Market Action

July 15, 2013

Are the bond vigilantes hanging up their spurs?

U.S. fixed-income mutual funds attracted investor deposits last week, rebounding from redemptions spurred by speculation that the Federal Reserve would scale back its unprecedented stimulus, while bond exchange-traded funds had withdrawals.

Investors put $219 million into U.S. taxable-bond mutual funds while pulling $456 million from bond ETFs in the week ended July 10, Denver-based research firm Lipper said yesterday in an e-mailed statement. They deposited more than $3 billion in bond mutual funds and ETFs combined during the week ended July 3, the first week of net deposits in five weeks. U.S. bond funds had withdrawals of $23.7 billion in the four weeks ended June 26, the most since October 2008, Lipper said.

“Taxable-bond fund investors were of two minds,” Lipper said in the statement. “Neither amount reflected a strong opinion on bonds.”

It’s always nice to see big banks hurt by negative convexity:

JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM). Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon warned investors that higher interest rates could lead to a “dramatic reduction” in the bank’s profits by eroding demand for mortgage refinancing.

The surge in 30-year home-loan rates to 4.46 percent at the end of June from 3.51 percent in mid-May caused second-quarter mortgage-fee revenue to decline 20 percent, the New York-based bank reported today. Refinancing volume could fall as much as 40 percent in the second half if rates remain elevated, Chief Financial Officer Marianne Lake told analysts on a call today.

Refinancings, which accounted for 76 percent of the industry’s $1.75 trillion in loan originations last year, slumped after 30-year rates surged in May and June, data compiled by Freddie Mac show. Applications to refinance loans fell 42 percent across the industry from May 17 to July 5, according to Joel Kan, an economist at the Mortgage Bankers Association, a Washington-based trade group.

Fortunately for Canadian banks, there is no real competition in Canada so we don’t have thirty-year open mortgages.

Electrical Engineering Professor Reza Iravani of the University of Toronto has come up with a a revolutionary idea for electricity delivery in Toronto:

“The delivery system has to be reinforced so even if you lose a station, the rest of the system can maintain operation without a major blackout,” he said.

Amazing. A system with some redundancy to make it more robust to single-point failure. Give the man a Nobel Prize – and, while you’re at it, a consulting contract to help the Bank of Canada with their Centralized Counterparty idea.

Investors in US Municipals have another thing to worry about:

Detroit bondholders may have a new worry after a judge ruled that Jefferson County, Alabama, could have paid legal bills for its bankruptcy from cash that was going to pay warrant holders owed $3 billion.

The ruling should concern bond investors whose revenue was previously protected from use by municipalities, said R. Dale Ginter, a bankruptcy lawyer at Downey Brand LLP in Sacramento, California. It may force those bondholders to reconsider waging an extensive legal fight to protect their interests, said Ginter, who represented retirees in the bankruptcy of Vallejo, California.

The ruling could apply to any municipal bankruptcy with debt being paid by pledged revenues such as parking fees, airport lease payments or water and sewer charges, Ginter said. Detroit is in talks to get bondholders and current and former city workers to accept $2 billion in exchange for wiping out the $11.5 billion they may be owed. Kevyn Orr, Detroit’s emergency financial manager, said he may put the city into bankruptcy if they can’t strike a deal.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 20bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. Volatility was lower than normal – especially when compared with recent times – but what there was was all positive. Volume was a little below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2336 % 2,580.6
FixedFloater 4.20 % 3.49 % 41,381 18.43 1 0.4889 % 3,952.1
Floater 2.72 % 2.91 % 86,966 19.96 4 0.2336 % 2,786.4
OpRet 4.60 % 2.27 % 73,962 0.70 3 -0.0895 % 2,620.1
SplitShare 4.66 % 4.47 % 66,412 3.93 6 0.0217 % 2,971.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0895 % 2,395.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.60 % 4.11 % 99,741 0.78 12 0.0726 % 2,292.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.33 % 5.34 % 138,163 14.81 26 0.2034 % 2,414.4
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.41 % 232,126 3.56 83 -0.0233 % 2,485.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.49 % 187,830 7.00 43 -0.0009 % 2,393.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.23
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 105,100 RBC crossed 103,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-14
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 2.53 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 65,010 Scotia crossed 56,000 at 22.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset 61,028 National bought 34,500 from Scotia at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 45,804 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.73.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 44,285 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 35,542 Scotia crossed 24,800 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.70 – 26.23
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3718

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.75 – 23.20
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2929

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.61 – 23.23
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.4981

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.61
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.15 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2191

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.25 – 25.48
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1695

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %

TD.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 25.90 – 26.04
Spot Rate : 0.1400
Average : 0.0809

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 2.48 %

Issue Comments

DBRS Puts WN on Review-Developing

DBRS has announced that it:

has today placed the ratings of George Weston Limited (GWL or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications.

