MAPF

MAPF Performance: March 2011

The fund had a poor month with a return of -0.44%, underperforming the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index (TXPR), which returned +0.50%. Figures for the BMO-CM “50” index, which I favour, are not yet available.

The fund’s poor performance is attributable to its heavy position in DeemedRetractibles issued by insurers, which did very poorly.

Well, it has to happen sometimes! Fortunately, the first two months of the quarter were good enough to keep the fund well ahead of the index over the three month period.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31 was $11.0560 after a distribution of 0.131577.

Returns to March 31, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month -0.44% +0.60% +0.44%
Three Months +3.92% +3.06% +2.28%
One Year +22.95% +13.11% +10.47%
Two Years (annualized) +33.87% +19.57% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +24.49% +7.18% +4.74%
Four Years (annualized) +17.39% +3.42%  
Five Years (annualized) +14.90% +3.59%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.69% +3.86%  
Seven Years (annualized) +12.55% +3.60%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.68% +4.49%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.37% +4.46%  
Ten Years (annualized) +13.64% +4.14%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.41%, +2.43% and +11.37%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +5.93%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.50%, +0.87% and +6.54% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are -0.08%, +1.42% & +6.35%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
March, 2011 11.0560 6.00% 0.994 5.964% 1.0000 $0.6594
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
Analysis of yields changed in February 2011 to include the concept of DeemedRetractible issues. DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. This deemed maturity has a significant effect on calculated yields.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on February 28; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.60% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2011 analysis (which is slightly in excess of the 5.54% index yield on March 31). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.0560 * 0.0560 = $0.6191, a decline from the $11.2375 * 0.0567 = $0.6371 reported in February, but an increase from the $11.1030 * 0.0546 = $0.6062 reported in January.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … that’s what I keep working towards!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: March 2011

Turnover declined dramatically in March, to about 17%. Now that the portfolio has repositioned itself to account for OSFI’s refusal to grandfather extant Tier 1 Capital, we are back to the slow trading of positions based on changes in relative value.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 4.2% (+2.4) 6.28% 6.43
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (0) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 5.9% (-5.2) 5.60% 14.54
Fixed-Reset 8.4% (-2) 3.43% 2.86
Deemed-Retractible 71.9% (+6.6) 6.12% 8.18
Scraps (Various) 10.2% (+0.4) 7.06% 10.68
Cash -0.6% (-2.0) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.00% 8.33
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January, February and March, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 43.1% (+3.4)
Pfd-2(high) 28.0% (+1.8)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 18.7% (-4.1)
Pfd-3(high) 6.6% (+1.5)
Pfd-3 3.6% (+0.3)
Pfd-3(low) 0.0% (-1.6)
Cash -0.6% (-2.0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.0% (-1.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 14.2% (-9.3)
$100,000 – $200,000 40.0% (+16.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 5.8% (-7.5)
>$300,000 40.5% (+4.4)
Cash -0.6% (-2.0)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. While direct comparisons are difficult due to the introduction of the DeemedRetractible class of preferred share (see above) it is fair to say:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to DeemedRetractibles
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower
Market Action

April 1, 2011

There’s a new bid for the NYSE:

Nasdaq OMX Group Inc. (NDAQ) and IntercontinentalExchange Inc. (ICE) made an unsolicited bid of about $11.3 billion for NYSE Euronext, trying to snatch the owner of the New York Stock Exchange away from Deutsche Boerse AG. (DB1)

Nasdaq OMX and ICE offered $42.50 in cash and stock for each NYSE Euronext share, according to a statement released today. The shares closed at $35.17 yesterday. Deutsche Boerse’s February all-stock agreement to purchase NYSE Euronext values the company at about $35.04 a share.

Ireland’s credit rating has been cut again:

Ireland’s credit rating was cut one level by Standard & Poor’s and put on watch for a possible downgrade by Fitch Ratings after the cost of rescuing Irish banks reached as much as 100 billion euros ($141.5 billion).

S&P today lowered the rating to BBB+ from A-, putting the country on the same level as Thailand and the Bahamas. The outlook is stable, S&P said in a statement. Fitch placed its long-term foreign and local-currency issuer default ratings of BBB+ on negative, “indicating a heightened probability of a downgrade in the near term,” it said in a statement.

