Regulation

Senate Hearings : S&P Steps Up

In the last statement listed on Banking Committee’s website, Vickie A. Tillman, Executive Vice President of Standard & Poor’s Credit Market Services, gave her views on the current controversy. She included a wonderful quotation from Eddy Wymeersch, Chairman of the Committee of European Securities Regulators and also Chairman of Belgium’s Banking and Financial Commission:

“The press and general opinion is saying it’s the fault of the credit rating agencies,” Eddy Wymeersch, chairman of Belgium’s Banking and Financial Commission watchdog told Reuters.

“Sorry, the ratings are just about the probability of default, nothing more. Now we have a liquidity crisis and not a solvency crisis,”

She then states that S&P has been rating Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) for thirty years, with the following results:

Initial Rating % of Default
AAA 0.04
AA 0.24
A 0.33
BBB 1.09
BB 2.11
B 3.34

She then reiterates Moody’s testimony regarding the role of the Credit Rating Agency in it’s relationship with the Originators:

While evaluating the credit characteristics of the underlying mortgage pool is part of our RMBS ratings process, S&P does not rate the underlying mortgage loans made to homeowners or evaluate whether making those loans was a good idea in the first place. Originators make loans and verify information provided by borrowers. They also appraise homes and make underwriting decisions. In turn, issuers and arrangers of mortgage-backed securities bundle those loans and perform due diligence. They similarly set transaction structures, identify potential buyers for the securities, and underwrite those securities. For the system to function properly, S&P relies, as it must, on these participants to fulfill their roles and obligations to verify and validate information before they pass it on to others, including S&P. Our role in the process is reaching an opinion as to how much cash we believe the underlying loans are likely to generate towards paying off the securities eventually issued by the pool. That is the relevant issue for assessing the creditworthiness of those securities.

There’s a lot in the presentation that repeats Moody’s testimony, or simply describes the S&P version of the same procedure, so I’ll skip over a lot of verbiage. Her major headings are:

  • The “Issuer Pays” Model Doesn Not Compromise the Independence and Objectivity of Our Ratings … this section includes a reference to a Fed Reserve paper Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate.
  • S&P Does Not “Structure” Transactions … they talk, yes. This encourages transparency and predictability.
  • Credit Enhancement – How Securities Backed By Subprime Mortgages Can Recieve, and Merit, Investment Grade Ratings … I’m getting tired of this topic, but I suppose she had to ensure it was addressed
  • S&P Has Been Warning the Market, and Taking Action, in Response to Deterioration in the Subprime Market Since Early 2006 … listing quite a few publications.
  • Impact of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 … blah blah blah

So … she covered pretty much the same ground as Moody’s did.

Interesting External Papers

Senate Hearings : The Empire Strikes Back

See? Accrued Interest isn’t the only blog in the world that can use Star Wars titles.

Following the last testimony reported here, that of Dr. Lawrence J. White, Moody’s stepped up to the plate. The testimony has been published by the Senate committee.

They first reviewed the process, including one very critical element:

It is important to note that, in the course of rating a transaction, we do not see individual loan files or information identifying borrowers or specific properties. Rather, we receive only the aforementioned credit characteristics provided by the originator or the investment bank. The originators of the loans and underwriters of the securities also make representations and warranties to the trust for the benefit of investors in every transaction. While these representations and warranties will vary somewhat from transaction to transaction, they typically stipulate that, prior to the closing date, all requirements of federal, state or local laws regarding the origination of the loans have been satisfied, including those requirements relating to: usury, truth in lending, real estate settlement procedures, predatory and abusive lending, consumer credit protection, equal credit opportunity, and fair housing or disclosure. It should be noted that the accuracy of information disclosed by originators and underwriters in connection with each transaction is subject to federal securities laws and regulations requiring accurate disclosure. Underwriters, as well as legal advisers and accountants who participate in that disclosure, may be subject to civil and criminal penalties in the event of misrepresentations. Consequently, Moody’s has historically relied on these representations and warranties and we would not rate a security unless the originator or the investment bank had made representations and warranties such as those discussed above.

