Market Action

August 12, 2009

Some Assiduous Readers may feel that I have a knee jerk reaction to increased rule-making … but it isn’t always the case! The proposed rules on US Municipal bond new issues isn’t all that bad:

Some institutional investors claimed that underwriters and their related accounts “buy bonds in the primary offering for their own account even though other orders remain unfilled,” the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board said in a statement today. The board is an industry self-regulatory group dominated by securities dealers.

The board proposal would require underwriters to “give priority to customer orders over orders for its own account” or from affiliates. It wouldn’t prohibit sales to related accounts, though underwriters “shall have the burden of justifying that such allocation was in the best interests of the syndicate” and in accord with principles of “fair dealing,” the board said in a draft interpretive notice.

The board’s announcement doesn’t mention complaints by issuers, who incur extra costs if bonds are sold at lower prices and higher interest rates than needed.

“The proposed changes help make the case for competitive rather than negotiated bond sales,” said Robert Doty, president of American Government Financial Services, a Sacramento, California-based adviser to issuers.

In competitive sales, issuers take the best price offered by bankers, whereas in negotiated sales, they rely on the advice of their underwriter and sometimes a financial adviser. Local governments’ and not-for-profits’ negotiated deals accounted for 86 percent of the $391.3 billion of new municipal bonds sold last year, according to Thomson Reuters data.

“Bond pricing in 2009 is the least efficient in years,” bankers at Ziegler Cos. said in a July 27 letter sent to clients who issue bonds. After underwriters set prices low enough to attract more orders than there are bonds, “investors rush to buy the cheap securities, and many flip them the next day for a quick profit,” the Chicago-based firm said.

Conflict of interest is an often overrated fault, but acting as both advisor and counterparty to an issuer … well, I call that a step over the line. By me, advising on price is an advisory matter and the brokerage is an agent; they are more than welcome to backup their advice with money and say something like …. ‘well, we can try and sell it at 5.50%, but if you go to 5.60% we’ll guarantee it’, and provide a backstop for the success of the underwriting. The key part of the word “backstop”, however, is “back” and third party orders should take priority. Once they start giving preferential – or even pro-rata – fills to related accounts, however, they are no longer agents but principals; they should make it very clear from the beginning just how they are acting.

Frankly, I’m a little surprised this issue hasn’t surfaced before, or that clients have allowed it! The source document states:

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”) is requesting comment on draft amendments to Rule G-11, on new issue syndicate practices, Rule G-8, on books and records, and Rule G-9, on preservation of records. The draft amendments to Rule G-11 would expand the rule to cover all primary market offerings, not just those for which syndicates are formed. They would also provide that, in general, unless otherwise agreed to by the issuer, the syndicate manager or the sole underwriter (as the case may be) shall give priority to customer orders over orders for its own account, orders from an affiliate for its account, or orders for their respective related accounts.

The UK FSA has published its rules on bonuses. Many of the principles insist on giving the employer a great deal of discretion:

Non-financial performance metrics should form a significant part of the performance assessment process.

The measurement of performance for long-term incentive plans, including those based on the performance of shares, should be risk-adjusted.

These changes will make lawyers very, very happy.

The CIT drama continues with a SEC filing:

As a first step of the restructuring plan, on July 20, 2009, the Company commenced a cash tender offer for its outstanding $1 billion in floating rate senior notes due August 17, 2009 and amended the offer on August 3, 2009. A description of the terms of the offer and the amendment are contained in Form 8-K’s filed by the Company on July 21, July 24 and August 3, 2009.

If the tender offer is successfully completed, the Company intends to use the proceeds of the Credit Facility to complete the tender offer and make payment for the August 17 notes. Further, the Company and a Steering Committee of the bond holder lending group do not intend for the Company to seek relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, but rather will pursue restructuring efforts as part of the comprehensive restructuring plan to enhance the Company’s liquidity and capital position. If the pending tender offer is not successfully completed, and the Company is unable to obtain alternative financing, an event of default under the provisions of the Credit Facility would result and the Company could seek relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

The Credit Facility contains provisions (i) requiring the Company and the Steering Committee to work together in good faith to promptly develop a mutually acceptable restructuring plan for the Company and its Subsidiaries and (ii) requiring the Company to adopt a restructuring plan acceptable to the majority in number of the Steering Committee by October 1, 2009. The agreement also calls for a draft of the restructuring plan on a “best efforts basis” by August 14, 2009. As a result, the Company currently expects to complete and begin executing on the restructuring plan prior to the required October 1 deadline.

In a successful effort to prove that they are morons, they copy-protected the PDF, so I copy-pasted from the MS-Word version. Just so you know.

Bloomberg had an interesting piece on the market for US RMBS:

Investors are overestimating potential yields in part because they are failing to consider how many loans are becoming delinquent for the first time and in part because they are arriving at incorrect conclusions on how long it will take to liquidate seized homes, the [Amherst Securities Group LP] New York-based analysts led by Laurie Goodman wrote in a report yesterday. Those issues can influence both the size of foreclosure losses and how quickly bonds get paid down.

“Do your homework, and sell securities which are being evaluated incorrectly by the marketplace,” the analysts wrote.

For example, the most-senior classes of 2006 and 2007 securities backed by prime-jumbo mortgages have rallied to more than 80 cents on the dollar, from as low as 55 cents, according to Amherst. So-called super-senior bonds backed by “option” adjustable-rate mortgages have jumped to about 48 cents, from the “low 30s,” the analysts wrote.

Investors also have been doing too little analysis of the differences, such as the level of home equity, among borrowers with currently non-delinquent mortgages backing non-agency bonds, which lack guarantees from government-supported Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or U.S. agency Ginnie Mae, they said.

What? Homework? Analysis? Who has time for that stuff, anyway, in between client meetings and sales? Just buy what the smiley-boy at the dealer’s tells you is good.

PerpetualDiscounts had yet another good day today, with a total return of +62bp to bring the median YTW down to 5.84%, equivalent to 8.18% interest at the standard pre-tax equivalency factor of 1.4x for taxable holders. Long Corporates now yield a hair over 6.0%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 215bp, narrowing in from the 230bp recorded on August 5 and returning to its month-end level.

Volume continued strong, with PerpetualDiscounts dominating the volume highlights table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 6.6046 % 1,392.4
FixedFloater 6.30 % 4.56 % 49,673 17.85 1 1.5294 % 2,437.4
Floater 3.27 % 3.25 % 124,343 19.08 2 6.6046 % 1,739.5
OpRet 4.87 % -9.57 % 145,125 0.09 15 0.1535 % 2,270.4
SplitShare 5.69 % 6.48 % 96,070 4.10 3 0.2107 % 2,038.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1535 % 2,076.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.31 % 86,827 2.65 4 0.0199 % 1,865.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.84 % 173,684 14.10 67 0.6240 % 1,765.2
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.07 % 507,015 4.15 40 0.0277 % 2,101.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.97
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.63
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 45.86
Evaluated at bid price : 48.61
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.70
Evaluated at bid price : 23.59
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 17.83
Evaluated at bid price : 17.83
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.69
Bid-YTW : 5.54 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.28
Evaluated at bid price : 19.28
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.26
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.54
Evaluated at bid price : 22.72
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.72
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.98
Evaluated at bid price : 19.98
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.34
Evaluated at bid price : 21.34
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.53
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 5.63 % A real move, as it traded 3,945 shares in a range of 11.52-07 before closing at 11.83-48, 5×2. This may be related to the announcements regarding the real estate vulture fund and the BPO equity issue … or it may not be. Take your pick.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 11.83
Evaluated at bid price : 11.83
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 7.57 % Traded 12,091 shares in a range of 11.37-21 before closing at 12.22-30, 1×23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 12.22
Evaluated at bid price : 12.22
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 111,000 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 53,300 and 35,000 shares at 19.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 106,800 TD crossed 99,000 shares at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.80
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 106,600 TD crossed 92,200 at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.62
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 102,181 RBC crossed 51,600 at 20.43; Nesbitt crossed 37,000 at 20.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 102,050 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 25.00; RBC crossed 67,500 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 97,998 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.20; Desjardins crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Miscellaneous News

AIC Preferred Income Fund: Under New Management

Manulife has announced:

that Manulife has signed an agreement to acquire AIC’s Canadian retail investment fund business.

Under the agreement, Manulife Mutual Funds would manage all AIC funds in Canada and AIC would continue to act as a fund sub-advisor for Manulife Mutual Funds.

Further:

Once complete, the acquisition of AIC Limited’s retail investment fund business by Manulife Financial will create significant scale and presence for Manulife’s individual wealth management business across Canada.

At AIC Limited, key members of its portfolio management team will return to their asset management roots by creating a sub-advisory business focused on high net-worth individuals, plus will continue to act as a sub-advisor for Manulife Mutual Funds.

The businesses based in Burlington and Toronto, Ontario currently have almost $13.7 billion* in combined investment funds assets under management across Canada.

“plus will continue to act …”? Oh, well, the doctors say I have to learn to let these things go.

AIC provides further details:

Investment management for the following AIC-managed and sub-advised funds will remain in place for the time-being, but Manulife Mutual Funds will review the line-up to determine the most appropriate next steps. The result of this review should be available shortly:

AIC Trust Funds:

  • AIC Preferred Income Fund

AIC Preferred Income Fund is rather interesting. Their promotional material states:

Why a preferred income fund?

Preferred shares are safer than common stocks not simply because they typically rank higher up the capital structure but also because traditionally only Canada’s largest public companies can earn access to the preferred market. AIC’s familiarity with all of those issuers increases the chances that AIC Preferred Income Fund will come to own the best of those issues.

A diversified portfolio of preferred shares and other attractive income-producing investments is a prudent choice for many investors. But choices are many and attention to the detailed terms, nuances and credit ratings of each issue/issuer is absolutely required. Ownership of the AIC Preferred Income Fund is simply an easier alternative … let us do the management and monitoring of the portfolio for you.

AIC Preferred Income Fund offers tax-advantaged income at a high current yield with relative safety in a single decision purchase. With an emphasis on dividend-paying preferred shares, AIC Preferred Income Fund delivers a steady stream of monthly income subject to lower tax rates relative to fixed income instruments (held outside a registered account). For investors at the highest marginal tax rates, in all provinces, after–tax returns on dividends exceed after–tax income returns from bonds or bond funds of similar current yield (held outside a registered account). And for many investors in lower tax brackets dividend income (held outside a registered account) can actually be completely free of tax. Distributions from the Fund may consist of dividends, capital gains, interest and/or return of capital.

AIC Preferred Income Fund provides you attractive current yield and tax efficiency.

… which is all very good, although more details supporting the statement AIC’s familiarity with all of those issuers increases the chances that AIC Preferred Income Fund will come to own the best of those issues. would have been most interesting.

Of additional interest is their statement of holdings reported by Morningstar:

Zeus Receivables Trust 8.7
Diversified Trust 6.8
Ridge Trust 5.8
Darwin Receivables Trust 5.8
Sun Life Finl 4.9
Canadian Master Trust 4.8
TORONTO DOMINION BK ONT 4.8
Bk Montreal Que Pfd 4.8
BANK N S HALIFAX 4.8
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BK COMM TORONTO ONT 4.8

Zeus Receivables is bank sponsored ABCP.

Diversified Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Ridge Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Darwin Receivables Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Canadian Master Trust is bank sponsored ABCP.

Market Action

August 11, 2009

There’s an interesting bit of law being litigated, regarding securitization and bankruptcy:

Terms of the two Lehman transactions, named Dante after the entity that issued the notes, specify that investors have first claim on whatever money is available if Lehman defaults or goes bankrupt. While the U.K.-based contract favors the noteholders, U.S. bankruptcy law normally protects a debtor company’s assets. Lehman is asking the bankruptcy judge to rule in its favor.

Not Yet Tested

Not yet tested is whether U.S. law permits the investors to use a written contract to give themselves priority claims after a bankruptcy. In the U.K., the related case was brought against Lehman and Bank of New York by a trustee for Australian noteholder Perpetual Trustee Co.

Rating agencies could start to downgrade credit-linked notes if Peck says Lehman can take away assets protecting the investments, debt research firm CreditSights Inc. said in a July 12 report. Insulating such deals from bankruptcy “forms the bedrock of securitization,” CreditSights analyst Atish Kakodkar said in the report.

Comrade Obama announced today that Americans are too stupid to invest:

The main difference in the proposal from earlier outlines is a provision to “better protect” small municipalities and “unsophisticated investors” by limiting their eligibility to trade derivatives. The rest of the statement mirrors earlier proposals by asking Congress to impose higher capital and margin requirements, move most derivatives to regulated exchanges and clearinghouses and impose supervision over all dealers.

Frank and Peterson’s proposal also left open whether to ban trading of so-called naked credit-default swaps, which were designed to insure against the default of a company’s bonds. Lawmakers and administration officials say the product has been abused by hedge funds and other investors who used them to speculate on the likelihood of a company’s collapse.

Naked contracts or positions are those in which the buyer doesn’t own the underlying asset or stock on which the trading is based.

Frank told reporters last month that he supports proposals to restrict derivatives sales to municipalities.

Soon all shorting will be illegal, and then everything will always go up!

DBRS downgraded some MAV2 notes today (MAV2 is the reincarnation of ABCP):

Negative rating migration in the underlying asset interests, particularly in CDO transactions with relatively low levels of credit enhancement, has increased the required enhancement level for the Notes to above that commensurate with the “A” rating assigned on January 21, 2009. Numerous reference entities have been downgraded (in some cases by more than ten notches), resulting in higher probabilities of default for the CDO asset interests. Monoline downgrades in particular have put pressure on the rating of the Notes. Any future deterioration in the credit quality of monoline insurers may lead to further ratings action. Figure 1 below lists the most notable downgrades of reference entities since January 1, 2009. In addition, a number of credit events, coupled with historically low realized recoveries, have reduced enhancement levels available to the CDO transactions. Figure 2 below lists the credit events and International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) protocol recoveries since January 1, 2009. These factors have resulted in a rapid deterioration in the credit quality of certain CDO asset interests.

Preferreds continued their winning ways today (this is the tenth consecutive trading day of gains for PerpetualDiscounts, over the course of which they have gained 4.81%) amidst continued heavy volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.4845 % 1,306.1
FixedFloater 6.40 % 4.65 % 48,443 17.73 1 3.0303 % 2,400.7
Floater 3.49 % 3.49 % 123,724 18.50 2 1.4845 % 1,631.7
OpRet 4.87 % -7.78 % 139,776 0.09 15 0.3517 % 2,266.9
SplitShare 5.71 % 6.47 % 93,891 4.10 3 0.1970 % 2,034.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3517 % 2,072.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.26 % 73,591 2.65 4 0.3093 % 1,865.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.85 % 5.89 % 173,199 14.03 67 0.1544 % 1,754.3
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.05 % 512,040 4.15 40 0.0083 % 2,100.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.07
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 11.36
Evaluated at bid price : 11.36
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 11.20
Evaluated at bid price : 11.20
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 23.62
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 2.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.43
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 19.01
Evaluated at bid price : 19.01
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 4.65 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 279,261 RBC crossed 266,400 at 27.80. Nice ticket!
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 187,631 RBC crossed 183,000 at 20.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.31
Evaluated at bid price : 20.31
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 88,141 RBC crossed 84,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 24.41
Evaluated at bid price : 24.63
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 69,796 RBC crossed 25,000 at 20.34, then 22,200 at 20.36.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.27
Evaluated at bid price : 20.27
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 69,545 TD crossed 45,000 at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 21.40
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Premium 66,735 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-11
Maturity Price : 24.74
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

August 10, 2009

CIT has amended its exchange offer for its debentures due August 17:

As a result of the amendment, holders of all Notes tendered prior to the expiration date at midnight, New York City time, at the end of Friday, August 14, 2009, will receive the amended purchase price of $875 in cash per $1,000 principal amount of Notes, as total consideration in the Offer. Previously, the purchase price, which included an early delivery payment, was $825 per $1,000 principal amount of Notes.

CIT announced that the amendment to the Offer also reduces the minimum tender condition to 58% of the Notes, an amount approximately equal to the number of Notes which pursuant to the Credit Facility the lenders are committed to tender and not withdraw. As of 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on Friday, July 31, 2009, CIT had received tenders for 64.97% of the Notes.

The withdrawal deadline for the Offer has been extended until midnight, New York City time, at the end of Wednesday, August 5, 2009. All other terms of the Offer remain unchanged.

They have also suspended preferred dividends:

the Company’s Board of Directors has decided to suspend dividend payments on its four series of Preferred Stock in order to improve liquidity and preserve capital while restructuring efforts are ongoing. Payments on the Company’s Equity Units (NYSE: CIT PrZ) are not affected by this decision.

China has claimed that industrial espionage by Rio Tinto has cost the country’s steel mills over $100-billion, in connection with recent arrests. I have no idea whether the charges are well-founded or not; but if true, a vigorous response should provide a hint to Canada and Germany, inter alia, that confident countries don’t just whine about it.

There has been a fascinating hiccup in BAC / SEC lawsuit over the MER bonuses:

U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff ended the hearing saying that he needs more information on the Aug. 3 accord between the bank and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which filed the suit. The settlement won’t be final unless Rakoff approves it.

If the SEC is correct that Bank of America lied about whether to pay the bonuses, then the proposed settlement isn’t “remotely reasonable,” Rakoff said.

Not a lot of price action today, but volume continued strong.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 2.2069 % 1,287.0
FixedFloater 6.59 % 4.83 % 46,624 17.50 1 1.4136 % 2,330.1
Floater 3.54 % 3.54 % 123,936 18.39 2 2.2069 % 1,607.9
OpRet 4.89 % -6.52 % 138,873 0.09 15 -0.0257 % 2,259.0
SplitShare 5.72 % 6.47 % 94,639 4.10 3 0.6088 % 2,030.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0257 % 2,065.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.55 % 85,410 14.20 4 0.1399 % 1,859.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.86 % 5.89 % 173,621 14.04 67 0.1000 % 1,751.6
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.01 % 518,941 4.16 40 0.0018 % 2,100.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 18.50
Evaluated at bid price : 18.50
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.60
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 22.23
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 4.83 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 8.36 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.07
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 3.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 11.20
Evaluated at bid price : 11.20
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 163,025 RBC bought 10,000 from anonymous at 24.60 and another 10,000 from HSBC at the same price. Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 24.43
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 101,890 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-09
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.25
Bid-YTW : -5.69 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 66,350 RBC crossed 48,600 at 20.30, then another 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 65,762 RBC crossed 49,200 at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.74
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 49,400 RBC sold 10,000 to anonymous at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-10
Maturity Price : 24.38
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.73 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 38,010 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.41
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
PrefLetter

PrefLetter Adds Class for Recommendations: FixedResetPremium

There is a lot of demand for short term preferred shares; short-term meaning “with a term of five years or less”.

I have resisted recommending FixedResets as part of the “ShortTerm” class that was introduced in the September 2008 edition, largely on the grounds that they are not, in fact, short term. They are just as perpetual as the straights and are fully exposed to increases in credit spreads and declining credit quality of the various issuers (see my seminar on FixedResets for further information) – in the same way that FloatingRate issues are not Money-Market substitutes.

However, most issues are now trading well above their call price, with reset spreads that are well above current market rates; investors may consider these issues to be five-year issues, provided they bear firmly in mind that they are extendible five year issues, and will have their maturity date reset to infinity if it is not convenient to the issuer to repay the principal. However, in the same manner as PerpetualPremiums, FixedResetPremiums have buffer protection against an increase in spreads. Investors who understand the risks and are prepared to accept the consequences may find the FixedResetPremium class attractive … so selections will be added to the PrefLetter recommendations commencing with the August issue.

The August issue will be prepared as of the close on August 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to the opening on August 17.

Market Action

August 7, 2009

The Credit Suisse bonus pool is doing well:

Credit Suisse Group AG, the largest Swiss bank by market value, told bankers a pool of toxic bonds and mortgages set aside as part of their compensation gained 17 percent since January, a person familiar with the matter said.

About 2,000 bankers were told of the return, based on a $5 billion fund of bad mortgages and bonds, the person said, declining to be identified because the matter is private.

When the mechanism was announced on December 18, I commented:

If I am correct – with the support of the BoE – and bank assets have, in general, been written down to far below fundamental value, this is a clever way for the executives to (a) earn brownie points, and (b) give themselves enormous bonuses.

The Globe and Mail had a host of adulatory articles about the MFC Dividend Cut today, by Tara Perkins, Steve Ladurantaye and Andrew Willis, all praising Guloien’s forthright and incisive action in repairing the battered balance sheet. None of them mentioned the pending charge of about $500-million due to changing assumptions or speculated as to whether tough times might cause a decrease to the marketting budget, but the Perkins story did add some colour regarding the hurried changing of the capital rules last fall:

On Sept. 30, the head of Canada’s regulator, the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, wrote an e-mail to various OSFI officials. “D’Alessandro just called and asked that we try to meet next week with the company to discuss capital,” Julie Dickson wrote, noting that the meeting would replace one that had been arranged for November. Mr. D’Alessandro wanted to discuss the capital requirements for the variable-annuity, or segregated funds, business, other e-mails show.

Discussions took place in October in which he laid out why he felt the rules were too onerous, and OSFI officials had a flurry of internal discussions. On Oct. 28, the rules were changed.

OSFI consulted with more than one insurer that month, but the changes were most important to Manulife.

Federal lobbyist records show that Mr. D’Alessandro also met with Prime Minister Stephen Harper on Nov. 6 to discuss “financial institutions.” It is not known what was discussed at the meeting with Mr. D’Alessandro.

On Nov. 18, Finance Minister Jim Flaherty received a memorandum from OSFI updating him on Manulife.

“In short, while Manulife’s results have been very good historically, the recent downturn in equity markets has had a significant impact on its capital levels,” the memorandum stated.

The arbitrary rule change was highlighted in my opinion piece OSFI and the Third Pillar. Lynx-eyed analysts at Credit Suisse AG and CIBC World Markets, however, noticed that dividend cuts are not a Good Thing and downgraded the common.

Citigroup is considering selling its energy trading unit:

— Citigroup Inc. may give up control of its Phibro LLC energy-trading business to outside investors, a person familiar with the matter said, as the bank faces what may be a $100 million payday for the unit’s chief, Andrew Hall.

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett also held talks with New York-based Citigroup about buying the business, and those negotiations have now ended, according to the person, who declined to be identified because the discussions are private.

Hall’s payout, which will be determined at the end of this year based on Phibro’s profits, may raise concern among lawmakers and regulators who are scrutinizing Citigroup’s compensation practices after a $45 billion government bailout last year.

On the one hand, I think is good news because I am in favour of a separation of banking & trading – with the strict proviso that this be accomplished by transparent nudges to capital rules, so that any regulated entity may determine whether it is primarily a banker or trader and have its regulatory capital calculated in an appropriate manner.

Even the whisper of this story is bad news, however. Citigroup isn’t examining the issue based on things like risk and reward – that’s too old fashioned for the new era. It appears that the basis for the decision will be cosmetic appeal: it’s a disgrace. I am, however, please to see that they have the moral character to resist the temptation to unleash an army of lawyers and accountants on Philbro, desperately seeking an uncrossed t in the regulatory requirements so they can pretend to be shocked and cancel the contract. There is still some integrity, at least, left in the world.

Today’s fascinating question is: Are Ken Lewis & Mom Boucher related, or what?


Ken Lewis
CEO
Bank of America

Mom Boucher
President
Hells Angels, Montreal

This question came to mind during the PrefBlog Sloppy Investment Thinking Awards Ceremony, which honoured Richard X. Bove of Rochdale Securities:

Mr. Bove notes that on Dec. 29 – when the new information concerning Merrill Lynch’s losses were disclosed to Bank of America’s management – that the bank’s stock was selling at $12.94 per share, whereas today the combined banks’ stock is trading close to $17 a share.

“Thus, one cannot argue that shareholders have been harmed by the bank’s decision that this was not a material reason to put off the merger,” he said in the note to clients.

The award is made with the assumption that the published extract has not distorted the main argument, which is akin to suggesting that blowing 90% of your paycheque on beer and prostitutes doesn’t do you any financial harm, since you’ve still got 10% left.

PerpetualDiscounts continued their winning ways of the week, up almost 45bp and leaving FixedResets in the dust again. These results were aided by superb performance from POW, which announced earnings today … no disaster, but held back by sub-par results from PWF (which owns GWO). Volume continued to be quite strong.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3229 % 1,259.2
FixedFloater 6.68 % 4.91 % 46,931 17.40 1 1.6240 % 2,297.6
Floater 3.62 % 3.63 % 70,348 18.21 2 0.3229 % 1,573.1
OpRet 4.89 % -4.23 % 138,235 0.09 15 0.0539 % 2,259.5
SplitShare 5.75 % 6.57 % 95,565 4.11 3 -0.2401 % 2,018.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0539 % 2,066.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.55 % 83,377 14.20 4 0.4012 % 1,857.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.87 % 5.89 % 174,751 14.02 67 0.4469 % 1,749.8
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.02 % 536,459 4.16 40 0.0665 % 2,100.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 24.43
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.83
Evaluated at bid price : 20.83
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 10.95
Evaluated at bid price : 10.95
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 22.62
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.68
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BMO.PR.N FixedReset 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.95
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 18.72
Evaluated at bid price : 18.72
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 17.45
Evaluated at bid price : 17.45
Bid-YTW : 6.92 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 45.75
Evaluated at bid price : 48.35
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.27
Bid-YTW : 4.91 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 21.73
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 46,500 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 19.82
Evaluated at bid price : 19.82
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 37,345 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 32,639 TD bought 11,300 from National at 25.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 31,830 RBC crossed 17,900 at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 24.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.53
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 30,675 RBC bought 19,800 from anonymous at 20.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-07
Maturity Price : 20.89
Evaluated at bid price : 20.89
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 29,091 TD bought 14,000 from RBC at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.79
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Interesting External Papers

Fed Funds Futures & the Expectations Hypothesis

Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton has announced:

Do current fed funds futures prices signal a belief by market participants that the Fed may begin raising interest rates early next year? My latest research paper suggests not.

The expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates posits that an investor could expect to receive the same return from buying a 6-month T-bill as from rolling over two 3-month T-bills. Although this is an appealing hypothesis, it has been consistently rejected by empirical researchers, including Campbell and Shiller (1991), Evans and Lewis (1994), Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) among many others. What that literature has shown is that when the 6-month yield is higher than the 3-month, on average you’d do better with it than with rolling over the 3-months. Typically the term structure slopes up, and typically you earn a higher return from longer term securities.

In a new paper coauthored with Hitotsubashi University Professor Tatsuyoshi Okimoto, we show that arbitrage should force the predictable excess returns on bonds of longer maturities to show up as predictable gains from taking the long position in fed funds futures contracts. The average upward slope to the term structure of interest rates should imply an average upward slope to the interest rates associated with fed funds contracts of increasing maturity. One might then want to adjust these futures rates to obtain an unbiased market expectation, as suggested in a recent paper by Piazzesi and Swanson.

Market Action

August 6, 2009

DBRS has published a new study Canadian Private Pension Plans – Are They Losing or Cruising?.

The SEC has extended the comment period for the short-selling proposals.

The BoE is monetizing debt like there’s no tomorrow:

The Bank of England expanded its bond purchase program beyond its original limit in an effort to spur lending and fight a recession that’s deeper than previously anticipated.

Bond yields plunged after the Monetary Policy Committee, led by Governor Mervyn King, kept the key interest rate at 0.5 percent and increased its purchase program by 50 billion pounds ($84 billion) to 175 billion pounds.

The Bank of England’s tone on the economy was less optimistic. It said in a statement that the recession “appears to have been deeper than previously thought.”

“While some recovery in output growth is in prospect, the margin of spare capacity in the economy is likely to continue to grow for some while yet, bearing down on inflation in the medium term,” the bank said.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to roar ahead today, shrugging off the woes of the equity market sparked by the slashing of the MFC common dividend. Somewhat surprisingly, the MFC PerpetualDiscounts were little affected, although one of the two FixedReset issues and the OpRet issue made it into the unpleasant part of the price movement table; both FixedResets were in the volume table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2312 % 1,255.2
FixedFloater 6.79 % 5.01 % 45,277 17.27 1 3.2903 % 2,260.9
Floater 3.63 % 3.66 % 123,419 18.14 2 0.2312 % 1,568.1
OpRet 4.89 % -6.25 % 139,872 0.09 15 -0.2586 % 2,258.3
SplitShare 5.74 % 6.45 % 98,232 4.12 3 0.4113 % 2,022.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2586 % 2,065.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 5.57 % 83,187 14.18 4 -0.1317 % 1,849.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.89 % 5.94 % 173,149 13.97 67 0.5696 % 1,742.1
FixedReset 5.50 % 4.05 % 541,017 4.17 40 -0.1265 % 2,099.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet -3.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.79
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-09-05
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : -41.98 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 4.70 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 45.66
Evaluated at bid price : 48.00
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.37
Evaluated at bid price : 20.37
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.51
Evaluated at bid price : 23.34
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.35
Evaluated at bid price : 21.35
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.20
Evaluated at bid price : 17.20
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 24.18
Evaluated at bid price : 24.56
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.23
Evaluated at bid price : 19.23
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 17.11
Evaluated at bid price : 17.11
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.18
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.11
Evaluated at bid price : 19.11
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.10
Evaluated at bid price : 22.24
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.01
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 84,635 TD crossed 25,000 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : 4.49 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 68,955 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 19.73
Evaluated at bid price : 19.73
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 43,200 RBC crossed 40,000 at 20.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 41,072 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.71
Bid-YTW : 5.61 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 36,945 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 26,625 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-08-06
Maturity Price : 22.39
Evaluated at bid price : 22.55
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulatory Capital

MFC 2Q09 Results: Common Dividend Slashed

Manulife Financial announced today:

its decision to reduce the Company’s quarterly common share dividend by 50% from $0.26 to $0.13 per share, payable on and after September 21, 2009 to shareholders of record at the close of business on August 18, 2009. The revised dividend will preserve approximately $800 million for MFC on an annualized basis as part of the Company’s strategic focus on building fortress levels of capital.

Preferred share dividends were, of course, not affected. Preferred Dividends must be paid in full for as long as the common shareholders are getting even a nickel.

MFC is also offering discounted common shares to participants in its common share DRIP. Sadly, this DRIP is not open to preferred shareholders; there are only three such plans that offer discounted common to preferred shareholders, and one of them is iffy.

Manulife common performed badly on news of the dividend cut. It’s my guess that the cut has been on their to-do list for some time; doing it now means the stock price will be hurt, but doing it at the peak of gloominess earlier would have had it slaughtered.

The new release stated:

Manulife Financial Corporation (“MFC”) today reported shareholders’ net income of $1,774 million for the second quarter ended June 30, 2009, compared to $1,008 million in the second quarter of 2008. Fully diluted earnings per share was $1.09 compared to $0.66 in 2008.

The quarter’s earnings were primarily driven by the significant increase in global equity markets which resulted in non-cash gains of $2,622 million, of which $2,379 million related to segregated fund guarantees. Partially offsetting these gains were the impact of lower corporate bond rates and, to a lesser extent, the continued pressure on credit. The decline in interest rates and other fixed income related items resulted in non-cash charges of $1,116 million, primarily as a result of the lower investment returns assumed in the valuation of policy liabilities. In addition, credit impairments totaled $109 million, other than temporary impairments (“OTTI”) on equity investments were $53 million and actuarial related charges for downgrades amounted to $106 million. During the quarter the Company increased its tax related provisions on leveraged lease investments by $139 million and reported net charges for changes in actuarial methods and assumptions of $87 million. Excluding the aforementioned items, earnings for the quarter totaled $776 million compared to $745 million a year ago.

We expect to complete our annual review of all actuarial assumptions in the third quarter, and our current expectation is that the updated assumptions will result in a material charge to earnings that will likely be recorded next quarter. Although we have not completed our assessment nor have we reached any conclusions, the preliminary information indicates that the possible change in assumptions with respect to policyholder behavior for segregated fund guarantee products may result in a charge not to exceed $500 million.

Exposures:

MFC Exposures
Tangible Holdco Equity*
CAD Millions
16,784
Other Tier 1 30.1%
Stock Leverage 58%**
Bond Leverage 890% ***
Seg Fund Leverage 1,061%
Effect of +1% Interest Rates 8.0%
Effect of -10% Equity Market 11.3%
Tangible Holdco Equity is Common Shares (16,250) plus Contributed Surplus (169) plus Retained Earnings (12,693) plus Non-Controlling interest in subsidiaries (209) less Accumulated other Comprehensive Loss (2,914) less Goodwill (7,608) and Intangibles (2,015) = 16,784.
Other Tier 1 = Liabilities for preferred shares and capital instruments (3,634) + Preferred Shares (1,419) = 5,053 / THE
Stock Leverage is Stocks on the balance sheet (9,688) divided by Tangible Holdco Equity. MFC has substantial derivative investments, but does not disclose the notional values of these positions, making this estimate rather unreliable.
Bond Leverage is bonds on the balance sheet (83,725) + mortgages (31,379) + Private Placements (24,701) + Policy Loans (7,090) + Bank Loans (2,458) = 149,353 divided by Tangible Holdco Equity. MFC has substantial derivative investments, but does not disclose the notional values of these positions, making this estimate rather unreliable.
Equity effect = 1,900 / THE
Interest rate effect = 1,336 / THE; note that a decrease in interest rates will cost them money. This figure is taken from the 2008 Annual Report since they couldn’t be bothered to disclose it in 2Q09, despite all their blather about “de-risking”.
Sources: Financial Supplement, Slides and 2008 Annual Report.

Despite including this post in the “Regulatory Capital” category of PrefBlog, I will not discuss MCCSR. This figure is useless for analytical purposes, since:

  • Corresponding US calculations are not disclosed
  • As preferred share investors we are interested in the publicly issued preferred shares, at the holdco level

As noted by DBRS:

The incurrence of debt at the holding company to provide equity capital to operating subsidiaries constitutes double leverage, the use of which should be conservative. The analysis of double leverage requires a review of the unconsolidated financial statements of the holding company, which are generally not in the public domain.

Update, 2009-8-7: DBRS has commented:

that today’s decision by Manulife Financial Corporation’s (Manulife or the Company) Board of Directors to reduce its dividend rate by 50% is expected to preserve close to $800 million annually in shareholder capital. This is the latest in a recent line of actions taken by the Company to build and preserve capital following the adverse impact of weakening equity markets and falling interest rates on its actuarial reserves and reported earnings. While DBRS regards this dividend reduction as extraordinary for a Canadian financial institution, the decision is nevertheless prudent in the context of the current operating and market environment. There are no implications for the Company’s ratings at this time. However, DBRS recognizes that further large losses without a corresponding build-up in common equity capital would likely lead to downward pressure on the ratings.