But the interesting part is the wrangling over the banks’ senior debt:

Ireland agreed yesterday to inject as much as 24 billion euros into four banks, while leaving bondholders untouched. The government already funneled 46.3 billion euros into the financial system and set up an agency that paid more than 30 billion euros to assume risky property loans. The total equates to about two-thirds the size of the Irish economy.

“The government’s position is very clear: It doesn’t want to take action on senior bondholders for the four banks that are going forward,” said Matthew Elderfield, head of regulation at the central bank, said in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “It recognizes that, on balance, that if you want to have these viable banks able to return to the market that would hurt their capacity to do that.”

During an election campaign last month, Eamon Gilmore, now deputy prime minister, dismissed ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet as a “civil servant” who would answer to politicians. As recently as March 28, Agriculture Minister Simon Coveney said the government planned to impose losses on senior bondholders in the banks to cut the costs of its bailout.

The cost of insuring against losses on the senior debt of European banks fell to the lowest in more than five months today. The Markit iTraxx Financial Index, linked to the senior debt of 25 banks and insurers, dropped as much as 6 basis points to 137, the lowest since November 19, before paring the decline, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. Credit-default swaps on Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain also declined.

California has problems of its own:

[California Governor Jerry ] Brown said yesterday he’s also putting together a plan to deal with the growing gap between assets and expected obligations of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System, the second-largest public pension in the U.S.

Calstrs’ so-called unfunded liability grew to $56 billion at the end of June, according to a report released yesterday. The 38 percent increase will require the state to boost its annual contribution by $140 million to $150 million, according to the pension fund. California paid $573 million toward teacher retirements last year.

Since 1999, teachers have been allowed to purchase up to five years of service credit to retire early and collect a full pension. Brown would repeal that benefit beginning in July.

DBRS has published a comment letter on the new ESMA guidelines:

The Consultation Paper seeks to clarify the endorsement regime and update the endorsement guidelines. ESMA currently interprets that “as stringent as” CRA requirements must be established by law or regulation in a third country by June 7, 2011 in order for the use of endorsement. It does not currently support the interpretation that a third country CRA would be permitted to follow “as stringent as” standards through its own policies and procedures. The Consultation Paper states that the CRA Regulation does not envisage a dual system of compliance or some combination of a third country legal/regulatory regime topped up by policies and procedures adopted by the third country CRA.

By way of background, endorsement allows the use in the EU of ratings issued outside the EU under certain conditions.

DBRS does not support ESMA’s current interpretation that it cannot supervise EU-registered CRAs who use endorsement without an equivalent third country regulatory regime in place. The key test should be whether a third country CRA adheres to standards as stringent as those required by the CRA Regulation, whether or not a third country regime has been enacted into law.

Endorsement is important because, according to the consultation paper:

A credit rating that a registered CRA endorses in compliance with the conditions set out in article 4.3 “shall be considered to be a credit rating issued by a credit rating agency established in the Community and registered in accordance with this Regulation” (art. 4.4). These ratings can be therefore used for regulatory purposes and be distributed to the public by registered CRAs.

This endorsement process started in October, 2009. The Canadian Securities Administrators published proposed regulatory changes on March 18, due to pressure from the Europeans:

The CESR’s stance is that the “comply or explain” model is insufficient, and thus they indicated to the CSA that they would not provide an equivalency recommendation to the European Commission should the CSA proceed on that basis. As the CSA notes in the introduction to the revised proposal, it’s a threat worth paying attention to:

The failure to obtain an equivalency determination from the European Commission, and the consequent inability of a CRO that issues ratings out of Canada to rely on the endorsement or certification models in the EU Regulation, would have a negative impact on such CROs. The issuers that such CROs rate might also be negatively impacted to the extent those ratings are used for regulatory purposes in the European Union.

As a result, the CSA are now proposing that, in the absence of exemptive relief, DROs must establish codes of conduct which do not deviate from the provisions set out in the proposed Instrument. Those provisions have also been revised somewhat, to require that a DRO establish certain governance protections, such as a majority of independent directors, and a formal internal controls system.