The action on GWL’s ratings is directly related to DBRS’s review of the ratings of Loblaw Companies Limited (Loblaw; see separate press release), which follows Loblaw’s announcement of an offer to acquire the shares of Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation (Shoppers) for $12.4 billion and the assumption of approximately $1 billion of debt (the Transaction).

The proposed financing, including GWL’s $500 million investment in Loblaw, would effectively reduce GWL’s voting ownership of Loblaw to approximately 46% from 63% at the end of F2012. That said, GWL intends to subsequently increase its ownership in Loblaw going forward.

GWL’s ratings reflect its holding in Loblaw and the Company’s own strong bakery brands and efficient operations, balanced by a continuing volatile input cost environment and the mature nature of the bakery industry.

DBRS will resolve its review of GWL at the same time as its review on Loblaw’s ratings. Should Loblaw’s ratings be confirmed or downgraded, similar rating action would likely follow for GWL. Any positive rating action for Loblaw in the medium to longer term would not necessarily result in the same for GWL.

The bid for Shoppers was reported this morning.

Weston has four preferred share issues outstanding, WN.PR.A, WN.PR.C, WN.PR.D and WN.PR.E, all Straight Perpetuals.

Issue Comments

DBRS Places L Under Review-Developing

DBRS has announced that it:

has today placed all ratings of Loblaw Companies Limited (Loblaw or the Company) Under Review with Developing Implications following the Company’s announcement of an offer to acquire the shares of Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation (Shoppers; see separate press release) for $12.4 billion and the assumption of approximately $1 billion of debt (the Transaction). The closing of the Transaction is subject to the approval of the shareholders of Shoppers and Loblaw, which is expected in September 2013.

The consideration offered for the equity consists of up to $6.7 billion in cash and up to 119.9 million Loblaw shares. The Transaction is expected to be financed through the combination of: (1) approximately $1.6 billion of cash, (2) $5.1 billion of fully committed bank facilities (including a $1.6 billion bridge loan), and (3) a subscription of $500 million additional Loblaw common shares from George Weston Limited (Weston).

On a pro forma basis, the combined company generated over $42 billion in revenue, $3 billion in EBITDA, and $1 billion in free cash flow. DBRS expects Loblaw to realize significant synergies by leveraging the strengths of both organizations, including the private label and loyalty programs, supply chain, and marketing. The Company believes it can achieve annual cost synergies of $300 million by year three. DBRS notes that these synergies are not dependent on any store closings.

Loblaw intends to operate Shoppers as a separate operating division. The Acquisition will increase Loblaw’s scale and improve its position in the growing health and wellness space in Canada.

The Developing Implications of the Under Review status reflects DBRS’s view that Loblaw’s business profile should benefit from increased scale, more diverse product offering, and potential synergies, which combined with the Company’s intended deleveraging plan, should largely offset the risks associated with the initial increase in financial leverage.

In its review, DBRS will focus on: (1) assessing the business risk profile of the combined entity as well as the risks associated with integration and realization of synergy potential, (2) Loblaw’s financial risk profile on a pro forma basis, including free cash flow generating capacity of the combined entity, a key indicator in the Company’s ability to reduce financial leverage within a reasonable time frame, and (3) the Company’s longer-term business strategy and financial management intentions.

Should the transaction close according to the proposed terms and provided that DBRS gains comfort with the Company’s ability and willingness to de-lever such that lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR is below 3.50 times within 18 to 24 months, the ratings would likely be confirmed. DBRS will proceed with its review as more information becomes available and aims to resolve the Under Review status by the closing of the transaction.

The bid for Shoppers was announced this morning.

