long-tenured track record of strong fundamentals and growing franchise points to an improving IA, which may offset the anticipated regulatory reform support-related downward pressure on the rating. Therefore, the expectation of a ratings downgrade following the removal of support is less likely.

DBRS continues to believe that changes in Canadian banking legislation and regulation point to a declining potential for timely support for Canada’s systemically important banks. Eventually, this decline is expected to result in a change in DBRS’s SA to SA3 from SA2. Currently, for these banks, the SA2 results in an uplift of one notch above their IAs. This regime primarily affects the six big Canadian banks that have been designated as domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). While this bail-in regime is expected to come into force in H1 2018, the proposed new bail-inable debt will only begin to be issued by D-SIBs at that time and no existing debt will be subject to bail-in retroactively. Thus, DBRS considers that there would not be sufficient bail-inable debt initially to reduce the likelihood of systemic support from its current level in Canada. DBRS expects to maintain the current notch of support until the D-SIBs build up sufficient new bail-inable senior debt such that the likelihood of systemic support has declined to a level at which this uplift is no longer warranted. The timing of such action depends on the finalization of the bail-in regime and the extent to which the D-SIBs build up their bail-inable senior debt. Two factors pressuring the D-SIBs to issue new bail-inable senior debt are the maturing of their existing senior debt and their need to meet the newly established requirements for total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) by November 1, 2021. DBRS continues to evaluate the impact of the proposed regulations and will comment further as the proposals are finalized. For more detail, please see “DBRS Comments on Proposed Implementation of Bail-in Regime in Canada; Bank Negative Trends Unchanged” published July 11, 2017, on dbrs.com.

The paper DBRS Comments on Proposed Implementation of Bail-in Regime in Canada; Bank Negative Trends Unchanged states in part:

Under the CDIC Act, if a bank is determined to have ceased or is about to cease to be viable, the CDIC would be authorized to take temporary control or ownership to the bank and conduct the bail-in process. Existing CDIC resolution tools include liquidation, forced sale and creation of a bridge bank. Adding to these powers, the proposed Bail-in Regime permits the conversion of bail-inable liabilities into common shares to recapitalize the distressed bank. CDIC would establish the terms and conditions of the bail-in with the intent under this Act to recapitalize the bank, while respecting the relative hierarchy of the bank’s obligations. Under this approach, more senior obligations are treated better than more junior obligations, as compared to an absolute hierarchy whereby more junior obligations would be written off completely. Thus, senior bail-inable debt would receive more common shares than NVCC securities and all securities in the same class would receive the same treatment.

In its TLAC guideline, OSFI specified its proposed minimum requirements for TLAC for D-SIBs. Initially, there will be a minimum of at least 21.5% for the Risk-based TLAC ratio (TLAC Measure / Risk Weighted Assets). Focusing on the risks faced by a bank, this ratio is considered the primary basis for assessing a D-SIB’s TLAC. There is also a minimum of 6.75% for the TLAC Leverage ratio (TLAC Measure / Exposure Measure), with the framework for determining this exposure being provided in OSFI’s Leverage Requirements guideline. This ratio is considered an overall measure of a D-SIB’s TLAC. Subject to certain adjustments and exclusions, TLAC comprises common equity Tier 1, additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 capital, and other TLAC instruments, principally bail-inable senior unsecured debt. OSFI considers that these minimums are consistent with the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) requirements for G-SIBs, thereby ensuring that Canada’s six D-SIBs are in a comparable position to G-SIBs globally and prepared if there is a change in the designation of one or more of these banks. The intent of the TLAC requirements is to require D-SIBs to have enough resources to be restored to viability after experiencing significant losses in a very stressed environment. D-SIBs will be expected to maintain buffers over the minimum requirements.

The original trend change was reported on PrefBlog in 2015 in the post DBRS: Bank Senior Debt On Trend-Negative Due to Government Support Uncertainty

Preferred shares were not affected by the trend opinion, but I considered the information to be material.

RY’s currently outstanding preferreds are: RY.PR.A, RY.PR.B, RY.PR.C, RY.PR.D, RY.PR.E, RY.PR.F, RY.PR.G, RY.PR.H, RY.PR.I, RY.PR.J, RY.PR.K, RY.PR.L, RY.PR.M, RY.PR.N, RY.PR.O, RY.PR.P, RY.PR.Q, RY.PR.R, RY.PR.W and RY.PR.Z.

Market Action

July 31, 2017

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5341 % 2,419.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5341 % 4,439.9
Floater 3.58 % 3.61 % 126,016 18.25 3 0.5341 % 2,558.7
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0785 % 3,059.9
SplitShare 4.70 % 4.43 % 52,351 1.39 5 0.0785 % 3,654.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0785 % 2,851.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.38 % 4.75 % 62,349 5.96 21 0.0699 % 2,779.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.29 % 79,132 14.96 15 -0.1300 % 2,922.9
FixedReset 4.32 % 4.43 % 177,007 6.34 98 -0.0226 % 2,411.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 5.39 % 114,459 6.11 30 -0.0859 % 2,860.6
FloatingReset 2.60 % 2.94 % 40,866 4.26 10 0.1079 % 2,644.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IFC.PR.C FixedReset -1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-31
Maturity Price : 15.61
Evaluated at bid price : 15.61
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
NA.PR.W FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-31
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 33,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-31
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
TD.PF.I FixedReset 31,081 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset 28,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-31
Maturity Price : 23.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BMO.PR.D FixedReset 23,625 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 20,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
CM.PR.R FixedReset 19,930 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
There were 9 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset Quote: 15.60 – 17.00
Spot Rate : 1.4000
Average : 0.8685

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-31
Maturity Price : 15.60
Evaluated at bid price : 15.60
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.11 – 22.78
Spot Rate : 0.6700
Average : 0.4427

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %

IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 23.21 – 23.74
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3494

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.21
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 23.74 – 24.25
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3537

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.74
Bid-YTW : 4.90 %

BMO.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2045

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

CCS.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.60 – 23.95
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2058

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %

Market Action

July 19, 2017

Matt Levine of Bloomberg passes on the latest legal wrinkle in the CDS field:

And when a bank needs rescuing, holders of its most senior stuff — the deposits, the secured debt — tend to be fully and seamlessly made whole, while holders of its most junior stuff — common stock, AT1 capital securities — tend to get instantaneously zeroed.

But in modern legal systems there is a problem with these hierarchies, which is that everyone who buys a junior claim on a bank and then sees that claim wiped out also automatically gets a lawsuit. If your junior claim is wiped out, you can sue someone — probably the bank, or whoever acquired the bank — claiming that your junior claim was wiped out unfairly: The proper procedures weren’t followed, or the bank wasn’t really insolvent when it was rescued, or it was really insolvent much earlier and its disclosures were wrong, or you were tricked into buying the junior claim by misrepresentations about its safety, or whatever. And you sue, and if you win, you have a senior claim: When a company loses a lawsuit, it actually has to pay up, making that claim unlike junior capital securities with perpetual maturity and long deferral periods.

This is just sort of weird. Here is a story about how Banco Popular Espanol SA’s credit default swaps are a mess, which is a small symptom of that larger weirdness:

Credit derivatives written against the failed Spanish lender’s junior debt were triggered in a matter of days and, given that these bonds were now worthless, it seemed self-evident to many that owners of the CDS would get paid in full.

But now a row has broken out over whether the potential value of legal claims bondholders are pursuing over Banco Popular’s collapse should be considered when determining any compensation, clouding the first payout on credit derivatives linked to a European bank since the rules were rewritten to iron out major flaws in 2014.

Lazy balance sheets at US utilities have been a point of corporate interest for well over a year now:

Led by massive acquisitions from pipeline companies Enbridge and TransCanada, six domestic businesses spent approximately $87-billion in the past 12 months snapping up U.S. firms.

Why are the Canadians suddenly stepping up? And can domestic CEOs in other sectors, all of whom aspire to grow internationally, steal a page from the utilities?

On the first question, the starting point for takeovers is this concept of lazy balance sheets south of the border. Executives at capital-hungry companies such as utilities are always conscious of their credit ratings. This is especially true of CEOs and boards at U.S. pipelines: Enron’s meltdown and the near-death experience of the global financial crisis made top-notch ratings a priority. As a result, many U.S. utilities carry relatively little debt. That’s “lazy” in the sense that the company could easily borrow more money, while continuing to be judged as investment grade by the likes of S&P and Moody’s.

While utility executives might care about ratings, the credit market stopped paying much attention last year. In the spring of 2016, borrowing costs began to fall for any investment grade-rated company. At the same time, the spread or gap narrowed between the interest rates paid by a blue-chip double-A-rated borrower and a still-respectable but more leveraged triple B-rated business. And credit markets opened up – massive loans and bond sales were possible.

And so today we learned:

Ontario utility Hydro One Ltd. moved into the U.S. natural gas and electrical transmission business Wednesday by acquiring Washington-based Avista Corp. for $4.4-billion.