Thus, we finally have a clear statement from the regulator that Credit Rating Agencies have the function of cheerleading for issuers. Yay.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 3bp, FixedResets up 9bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 6bp. Volatility was muted, volume was fair.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0476 % 2,410.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0476 % 3,624.7
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 40,183 21.58 4 0.0476 % 2,602.2
OpRet 4.91 % 3.14 % 58,613 2.12 8 0.0337 % 2,412.0
SplitShare 5.21 % -0.75 % 118,513 0.70 6 0.0676 % 2,491.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0337 % 2,205.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.42 % 128,564 1.19 8 0.2081 % 2,045.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.53 % 130,895 14.46 16 -0.0263 % 2,138.7
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.40 % 226,258 2.98 57 0.0915 % 2,292.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.10 % 304,941 8.25 53 0.0597 % 2,097.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset 103,180 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 73,323 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 54,390 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 52,600 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 52,103 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 48,934 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.32 – 26.50
Spot Rate : 2.1800
Average : 1.3125

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.85 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.4000
Average : 0.9335

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %

W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.29 – 24.63
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2204

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-01
Maturity Price : 24.04
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.09 – 24.45
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2507

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 24.09
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 24.77 – 25.04
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1683

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.98 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1720

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %

Regulation

"You Are Stupid", say Canadian Securities Administrators

Janet McFarland reports in the Globe and Mail :

Canadian regulators are proposing major new restrictions on the sale of securitized financial products like asset-backed commercial paper, arguing unsophisticated investors should not be buying products that are potentially too complex and risky.

The Canadian Securities Administrators, an umbrella group for Canada’s provincial securities commissions, has unveiled a host of reforms to govern the sale of securitized products, responding to calls for tighter regulation following the melt-down of Canada’s $32-billion market for non-bank asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) in the summer of 2007.

In the CSA’s own words:

A key element of the proposed rules is the narrowing of the class of investors who can buy securitized products in the exempt market to a smaller, more sophisticated group. This feature is intended to help investors avoid products whose risk profiles and underlying components may be unsuitable for their investment objectives.

The CSA is seeking input from investors and marketplace participants on the proposals. The comment period is open until July 1, 2011.

The Requiest for Comment states:

The following is a summary of several significant features of the Proposed Exempt Distribution Rules.
(i) Removal of existing prospectus exemptions
We propose that the following prospectus exemptions in NI 45-106 be unavailable for distributions of securitized products that are not covered bonds or non-debt securities of MIEs:

  • • section 2.3 (the accredited investor exemption);
  • • section 2.4 (the private issuer exemption);
  • • section 2.9 (the offering memorandum exemption);
  • • section 2.10 (the minimum amount investment exemption);
  • • subsection 2.34(2)(d) and (d.1) (financial institution or Schedule III bank specified debt exemption);
  • • section 2.35 (the short-term debt exemption).

Instead, we propose to add a new prospectus exemption for the distribution of securitized products.
(ii) New Securitized Product Exemption (section 2.44)
Proposed section 2.44 contains the new prospectus exemption for distributions of securitized products to an “eligible securitized product investor” purchasing as principal (the Securitized Product Exemption). The definition of “eligible securitized product investor” essentially is the same as the definition of “permitted client” in National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements and Exemptions.

The definition comes later:

