PrefLetter

October PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the October edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The October edition will contain an appendix discussing the summer rally in PerpetualDiscount preferred shares which extended from May 20 to September 24 and resulted in what appears to be a regime shift in market valuations of individual issues: Implied Volatility (of the call option embedded in PerpetualDiscounts) is now a very significant determinant of relative market prices.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The September issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Tuesday (Monday is Thanksgiving). I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the October issue.

Miscellaneous News

Flash Crash: SEC's Statement of Fact Challenged by Nanex

Nanex has published a very important post titled May 6’th 2010 Flash Crash Analysis; Continuing Developments; Sell Algo Trades:

We have obtained the Waddell & Reed (W&R) May 6, 2010 trade executions from the executing broker in the June 2010 eMini futures contract. There were 6,438 trades totalling 75,000 contracts. We matched them by time, price and size to the 147,577 trades (844,513 contracts) in the CME time and sales data between 14:32 and 14:52 (they matched exactly). One-second resolution charts of the W&R trades along with other eMini trades are shown below in various time frames.

The SEC report identified a Sell Algorithm selling 75,000 contracts as the cause of the flash crash. If the “Sell Algorithm” in the SEC report refers to the Waddell & Reed trades, then there is a problem. A big one. Looking at the trades in context with the other trades during that time, they do not appear to be significant. The W&R trades also do not occur near the ignition point (14:42:44.075) we identified earlier. Furthermore, the W&R trades are practically absent during the torrential sell-off that began at 14:44:20. The bulk of the W&R trades occurred after the market bottomed and was rocketing higher — a point in time that the SEC report tells us the market was out of liquidity. Finally, the data makes it clear that the algorithm does take price into consideration; you can see it stops selling if the price moves down over a short period of time.

Something is very wrong here.

There are some charts of great interest.

I quite agree that something is very wrong here. The SEC stated quite explicitly:

This large fundamental trader chose to execute this sell program via an automated execution algorithm (“Sell Algorithm”) that was programmed to feed orders into the June 2010 E-Mini market to target an execution rate set to 9% of the trading volume calculated over the previous minute, but without regard to price or time.

Let’s play lawyer. “Target” does not necessarily mean that the execution rate was achieved. It only means it was targetted, and it is possible that other considerations adjusted this target. “Without regard to price” is formally consistent with Nanex’s observations regarding the appearence of pauses in algo execution, since the pauses are triggered by the rate of price decline; it might be that “without regard to price” means simply that once the market price has flattened out it starts executing again, regardless of what level prices reached during the pause period.

But that’s just hair-splitting. I will be most disappointed if this SEC report turns out to have been an exercise in legalistic hairsplitting.

Now, it is not necessarily the case that the SEC report and conclusion is completely wrong, even given the execution pause; it is entirely possible that Waddell Reed soaked up all the available liquidity and the price decline triggered other things. In that case the SEC report is not wrong, per se, but it has missed the point of the affair which (assuming that the hypothesis is correct) is far different from the stated conclusions.

After all, if I put in a market order to sell 100,000 shares; execution of this order takes the market price down a buck; the decline in market price triggers stop loss orders of 200,000 shares which take the market price down another two bucks; and this decline in market price causes the momentum players to jump in with both feet while all potential buyers sit on their hands and the maret price declines another four bucks … what’s the cause of the seven dollar decline? Me, I would say “mainly bozo price-based technical traders”, but maybe the SEC would blame me for the whole thing.

The SEC needs to clarify this.

The story has been picked up by the New York Times:

The findings are based on the actual private trading data from the afternoon of May 6 given to Nanex by Waddell & Reed — presumably because Waddell & Reed wants the data to be made public to clear its name as the cause of the crash.

The data was verified for Nanex by Barclays Capital, at the request of Waddell & Reed.
Barclays Capital supplied the computer algorithm used by Waddell & Reed to make the sale.

In a statement, Waddell & Reed said, “Following the recent release of the regulatory report on the ‘flash crash,’ many market observers have noted that the events of May 6 involve multiple issues that transcend the actions of any single market participant. We agree with those observations.”