Toronto-based Hydro One, which was privatized by the Ontario government in 2015, is making its first foray outside the province by buying a utility that supplies electricity to 379,000 customers and gas to 342,000 clients across five western U.S. states. Hydro One has 1.3 million customers in Ontario.

Hydro One is the latest in a series of Canadian utilities to acquire an American rival, with six domestic companies collectively committing $87-billion to U.S. takeovers over the past 18 months.

But S&P was not impressed:

  • •On July 19, 2017, Toronto-based Hydro One Ltd. (HOL) announced the C$6.7 billion (US$5.3 billion) proposed acquisition of Avista Corp., a U.S.-based electricity and gas utility.
  • •We are revising our outlook on HOL and subsidiary Hydro One Inc. (HOI) to negative from stable.
  • •We are also affirming our ratings on HOL and HOI, including our ‘A’ long-term corporate credit rating on both.
  • •The outlook revision reflects the shift in HOL’s business strategy, as well as the slightly weakened business risk from the acquisition


Historically, HOL’s focus on Ontario provided the company with incremental business strength based on a favorable market position, regulation, and operational history. With the Avista acquisition, we believe HOL’s business risk has eroded slightly. Furthermore, the additional leverage that the transaction introduces also eroded HOL’s credit metrics and financial risk.

The negative outlook on HOL reflects our view that the Avista acquisition signals a shift in HOL’s business strategy, which will align the company with its global peers removing the historical rationale for a one-notch rating uplift. The negative outlook also reflects the execution and financing risk inherent in any large acquisition. We recognize that the use of the convertible debentures will create a temporary impact on credit metrics, with AFFO-to-debt forecast at about 9% until conversion. However, we expect the debentures will be converted to equity in full.

As as for Avista:

  • •Toronto, Ontario-based utility Hydro One Ltd. (HOL) has entered into an agreement to acquire U.S.-based Avista Corp. (Avista) for C$6.7 billion in an all-cash transaction.
  • •We are affirming our ratings on Avista, including the ‘BBB’ issuer credit rating, and revising the outlook to positive from stable.
  • •The positive outlook reflects the potential for higher ratings on Avista if the acquisition is completed as proposed.


S&P Global Ratings today said it affirmed its ratings, including the ‘BBB’ issuer credit rating, on Avista Corp. and revised the outlook to positive from stable.

The outlook revision on Avista reflects the potential for higher ratings upon the completion of the acquisition by Hydro One Ltd. (HOL). Post-acquisition, we will view Avista as a highly strategic subsidiary of HOL. Our assessment is based on our view that Avista will be an important member of the HOL group, highly unlikely to be sold, and integral to overall group strategy and operations. Avista will be a significant cash flow contributor to the group, making up about 22% of consolidated EBITDA.

So Avista is already BBB, but according to their 2016 Annual Report, about $1.2-billion of their $1.6-billion total long-term debt matures in and after 2022 and carries an average interest rate of 5.09%, compared to an average coupon of 5.2% on US long term corporates. Maybe it’s Hydro 1 that should be regarded as having the lazy balance sheet, if this is an issue in this acquisition!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.28%, equivalent to 6.86% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield a little more than 3.80%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 305bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) widening from the 300bp reported July 12.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.2959 % 2,469.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 3.2959 % 4,532.2
Floater 3.50 % 3.52 % 108,289 18.48 3 3.2959 % 2,611.9
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1484 % 3,074.8
SplitShare 4.68 % 4.07 % 56,884 1.42 5 0.1484 % 3,671.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1484 % 2,865.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.38 % 4.75 % 70,290 6.11 21 0.1625 % 2,772.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.28 % 86,657 15.02 15 0.3805 % 2,921.5
FixedReset 4.32 % 4.31 % 183,149 6.40 98 0.1931 % 2,403.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 5.43 % 118,120 6.15 30 0.3254 % 2,851.9
FloatingReset 2.59 % 2.95 % 43,114 4.29 10 0.1988 % 2,632.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BIP.PR.A FixedReset -1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.69
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
GWO.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
GWO.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.17
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 16.70
Evaluated at bid price : 16.70
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 22.57
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %
TRP.PR.H FloatingReset 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 15.27
Evaluated at bid price : 15.27
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 15.85
Evaluated at bid price : 15.85
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
MFC.PR.M FixedReset 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.33
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 3.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 14.76
Evaluated at bid price : 14.76
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 3.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 14.68
Evaluated at bid price : 14.68
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 3.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 14.75
Evaluated at bid price : 14.75
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.R FixedReset 553,775 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 134,714 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.97
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BNS.PR.E FixedReset 122,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
TRP.PR.J FixedReset 121,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
TD.PF.G FixedReset 90,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.68
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
TD.PF.I FixedReset 86,431 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.75 – 24.20
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2911