They also make the point that the 2002-2005 vintages of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS; “vintage” refers to the date the mortgage was given) are performing at or above expectations; it’s the 2006 vintage that is creating headaches. The following data is extracted from their figure 2:

Downgrade / Upgrade Percentage By Vintage (By Rated Original Balance)
  Subprime
Vintage Downgrade Upgrade
2002 2.3% 2.0%
2003 1.1% 2.7%
2004 0.3% 0.2%
2005 0.5% 0.3%
2006 5.4% 0%
2002-2006 2.2% 0.6%

Moody’s categorized their response to an observed deterioration in sub-prime portfolios as follows:

  • We began warning the market starting in 2003
  • We tightened our ratings criteria
  • We took rating actions as soon as the data warranted it:As illustrated by Figure 3, the earliest loan delinquency data for the 2006 mortgage loan vintage was largely in line with the performance observed during 2000 and 2001, at the time of the last U.S. real estate recession. Thus, the loan delinquency data we had in January 2007 was generally consistent with the higher loss expectations that we had already anticipated. As soon as the more significant collateral deterioration in the 2006 vintage became evident in May and June 2007, we took prompt and deliberate action on those transactions with significantly heightened risk.

Note that the first two points are also elucidated; I’m just highlighting their third point.

Their Figure 5 provides some detail that I’ve been trying to find for a while. Readers will remember the decomposition of the Bear Stearns ABS 2005-1 in this blog, and know that the highest rated tranche is the biggest, while the smaller tranches are relatively small. The tranches On Review or Downgraded (First & Second Lien Transactions combined) comprise 15.9% of the total by number, but only 5.4% by dollar value.

And, finally, they get to their actions to address the problems and their recommendations for others. Moody’s initiatives are:

  • Enhancements to analytical methodologies
  • Continued investments in analytical capabilities
  • Changes to credit policy function (this means increased separation of the reporting channels between the sales and ratings departments)
  • Additional market education
  • Development of new tools beyond credit ratings

I am sure they mean well by their last two points, but they won’t work. The market does not want to be educated and the market does not want any more detail – the reaction to their change in bank rating methodology proves that.

What does the market want? The market wants a very simple methodology so it can claim to have done a due-diligence without wasting more than five minutes on investment crap and someone to blame when something goes wrong, that’s what the market wants.

Moody’s recommendations for policies outside its control are:

  • Licensing or other oversight of mortgage brokers
  • Greater disclosure of additional information by borrowers and lenders
  • Tightening due diligence standards for underwriters
  • Stronger representations and warranties
  • Increased disclosure from issuers and servicers on the individual loans in a pool
  • Increasing transparency (in structured products)

Not very much, perhaps, but not very much change is needed.

Data Changes

New Issue : BMO 5.25% Perpetual

Hot on the heels of the BNS 5.25% Perp New Issue comes a very similar offering from BMO!

Bank of Montreal (TSX, NYSE: BMO) today announced a domestic public offering of $250 million of Non-Cumulative Perpetual Class B Preferred Shares Series 14 (the “Preferred Shares”).

With an anticipated closing date of October 9, this too will get the Tier 1 Capital onto BMO’s balance sheet prior to their year-end.

Size: 10-million shares = $250-million. Greenshoe option for 2-million shares = $50-million.

Dividends: 5.25% of par = $1.3125 p.a. Fat first dividend of $0.49983 payable February 25, 2008 based on October 9 closing.

Redemption: Redeemable at $26 commencing November 25, 2012; redemption price declines by $0.25 annually until November 25, 2016; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Priority: Parri Passu with all other preferred shares; Senior to common; Junior to everything else.

Ratings: S&P: P-1(low); DBRS Pfd-1; Moody’s: Aa3 (I can’t remember seeing a Moody’s rating for a Canadian Pref before … is BMO doing a little ratings-shopping after their downgrade by S&P?)

HIMIPref™ Valuation: The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with a preIssue securityCode of P25008. Estimated fair price with some comparables is:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/26
BMO.PR.H 25.35 25.60-66
BMO.PR.J 22.90 22.72-75
BMO.PR.? 25.32 Not Yet Trading
BNS.PR.? 25.33 Not Yet Trading

Market Action

September 26, 2007

Manor & Mendelson, co-founders of Portus Alternative Asset Management Inc., are being charged:

with 12 counts of fraud, money laundering, and possession of property obtained by crime on Wednesday, the result of a lengthy international investigation.