A spokesman said, “After discussion, we granted permission to use the data, which was supplied to us by the executing broker.”

Market Action

October 7, 2010

BIS has released a working paper by Ben Craig and Goetz von Peter titled Interbank tiering and money center banks:

This paper provides evidence that interbank markets are tiered rather than flat, in the sense that most banks do not lend to each other directly but through money center banks acting as intermediaries. We capture the concept of tiering by developing a core-periphery model, and devise a procedure for fitting the model to real-world networks. Using Bundesbank data on bilateral interbank exposures among 1800 banks, we find strong evidence of tiering in the German banking system. Econometrically, bank-specific features, such as balance sheet size, predict how banks position themselves in the interbank market. This link provides a promising avenue for understanding the formation of financial networks.

The first column of Table 1 reports the simplest regression using bank size as the sole explanatory variable. The log of total bank assets is highly significant; a marginal increase in size from the average balance sheet of &eur;230 million raises the probability of belonging to the core by a sixth of a percent. Indeed, size is a fairly reliable classifier. The average size of banks in the core is 51 times that of banks in the periphery. Hence, large banks tend to be in the core, while small banks are found in the periphery of the interbank network.

Systemic importance is highly correlated with a bank’s network position: it is extremely unlikely that a systemically important bank would not be in the core, as indicated by the low rate of false core predictions, Prob(c|P). But the moderate fit also suggests that a bank’s position in the network is something that goes beyond its systemic importance.

The success of “Balance Sheet Size” in predicting network placement supports my contention that surcharges for systemically important banks should be based on a balance sheet variable – either gross assets or risk-weighted assets, I’m not particular – rather than upon a regulator’s determination that such-and-such bank is systemically important.

One thing I would like to see addressed is an examination of how increasing the risk-weighting of interbank assets would change the model. It is far too cheap, in terms of capital, for a bank to hold another bank’s paper; this increases the chance for contagion.

It was a day of readjusting prices on continued heavy volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 8bp and FixedResets picking up 8bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1835 % 2,167.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1835 % 3,284.1
Floater 2.88 % 3.22 % 75,161 19.20 3 0.1835 % 2,340.8
OpRet 4.91 % 3.21 % 77,017 0.15 9 0.0647 % 2,372.0
SplitShare 5.91 % -29.65 % 65,579 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,383.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0647 % 2,168.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.25 % 130,476 5.38 19 0.0083 % 1,999.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.47 % 5.46 % 226,842 14.70 58 -0.0784 % 1,994.0
FixedReset 5.28 % 3.18 % 325,957 3.29 47 0.0778 % 2,264.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-07
Maturity Price : 23.46
Evaluated at bid price : 23.71
Bid-YTW : 5.41 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-07
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 22.72
Bid-YTW : 5.32 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-07
Maturity Price : 21.22
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.02
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 84,546 RBC crossed blocks of 17,700 and 25,000, both at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.09
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 83,119 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 20,000 and 50,000, both at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 74,655 National sold two blocks of 10,000 each to anonymous, both at 24.45. Desjardins crossed 15,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-07
Maturity Price : 24.23
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 61,740 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-07
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.91
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 56,800 T crossed 35,000 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 40,225 RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Miscellaneous News

The Flash Crash and Financial Terrorism

Roubine Global Economics has published an alarmist blog post titled The Flash Crash and Financial Terrorism: Could the Nineteenth Street NW Scenario Come True?:

But the SEC’s explanation is scarcely reassuring, and the incident is surely symptomatic of the pervasive market uncertainty.[1] That a single trade could wreak such havoc also raises the intriguing (and frightening) possibility of a deliberately engineered financial crash.

A recent account, Nineteenth Street, NW, describes one possible scenario in which the terrorists use an off-shore hedge fund to launch a series of speculative attacks. The terrorists start with already weak currencies or markets—perhaps an overvalued currency or an under-financed sovereign[2]—and as they succeed in their initial speculative attacks, not only do they gain additional capital to launch their next attack, they also induce other (profit, not politically, motivated) investors to join the bandwagon of the next round of speculative attacks. In the story, the terrorists are also able to learn of the central banks’ FX intervention strategies (an issue of growing salience once more)—and plan a nasty surprise at a meeting of central bank governors and ministers to really spook markets. Eventually, given the interconnectedness of the global financial system, these cascading crises culminate in a global financial crash—costing trillions of dollars, and millions their jobs, homes, and life-savings.