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 23.27
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 23.12 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2698

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.12
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

TD.PF.D FixedReset Quote: 23.70 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1987

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %

MFC.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 22.01 – 22.35
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2438

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.63 – 21.87
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 21.36
Evaluated at bid price : 21.63
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

BIP.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.78 – 24.00
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1502

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-19
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %

Market Action

July 28, 2017

I’m always happy when somebody agrees with me:

The report, released Thursday by the School of Public Policy at the University of Calgary1 and authored by Henri-Paul Rousseau, examines the option of banning embedded sales commissions for Canadian financial advisers and the broader, public-interest issues arising from such a ban.

According to Mr. Rousseau, the ban on these commissions would create a number of public policy issues. Firstly, it would likely create an advice gap in Canada, due to households being averse to paying up front for an advice fee. Secondly, it will likely cause a loss of choice for Canadians who have varying needs and preferences. The report says that smaller and independent product manufacturers and distributors would be squeezed out, creating a market concentration in the hands of the bigger financial-advice players, as well as a loss in pricing transparency for clients.

The full report is titled WHY BANNING EMBEDDED SALES COMMISSIONS IS A PUBLIC POLICY ISSUE: A commentary adapted from notes for the concluding panel of “The New Paradigm of Financial Advice” conference, held in Toronto on March 31, 2017:

The U.K. provides an example which should not be followed. Regulators there have banned embedded commissions, forcing clients to pay directly for financial advice. The result is that modest-income clients have decided not to seek financial advice, even though that decision will likely negatively affect their portfolios.

The dangers of this “advice gap” are being downplayed by those who believe that robo-advisors and banks can fill the need instead. In fact, robo-advisors and banks are mostly not equipped to step into the gamma role of coaching their clients.

A ban would also mean less choice in the market for a service that needs to be competitive and innovative to serve the broad spectrum of clients’ circumstances, risk appetites and needs. In addition, smaller and independent product manufacturers and distributors would be squeezed out, creating a market concentration in the hands of
the bigger players.

The second paragraph quoted above is incomplete, it seems to me, with respect to the role of robo-advisors. That channel seems best suited for ‘those who know not and know that they know not’. Those are the guys who earnestly seek out an advisor and are greatly impressed when he repeats that morning’s headlines from the Wall Street Journal, together with commentary on what “Janet” and “Stephen” are going to do with “interest rates” in the next six months, but they’re not really all that interested. ‘Get me invested and don’t bother me’ is their motto and a robo-advisor can scratch that itch really well.

The problem is with ‘those who know not and know not that they know not’. These are the people with a profound disinterest in financial markets. They’re the people who, unless they happen to know somebody in the business, will go to the bank and ask for something “safe”, so the friendly banker will put them into a grossly unsuitable portfolio of GICs that are immensely profitable for the bank. What we should want, as a matter of public policy, is for them to know that Charlie down at the club ‘does something with stocks and bonds’, so they go to Charlie. I will agree that Charlie is probably not the greatest advisor around, but he knows more than a bank teller and has access to a wider range of investments. Sure, he takes his half-point cut on the deal. It’s worth it. Not because his advice, considered objectively, is so wonderful, but because his advice has given his new clients confidence and because – in most, although certainly not all, cases – the portfolio his clients end up with is reasonable. Not great, not particularly cheap, but reasonable.

Banks? My attention was drawn recently to the RBC Managed Payout Solution. My God. How can anybody offer up that marketing strategy without blushing? I just about had a coronary.

So maybe the economy’s not so good:

Employers created an average of 11,000 new jobs a month for the first five months of the year, according to Statistics Canada’s Survey of Employment, Payrolls and Hours (SEPH) for May, released on Thursday.

The weak jobs data suggest that “paid employment creation so far this year is the worst since the 2009 recession,” said Krishen Rangasamy, senior economist with National Bank of Canada.

The payroll survey results stand in sharp contrast to Statscan’s other labour report, the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which has exceeded expectations for months and paints a much rosier picture of the country’s job market. The difference in the numbers reported by the two employment surveys is not unusual because the SEPH report is based on payroll data from Canada Revenue Agency, while the LFS relies on people providing information about their wages and job status to data collectors. The SEPH numbers are considered more reliable; the labour force survey is volatile and not as dependable given that it has a huge margin of error.