Loblaws has a single preferred share issue outstanding, L.PR.A, an OperatingRetractible.

Update, 2013-7-17: DBRS has announced a correction:

In terms of placing the ratings of Loblaw Companies Limited Under Review with Developing Implications yesterday, DBRS would like to clarify that the calculation of the lease-adjusted debt-to-EBITDAR ratio excludes Loblaw’s Financial Services division; that is, it would be adjusted to exclude PC Bank securitization and GICs. The complete text of the revised press release follows.

PrefLetter

July PrefLetter Released!

The July, 2013, revised edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2013, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2013, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Issue Comments

Fitch Maintains Negative Outlook on SLF

Fitch Ratings has announced (on July 2):

The Negative Outlook reflects the historical volatility in SLF’s earnings and the possibility it may continue at run-rate operating earnings and debt service that is not supportive of the current rating level.

Fitch believes SLF’s ability to improve its run-rate operating earnings will depend in part on how the company deploys the proceeds from the pending sale of Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.) and Sun Life Insurance & Annuity Co. of New York to Delaware Life Holdings, a company owned by shareholders of Guggenheim Partners. The two Sun Life companies contain SLF’s U.S. variable annuity (VA) and certain life insurance businesses which have in recent history been a drag on overall earnings and a significant consumer of capital. The sale has been delayed due to regulatory review but Fitch expects it will be successfully completed.

The IFS ratings of SLF’s U.S. life subsidiaries remain on Rating Watch Negative. Resolution of the Rating Watch will occur following further discussions with management and completion of the sale, and will likely result in a downgrade of the IFS ratings by at least one notch. Absent discussions with Guggenheim Partners, the ratings will be withdrawn. Assuming no material changes to the credit of the entities involved Fitch may not comment further until completion of the sale.

The key rating triggers that could result in a downgrade include:
–Failure to complete the sale of the company’s run-off U.S. operations;
–A decline in adjusted fixed-charge coverage, excluding equity market and interest rate impacts below 6x;
–A sustained drop in the company’s risk-adjusted capital position with no plans or ability to rectify; this would include the MCCSR ratio falling below 200%;
–An increase in financial leverage to over 25%;
–A large acquisition that involves execution and integration risk or impacts the company’s leverage and capitalization.

The key rating triggers that could result in a return to a Stable Outlook include:
–Completion of the sale of run-off U.S. operations;
–Consistent maintenance of adjusted fixed-charge coverage, excluding equity market and interest rate impacts, of over 6x.

SLF has numerous preferred share issues outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E (all DeemedRetractible) and SLF.PR.F, SLF.PR.G, SLF.PR.H and SLF.PR.I (all FixedReset).

Issue Comments

DGS.PR.A Annual Report 2012

Dividend Growth Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to December 31, 2012.

DGS / DGS.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Whole Unit +13.2% +7.8%
DGS.PR.A +5.4% +5.4%
DGS +26.3% +11.4%
S&P/TSX Composite Index +7.2% +4.8%

I think a dividend-tilting index would have been a more appropriate benchmark for this fund than the Composite, but we’ll let that go.

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.06% of the whole unit value

Average Net Assets: The Net Asset Value at year end was $106.7-million, compared to $104.7-million a year prior, so call it an average of $105.7-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends and interest received of $4.77-million divided by average net assets of $105.7-million is 4.5%.

Income Coverage: Dividends and Securities Lending Income of $4.77-million less expenses of $1.11-million is $3.66-million, to cover preferred dividends of $3.35-million is 109%.

Market Action

July 12, 2013

Nothing happened today.

It was another day of solid recovery for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 26bp, FixedResets gaining 10bp and DeemedRetractibles up 15bp. The Performance Highlights table is suitably bulky, comprised entirely of winners. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3909 % 2,574.6
FixedFloater 4.22 % 3.50 % 41,237 18.40 1 1.1236 % 3,932.8
Floater 2.73 % 2.93 % 86,335 19.93 4 0.3909 % 2,779.9
OpRet 4.60 % 1.79 % 75,091 0.71 3 0.2049 % 2,622.4
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.14 % 67,124 3.94 6 0.0383 % 2,970.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2049 % 2,397.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.60 % 4.06 % 100,281 0.78 12 0.2813 % 2,290.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.35 % 5.25 % 139,247 14.78 26 0.2609 % 2,409.5
FixedReset 4.95 % 3.40 % 235,243 3.58 83 0.1004 % 2,486.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.04 % 4.50 % 185,094 6.91 43 0.1558 % 2,393.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 4.98 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.47 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 79,800 TD crossed 49,500 at 24.75; National crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 52,750 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 45,721 TD crossed 30,300 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 43,983 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset 40,680 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 36,325 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.50 – 22.95
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3645