“eligible securitized product investor” means
(a) a Canadian financial institution or a Schedule III bank;
(b) the Business Development Bank of Canada incorporated under the Business Development Bank of Canada
Act (Canada);
(c) a subsidiary of any person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), if the person owns all of the voting securities of the subsidiary, except the voting securities required by law to be owned by directors of the subsidiary;
(d) a person registered under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of Canada as an adviser or dealer, other than as a scholarship plan dealer or a restricted dealer;
(e) a pension fund that is regulated by either the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (Canada) or a pension commission or similar regulatory authority of a jurisdiction of Canada or a wholly owned subsidiary of such a pension fund;
(f) an entity organized in a foreign jurisdiction that is analogous to any of the entities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e);
(g) the Government of Canada or a jurisdiction of Canada, or any Crown corporation, agency or wholly-owned entity of the Government of Canada or a jurisdiction of Canada;
(h) any national, federal, state, provincial, territorial or municipal government of or in any foreign jurisdiction, or any agency of that government;
(i) a municipality, public board or commission in Canada and a metropolitan community, school board, the Comité de gestion de la taxe scolaire de l’île de Montréal or an intermunicipal management board in Québec; (j) a trust company or trust corporation registered or authorized to carry on business under the Trust and Loan Companies Act (Canada) or under comparable legislation in a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction, acting on behalf of a managed account managed by the trust company or trust corporation, as the case may be;
(k) a person acting on behalf of a fully managed account managed by the person, if the person is registered or authorized to carry on business as an adviser or the equivalent under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction;
(l) an investment fund if it is one or both of the following:
(i) managed by a person registered as an investment fund manager under the securities legislation of a
jurisdiction of Canada;
(ii) advised by a person authorized to act as an adviser under the securities legislation of a jurisdiction of
Canada;
(m) a registered charity under the Income Tax Act (Canada) that obtains advice from an eligibility adviser or an adviser registered under the securities legislation of the jurisdiction of the registered charity;
(n) an individual who beneficially owns financial assets, as defined in section 1.1 having an aggregate realizable value that, before taxes but net of any related liabilities, exceeds $5 million;
(o) a person that is entirely owned by an individual, or individuals referred to in paragraph (n), who holds the beneficial ownership interest in the person directly or through a trust, the trustee of which is a trust company or trust corporation registered or authorized to carry on business under the Trust and Loan Companies Act (Canada) or under comparable legislation in a jurisdiction of Canada or a foreign jurisdiction;
(p) a person, other than an individual or an investment fund, that has net assets of at least $25 million as shown on its most recently prepared financial statements;
(q) a person that distributes securities of its own issue in Canada only to persons referred to in paragraphs (a) to (p);”

I told you that things like this were going to happen! The regulators will not be happy until the only investment options available to retail are homogenized vanilla funds sold by banks, who must be good, since they employ a lot of ex-regulators.

Market Action

March 31, 2011

Europe’s on credit watch:

Moody’s Investors Service said it can’t rule out further credit downgrades for euro-region nations because the agreement on a permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, doesn’t go far enough.

European Union leaders met March 25 and set out new rules on bailout loans. Their failure so far to provide a permanent system whereby stronger nations support the finances of their weaker counterparts leaves bondholders at risk, Moody’s said.

“The absence of a fiscal-transfer mechanism and the conditions under which assistance will prospectively be made available leave downside risk to private creditors,” the rating agency said in an e-mailed report today. “Consequently, further rating downgrades cannot be ruled out.”

… so the ECB is suspending credit quality requirements:

The European Central Bank said it will accept all debt instruments backed by the Irish government as collateral against ECB loans as the country attempts to shore up its banking industry.

The Frankfurt-based ECB said Ireland’s commitment to recapitalize its banks and comply with a consolidation program prescribed by the European Union and International Monetary Fund must be assessed “positively.” The suspension of the minimum credit-rating threshold is based on “this positive assessment of the program,” a capital increase for Ireland’s four banks and the decision to “deleverage and downsize the banking sector,” the ECB said.

It is not the first time the ECB has loosened its collateral rules to help a euro-area member state in distress. In May last year, the ECB announced it would accept all Greek government debt as collateral when lending to banks, suspending minimum credit-rating thresholds to support a 110 billion-euro bailout of the debt-strapped nation. Ireland was the second of the now 17 euro-area members to receive a bailout last year.

The ECB “deems debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Irish government to fulfill the credit standards required for collateral in Eurosystem credit operations,” the bank said. “The relevant risk control measures will be reviewed on a continuous basis.”

It was a good day to end the month in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 10bp, FixedResets exactly flat and DeemedRetractibles winning 13bp. Volatility was muted, with only two entries on the Performance Highlights table. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1310 % 2,408.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1310 % 3,623.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.28 % 39,750 21.55 4 0.1310 % 2,601.0
OpRet 4.86 % 3.11 % 59,062 1.12 9 -0.0942 % 2,411.2
SplitShare 5.08 % 2.69 % 119,760 0.97 5 0.1427 % 2,489.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0942 % 2,204.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.61 % 132,829 2.77 10 0.0020 % 2,041.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.50 % 5.54 % 131,014 14.46 14 0.0970 % 2,139.3
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.42 % 230,853 2.93 57 0.0000 % 2,290.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.20 % 5.11 % 305,763 8.23 53 0.1315 % 2,095.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 72,495 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 46,163 Nesbitt sold 11,100 to anonymous at 24.70, then crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.69
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 41,995 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 32,614 Scotia crossed 27,800 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 28,315 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.94
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 27,635 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.39.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 23.05 – 23.75
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.4898

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-31
Maturity Price : 22.77
Evaluated at bid price : 23.05
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.50 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3613

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %

ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 20.31 – 20.73
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3014

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 7.30 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.05 – 24.44
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2745

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.12 – 26.49
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2559

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-05-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.12
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.00 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %

Miscellaneous News

TMX to Report Closing Quotes … Someday

Readers will remember that quotes provided by the TMX at the “end of the day” are not closing quotes: they are “last” quotes, measured at 4:30. They will differ from the Closing Quotes measured at 4:00 because orders may be cancelled, but not added, during the extended trading session – the one exception being that you can add as many orders as you like at the Closing Price.

I brought this to the attention of the TMX (I don’t think they’d ever really thought about it; my suspicion is that the code that worked perfectly well when there was not extended trading session simply got overlooked when the ETS was invented … put that is pure speculation on my part). The TMX took a survey of their customers and:

While we are not in a position to disclose survey results, we can tell you that there was limited interest from our clients with respect to the 4:00 PM closing bid/ask information. We are following up on adding 4:00 PM close bid/ask data to our end-of-day Trading Summary products and Market Data Web – Custom Query product. However, due to other development commitments and priorities, we can not say when this will be implemented.

I’m rather surprised and can only assume that the surveys were completed by database dorks rather than end users, because the Last Quote is only useful insofar as it reflects the Closing Quote – it has absolutely zero independent value.

I’m also surprised that there will be a potentially significant delay in giving users the option. I’ve never had the chance to examine the TMX code, so obviously I’m speculating again … but retrieval, storage and dissemination of Closing Quotes seems like a fairly trivial database operation. I don’t understand how implementation could possibly take more than a day.

I will, on occasion, spend some actual money to buy the “Trades and Quotes” output from the TMX – but not very often, because there is a charge for each quote and there can, conceivably, be several thousand quotes per minute. However, this will rarely be reported on PrefBlog in a timely manner, because I am separately advised that my problems nailing down IAG.PR.C on March 25 and CM.PR.K on March 28 were due to uploading schedules – detailed quote data is only put on DataLinx overnight, not within a few hours of the close.

Market Action

March 30, 2011

Europeans seem to want to blame commodity price inflation on speculators – Hoenig blames the Fed:

The Federal Reserve’s “highly accommodative” monetary policy is partly to blame for rapidly increasing global commodity prices, said Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig, who called on colleagues to raise the benchmark interest rate toward 1 percent soon.

“Once again there are signs that the world is building new economic imbalances and inflationary impulses,” Hoenig, the central bank’s longest-serving policy maker and the lone dissenter at Fed meetings last year, said in the text of a speech today in London. “The longer policy remains as it is, the greater the likelihood these pressures will build and ultimately undermine world growth.”

This was also discussed in the post QE2 and Inflation.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts getting whacked for 23bp, FixedResets down 2bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 10bp. Not a lot of volatility, with only three entries in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was above average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.54%, equivalent to 7.20% interest at this year’s standard conversion factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yied 5.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now about 170bp, a significant tightening from the 180bp reported on March 23.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2627 % 2,405.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2627 % 3,618.2
Floater 2.50 % 2.29 % 40,043 21.52 4 0.2627 % 2,597.6
OpRet 4.86 % 2.79 % 59,148 0.25 9 0.1630 % 2,413.5
SplitShare 5.09 % 2.63 % 124,706 0.97 5 -0.0468 % 2,486.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1630 % 2,206.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.70 % 144,723 2.44 10 0.0139 % 2,041.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.51 % 5.54 % 130,363 14.53 14 -0.2268 % 2,137.2
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.43 % 232,952 2.93 57 -0.0185 % 2,290.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.21 % 5.15 % 315,650 8.26 53 0.0989 % 2,093.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.47
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.97 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.36
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset 211,075 Issuer bid.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 2.15 %
BMO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 84,813 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
CM.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 78,296 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.44
Bid-YTW : 4.67 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 66,669 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 62,776 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
RY.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 58,423 RBC crossed 12,000 at 23.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.72
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.23 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.3630

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %

IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.37 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.1969

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.63 – 26.13
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3935

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.62 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2839

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-30
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.62
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.45 – 27.03
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4906

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %

BNS.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.48 – 26.69
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1376

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %

Issue Comments

RF.PR.A: Shareholders to Vote on Manager Change

C.A. BANCORP CANADIAN REALTY FINANCE CORPORATION has released an Information Circular:

You are invited to the Special Meeting of holders of Class A shares and Preferred shares, Series 1 (collectively, the “Shareholders”) of C.A. Bancorp Canadian Realty Finance Corporation (the “Corporation”) to be held at the offices of the Corporation, The Simpson Tower, 401 Bay Street, Suite 1600, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2Y4 on April 25, 2011 at 2:00 P.M. (the “Meeting”). The purpose of the Meeting is to provide Shareholders with the opportunity to consider and pass a special resolution to approve the following proposed transaction:

  • (a) the acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of C.A. Bancorp Ltd. (the “Manager”) by Green Tree Capital Management Corp. (“Green Tree”) (the “Change of Control”);
  • (b) an amendment to the commitment agreement dated January 31, 2008 between C.A. Bancorp Inc. (the “Parent”) and the Corporation (the “Commitment Agreement”) to permit the Commitment Agreement’s assignment from the Parent to Green Tree and the release of the Parent from any further obligations; and
  • (c) an amendment to the management agreement dated July 6, 2009 between the Manager and the Corporation (the “Management Agreement”) to provide that the Manager is not entitled to payment of a termination fee where the Management Agreement is terminated by the Corporation in the context of a material breach or default.

Approval of the proposed transaction will result in the transfer of control of the Manager from the Parent to Green Tree, an Ontario corporation established for the sole purpose of entering the proposed transaction.

If successful, portfolio management will be contracted to Quantus:

Jamie Spreng formed Quantus Investment Corp. (formerly Spreng Asset Management Inc.) in April 2010. The firm became registered as a portfolio manager and investment fund manager in July 2010. Its offices are located at 36 Toronto Street, Suite 1150 in Toronto, Ontario. The firm subsequently added the registration category of exempt market dealer at the end of 2010. Mr. Spreng acts as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Compliance Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and Ultimate Designated Person for Quantus Investment Corporation. For Quantus, the investment objective is to maximize risk-adjusted returns. The Quantus Funds only charge a performance fee, there is no management fee. Mr. Spreng’s objective is to generate steady, consistent returns for clients pursuant to various hedge fund products.

Super. So the mortgages will be run by a hedge fund specialist with zero track record.

I mocked this issue at its genesis, due largely to the huge leverage. The leverage problem was addressed with a warrants issue and Asset Coverage is now a much more respectable 1.8-:1 based on the December 2010 Financials. So far so good.

But look at the assets! 36.4-milion in mortgages, 18.4-million in cash and 6.4-million in publicly traded securities, including preferred shares and junk bonds! The circular explains:

the uncertainty relating to the ownership of the Manager has depressed the number and quality of new lending opportunities for the Corporation, resulting in the Board’s decision to suspend quarterly distributions on the Class A Shares;

The preferreds have a rather unusual NAV Test:

Pursuant to the Commitment Agreement dated January 31, 2008 between the Parent and the Corporation, the Parent has agreed that, for so long as there are Preferred Shares of the Corporation outstanding, if the Adjusted Net Tangible Asset Value2 is less than 111% of the Original Preferred Share Issue Price3 as at the end of such quarter, the Parent will subscribe for, or arrange for subscriptions for, additional Class A Shares in an amount at least equal to the deficiency, within 10 business days following the end of the quarter (or if a deficiency or increased deficiency is discovered, including as a result of an audit or a review of the financial statements of the Corporation by its auditors, within 10 business days of confirming the amount of such deficiency). If the Parent defaults in its obligation then:

  • (a) under the articles of the Corporation:
  • (i) steps shall be initiated to redeem the Preferred Shares, the funding of which would occur pro rata as funds become available to fund such redemptions;
  • (ii) the Preferred Shares become voting;
  • (iii) the Class A Shares and Class J Shares become non-voting;
  • (iv) the Board of Directors shall call a meeting of shareholders to elect a new Board of Directors, a majority of whom must be independent of the Parent and its affiliates; and
  • (v) the Board of Directors shall appoint a qualified firm or individual to supervise an orderly liquidation of the Corporation;

and from the prospectus:

No distributions will be paid on the Class A Shares if (i) the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares are in arrears, or (ii) after the payment of the distribution by the Corporation the Adjusted Net Tangible Asset Value of the Corporation is less than 111% of the Original Preferred Share Issue Price. See ‘‘Description of Share Capital — Description of Class A Shares’’.

Well, I just plain don’t like this issue and recommend that preferred shareholders vote against the plan. A change in recommendation will be dependent upon:

  • The company should obtain a credit rating for the preferreds
  • The company should present a credible plan for funding the redemption of the preferreds (e.g., a credit line with a major bank).
  • The NAV test should be more stringent.
Market Action

March 29, 2011

How ’bout them US house prices, eh?:

The S&P/Case-Shiller index of property values in 20 cities fell 3.1 percent from January 2010, the biggest year-over-year decrease since December 2009, the group said today in New York. The decline was in line with the 3.2 percent median forecast by economists in a Bloomberg News survey.

Rising foreclosures are swelling the number of houses on the market, which may put additional pressure on prices in coming months. At the same time, a further decline in home values may keep potential buyers on the sidelines as they foresee better deals, hurting construction and consumer spending as owners’ equity evaporates.

It’s an ill wind that blows nobody any good. We may be witnessing the birth of a few residential real-estate empires:

Delavaco Properties LP plans to spend as much as $30 million this year and $40 million in 2012 to buy bank-owned houses and condominiums in foreclosure-ridden South Florida. The private-equity fund will pay cash.

As lenders tighten mortgage standards and consumers stay on the sidelines amid a five-year slide in home prices, all-cash purchases are surging. The deals are done mostly by investors who can get properties for less than buyers needing loans, fix them up and resell or rent them.

But there’s finally a start to the eventual wind-down of Fannie & Freddie:

U.S. House Republicans proposed legislation that would begin reducing the influence of government-run mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Representative Scott Garrett, a New Jersey Republican and chairman of the capital markets panel of the House Financial Services Committee, is leading the effort. Most of the Republican proposals line up with a list of recommendations put forth in February by the Treasury Department and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Garrett’s panel will hold a hearing on March 31 on the proposals.

When it comes to the Treasury, “at the end of the day, we have the same ultimate goal to achieve here,” Garrett said at a press conference today. “If you look through their white paper, if you look at what we have, in essence we’re on the same page.”

Won’t last though – politicians love loan guarantees. ‘We can Do Good, and it doesn’t even cost anything!’

Europe’s politicians might find it harder to get co-investors:

Portugal and Greece were downgraded by Standard & Poor’s, which said the European Union’s new bailout rules may mean that both nations eventually renege on their debt obligations.

S&P cut Portugal for the second time in a week to the lowest investment-grade rating of BBB-, three steps below Ireland. Greece’s rating fell two grades to BB-, three levels below investment grade. S&P cited concerns that both countries may be forced to restructure debt after seeking European aid and that governments will be paid back before other creditors.

It was a strong day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 38bp, FixedResets up 13bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 9bp. Volume was good and volatility jumped.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1312 % 2,399.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1312 % 3,608.7
Floater 2.51 % 2.29 % 41,501 21.51 4 -0.1312 % 2,590.8
OpRet 4.87 % 3.67 % 58,412 1.13 9 0.1288 % 2,409.6
SplitShare 5.08 % 2.67 % 129,342 0.98 5 -0.0547 % 2,487.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1288 % 2,203.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.53 % 132,112 1.20 10 0.1163 % 2,041.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.54 % 125,407 14.51 14 0.3768 % 2,142.0
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.42 % 234,918 2.93 57 0.1267 % 2,290.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.22 % 5.15 % 320,219 8.25 53 0.0918 % 2,090.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.38
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 24.25
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.84
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 68,065 TD bought 20,000 from Nesbitt at 25.85, then crossed the same number at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 5.17 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 54,997 RBC crossed 50,000 at 21.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 51,590 RBC crossed 50,000 at 23.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 45,110 Desjardins crossed 40,000 at 26.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 42,665 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 20.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 20.91
Evaluated at bid price : 20.91
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 39,568 Nesbitt bought 25,000 from RBC at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.45
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.35 – 24.71
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2364

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 24.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %

GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.07 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2613

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.95 – 28.25
Spot Rate : 1.3000
Average : 1.1936

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.95
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.05 – 24.30
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1565

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.95 – 24.22
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1872

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-29
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.37 – 24.69
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2422

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %