Banking Crisis 2008

Fed to Open Spigots Further

The Fed has announced:

In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will employ all available tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability. The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and anticipates that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. To provide greater support to mortgage lending and housing markets, the Committee decided today to increase the size of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet further by purchasing up to an additional $750 billion of agency mortgage-backed securities, bringing its total purchases of these securities to up to $1.25 trillion this year, and to increase its purchases of agency debt this year by up to $100 billion to a total of up to $200 billion. Moreover, to help improve conditions in private credit markets, the Committee decided to purchase up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities over the next six months.

Wow. They’re flooding the market with cash.

Update: Across the Curve comments that credit spreads are tighter and TIPS breakeven is wider.

Update, 2009-3-19: Commentary from Econbrowser

Update, 2009-4-3: Bernanke has given a speech titled The Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet, in which he makes the point:

the provision of liquidity on a collateralized basis to sound financial institutions is a traditional central bank function. This so-called lender-of-last-resort activity is particularly useful during a financial crisis, as it reduces the need for fire sales of assets and reassures financial institutions and their counterparties that those institutions will have access to liquidity as needed. To be sure, the provision of liquidity alone cannot address solvency problems or erase the large losses that financial institutions have suffered during this crisis. Yet both our internal analysis and market reports suggest that the Fed’s ample supply of liquidity, along with liquidity provided by other major central banks, has significantly reduced funding pressures for financial institutions, helped to reduce rates in bank funding markets, and increased overall financial stability. For example, despite ongoing financial stresses, funding pressures around year-end 2008 and the most recent quarter-end appear to have moderated significantly.

With respect to Maiden Lane, et al., he states:

These extensions of credit are very different than the other liquidity programs discussed previously and were put in place to avoid major disruptions in financial markets. From a credit perspective, these support facilities carry more risk than traditional central bank liquidity support, but we nevertheless expect to be fully repaid. Credit extended under these programs has varied but recently has accounted for only about 5 percent of our balance sheet. That said, these operations have been extremely uncomfortable for the Federal Reserve to undertake and were carried out only because no reasonable alternative was available. As noted in the joint Federal Reserve-Treasury statement I mentioned earlier, we are working with the Administration and the Congress to develop a formal resolution regime for systemically critical nonbank financial institutions, analogous to one already in place for banks. Such a regime should spell out as precisely as possible the role that the Congress expects the Federal Reserve to play in such resolutions.

Issue Comments

MFC: Moody's Downgrades Insurer Financial Strength

Moody’s has announced:

downgraded the insurance financial strength (IFS) ratings of Manulife Financial Corporation’s (Manulife; TSX: MFC) subsidiaries to Aa3 from Aa1.

Manulife reported the following sensitivities of its capital and earnings to equity markets: (1) MLI’s regulatory capital ratio (known as MCCSR) will decline 2 percentage points for every 1 percentage point decline in the equity markets; and (2) MLI will suffer a C$1.6 billion rise in reserve charges (after-tax) for equity market guarantees for every 10% drop in equity markets. By contrast, some of Manulife’s peers have reported significantly less onerous sensitivities — with MCCSR and reserve charge sensitivities a fraction of Manulife’s. Equity markets, Moody’s notes, are down approximately 10-15% since the start of 2009, and had been down 20% earlier this year, highlighting the potential for further volatility in regulatory capitalization.

The negative outlook reflects the company’s continuing susceptibility to declines in the equity markets. As noted above, Manulife, unlike most of the other large writers of variable annuities and segregated funds in North America, has not implemented a comprehensive equity hedging program, making the company more vulnerable than peers to equity market volatility. After giving benefit for Manulife’s C$450 million preferred share equity raise this month, Moody’s estimates MLI’s MCCSR at or around 200%, which is low relative to historic standards and relative to Moody’s expectations at Manulife’s current Aa3 IFS rating level. Assuming a C$2.4 billion charge for higher variable annuity guarantee reserves (given equity markets are down 15%), Moody’s estimates a consolidated financial leverage ratio of over 25% at present, versus 22% at the end of 2008.

Moody’s Global Rating Methodology for Life Insurers notes:

The IFS ratings are assigned to life insurance operating companies and are Moody’s opinions of the ability of insurance companies to repay punctually senior policyholder claims and obligations.

Manulife has the following preferreds outstanding: MFC.PR.A (OpRet); MFC.PR.B (PerpetualDiscount); and MFC.PR.C (PerpetualDiscount). These issues were last mentioned on PrefBlog when Fitch downgraded MFC on March 2.

Market Action

March 17, 2009

PrefBlog’s SEDAR-watching Department, otherwise known as Assiduous Reader MP, points out that Sun Life Financial has issued a new $5-billion shelf prospectus. Of particular interest are the Class B Preferred Shares:

The Class B Shares of each series rank on a parity with the Class B Shares of each other series with respect to the payment of dividends and the return of capital on the liquidation, dissolution or winding-up of SLF. The Class B Shares are entitled to preference over the Common Shares and any other shares ranking junior to the Class B Shares with respect to the payment of dividends and the return of capital, but are subordinate to the Class A Shares and any other shares ranking senior to the Class B Shares with respect to the payment of dividends and return of capital.

However, there are no shares of this class currently outstanding (all the extant SLF preferreds are Series A) and the ability to issue Class Bs has been around for some time – see, for example, the shelf prospectus dated November 4, 2005.

Canadian equities continued their rally today and PerpetualDiscounts rose with them. SplitShares did quite well today – not surprisingly, what with asset coverage improving by leaps and bounds.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7904 % 807.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7904 % 1,305.5
Floater 4.90 % 6.13 % 60,322 13.73 3 0.7904 % 1,008.5
OpRet 5.29 % 4.87 % 128,758 3.89 15 0.1696 % 2,047.5
SplitShare 6.94 % 9.77 % 53,844 4.79 6 1.7565 % 1,599.9
Interest-Bearing 6.15 % 10.70 % 34,350 0.75 1 0.5149 % 1,910.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3343 % 1,481.4
Perpetual-Discount 7.29 % 7.38 % 159,728 12.06 71 0.3343 % 1,364.4
FixedReset 6.18 % 5.84 % 621,908 13.73 30 0.5363 % 1,788.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -2.14 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of March 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 6.85
Bid-YTW : 17.33 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.92 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 13.25
Evaluated at bid price : 13.25
Bid-YTW : 9.21 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 22.81
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 20.52
Evaluated at bid price : 20.52
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 7.15
Evaluated at bid price : 7.15
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 15.77
Evaluated at bid price : 15.77
Bid-YTW : 7.44 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 14.76
Evaluated at bid price : 14.76
Bid-YTW : 9.23 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 17.31
Evaluated at bid price : 17.31
Bid-YTW : 7.74 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.41
Bid-YTW : 10.77 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 17.53
Evaluated at bid price : 17.53
Bid-YTW : 8.01 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 16.64
Evaluated at bid price : 16.64
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 17.72
Evaluated at bid price : 17.72
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 14.98
Evaluated at bid price : 14.98
Bid-YTW : 8.06 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 22.75
Evaluated at bid price : 22.79
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.33 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 12.95 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 21.48
Evaluated at bid price : 21.80
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 8.03 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.35 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-07-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.48
Bid-YTW : -0.07 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 19.05
Evaluated at bid price : 19.05
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 14.84
Evaluated at bid price : 14.84
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 18.17
Evaluated at bid price : 18.17
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 12.50
Evaluated at bid price : 12.50
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 16.96
Evaluated at bid price : 16.96
Bid-YTW : 7.26 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 7.38 %
BNS.PR.Q FixedReset 2.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 4.66 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 2.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 20.71
Evaluated at bid price : 20.71
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 14.21
Evaluated at bid price : 14.21
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 17.61
Evaluated at bid price : 17.61
Bid-YTW : 7.28 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 2.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 18.95
Evaluated at bid price : 18.95
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 2.73 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of March 12 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.27
Bid-YTW : 9.27 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 14.95
Evaluated at bid price : 14.95
Bid-YTW : 8.46 %
BNA.PR.B SplitShare 3.42 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 8.18 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 3.58 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of March 13 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.11
Bid-YTW : 9.77 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 3.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.21
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 287,644 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 89,637 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 48,541 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.94
Evaluated at bid price : 23.98
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 32,937 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 28,248 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 26,723 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-17
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

Fed Postpones Tightening of Bank Capital Quality Rules

The Fed has announced:

the adoption of a final rule that delays until March 31, 2011, the effective date of new limits on the inclusion of trust preferred securities and other restricted core capital elements in tier 1 capital of bank holding companies (BHCs).

The final rule explains:

Under limits on restricted core capital elements that are currently in effect, a BHC generally may include in tier 1 capital cumulative perpetual preferred stock and trust preferred securities up to 25 percent of the sum of core capital elements (including cumulative perpetual preferred stock and trust preferred securities). The new limits would limit restricted core capital elements includable in the tier 1 capital of a BHC to 25 percent of the sum of core capital elements (including restricted core capital elements), net of goodwill less any associated deferred tax liability. In addition, internationally active BHCs would be subject to a further limitation.

In particular, the amount of restricted core capital elements (other than qualifying mandatory convertible preferred securities) that an internationally active BHC could include in tier 1 capital could not exceed 15 percent of the sum of core capital elements (including restricted core capital elements), net of goodwill less any associated deferred tax liability.

In light of conditions in the capital markets, the Board has considered whether an additional extension of the effective date of the new limits is appropriate. The economic conditions for the past 18 months, and currently, have created a situation in which requiring adherence to the new limits by the March 31, 2009, effective date creates a substantial burden for many BHCs in a way that was not anticipated when the final rule was adopted in 2005. In the prevailing market conditions, it is especially important for BHCs to expend efforts to increase their overall capital levels, although it is challenging to do so now through retention of earnings, the most typical means. Therefore, to promote stability in the financial markets and the banking industry as a whole, the Board has decided to further delay the effective date of the new limits until March 31, 2011. The Board believes that this extended transition period would allow affected BHCs sufficient flexibility to satisfy the Board’s risk-based and leverage capital guidelines during the current stressed market conditions.

Market Action

March 16, 2009

Monetary stimulus appears to be having an effect in the UK:

By buying government securities to increase the supply of money, Bank of England Governor King is taking a step that Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke has only talked about. Early results have been encouraging: Yields on 10-year U.K. government bonds fell to 2.94 percent March 13, at least a 20-year low, from 3.64 percent before King announced the policy March 5.

“The BOE is providing an actual experiment in answering some of the concerns that the Fed has about the effectiveness” of using the strategy to effectively print more money, says former Fed Governor Laurence Meyer, now vice chairman of St. Louis-based Macroeconomic Advisers LLC.

King — whose office adjoined Bernanke’s when the two were visiting professors at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts, during the 1980s — is pursuing both approaches.

Gilt Purchases

He is aiming to expand reserves in the financial system through purchases of U.K. government bonds, known as gilts — a strategy he describes as “conventional unconventional” monetary policy. He will also buy private-sector assets as Bernanke is doing — an approach the Bank of England chief calls “unconventional unconventional.”

Nobody knows what to call things nowadays! I called it “monetary stimulus” because it is government securities that are being purchased; I would not call this “quantitative easing”. I presume that King refers to the process as “conventional unconventional” because “conventional conventional” would be buying government securities at issue time.

The crisis is going to re-write the economics textbooks all right! Especially the glossary!