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 22.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 24.51 – 24.96
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3676

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %

RY.PR.W Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.05 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1242

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 24.79
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %

MFC.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.98 – 26.20
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1479

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.98
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.60 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.3184

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.25 – 25.50
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1853

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %

Indices and ETFs

TXPR & TXPL Quarterly Revision

S&P Dow Jones Indices Canadian Index Operations has announced:

the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P/TSX Venture Select Index Reviews. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 22, 2013

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index

ADDITIONS

Symbol Issue Name

CUSIP
BAM.PF.D BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 37 112585 56 7
BAM.PR.J BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 12 112585 88 0
BAM.PR.M BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 17 112585 83 1
BAM.PR.R BROOKFIELD ASSET MANAGEMNT INC CL A PR SER 24 112585 74 0
BCE.PR.G BCE INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘AG’ 05534B 73 7
BNS.PR.A BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) PR SERIES ’19’ 064149 73 5
BRF.PR.A BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PWR PREF EQTY INC A PR 1 11283Q 20 6
BRF.PR.F BROOKFIELD RENEWABLE PWR PREF EQTY INC A PR 6 11283Q 70 1
CM.PR.M CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK SERIES ’37’ PR 136069 46 5
CU.PR.G CANADIAN UTILITIES LIMITED 2ND PR SER ‘DD’ 136717 64 2
EMA.PR.E EMERA INC. PR SERIES ‘E’ 290876 70 5
ENB.PR.Y ENBRIDGE INC. PR SER ‘3’ 29250N 68 3
GWO.PR.G GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC. 5.20% 1ST PR SERIES G 39138C 88 2
GWO.PR.M GREAT-WEST LIFECO INC. 5.80% 1ST PR SERIES M 39138C 81 7
MFC.PR.K MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’13’ 56501R 74 2
NPI.PR.A NORTHLAND POWER INC. SERIES 1 PR 666511 30 8
PWF.PR.O POWER FINANCIAL CORP. 5.80% SERIES ‘O’ 1ST PR 73927C 78 7
RY.PR.D ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1ST PR NON-CUM SER ‘AD’ 780102 84 4
TD.PR.P TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE) CL ‘A’ 1ST PR P 891145 20 3
TD.PR.Q TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (THE) CL ‘A’ 1ST PR Q 891145 30 2

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index

ADDITIONS

Symbol Issue Name

CUSIP
MFC.PR.K MANULIFE FINANCIAL CORP. CL 1 PR SER ’13’ 56501R 74 2

Market Action

July 11, 2013

Sorry this is so late, folks! Summertime and the living is easy!

More Fed-watching!

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke called for maintaining accommodation even as the minutes of policy makers’ June meeting showed them debating whether to stop bond buying by the Fed in 2013.

“Highly accommodative monetary policy for the foreseeable future is what’s needed in the U.S. economy,” Bernanke said yesterday in response to a question after a speech in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Fed chairman spoke just three hours after the central bank released minutes of the June 18-19 gathering showing that about half of the 19 participants in the Federal Open Market Committee wanted to halt $85 billion in monthly bond purchases by year end. At the same time, the minutes showed many Fed officials wanted to see more signs employment is improving before backing a trim to bond purchases known as quantitative easing.

The debate underscores Bernanke’s challenge in affirming that, even after starting to reduce monthly bond buying, policy makers plan to maintain unprecedented stimulus with a record-high balance sheet and near-zero target interest rate.

The persecution of Fabulous Fab for doing his job is entering a new stage:

After the allegations, he kept his head down. He testified succinctly before Congress, left his job to enroll in a doctoral program, and popped up in Africa doing charity work.

This is the new Fabrice Tourre who will walk into Manhattan federal court July 15.