LIBOR is on its way out:

The U.K. Financial Conduct Authority will phase out the key interest-rate indicator by the end of 2021 after it became clear there wasn’t enough meaningful data to sustain the benchmark that underpins more than $350 trillion in securities, Andrew Bailey, the head of the regulator, said in a speech Thursday at Bloomberg’s London office.

But the 58-year-old Bailey said the market supporting Libor — where banks provide each other with unsecured lending — was no longer “sufficiently active” to determine a reliable rate and alternatives must be found. For one currency and lending period there were only 15 transactions in 2016, he said.

The FCA only started regulating Libor in 2013, the same year legislation was passed making it a criminal offense to take any misleading action in relation to financial benchmarks.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5083 % 2,406.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5083 % 4,416.3
Floater 3.60 % 3.63 % 127,190 18.23 3 -0.5083 % 2,545.1
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0864 % 3,057.5
SplitShare 4.71 % 4.43 % 52,317 3.78 5 0.0864 % 3,651.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0864 % 2,848.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.39 % 4.71 % 63,188 6.09 21 -0.0278 % 2,777.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.25 % 80,086 14.97 15 0.0607 % 2,926.7
FixedReset 4.32 % 4.32 % 179,116 6.38 98 0.1529 % 2,412.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.07 % 5.42 % 118,276 6.12 30 -0.0595 % 2,863.0
FloatingReset 2.54 % 2.89 % 42,339 4.27 10 -0.1573 % 2,641.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.75
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.99
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
IAG.PR.G FixedReset 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.24
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 269,117 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.19
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 166,736 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 128,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset 117,621 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
NA.PR.X FixedReset 111,178 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.74
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
RY.PR.Q FixedReset 109,410 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-05-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.64
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.W FixedReset Quote: 21.64 – 22.05
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.64
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %

BAM.PF.I FixedReset Quote: 25.75 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1441

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2022-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.15 – 22.47
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2318

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 21.74
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %

BAM.PF.F FixedReset Quote: 23.87 – 24.27
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3172

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.87
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %

POW.PR.G Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.24 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1716

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2047-07-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 17.23 – 17.60
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2926

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.23
Bid-YTW : 8.15 %

New Issues

New Issue: CPX FixedReset, 5.75%+412M575

Capital Power Corporation has announced:

that it will issue 5,000,000 Cumulative Minimum Rate Reset Preference Shares, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per Series 9 Share (the “Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $125 million on a bought deal basis with a syndicate of underwriters, co-led by TD Securities Inc. and National Bank Financial Inc. In addition, Capital Power has granted the underwriters an option, exercisable in whole or in part anytime up to two business days prior to closing, to purchase up to an additional 1,000,000 Series 9 Shares on the same terms, for additional gross proceeds of up to $25 million.

The Series 9 Shares will pay fixed cumulative dividends of $1.4375 per share per annum, yielding 5.75% per annum, payable on the last business day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of directors of Capital Power, for the initial period ending September 30, 2022. Assuming an issue date of August 9, 2017, the first quarterly dividend of $0.2048 per share is expected to be paid on September 29, 2017. The dividend rate will be reset on September 30, 2022 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and 4.12%, provided that, in any event, such rate shall not be less than 5.75%. The Series 9 Shares are redeemable by Capital Power, at its option, on September 30, 2022 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series 9 Shares will have the right to convert all or any part of their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preference Shares, Series 10 (the “Series 10 Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2022 and every five years thereafter. Holders of Series 10 Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly floating dividend at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 4.12%, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Capital Power.

Net proceeds of the offering will be used to reduce indebtedness under Capital Power’s credit facilities.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services, a business unit of S&P Global Canada Corp., has assigned a provisional rating of P-3 for the Series 9 Shares and DBRS Limited has assigned a preliminary rating of Pfd-3 (low) for the Series 9 Shares.

The Series 9 Shares will be issued pursuant to a prospectus supplement to Capital Power’s short form base shelf prospectus dated May 3, 2016. The prospectus supplement will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in all provinces and territories in Canada. The Offering is subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory and stock exchange approvals.

They have also announced:

On July 25, 2017, the Company’s Board of Directors approved an increase of 7.1% in the annual dividend for holders of its common shares, from $1.56 per common share to $1.67 per common share. This increased common dividend will commence with the third quarter 2017 quarterly dividend payment on October 31, 2017 to shareholders of record at the close of business on September 29, 2017.

The new issue is extraordinarily expensive, according to Implied Volatility analysis:

impvol_cpx_170727
Click for Big

It’s a standard trick, but it never gets old! Set the yield of your new issue in accordance with the yield of lower-priced instruments … which will almost always have lower yields due to their lower call risk. The theoretical price of the new issue, according to this analysis, is 23.65.