The account is purely fictional, of course, but as George Soros proved when he helped oust the UK pound from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, weak fundamentals and jittery markets make for successful speculative attacks against even major central banks. And as the flash crash has amply demonstrated, markets are plenty jittery these days.

There’s so much here that is completely off-base I scarcely know where to begin. Terrorists launching speculative attacks via a hedge fund? Well, if they were that smart they wouldn’t be terrorists.

The Flash Crash caused 20 minutes of chaos, as the $4.1-billion market order swamped available liquidity, but the market quickly recovered. Dave Cummings estimates the cost of that adventure to be $100-million … and you can bet that the next twenty minutes would have cost more, given the lack of fundamental justification. Chaos inducing trades of this magnitude can only be done by sovereigns – China, say, the day before invading Taiwan. And in that event, you can bet the Fed would be involved, buying up Treasuries with fiat money as fast as the Chinese could sell.

Soros making a “successful speculative attack” in 1992? The UK owes Soros its heartfelt gratitude that he assisted in taking the pound out of the ERM. The attack was speculative, certainly, in the sense that there was no way of knowing for sure what was going to happen. But it would not have been successful had it been fundamentally unsound. What the events of September 1992 showed was that it was sterling’s position in the ERM that was unsound. Had they remained, the distortions would have spread from the financial economy to the real economy and things would have been, ultimately, much worse.

Which is the role of hedge funds and the role of short-trading: to yell that the emperor has no clothes. Politicians and global bureaucrats heartily dislike the entire process, because they’re the tailors. However, most of these attacks are unsuccessful because they are not based in fundamentals – they’re just chatter by wannabes.

The funny part about the essay is that the author acknowledges this:

Because the specific trigger is almost impossible to predict, crisis prevention efforts are better directed at addressing the underlying vulnerabilities. Quite simply, if there are no vulnerabilities, then a “triggering event” (deliberate or accidental) will have nothing to ignite, and will just fizzle out instead.

So who are the wise people who are going to make the system invulnerable, carefully ensuring that nothing bad can ever happen to anybody anywhere?

Starting from this premise, the Early Warning Exercise draws on a wide range of analytical tools, market information, and expert opinions. A key goal is to “connect the dots”—that is, understand how shocks in one country or market could spread across the global financial system. The findings are communicated confidentially to finance ministers and central bank governors at the IMF Spring and Fall meetings in order that they may take prompt preventive and corrective actions, especially those that require international cooperation and coordination.

Ah, yes, the IMF, perpetually on the prowl to expand its bureaucracy.

And who, you may ask, is raising the bogeyman of financial terrorism (as described in the novel Nineteenth Street NW) and pointing to the IMF as the saviour of the world? Funny you should ask:

Rex Ghosh is an economist with the International Monetary Fund and the author of Nineteenth Street NW (www.nineteenthstreetnw.com), a thriller about financial terrorism and a global market crash.

Roubini has demeaned himself by publishing this claptrap.

Issue Comments

ALB.PR.A Reorganization Proposal: Shares to be Refunded

Allbanc Split Corp II has announced:

that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to reorganize the Company. The reorganization will permit holders of Capital Shares to extend their investment in the Company beyond the scheduled redemption date of February 28, 2011 for an additional five years. The Preferred Shares will be redeemed on the same terms originally contemplated in their share provisions. Holders of Capital Shares who do not wish to extend their investment and all holders of Preferred Shares will have their shares redeemed on February 28, 2011.

The reorganization will involve (i) the extension of the originally scheduled redemption date, (ii) a special retraction right to enable holders of Capital Shares to retract their shares as originally contemplated should they not wish to extend their investment and (iii) the issuance of a new class of preferred shares in order to provide continuing leverage for the Capital Shares.