It has been quite some time since I saw Boaz – I look forward to seeing him in the dock. Regardless of guilt or innocence of these particular charges, he ran away from 26,000 customers, 100 employees, and me. That’s not cricket.

Inquiries into the Credit Rating Agencies has begun:

The SEC wants to know whether issuers pushed credit raters to “diverge from their stated methodologies and procedures,” Cox said in testimony prepared for the Senate Banking Committee today. In particular, the commission is “examining” whether firms were “unduly influenced by issuers and underwriters,” he said.

I have posted further detail of the hearings and will continue to plough through the testimony. Alex Cukierman has written an essay on VoxEU regarding central bank independence, which may possibly be a move in the Trichet / Sarkozy game. And this game is just simply a part of the markets / politicians tournament, just like the credit ratings agency investigations. I am attempting to form a troupe of attractive Swedish cheerleaders to encourage the Markets faction … if you qualify, drop me a line!

In somewhat related news, Larry Summers has (quite correctly) warned against giving the Feds too many hats to wear.

“I think it’s clear that when you vest regulation for consumer protection with agencies like the Federal Reserve whose primary mandate is the health of the financial system or the health of the lenders, you are going to get insufficient vigilance with respect to consumer protection,” he said during a panel discussion for the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project.

The next US jobs number, due a week Friday, will be closely watched – especially as there are some concerns that the last one might have been distorted:

Many economists suspect the drop in August payrolls was exaggerated by a fluky fall in local government payrolls, and new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics supports that.

On Tuesday the BLS released state payroll data for August. If you sum up the changes across the 50 states and the District of Columbia, the total rose 159,000, compared to the decline of 4,000 in the national data.

With all the worries in the High-Yield market and concerns over the stability of the banking system,  yesterday’s news release regarding large loans syndicated in the US was a good sign.

The volume of Shared National Credits (SNC) rose by 21% in 2006, the fastest pace since 1998, reflecting, in part, significant merger and acquisition lending, according to the SNC2 review results released today by federal bank and thrift regulators.

Criticized commitments rose to $114 billion, but still remain less than half of their peak dollar level in 2002. Criticized credits represent a modest 5.0 percent of total commitments, about the same rate experienced over the past three SNC reviews.

Which is not to say, of course, that everything is unfolding as one might have thought six months ago. It looks like the Sallie Mae takeover will not proceed as originally planned, if at all:

SLM Corp. said a group led by J.C. Flowers & Co. won’t complete the $25.3 billion purchase of the largest U.S. student loan company. The group said it’s open to negotiation.

The group doesn’t expect to complete the $60-a-share acquisition, Reston, Virginia-based SLM, known as Sallie Mae, said today in a statement. Under an agreement announced in April, SLM was to be sold for $60 a share to an entity 50.2 percent- owned by Flowers, with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. each holding 24.9 percent.

Shake-ups in the Very Big Brokerage segment are coming! The Chinese brokerage, Citic, is now number eight globally, although that’s with rankings by market capitalization and:

The S&P 500’s measure of seven U.S. securities firms is valued at 8.8 times estimated profit, about a quarter of the 38 times for their four listed Chinese peers. Citic trades at 34 times estimated earnings, compared with 10 times profit for Bear Stearns, 7.9 times for Morgan Stanley, and Lehman’s 8 times. Haitong Securities trades at 52 times estimated profit, Hong Yuan is at 39 times, while Northeast Securities is at 28 times profit.

Still, it’s not too long since no such qualification would have been necessary. And it looks like Warren Buffet, saviour of Salomon, is sniffing around Bear Stearns:

Bank of America Corp., Wachovia Corp., and two Chinese companies, Citic Group and China Construction Bank Corp., also are among the potential bidders, the New York Times reported, citing unidentified sources.

I can just imagine the consternation if a Chinese firm takes over an iconic trader like the Bear – particularly given concern about the Chinese government’s commitment to the free flow of information. But then, the big brokerages have had a few problems recently:

Merrill Lynch & Co., the third biggest U.S. securities firm, may record losses of as much as $4 billion on fixed-income assets, resulting in the lowest quarterly earnings in almost six years, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. analyst William Tanona said.