Tempers are flaring about TARP’s populism and stress tests:

When the U.S. Treasury persuaded the nation’s nine biggest banks to accept capital investments in October, it signaled the whole industry was weak, Kovacevich, 65, said in a March 13 speech at Stanford University in California. Even though Wells Fargo didn’t want the money, it must comply with the same rules that the government placed on banks that did need it, he said.

“Is this America — when you do what your government asks you to do and then retroactively you also have additional conditions?” Kovacevich said. “If we were not forced to take the TARP money, we would have been able to raise private capital at that time” and not needed to cut the dividend to preserve cash, he said.

Kovacevich said the government is still making mistakes as it tries to save the industry. The “stress test,” designed to determine which of the 19 largest U.S. banks need more capital, provides opportunities for short-sellers to drive down bank stocks and can hurt confidence in the system even more, he said.

“We do stress tests all the time on all of our portfolios,” Kovacevich said. “We share those stress tests with our regulators. It is absolutely asinine that somebody would announce we’re going to do stress tests for banks and we’ll give you the answer in 12 weeks.”

I noted on March 12 that CIBC had issued a collateral call to MAV Trust (the successor to non-bank ABCP) … it wasn’t met:

As noted in the DBRS press release dated March 12, 2009, the deadline for providing additional collateral was 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 2009. DBRS was advised that MAVII did not receive the funding of $19.3 million. Since no funding was advanced, CIBC had the option to terminate all or a portion of the leveraged credit default swap transactions collateralized by MAVII. The resulting reduction in collateral supporting the MAVII notes is capped at $107,742,597 (or approximately 1.1% of the assets of MAVII). DBRS was advised today that the entire notional amount of these credit default swap transactions was terminated.

As indicated in the DBRS press release dated March 6, 2009, confirming the ratings of the MAVI and MAVII Class A-1 and Class A-2 Notes (the Notes), the potential for transactions not subject to the 18-month moratorium to unwind was considered by DBRS when assigning the “A” rating to the Notes, and no rating action is warranted at this time.

Willem Buiter writes an interesting piece on VoxEU regarding resolution of the banking crisis – but it is crippled by his idea that markets are efficient. They’re not. There must be some way of cross-training academics & market practitioners such that the former could lose some their awe for the latter. Perhaps an in-depth study of some of the successful pension funds might be a good start?

Another good day for PerpetualDiscounts, which have now recovered 3.88% from their recent low on March 10 … but they’re still down 6.55% from their 2009 high reached on January 13.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4537 % 800.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4537 % 1,295.3
Floater 4.94 % 6.05 % 60,732 13.86 3 0.4537 % 1,000.6
OpRet 5.30 % 5.01 % 133,362 3.90 15 0.0918 % 2,044.0
SplitShare 7.07 % 10.53 % 54,290 4.77 6 0.2535 % 1,572.3
Interest-Bearing 6.18 % 11.36 % 34,883 0.75 1 -0.4103 % 1,900.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.8364 % 1,476.5
Perpetual-Discount 7.32 % 7.47 % 160,248 12.01 71 0.8364 % 1,359.8
FixedReset 6.22 % 5.86 % 631,360 13.71 30 0.2696 % 1,779.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -4.05 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 8.78 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -3.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 8.19 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -3.01 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of March 5 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.05
Bid-YTW : 9.85 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -2.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.70
Evaluated at bid price : 17.70
Bid-YTW : 8.30 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.55
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 8.70 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -2.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 10.43 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 8.40 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 10.60 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 18.77
Evaluated at bid price : 18.77
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 13.85
Evaluated at bid price : 13.85
Bid-YTW : 8.08 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 45.09
Evaluated at bid price : 47.01
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.08 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 13.89 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.79
Evaluated at bid price : 16.79
Bid-YTW : 6.83 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 7.25
Evaluated at bid price : 7.25
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 15.37
Evaluated at bid price : 15.37
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.18
Evaluated at bid price : 16.18
Bid-YTW : 8.08 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 21.71
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.51
Evaluated at bid price : 16.51
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.80
Evaluated at bid price : 14.80
Bid-YTW : 8.16 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.43
Evaluated at bid price : 16.43
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 20.96
Evaluated at bid price : 20.96
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.65
Evaluated at bid price : 16.65
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 18.01
Evaluated at bid price : 18.01
Bid-YTW : 7.39 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.76
Evaluated at bid price : 16.76
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.61
Evaluated at bid price : 16.61
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 8.77 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 20.45
Evaluated at bid price : 20.45
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset 1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 24.01
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 12.52
Evaluated at bid price : 12.52
Bid-YTW : 9.56 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 20.85
Evaluated at bid price : 20.85
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 20.01
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-07-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 7.76 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 18.08
Evaluated at bid price : 18.08
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.55
Evaluated at bid price : 16.55
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.46
Evaluated at bid price : 14.46
Bid-YTW : 8.26 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.36
Evaluated at bid price : 16.36
Bid-YTW : 6.89 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.26 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.87
Bid-YTW : 16.10 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 19.28
Evaluated at bid price : 19.28
Bid-YTW : 7.61 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.45
Evaluated at bid price : 16.45
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 18.45
Evaluated at bid price : 18.45
Bid-YTW : 7.77 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.59
Evaluated at bid price : 14.59
Bid-YTW : 7.78 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.95
Evaluated at bid price : 14.95
Bid-YTW : 9.10 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.94
Evaluated at bid price : 17.94
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.05
Evaluated at bid price : 14.05
Bid-YTW : 7.97 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 3.03 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of February 27 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.83
Bid-YTW : 10.53 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 3.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 6.96 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 3.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.59
Evaluated at bid price : 16.59
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 3.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 6.80 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 4.17 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 27 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.00
Bid-YTW : 16.60 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 4.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.I FixedReset 96,510 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 95,648 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 93,650 National crossed 79,800 at 14.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 8.19 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 44,000 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 16.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 16.59
Evaluated at bid price : 16.59
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 34,421 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-16
Maturity Price : 14.55
Evaluated at bid price : 14.55
Bid-YTW : 8.70 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 33,100 RBC crossed 19,900 at 7.83.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.83
Bid-YTW : 10.53 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Interesting External Papers

IIAC Releases 4Q08 Industry Report

The Investment Industry Association of Canada has released its Securities Industry Performance Report, 4Q08 with the highlights:

  • Operating revenues and profits fall 7% and 46% respectively from previous quarter and 15% and 39% from 2007.
  • Margin borrowing hits five year low as client debt margin outstanding falls to $8.8 billion at year end
  • Investment banking revenues drops back 33% for the year.

I found the commentary regarding proprietary trading to be of most interest:

Mixed results were witnessed in the principal trading business– while fixed-income desks experienced recent high revenue, their equity counterparts suffered a recent record low. Bond traders were successful in re-balancing inventory positions in advance of changing credit market conditions and were able to earn trading profits in 2008. Equity trading however suffered trading losses of $11 million on the year, the worst showing since 1990.

That’s the danger of day-trading. It’s immensely profitable through the cycle – but you have to have the capital to survive a bad year … or two.

Interesting External Papers

BoE Releases Quarterly Bulletin

The Bank of England has announced:

The 2009 Q1 issue of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin is published today. It contains the following articles and reports:

  • Foreword, by Spencer Dale, Chief Economist and Executive Director – Monetary Analysis and Statistics, Bank of England.
  • Markets and operations. This regular quarterly commentary discusses recent developments in global capital markets. It also reviews the Bank’s official operations.
  • Price-setting behaviour in the United Kingdom: a microdata approach. This article examines how often prices change and how much they change by analysing data on individual price quotes. The evidence suggests that, on average, prices change once every four to five months. Evidence from higher frequency supermarket data suggests that prices change more often than this – once every two weeks. More generally, the work shows that the frequency of price changes varies across different sectors and product groups.
  • Deflation. This article examines the different economic costs associated with deflation. It explains that it is important not to confuse the economic costs associated with the circumstances that caused prices to fall with the costs of deflation itself. The costs of deflation are most likely to be associated with debt deflation and downward nominal wage rigidities. But if policy responds sufficiently promptly and decisively then these costs are likely to be modest and short-lived.

The report contains the usual high-quality BoE research and commentary.

While interesting and valuable, the decomposition of the LIBOR spread into credit and non-credit components is fishy in the extreme. As explained in the box on page 498 of the 2007-Q4 Bulletin, the decomposition relies on the CDS spread being a perfect estimate of credit qualtiy – which we know is not true since there is a huge component of non-credit pricing in related bond prices … which in turn rely on equity prices as being a perfect valuator of a company’s assets. These calculations simply measure the degree of internal consistency between the various markets, but if the linchpin is removed, you’re not left with much.

After all, stock prices are determined largely by the sentiments of stock-brokers and, as Assiduous Readers will know, if a stockbroker gives you a choice between investment advice and having lunch … pick lunch.

There are a lot of great charts and commentary in the Bulletin and I won’t reproduce them all. I’ll just close with a topic near and dear to preferred share investors: Tier 1 vs. Sub-Debt spreads:

PrefLetter

March Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The March, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the March, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the April, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close April 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on April 13 (note that April 10th is Good Friday).

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: Some subscribers will have received two copies of this month’s edition; others will have received their copy as a direct eMail from me. I apologize for this; I experienced a most inopportune software failure.

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Should you have a similar problem, I will:

  • eMail you another copy
  • place it on a website for download without eMail
  • try to get it to you as an image file
  • Fax you a copy
  • Mail the damn thing!

Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Miscellaneous News

Barry Critchley Reviews Fixed-Resets

Barry Critchley used his column in the Financial Post to note Rate-Reset Prefs Gain Followers:

In all, $8.7-billion of Tier 1 capital has been raised (about half of that this year) and those fundings have helped the Canadian banks overcome any capital problems that may have arisen because of the global financial crisis and the recession.

So why have they been so successful? “The investment community like the structure because in five years time you have the option of redemption or going floating or fixed. The five-year horizon is much more attractive from managing interest-rate risk perspective,” said Nagel.

Attractive, sure. The reset feature is worth something, I’ve always agreed with that part. Historically, however, purchasers have paid too much (that is, accepted a small yield and given the issuers generous redemption terms) for the benefit – but the situation is improving; fixed-resets have recently been seen in the Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund portfolio on an opportunistic basis; further weakness may make the sector as a whole competitive with straights.

But we will see!

Issue Comments

RPQ.PR.A: Underlying Note Now Rated CCC by S&P (?)

RPQ.PR.A is a stuctured product which was last discussed on PrefBlog when dividends were suspended and the rating withdrawn.

Essentially, holders of this issue have written a “financial disaster insurance policy” – they get paid coupons as a premium on their money, but have to make a massive payment if there are too many defaults in the bonds comprising the reference portfolio.

The deal was structured via a Credit Linked Note issued by the Bank of Nova Scotia; I see that this Credit Linked Note – orginally rated A- by S&P – is now rated CCC, with a rating date of March 10. I note that the December ’08 Performance Update for RPQ.PR.A (published by CC&L group, the sponsor) states that the rating for the Credit Linked Note has been withdrawn – I’m not sure what’s going on. It is possible that BNS originally had two credit linked notes with the stated maturity, and that it is an unrelated issue that is now rated CCC … but I suggest that those potentially affected by this change contact CC&L, BNS and S&P … and let me know what you find out!

I confess to a certain morbid curiosity regarding this and its related issues. RPQ.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.