A special meeting of holders of the Capital Shares will be held on December 7, 2010 to consider and vote upon the proposed reorganization. Details of the proposed reorganization will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Capital Shares of record on October 28, 2010 in connection with the special meeting and will be available on www.sedar.com. Implementation of the proposed reorganization will also be subject to applicable regulatory approval including the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Allbanc Split Corp. II is a mutual fund corporation created to hold a portfolio of publicly listed common shares of selected Canadian chartered banks.

ALB.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the company announced it was considering reorganizing. ALB.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

FCS.PR.B Exchanged from FIG.PR.A; DBRS Rates Pfd-3(low)

Faircourt Asset Management has announced:

the completion of the merger of Faircourt Income & Growth Split Trust (“FIG”) into Faircourt Split Trust, as the continuing fund (“FCS”), effective September 30, 2010 (the “Merger”). The Merger was approved by unitholders and preferred securityholders of each of FIG and FCS at special meetings of the preferred securityholders and unitholders held on September 13, 2010, September 20, 2010 and September 27, 2010. FCS will continue trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) under the symbols “FCS.UN” for the units and “FCS.PR.B” for the new preferred securities.

In addition, in connection with the Merger, the preferred securities of FIG were exchanged on a one-for-one basis for 6.25% preferred securities of FCS. Again, as preferred securities are recorded on a book-based system, no action is required by holders of the preferred securities to be recognized as a preferred securityholder of FCS.

By effecting the Merger on a taxable basis for both the unitholders and the holders of preferred securities rather than on a tax-deferred rollover basis, the Merger will also enable FCS to preserve its realized capital losses from the current taxation year and loss carry forwards from prior taxation years and to avoid realizing its unrealized losses.

DBRS has announced that it:

has today assigned a rating of Pfd-3 (low) to the 6.25% Preferred Securities issued by Faircourt Split Trust (FCS). DBRS has also discontinued the Pfd-3 rating of FCS’s 5.75% Preferred Securities and the Pfd-4 (high) rating of the Preferred Securities issued by Faircourt Income & Growth Split Trust (FIG).

Faircourt Asset Management Inc. (Faircourt) was the manager of both FIG and FCS. The ratings of FIG and FCS were placed Under Review with Developing Implications on August 19, 2010, after Faircourt announced that shareholder meetings would be held for both funds to vote on a proposal to merge FIG into FCS (the Continuing Trust). In meetings held from September 13 to 27, 2010 (adjournments were caused by a lack of quorum), the preferred securityholders and unitholders of FIG and FCS approved the merger.

The FIG preferred securityholders approved an extraordinary resolution authorizing the exchange of their existing securities for the new series of 6.25% Preferred Securities issued by FCS.

Holders of the 6.25% Preferred Securities have benefited from an effective upgrade in credit quality, resulting mainly from an increase in downside protection following the merger into the Continuing Trust.

The Pfd-3 (low) rating of the 6.25% Preferred Securities is primarily based on the downside protection available (32% as of October 5, 2010) and the diversification of the Continuing Trust’s investment portfolio. The main constraints to the rating are the following:

(1) The downside protection provided to holders of the 6.25% Preferred Securities is dependent on the value of the securities in the investment portfolio.

(2) Volatility of price and changes in the dividend policies of the underlying issuers may result in significant reductions in dividend coverage or downside protection from time to time.

(3) Reliance on the manager to generate a high yield on the investment portfolio to meet distributions and other trust expenses without having to liquidate portfolio securities.

The 6.25% Preferred Securities are scheduled to mature on December 31, 2014.

FIG.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the merger and exchange was approved. FCS.PR.B is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

October 6, 2010

Japan is rumoured to be considering a capital surcharge on systemically important banks, but details and confirmations are scarce:

Japan’s financial regulator is considering forcing the country’s largest banks to hold more capital than required under Basel III rules, a person with direct knowledge of the matter said.

The Financial Services Agency will start internal discussions soon on whether to apply a capital surcharge to systemically important lenders such as Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Inc., the person said, declining to be identified because the matter is confidential.