In 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission sued New York-based Goldman Sachs and Tourre for fraud for concealing the role of the hedge fund Paulson & Co., founded by billionaire John Paulson, in selecting the assets inside the Abacus portfolio — assets Paulson wanted to fail.

Goldman Sachs paid a then-record $550 million fine to settle the allegations. Tourre chose to fight them. U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest, who will oversee the trial, summed up the SEC’s case like this: “Tourre handed Little Red Riding Hood an invitation to grandmother’s house while concealing the fact that it was written by the Big Bad Wolf.”

Tourre’s court date threatens to undo some of the progress Goldman Sachs has made in rehabilitating its image. In the lead-up to his trial, the bank and its former employee have exhibited an awkward arm’s-length relationship. Goldman Sachs is paying for Tourre’s defense and for the use of a sophisticated public-relations team from Sard Verbinnen & Co., but the bank is limited by the terms of its SEC settlement in what it can say publicly about the Abacus deal.

“This is so clearly a case of scapegoating,” said Dennis Kelleher, CEO of Better Markets, an advocacy group that has lobbied for the overhaul of financial regulations. “It’s one of the most egregious misuses of SEC power I’ve ever seen.”

If he loses – and he could go to jail over this – one lesson must be learned by all fund sponsors: it must be stated in the offering materials, in big bright red letters, that all the assets of the fund were bought from somebody else. Somebody who will not, presumably, be too upset if they subsequently decline in value.

As an aside, the HR departments are taking over:

Valerie Thompson went from a childhood hawking fish, fruit and vegetables in London’s run-down East End to a Eurobond star at Salomon Brothers Inc. when it was the world’s biggest trading firm. Like the successful trader she was, she got out at the top.

Eurobonds, international securities with untaxed interest payments, were only a decade old in 1973 when Thompson, who left school at age 15, landed a clerical job typing orders into a telex machine. She prospered as the market surged and was running new-issue strategy and managing the risk generated on London’s biggest bond trading floor when she left, just before the 1987 stock crash and as market returns began to diminish.

For all her acumen, Thompson, 57, says someone with her background couldn’t get a job in today’s financial industry.
“They closed the door,” she said in a lunchtime interview at Coya, the Peruvian restaurant on London’s Piccadilly, last month. “And they said, ‘You know what? To work in the City now you need three degrees.’ I find it downright wrong.”

When I got into this industry in 1986, I was working for Merrill Lynch as a temp; I applied for one of the posted jobs. HR told me they weren’t hiring … a chemistry degree? Why would we hire somebody with a chemistry degree? I don’t see any beakers around here, do you, Edna? My manager kicked ass and I got a new call offering me my pick of all the jobs in operations.

Tim Kiladze of the Globe has a very good article on the Canadian implications of the Basel 3 leverage ratio, titled How Canada’s banks benefit from OSFI’s leverage ratio:

While that might be a problem outside Canada, the Big Six argue that they already comply with OSFI’s asset-to-capital multiple, which limits a bank’s assets to 20 times their capital. Reverse that equation, and you get a 5-per-cent leverage ratio.

In other words, they should already exceed the coming 3-per-cent minimum, and even would be close to the 5- and 6-per-cent levels the U.S. just proposed for its own banks, depending on their size.

But it isn’t that easy. The way OSFI calculates leverage and capital differs from the new Basel standards. If you update OSFI’s model to abide by the new rules, our banks aren’t as well off.

The key difference, according to analyst Brad Smith at Stonecap Securities, is rooted in how you classify capital. Under OSFI’s model, Tier 1 and Tier 11 capital are included, whereas the Basel model has much stricter definitions. (Explaining these nuances gets incredibly wonky, but the main message is that OSFI is more lenient.)

By including Tier 2 capital, OSFI offers the Big Six a 26-per-cent leverage benefit – meaning their total capital jumps to $178-billion from just $141-billion of straightforward Tier 1 capital.

Mr. Smith also noted that OSFI’s calculation strips $167-billion of estimated securitized mortgages out of the Big Six’s asset exposure, lowering their asset total.

Removes these benefits and Mr. Smith calculates that Canadian banks would still meet the new Basel leverage requirements, but “fall well below” the proposed U.S. measure.