And, in late news, it was announced that Canada’s getting into the act:

Australian investment bank Macquarie Bank Ltd will buy Canadian investment and brokerage firm Orion Financial Ltd for about C$147 million ($146 million) in cash and stock.

Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser notes that the latest dust-up in American politics is over a relatively picayune $5-billion for children’s health; suggesting there are other exposures that have been recklessly undertaken in the past five years. It is clear that some hard measures will need to be taken if the dollar is to retain value, a matter that Accrued Interest notes is of increasing concern. I’m just happy that the GAO is now referring to the decline of the Roman Empire as opposed to the fall of the Roman Republic as a metaphor. If we’re going to decline and fall all over the place, let’s at least get the metaphors right!

US Equities had a good day, with financials leading the way – attributed to the idea that Warren Buffett might possibly like the sector.

If it turns out that the sector does poorly, will there be a Senate Inquiry?

Tech stocks led Canadian equities up a bit.

Treasuries did almost nothing, but did it while attracting lots of bids to the quarterly refunding (it was the two-year today). One has to feel sorry for a reporter so abjectly desperate to make things sound interesting that she writes:

The benchmark 10-year note’s yield rose almost 1 basis point to 4.63

The only thing worse is having to quote such a report! Canadas were weak, but nothing out of the ordinary.

The preferred share market normalized a bit after yesterday’s repricing, but the PerpetualDiscount sector continued to fall. Volume returned to the light-but-still-reasonable levels that have been in effect all month.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.72% 4.68% 1,062,629 15.88 1 -0.0816% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.76% 95,952 15.87 8 +0.3998% 1,034.6
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 81,047 10.76 3 +0.0410% 1,049.0
Op. Retract 4.85% 4.05% 77,146 3.24 15 -0.0869% 1,027.8
Split-Share 5.14% 4.77% 96,837 3.84 13 +0.0674% 1,046.9
Interest Bearing 6.31% 6.61% 65,532 4.26 3 +0.1386% 1,040.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.29% 91,082 7.06 24 -0.0300% 1,024.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.15% 5.19% 240,616 14.78 38 -0.4355% 967.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.8295% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.6196% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.5306% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 23.16 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.2860% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.1112% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.A OpRet 495,700 Went ex-Dividend today for $0.33125. Global crossed 247,700 for cash at $26.21, then 247,700 for regular settlement at 25.87. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.32% based on a bid of 25.76 and a call 2007-11-30 at 25.75.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 106,032 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.12% based on a bid of 23.53 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 66,100 Desjardins crossed 60,000 at 22.28. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualPremium 35,725 RBC bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 25.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 25.38 and a call 2013-03-02 at 25.00.
MFC.PR.A OpRet 26,700 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.83. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.76% based on a bid of 25.65 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.

There were eight other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : August, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-08-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,606.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,914.1 13 2.0 5.36% 11.1 262M 5.82%
Floater 1,514.5 4 1.74 4.80% 14.3 51M 5.39%
OpRet 1,482.0 34 1.20 4.28% 1.6 58M 6.06%
SplitShare 1,494.5 9 1.89 5.80% 5.3 61M 6.19%
Interest-Bearing 1,741.8 7 2.00 6.43% 2.6 118M 7.69%
Perpetual-Premium 1,133.9 5 1.39 5.32% 5.8 127M 5.66%
Perpetual-Discount 1,295.5 9 1.55 5.64% 14.2 150M 5.72%

Index Constitution, 2001-08-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-08-31, Post-rebalancing

Regulation

Senate Hearings on Credit Ratings Begin

Senate Banking Committee hearings on the Credit Rating Agencies have commenced.

The committee has published remarks by the politicians and statements from witnesses on its website. Of great interest is the testimony from Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., of Columbia Law School. He criticizes Levitt’s proposals:

Although conflicts of interest are critical, it is far from clear that they can simply be eliminated. The fundamental conflict is that the issuer hires the rating agency to rate its debt (just as the issuer also hires the auditor to audit its financial statements). It is not easy to move to a different system. To be sure, until the early 1970s, the rating agencies were paid by their subscribers, not the issuer. But they barely broke even under this system. More generally, the deeper problem with subscription-funded ratings is that there is no way to tax the free rider.

Bureaucratic regulation faces other problems. It does not seem within the effective capacity of the SEC, or any more specialized agency, to define what an investment grade rating should mean or the process by which it is determined. Such efforts would only produce a telephone book-length code of regulations, which skilled corporate lawyers could easily outflank.