The Swiss panel said UBS AG and Credit Suisse should hold almost double the capital required under the Basel III proposals announced last month. By 2019, the lenders would need to hold at least 10 percent of capital in common equity, compared with 7 percent required under Basel.

The possibility of a global capital surcharge of around 2 percent for the world’s most important banks “cannot be ruled out,” Shinichi Ina, a Tokyo-based analyst at Credit Suisse, wrote in a report this week.

This is regulation in a nut’s hell. I support a progressive surcharge on Risk Weighted Assets. I am quite aware that RWA is, at best, an imperfect measure of a bank’s systemic importance; but I assert that singling out a group of “Top Tier” banks is worse.

Bad news for Ireland:

Ireland got an unwelcome jolt Wednesday as Fitch Ratings cut its sovereign credit rating to the lowest level of any of the major agencies, citing the heavy burden of bailing out the country’s banking sector.

Fitch cut Ireland’s long-term foreign- and local-currency ratings to A+ from AA-. Moody’s Investors Service, which warned Tuesday that it was reviewing the country for a possible downgrade, and Standard & Poor’s both rate Irish debt higher.

The move “reflects the exceptional and greater-than-expected fiscal cost associated with the government’s recapitalization of the Irish banks, especially Anglo Irish Bank,” Chris Pryce, Fitch’s director of sovereign ratings said in a statement.

The Bank of Canada has released a Working Paper by James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, and Miguel Molico titled Central Bank Haircut Policy:

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.

The TMX has a new page showing Bond Market Data. The data from today (labelled July 19, 2010), showing $20.04-billion face nominal Canadas being traded vs. $0.01-billion face RRBs, should illustrate the points I have made at various time regarding the relative liquidity of the latter! I presume – but do not know – that they get their trading statistics from the same data set used for their prices, which are major Canadian dealers.

The Canadian preferred share market showed continued strength on continued high volume, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 17bp and FixedResets up 10bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.47%, equivalent to 7.66% interest at the standard conversion factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield 5.2% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) now stands at about 245bp, a sharp decline from the 260bp reported on September 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1102 % 2,163.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1102 % 3,278.1
Floater 2.89 % 3.24 % 74,699 19.17 3 0.1102 % 2,336.5
OpRet 4.91 % 3.10 % 76,913 0.15 9 0.0457 % 2,370.4
SplitShare 5.91 % -31.75 % 66,246 0.09 2 0.1836 % 2,383.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0457 % 2,167.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.30 % 125,143 4.86 19 0.0921 % 1,999.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.47 % 223,552 14.68 58 0.1676 % 1,995.5
FixedReset 5.29 % 3.20 % 321,372 3.30 47 0.1029 % 2,262.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 24.30
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 25.63
Evaluated at bid price : 25.68
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.93
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 23.52
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 120,790 RBC crossed 89,100 at 20.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 20.27
Evaluated at bid price : 20.27
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 95,566 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 10,000, both at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 91,262 Nesbitt crossed 88,000 at 16.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 16.30
Evaluated at bid price : 16.30
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 59,453 RBC crossed 49,900 at 26.66.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 46,291 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 38,548 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-06
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.77
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
There were 54 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Contingent Capital

Nagel, Tory's Opine on Preferred Shares, Contingent Capital

Financial Webring Forum brings to my attention a Globe & Mail article titled What happens to rate reset prefs in Basel III?:

John Nagel at Desjardins Securities has been watching the issue closely, trying to get clarity from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. He has a vested interest in the outcome because the Desjardins team invented the structure.

At the moment nothing has been decided, but Mr. Nagel said the last he heard, a contingent capital clause was being considered for all new rate reset issues. As a reminder, contingent capital simply means a security type that will convert to common equity when things get rocky.

As far as he knows, outstanding rate reset issues will be grandfathered under Basel III and will count as Tier 1 capital and equity. Going forward, though, Mr. Nagel thinks prospectuses for these issues could have a section, possibly called the Automatic Exchange Event, that describes how preferred shares are exchanged into common equity.

However, this type of “trigger event” would only happen if OSFI declares the financial institution “non-viable” and Mr. Nagel suspects it’s unlikely that will happen in Canada.

“If a bank or an institution was in trouble, long before it would be declared non-viable they would halt trading and OSFI would say ‘Fine, you’re merging with BMO or RBC,” he said. If a merger occurred, the distressed institution’s preferred shares would then become obligations of the acquirer.

No moral hazard here, no way, not in Canada!

The critical “point of non-viability” at which Mr. Nagel believes conversion will be triggered is in accord with Dickson’s speech in May, most recently referenced in PrefBlog in the post A Structural Model of Contingent Bank Capital. The recent BIS proposals insist on some conversion point, setting the point of non-viability as the floor limit, as discussed in BIS Proposes CoCos: Regulatory Trigger, Infinite Dilution.

As I have discussed, many a time and oft, I think that’s a crazy place to have the conversion trigger. It may help somewhat in paying for a crisis, but it will do nothing to prevent a crisis. S&P agrees.

In order to prevent a crisis, the conversion trigger has to be set much further from the point of bankruptcy; the McDonald CoCos are an academic treatment of a model I have advocated for some time: there is automatic conversion if the common price falls below a pre-set trigger price; the conversion is from par value of the preferreds into common at that pre-set price. I suggest that a sensible place to start thinking about setting the trigger price is one-half the common equity price at the time of issue of the preferreds.

Tory’s published a piece by Blair W Keefe in May, titled Canada Pushes Embedded Contingent Capital:

A number of concerns arise with the use of embedded contingent capital.

First, it is likely that the conversion itself could cause a “run” on the troubled bank: effectively, the conversion means that the bank is on the eve of insolvency and the conversion does not create any additional capital; it merely improves the quality of the capital. As a practical matter, it will likely be essential for the government to immediately provide funding to the bank; however, with the former holders of subordinated debt and preferred shares being converted into holders of common shares, the government could replenish the subordinated debt rather than being required to replenish the Tier 1 capital, which occurred in the financial crisis. Therefore, it should be less likely that the government would suffer a financial loss.

This echoes my point about prevention vs. cure.

Third, the cost of capital could increase significantly for banks, particularly if the new capital instruments are viewed as equity – given their conversions in times of financial difficulty to common share equity – rather than debt instruments. OSFI is sensitive to this concern and is the reason why OSFI is advocating a trigger that occurs on the eve of insolvency (rather than earlier in the process) when the holders of subordinated debt and preferred shares would anticipate incurring losses in any event.

In other words, OSFI thinks you can get something for nothing. Ain’t gonna happen. Either we’ll raise the cost of capital for the banks, or we’ll do this pretend-regulation thing for free and then find out it doesn’t work. One or the other.

Seventh, if the embedded contingent capital proposals are adopted, how will those requirements need to be reflected in the Basel III capital proposals? Similarly, what treatment will rating agencies give to contingent capital? If the triggering event is considered remote, rating agencies may not give “equity” credit treatment for the instruments.

Finally, with any change of this nature, market participants worry about the unexpected consequences: Will hedge funds or other market participants be able to “game” the system? Will the conversion features create more instability for a bank experiencing some financial difficulty? Could the conversion create a death spiral of dilution? and so on.

Ms. Dickson’s beloved “Market Price Conversion” formula will almost definitely create a death spiral. While fixed-price conversion may create multiple equilibria (which the Fed worries about), I see that as being the lesser of a host of evils. Gaming can be reduced if the conversion trigger is based on a long enough period of time: my original and current suggestion is VWAP measured over 20 consecutive trading days. It would be very expensive to game that to any significant extent, and not very profitable. On the other had, if the conversion trigger is a single share trading below the conversion price … yes, that presents more of a problem.

Market Action

October 5, 2010

The European stress tests are encountering renewed criticism:

The health check, undertaken by the Committee of EuropeanBankingSupervisors (CEBS), tested sovereign debt holdings in short-term trading books but turned a blind eye to the longer-term banking books. Then it emerged that the so-called “gross disclosures” weren’t gross at all. The latest Irish bank bailout has now revealed a third flaw.

The tests were supposed to reassure global investors by showing that systemically important eurozone banks could survive what was perceived as their biggest threat — a sovereign default. But the tests skirted around the Irish situation in two ways. First, Ireland’s banks have failed due to an immense property crash, not a sovereign crisis. Second, the biggest disaster zone — Anglo Irish Bank — was not even stress-tested.

Jerome Kerviel, the SocGen trader who was in the position of a drug mule caught at customs, has been sentenced to three years in jail:

Former Societe Generale (SOGN.PA) trader Jerome Kerviel was sentenced to three years in jail by a Paris court on Tuesday for his role in a trading scandal and ordered to pay the French bank 4.9 billion euros ($6.8 billion).

The verdict came as a victory for SocGen, which always maintained Kerviel acted alone and without the sanction of his managers at the bank. It had sought payment of damages for the money it lost unwinding the trader’s risky market bets in 2008.

The payment to SocGen equates to 3.2 percent of France’s central government deficit for 2010, the GDP of Monaco or 16 percent of the French bank’s market value. Kerviel is currently paid 2,300 euros a month as a technology consultant.

Kerviel was last discussed on PrefBlog on May 3. There is no indication that any of those actually responsible have even been charged.

Moody’s warns on Ireland:

Moody’s Investors Service said Tuesday it may cut Ireland’s debt rating again, citing the increased cost to the government of repairing the stricken banking system, weak economic growth and rising borrowing costs.

A further downgrade could push Ireland’s borrowing costs higher and make it more difficult for the government to meet its debt repayments without seeking help from the European Union’s European Financial Stability Fund.

“Me, too!”, shouts DBRS. The EU bureaucrats will have to take decisive action, as discussed October 1.

Norwegian police are feverishly attempting to make the markets safe for the incompetent:

Two day traders have been arrested by Norwegian police for allegedly cracking an algorithm of U.S. brokerage firm Timber Hill, in order to manipulate the stock prices of three companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.

The two day traders, Svend Egil Larsen and Peder Veiby, have been charged with “market manipulation” and face up to six years in jail if convicted. Timber Hill is a subsidiary of Interactive Brokers and acts as its market maker.

Norwegian police claim that between March 2007 and March 2008, the two traders conducted more than 2,200 purchase and sale orders which were “ not real” and jacked the price of the shares in three Norwegian companies up or down before taking a profit Bottom line: the two day traders outsmarted Timber Hill’s algorithm and made money in the process. The three Norwegian companies were Hafslund, Wilh. Wilhelmsen and Odfjell.

Veiby earned 250,000 Norwegian kroner ($40,698) in the alleged scam while Larsen earned 160,000 Norwegian kroner ($26,056). Timber Hill did not return Securities Technology Monitor’s call seeking comment by press time.

“In our view it is a deliberate manipulation against the computer they’ve been trading against so that the system changed the prices and they were able to earn money,” said Christian Steinberg with the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime in an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Dagens Naeringsliv.

The newpaper report said that Larsen declined to comment and Veiby denied any wrongdoing on the grounds he did “not act with the intent to commit price manipulation in the legal sense.” The alleged scam was uncovered by the Oslo Stock Exchange, which reported it to the Norwegian National Authority and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime.

I don’t see that anything wrong was done at all. Willing buyer, willing seller, arm’s length … what’s the problem? Trades “not real”? I don’t see it. They owned the stock, they had the risk, there was transfer of risk … if Timber Hill can’t programme its algorithms better than that, the individuals charged have done a service to the market by taking capital away from those unable to deploy it with competence. Timber Hill’s only possible excuse is that the amounts were so small (less than $100,000 total profit for a year) that the efect was lost as a rounding error … but that’s a pretty flimsy excuse.

However, according to the Google translation of a story in Norwegian titled Klart dette er greit, the story is more complex than reported above – naturally enough:

The two exploited a weakness in the computer algorithm in the near half a year without Hill Timberlake discovered it. This week in Oslo District Court has been discussed in court if the two ran the illegal market manipulation, or whether they simply were smarter than any other market player.

– It is obvious that what they have done is okay, says Jan Erik Meidell.

Meidell was employee number three when he started in Timber Hill in 1994. He helped build the brokerage house’s position in market making in Europe, and was one of two managers for their trading in Europe. Meidell ruled the so-called share the robots, and he claims to know the Timber Hills algorithms and trading strategies in detail. Today Meidell PhD student at NHH and co-owner of the investment fund NorthSeaGem.

He believes it is “nonsense” that the two persons now sitting accused of having exploited a weakness in Timber Hills algorithms.

– Timber Hill has chosen a strategy that involves risk and acknowledge that it sometimes will lead to losses, “says Meidell to dn.no

– What do you think that people take advantage of the robot’s weakness when the opportunity occasionally arises?

– Sure it’s okay. Whoever is to play, must withstand the roast, “says Meidell.

The most important point is that Timber Hill is fully aware that they can not have full control over all shares always mean Meidell. It is not so important – the overall strategy is in fact profitable strategy for Timber Hill.

– They think that what they lose in one stock, it will win them back in others. Does the strategy in more than 50 percent of cases, so you earn bucks, and it’s just that Timber Hill, says Meidell.

Timber Hill has been absent in the trial which is now in the Oslo City Court, and they have not wanted to respond to Dagens Næringsliv inquiries.

– I think Timber Hills reaction ultimately had been “awesome, you managed to crack our algorithm. Perhaps they had even offered them jobs, “says Meidell.

So .. who knows? However, it does look a little as if the Norwegian regulator is attempting to ensure that incompetent traders are protected, and that the stock market is a nice little place where children play nicely.

Another strong day on heavy volume for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 30bp and FixedResets tagging along for a 9bp gain.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2747 % 2,161.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2747 % 3,274.5
Floater 2.89 % 3.25 % 75,797 19.15 3 -0.2747 % 2,333.9
OpRet 4.90 % 2.99 % 77,452 0.15 9 0.1982 % 2,369.4
SplitShare 5.92 % -30.42 % 66,814 0.09 2 0.4921 % 2,379.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1982 % 2,166.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.71 % 5.30 % 124,470 5.31 19 -0.0041 % 1,997.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.50 % 220,892 14.68 58 0.2970 % 1,992.2
FixedReset 5.27 % 3.20 % 318,578 3.29 47 0.0863 % 2,260.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 20.17
Evaluated at bid price : 20.17
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 22.25
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 23.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.12
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 67,860 Desjardins bought 10,000 from National at 24.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 24.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.38
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 54,850 TD crossed 40,000 at 28.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.06
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 44,644 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.69
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 41,425 TD bought 12,600 from anonymous at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
NA.PR.M Perpetual-Premium 39,120 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 37,910 TD crossed 10,000 at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 22.47
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

FFH.PR.I Settles Steady on Big Volume

Fairfax Financial Holdings has announced that it:

has completed its previously announced public offering of Preferred Shares, Series I (the “Series I Shares”) in Canada. As a result of the underwriters’ exercising in full their option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series I Shares, Fairfax has issued 12,000,000 Series I Shares for gross proceeds of $300 million. Net proceeds of the issue, after commissions and expenses, are approximately $291 million.

Fairfax intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to augment its cash position, to increase short term investments and marketable securities held at the holding company level, to retire outstanding debt and other corporate obligations from time to time, and for general corporate purposes.

The Series I Shares were sold through a syndicate of Canadian underwriters led by BMO Capital Markets, CIBC World Markets Inc., RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and Scotia Capital Inc., and that also included TD Securities Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Cormark Securities Inc., GMP Securities L.P., Canaccord Genuity Corp., Desjardins Securities Inc. and HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc.

$300-million? That means the greenshoe was fully exercised. FFH.PR.I is a FixedReset 5.00%+285, announced September 27.

FFH.PR.I traded 516,783 shares in a range of 24.85-97 before closing at 24.91-93, 5×33.

Vital statistics are:

FFH.PR.I FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-10-05
Maturity Price : 24.86
Evaluated at bid price : 24.91
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %

FFH.PR.I is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.