In order to meet a 5-per-cent minimum, “domestic banks would either have to reduce on-balance sheet exposure by over $700-billion (20 per cent) or add additional Tier 1 capital of approximately $35-billion even before considering the impact of off-balance sheet exposure levels,” Mr. Smith noted.

It may actually be worse than that. As I frequently complain, OSFI can boost the allowable leverage to 23x, and neither OSFI nor the bank benefitting has to give any explanation at all for the increased ceiling. I suspect it’s all just arranged over a friendly lunch.

A very nice day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 59bp, FixedResets gaining 9bp and DeemedRetractibles up 19bp. The Performance Highlights table is comprised entirely of winners, dominated by PerpetualDiscounts and PerpetualPremiums. Volume was above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1044 % 2,564.6
FixedFloater 4.27 % 3.55 % 41,853 18.31 1 0.2117 % 3,889.1
Floater 2.74 % 2.92 % 86,387 19.94 4 0.1044 % 2,769.1
OpRet 4.61 % 2.04 % 74,273 0.71 3 0.0335 % 2,617.1
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.33 % 69,829 3.95 6 0.0042 % 2,969.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0335 % 2,393.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.62 % 4.30 % 101,098 0.79 12 0.2721 % 2,283.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.36 % 5.35 % 140,889 14.77 26 0.5984 % 2,403.2
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.48 % 236,060 3.57 83 0.0929 % 2,483.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.05 % 4.52 % 187,306 7.03 43 0.1937 % 2,389.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 23.54
Bid-YTW : 5.26 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.64
Evaluated at bid price : 22.96
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 115,298 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 107,266 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 4.54 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 84,844 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 79,654 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset 73,840 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.89
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BNS.PR.A FixedReset 64,326 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : -20.20 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.90 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4098

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

BAM.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.34 – 25.69
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2021

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2559

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 24.25 – 24.47
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1301

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 24.25
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.75 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1594

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-11
Maturity Price : 24.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

MFC.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2154

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %

Market Action

July 10, 2013

It’s a Fed-Watching Frenzy!

“The minutes largely reiterated what the chairman said in June,” Ryan Larson, the Chicago-based head of U.S. equity trading at RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc., said by e-mail. His firm oversees $290 billion. “Tapering, whether it will be this year or next, is inevitable. The market was initially encouraged that the Fed is waiting on additional data, but possibly taken aback by the fact that about half the participants indicated that asset purchases should end later this year.”

Minutes from the central bank’s June 18-19 meeting, released today in Washington, showed that while several members judged that a reduction in asset purchases “would likely soon be warranted,” many officials want to see more signs employment is picking up before they’ll begin slowing the pace of $85 billion in monthly bond purchases.

The Globe was a bit more colourful:

The minutes show there was an intense debate about how to communicate the Fed’s intentions. A minority of policy makers are worried that the Fed’s policies are too aggressive, risking inflation and asset-price bubbles, and should be reversed as soon as possible. And among the supporters of more QE, there was a feeling that the central bank should nonetheless send the message that economic conditions were improving, heralding an eventual end to the bond-buying program.

It was decided that Mr. Bernanke should attempt to lay out a path for QE at the press conference that followed the meeting. That’s when he told reporters that if the economic outlook held, the Fed likely would slow its bond purchases later in 2014 and end the program in the middle of 2015, when the unemployment rate likely will have fallen to about 7 per cent.

Stock markets plunged immediately, as traders the world over largely disregarded Mr. Bernanke’s insistence that the Fed also could boost asset purchases if the economy failed to unfold as expected.

BIS has published a paper titled Analysis of risk-weighted assets for credit risk in the banking book:

The bottom-up portfolio benchmarking exercise (the hypothetical portfolio exercise, or HPE), under which banks were asked to evaluate the risk of a common set of (largely low-default) wholesale obligors and exposures, revealed notable dispersion in the estimates of PD and LGD assigned to the same exposures. The three wholesale asset classes covered by the HPE analysis (sovereign, bank, and corporate) account on average for about 40% of participating banks’ total credit RWAs. A rough translation of the implied risk weight variations into potential impact on banks’ capital ratios suggests that the impact could be material; at the extremes, capital ratios could vary by as much as 1.5 to 2 percentage points (or 15 to 20% in relative terms) in either direction around the 10% benchmark used for this study. However, most of the banks (22 of the 32 participating banks) lie within one percentage point of that benchmark (see Chart 1 below).