Sadly, he did not discuss Levitt’s five recommendations in detail. He did, however, make three recommendations of his own:

Proposal One: Disclose Default Rates On Each Rating Grade For Each Product. the SEC could calculate the five year cumulative default rates on different classes of financial products for each rating agency and disclose this data on one centralized web site. Admittedly, Moody’s already discloses such information on its own web site, but others do not, and it is the comparison that is critical.

Proposal Two: Forfeiture of NRSRO Status. In principle, rating agencies should compete in terms of their relative accuracy. But the market does not appear to penalize inaccuracy very heavily, and corporate issuers may prefer the rater with the most optimistic bias. The best response to this problem is to make the rating agency’s status as an NRSRO depend upon maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy. This proposal would not bar a rating agency from continuing to issue ratings during any period in which it was disqualified as an NRSRO, but such ratings would be useful only for their informative value, not their legal impact.

Proposal Three: A Transparency Rule: Encourage the Growth of Subscription-Based Rating Agencies By Giving Them Access to the Same Data Made Available By the Issuer to Any Other Rating Agency.

The point regarding Proposal Two is introduced earlier in his remarks:

In other markets, a professional whose advice was demonstrably inaccurate would lose business. But this does not necessarily hold true in the market for debt ratings, because the service providers in this market are not simply providing information through their ratings. They are also conferring a governmentally-delegated permission to buy upon institutional investors that are legally restricted to purchasing securities rated investment grade.6 This is the real significance of the SEC’s Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (or “NRSRO”) designation, because only a rating agency with this designation can render debt securities eligible for purchase by many investors. Put bluntly, an NRSRO can sell its services to issuers, even if the market distrusts the accuracy of its ratings, because it is in effect licensing the issuer to sell its debt to certain  regulated investors. This is a power that no other gatekeeper possesses.

I should point out that the statement In other markets, a professional whose advice was demonstrably inaccurate would lose business. is demonstrably false. There are many, many professionals in the business who are chronic underperformers and still do quite well, thank you very much. I suggest that if the regulators wish to intervene to improve capital market efficiency to such an extent, they would be better off imposing performance measurements on stockbrokers and portfolio managers. This will not happen; nor would I support it happening.

Dr. Lawrence J. White, Professor of Economics at NYW was the next to speak:

I would strongly prefer the simple elimination of the NRSRO designation and the concomitant withdrawal of the regulatory delegations of safety judgments that have given so much power to the SEC’s NRSRO decisions. The participants in the financial markets could then freely decide which bond rating organizations (if any) are worthy of their trust and dealings, while financial regulators and their regulated institutions could devise more direct ways of determining the appropriateness of bonds for those institutions’ portfolios. Also, I fear that some of the “good character” provisions of the Act might be used in the future to create new barriers to entry.

He analyzes the Agencies role in the current kerfuffle, stating:

Here, the story as to why the bond raters have been slow to downgrade is clearer. To a large extent — with only one new element — it is a repeat of the reasons for their delay in the Enron and other, earlier downgrades.

First, the bond rating firms have a conscious policy of not trying to adjust their ratings with respect to short-run changes in financial circumstances; instead, they try to “rate through the cycle”. Regardless of the general wisdom of such a philosophy, it does mean that when the short-run changes are not part of a cycle but instead are the beginning of a longer-run trend, the bond raters will be slow to recognize that trend and thus slow to adjust their ratings.

Fourth, and this is a new element in the current situation, the bond raters have had to deal with (for them) a new kind of risk. For their traditional ratings of corporate, municipal, and sovereign bonds, and even for rating simple MBS, they have focused solely on credit (or default) risk: the possibility that the borrower will fail to repay its obligations in full and in a timely manner. In rating collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), however, where the underlying collateral was MBS and other securities, an extra feature could affect the ability of the CDOs to be paid off in full and in a timely manner: liquidity risk, which is the risk that the markets for the underlying collateral will become illiquid (perhaps because of fears and uncertainties among market participants as to underlying repayment possibilities), leading to unusually wide spreads between bid and ask prices for those underlying securities. Those wider spreads, in turn, could trigger forced liquidations of the asset pools underlying the CDOs and lead to unexpected losses to the investors in the CDO securities, even if the underlying collateral were ultimately to perform with respect to credit risk along the lines that had been predicted.

Holders of, for instance, DG.UN, will know all about the fourth risk!

Readers will not be surprised at my rapturous applause for his conclusion:

I strongly urge the Congress not to undertake any legislative action that would attempt to correct any perceived shortcomings of the bond rating firms.

I base this plea on two grounds: First, it is difficult, if not impossible, to legislate remedies that could somehow command the bond raters to do a better job. One could imagine legislation that would mandate certain business models — say, forcing the industry back to its pre-1970s model of selling ratings to investors, because of concerns about potential conflicts of interest — or that would mandate certain standards of required expertise as inputs into the rating process. But such legislation risks doing far more harm than good, by rigidifying the industry and reducing flexibility and diversity.

Second, as was discussed above, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 was signed just a year ago, and the final implementing regulations were promulgated only three months ago. Including the two firms that were newly designated in May 2007, just before the final regulations were promulgated, there are now seven NRSROs. The SEC’s more timely and transparent procedures under the Act should yield at least a few more. The financial markets — and equally important, financial regulators — should be given an opportunity to adjust to the new circumstances of a more competitive ratings market, with more choices, more business models, and more ideas.

More later.

Market Action

September 25, 2007

Today’s word is confidence. Sadly, it’s only a word:

Consumer confidence slumped to the lowest level in almost two years and home sales weakened, threatening U.S. household spending and bolstering the case for the Federal Reserve to keep cutting interest rates.

The Conference Board’s index of consumer confidence fell more than forecast in September, to 99.8 from 105.6.

The consequences of extreme lack of confidence are currently illustrated by the continuing Northern Rock saga, in which some possible bidders are thought to think it’s worth more dead than alive:

Former Goldman banker Chris Flowers may join the Cerberus Capital Management LP and Citadel Investment Group LLC hedge funds in splitting up Northern Rock, the Sunday Telegraph reported Sept. 23, citing an unidentified person familiar with the proposal.

A Northern Rock bail-out might cause some embarrassment with UK regulators :

The U.K.’s Financial Services Compensation Scheme has 4.4 million pounds to protect deposits, compared with $49 billion at a similar fund in the U.S., the London-based Independent reported today, without saying where it got the information.

Even that, though, is a huge bankroll compared to what we have in Canada: $1.4-billion as of 2006-3-31. The 2006 report is the one relevant to the 2007 Annual Public Meeting. Call the papers! I want to revise my confidence number!

The WSJ republished the IMF’s risk diagram, which is cool enough to be worth posting:

The further from the centre, the riskier the axis.

The S&P/Case-Shiller US Housing Price Indices were released today and flesh out the anecdotal descriptions of how bad the US market is:

10-City Composite was down 4.5% versus July of 2006, while the 20-City Composite was down 3.9% over the same time period.

This is the first significant yoy decline in these indices since the recession of Bush the Elder; the worst three cities for housing in the past year have been Detroit (-9.7%); Tampa (-8.8%); and San Diego (-7.8%). It’s Detroit that looks really ugly: the index level, set to a base of 100 in January 2000, is only 111.3 in July 2007, implying an annualized rate of return of less than 1.5%. So much for housing as a long term investment, in Detroit, anyway! For those who look at the detailed data and want a comparison, US Inflation data is available from the Bureau of Labour Labor Statistics: The Jan 2000 “All items less food and energy” index (US City Average, Not Seasonally Adjusted) was 100.3; July 2007 is 115.1, implying the average Case-Shiller index should be about 114.7 to stay even.

Since the 10-city composite is actually 215.9 and the 20-city composite is 198.4, there are two ways of looking at it: (i) What are those greedy Americans complaining about?, or (ii) Wow, they’ve got a lot further to fall. JDH at Econbrowser discusses the matter and worries about repercussions in the financial markets. If he’s not gloomy enough for your tastes, Dear Reader, try Nouriel Roubini:

So as JP Morgan rightly put it there is “no sign of a floor for housing”. The housing recession will continue throughout 2008 and the fall in home prices will continue into 2009 before any bottom is reached.

As an aside, the WSJ has highlighted some research by the Atlanta Fed showing that home ownership in the States increased from 64% in 1994 to 69% in 2005. The rate had been static from the mid-sixties to 1994.

Speaking of the CPI, a Bloomberg columnist has produced a column pandering to the ‘CPI Lie’ crowd. It’s certainly a pleasant change to see some actual meat on the bones of the slogan! He states, for instance:

Medical expenses are given short shrift as well. It wasn’t that long ago when employers could cover almost all of an employee’s health-care bills.

Now workers are shelling out an average of $3,281 from their paychecks for family medical coverage, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, a non-profit organization based in Menlo Park, California. The average premium for a family policy is more than $12,000 annually.

So why is this a measure of inflation? It looks more like a cut in salary (via reduction in benefits) to me … which may come to the same thing to somebody attempting to maintain a standard of living with the same work, but should not be mis-labelled.

Willem Buiter took a break from writing for VoxEU to post to his own blog, criticizing Trichet for rising to Sarkozy’s bait. Buiter is quite right; Trichet should retain his dignity and leave the criticism of Sarkozy to me!

US equities were flat, with a few high-profile drops due to earnings-forecast revisions being greatly overemphasized by the media. Canadian equities were very slightly up, with a few advances desperately siezed on by reporters in dire need of something to report.

Treasuries had a good day, with predictions of further Fed cuts bringing some more highly-desirable term spread into the curve:

The difference in yield, or spread, between 10- and two-year yields was 63 basis points today, the widest since April 2005.

Canadas did nothing much.

It was an exciting day in the preferred share market today, almost certainly due to the BNS 5.25% Perp New Issue, which seems to have had the effect of repricing the entire spectrum of perpetuals. In other words, the universe has adjusted itself to the new issue, rather than the other way ’round.

Perpetuals dropped quite significantly, as perpetualDiscounts, yesterday priced to yield 5.09% suddenly dropped in price to yield 8bp more – exactly half of the distance between the universe and new issue yield, deciding 5.17% was a much better level.  The perpetualPremium index, formerly 5.13%, is now 5.29%. This figure is not only more than the new issue yield, but is more than the perpetualDiscount yield … I would normally expect discounts to yield more than premiums, to compensate for the greater – and more immediate – interest rate risk. Markets, however, sometimes don’t listen to me as well as they should.

The Claymore Preferred share ETF had a $0.35 drop in NAV today after a distribution of $0.2185. The fund offered by my firm, MAPF, did not have its most pleasant day ever recorded, but is now well ahead of CPD on the month to date. We’ll see what the last three trading days bring!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.73% 4.69% 1,105,201 15.86 1 +0.0000% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.78% 97,108 15.77 8 -0.0711% 1,030.4
Floater 4.48% 1.82% 82,420 10.76 3 -0.1495% 1,048.6
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.15% 76,872 3.30 15 -0.0621% 1,028.7
Split-Share 5.14% 4.85% 97,204 3.84 13 +0.1852% 1,046.2
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.71% 64,702 4.25 3 -0.4104% 1,038.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.52% 5.29% 90,888 7.43 24 -0.5628% 1,025.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.12% 5.17% 242,292 15.20 38 -1.3334% 972.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -3.9556% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.8621% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -2.8073% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 22.85 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -2.4268% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 23.32 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.H OpRet -2.3864% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 25.77 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -2.3510% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 24.09 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.3068% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 25.41 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.1825% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -2.1638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.06 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.9772% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.9772% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.9707% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.38 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.9583% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 23.03 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.9071% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.7954% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.52 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.7734% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.71 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.7105% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.5537% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.5284% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.55 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.3573% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.07% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2444% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.22 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium -1.2006% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 25.51 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1553% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.0855% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 22.78 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0806% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 23.80 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0412% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 22.81 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.0056% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.0031% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.3500% Asset coverage of just over 2.5:1 as of September 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.50% based on a bid of 10.51 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 81,650 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.25, then another 20,000 at 24.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 24.09 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.N OpRet 32,260 National Bank crossed 30,000 at 26.27. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.83% based on a bid of 26.27 and a softMaturity 2014-1-30 at 25.00.
IGM.PR.A OpRet 30,130 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.47% based on a bid of 26.94 and a call 2009-7-30 at 26.00.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 27,525 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.99% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 24,983 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 23.32 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventeen other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : July, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-07-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,589.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,907.1 12 2.0 5.39% 9.8 161M 5.78%
Floater 1,498.0 4 1.75 4.95% 13.8 68M 5.56%
OpRet 1,462.2 36 1.22 4.40% 1.8 62M 6.20%
SplitShare 1,493.4 8 1.87 5.78% 6.9 69M 6.19%
Interest-Bearing 1,724.5 7 2.00 6.22% 2.7 127M 7.77%
Perpetual-Premium 1,130.0 4 1.25 5.01% 5.6 226M 5.70%
Perpetual-Discount 1,285.5 10 1.60 5.78% 14.2 134M 5.75%

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-07-31, Post-rebalancing

Data Changes

BNS New Issue : 5.25% Perpetual

Scotia has announced:

a domestic public offering of 12 million, 5.25% non-cumulative preferred shares Series 16 (the “Preferred Shares Series 16”) at a price of $25.00 per share, for an aggregate amount of $300 million.
    The Bank has agreed to sell the Preferred Shares Series 16 to a syndicate of underwriters led by Scotia Capital Inc. on a bought deal basis. The Bank has granted to the underwriters an over allotment option to purchase up to an additional $45 million of the Preferred Shares Series 16 at any time up to 30 days after closing.
    Closing is expected to occur on or after October 12, 2007. This domestic public offering is part of Scotiabank’s ongoing and proactive management of its Tier 1 capital structure.

This will get the money into Tier 1 prior to Scotia’s year-end on October 31. I certainly don’t think Scotia’s in any trouble, but I suspect that all the banks will have seen their balance sheets bulk up over the past six weeks (as their sometime customers find it more difficult or too expensive to borrow on the money market) and who knows? We might even see some more issuance from those banks that have the room.

Come on TD! Let’s see a good big batch of TD Perps!

Anyway:

Size: 12-million shares (= $300-million), underwriters’ option for additional 1.8-million shares (= $45-million)

Issue Price: $25.00 

Dividend: 5.25% = $1.3125 p.a.  Paid on third-last business day of Jan, April, July, Oct. Long first dividend of $0.39195 anticipated, to be paid Jan 29.

Redemption: Redeemable commencing third-last business day in January, 2013, at $26.00. Redemption price declines by $0.25 p.a. until January 27, 2017; redeemable at $25.00 thereafter.

Seniority: On parity with all other preferred shares, senior to common, junior to everything else.

On the whole, the issue looks pretty good and I suspect that it will trade at an immediate premium:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/24
BNS.PR.J 26.05 26.01-10
BNS.PR.K 24.29 24.67-73
BNS.PR.L 23.51 23.49-55
BNS.PR.M 23.51 23.51-57
Series 16 25.93 Not yet trading

The new issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with the securityCode P50013.

Update, after close: What a difference a day makes! As briefly discussed in the September 25 Review, the new issue appears to have been the cause (or at least the trigger!) for a mass repricing of perpetuals. A revised table of comparibles is:

Comparables
Issue Fair Value
Estimated
by HIMIPref™
Quote 9/25
BNS.PR.J 25.40 25.41-60
BNS.PR.K 24.03 24.09-20
BNS.PR.L 23.10 23.03-24
BNS.PR.M 23.10 22.85-90
Series 16 25.45 Not yet trading

Update, 2007-10-10: As of the close today, fair value is estimated as $24.52.

Update, 2007-10-11: As of the close today, fair value is estimated at $24.43.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : June 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-06-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,592.5 1 1.00 5.38% 14.9 31M 5.35%
FixedFloater 1,909.1 13 2.0 5.43% 14.5 142M 5.76%
Floater 1,507.4 4 1.75 5.18% 13.7 66M 5.73%
OpRet 1,449.6 37 1.24 5.04% 1.8 63M 6.23%
SplitShare 1,481.2 8 1.87 6.08% 5.4 78M 6.20%
Interest-Bearing 1,692.4 7 2.00 6.92% 2.8 132M 7.92%
Perpetual-Premium 1,113.8 4 1.25 5.26% 5.7 104M 5.76%
Perpetual-Discount 1,264.3 10 1.60 5.75% 14.2 117M 5.84%

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-06-29, Post-rebalancing