Click for Big
Change from 10% capital ratio if individual bank risk weights from the HPE are adjusted to the median from the sample. Each bar represents one bank. The chart is based on the assumption that variations observed at each bank for the hypothetical portfolios are representative for the entire sovereign, bank, and corporate portfolios of the bank and are adjusted accordingly. No other adjustments are made to RWA or capital.

A reader brings to my attention a debunking of green disinformation:

  • The “Gas Town Steam Clock” is not powered by steam
  • The iconic wind turbine at Grouse Mountain is an energy sink
  • BC Hydro’s emissions reporting is highly misleading
  • Vancouver is nowhere as near as green as it likes to thing it is

I left this one out yesterday: DBRS confirmed RY at Pfd-1(low), although its NVCC-compliant RY.PR.W is still under Review-Negative:

RBC’s diversified business model and geographic profile have provided the Bank with consistently strong profitability and return on equity throughout various business and credit cycles. RBC is the largest retail bank in Canada and currently holds first or second-ranking positions in each business it participates in domestically, with an objective to become the leader in every business. The Bank continues to build on its leading market positions within Canada and is expanding its presence globally, particularly in wealth management and capital markets, where the Bank has been increasing its market share among the top global banks.

Despite strong performance in recent years, continued long-term domestic growth within Canada is expected to be a challenge given the Bank’s significant market share positions, the mature Canadian banking industry and the competitive landscape. Domestically, RBC and its large competitors have little room to grow beyond market growth rates, which have been strong in recent years. Additionally, foreign banks that previously exited the domestic market during the crisis have re-emerged as competitors.

DBRS does not expect potential house price depreciation in Canada to result in material losses from the Bank’s real estate secured lending portfolio, notwithstanding the high indebtedness of the average Canadian consumer and significant increases in housing prices in certain sectors of the Canadian real estate market.

The rating on the Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series W remains Under Review with Negative Implications. DBRS hopes to resolve this rating in the near future after the publication of the results from DBRS’s recent Request for Comments on Rating Subordinated, Hybrids and Preferred Bank Capital Securities

It was another day of retreat for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 24bp, FixedResets off 8bp and DeemedRetractibles down 13bp. The Performance Highlights table was at average length – it hasn’t been average for a while!

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.41%, equivalent to 7.03% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.65%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the Seniority Spread) is now about 240bp, unchanged from the figure reported July 3.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5062 % 2,561.9
FixedFloater 4.23 % 3.57 % 41,662 18.12 1 -0.1779 % 3,880.9
Floater 2.74 % 2.94 % 84,173 19.90 4 -0.5062 % 2,766.2
OpRet 4.81 % 2.08 % 77,228 0.71 4 0.0097 % 2,616.2
SplitShare 4.67 % 4.28 % 70,619 3.95 6 -0.1368 % 2,969.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0097 % 2,392.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.63 % 4.60 % 102,398 0.79 12 -0.0928 % 2,277.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.39 % 5.41 % 142,637 14.77 26 -0.2398 % 2,389.0
FixedReset 4.96 % 3.50 % 237,865 3.38 83 -0.0814 % 2,481.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.06 % 4.53 % 178,192 7.03 43 -0.1258 % 2,385.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.46
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 24.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 17.94
Evaluated at bid price : 17.94
Bid-YTW : 2.94 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 305,615 TD crossed blocks of 250,000 and 48,600, both at 23.80. Nice tickets!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 160,395 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 100,000, both at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 143,422 Desjardins crossed blocks of 50,000 and 83,300, both at 21.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 21.24
Evaluated at bid price : 21.24
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 139,715 RBC crossed 40,000 and 59,600, both at 26.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.24
Bid-YTW : 2.49 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 137,785 Reset rate announced.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 56,221 National crossed 24,700 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.30 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1902

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -6.57 %

TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount Quote: 49.70 – 50.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-07-10
Maturity Price : 49.24
Evaluated at bid price : 49.70
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.45 – 25.78
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2453

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 25.70 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2182

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 4.28 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.13 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1798

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.13
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.16 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.3101

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %