Really, I don’t have much to say beyond the headline … but tune in and tell me what you think!
BIS Tweaks Capital Rules
The Bank for International Settlements has tweaked its capital rules, announcing:
At its 8-9 July meeting, the newly expanded Basel Committee on Banking Supervision approved a final package of measures to strengthen the 1996 rules governing trading book capital and to enhance the three pillars of the Basel II framework.
Most of the modifications have to do with securitizations. The document Enhancements to the Basel II framework gives the details; the most interesting – to me! – extracts are:
During the recent market turmoil, several banks that provided LFs to ABCP programmes chose to purchase commercial paper issued by the ABCP conduit instead of having the conduit draw on its LF. The LF provider then risk weighted the ABCP based on the paper’s external rating. As a result, the LF provider benefited from the external rating on the commercial paper when assigning a risk weight to that paper, even though the rating was due in large part to the bank’s own support of the conduit in the form of the LF.
That particular loophole has been plugged!
In a nod to the political needs of the Canadian government, GMD facilities (which became one of the scapegoats for the non-bank ABCP fiasco) have been eliminated:
More specifically, paragraph 580 states that banks may apply a 0% CCF to eligible liquidity facilities that are only available in the event of a general market disruption (ie where more than one SPE across different transactions are unable to roll over maturing commercial paper, and that inability is not the result of an impairment in the SPEs’ credit quality or in the credit quality of the underlying exposures). Paragraph 638 states that an eligible liquidity facility that can only be drawn in the event of a general market disruption is assigned a 20% CCF under the SF. That is, an IRB bank is to recognise 20% of the capital charge generated under the SF for the facility.
The framework has been changed to eliminate paragraphs 580 and 638, in the SA and IRB Approach, respectively. This eliminates any favourable treatment accorded to market disruption liquidity facilities under Basel II.
I asked OSFI if they had any examples of a GMD line causing problems for a bank when the the GMD line was independent of reputational concern. With their customary aplomb, OSFI has declined to answer the question.
The section on Supervision discusses reputational risk:
Reputational risk can be defined as the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding (eg through the interbank or securitisation markets).
…
A bank should incorporate the exposures that could give rise to reputational risk into its assessments of whether the requirements under the securitisation framework have been met and the potential adverse impact of providing implicit support.
…
Reputational risk also arises when a bank sponsors activities such as money market mutual funds, in-house hedge funds and real estate investment trusts (REITs). In these cases, a bank may decide to support the value of shares/units held by investors even though is not contractually required to provide the support.
…
For instance, to avoid damaging its reputation, a bank may call its liabilities even though this might negatively affect its liquidity profile. This is particularly true for liabilities that are components of regulatory capital, such as hybrid/subordinated debt.
…
By providing implicit support, a bank signals to the market that all of the risks inherent in the securitised assets are still held by the organisation and, in effect, had not been transferred. Since the risk arising from the potential provision of implicit support is not captured ex ante under Pillar 1, it must be considered as part of the Pillar 2 process.
There are also changes to calculation of market risk for the trading book:
In October 2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) released guidelines for computing capital for incremental default risk for public comments. At its meeting in March 2008, it reviewed comments received and decided to expand the scope of the capital charge. The decision was taken in light of the recent credit market turmoil where a number of major banking organisations have experienced large losses, most of which were sustained in banks’ trading books. Most of those losses were not captured in the 99%/10-day VaR. Since the losses have not arisen from actual defaults but rather from credit migrations combined with widening of credit spreads and the loss of liquidity, applying an incremental risk charge covering default risk only would not appear adequate. For example, a number of global financial institutions commented that singling out just default risk was inconsistent with their internal practices and could be potentially burdensome.
The incremental risk charge (IRC) is intended to complement additional standards being applied to the value-at-risk modelling framework.
This is a major issue for insurers. Assiduous Readers may recall that one of the issues regarding capital adequacy of insurers is their practice of estimating bond risk without consideration of price; if the rating – or their internal analysis – indicated a 0.1% chance of default, say, that’s what was used for risk purposes, regardless of whether the bond was trading at governments +10bp or governments +500bp. To some extent this is rational; to some extent it ain’t. The question of how forcefully this idea is applied to the investment book of insurers will be a fascinating subject over the next few years.
These BIS tweaks further extend into the calculation of market risks.
FixedReset Video Seminar Accredited for CE Hours
I am pleased to announce that the Seminar on FixedReset issues has been accredited for four hours of IDA Continuing Education – Professional Development.
Access to the material may be purchased by clicking the icon below:
July 13, 2009
CIT has hired a bankruptcy specialist:
CIT Group Inc., the century-old lender to 950,000 businesses that has been unable to persuade the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to guarantee its debt sales, hired bankruptcy specialist Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP as an adviser amid a plunge in its stock and bonds.
CIT has stated:
in response to recent media reports regarding its pending Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) application with the FDIC, confirmed that its application to participate in the TLGP remains outstanding. CIT continues to be in active dialogue with the government. There can be no assurance that CIT’s application will be approved by the FDIC, nor as to the timing or terms of any such determination.
and
today confirmed that it remains in active discussions with its principal regulators on a series of measures to improve the company’s near-term liquidity position.
Among the matters being discussed are the Company’s application to participate in the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. The Company is also actively discussing liquidity solutions that do not involve access to the TLGP program, such as the near-term transfer of assets into CIT Bank through Section 23A waivers and the transfer of its Vendor Finance and Trade Finance businesses into CIT Bank; these transfers if approved would enhance CIT’s liquidity position
After the bell, it was reported that:
The U.S. government is in advanced discussions to give aid to CIT Group Inc., the Wall Street Journal reported on its Web site, without saying where it got the information.
One option would have the FDIC backing the company’s debt, according to the newspaper.
The fallout from the BofA/Merrill takeover continues to be fascinating:
Regulators contend Bank of America owes at least part of a $4 billion fee it agreed to pay in January — even without a completed legal document — because the company benefited from implied U.S. backing on about $118 billion of Merrill Lynch assets, such as mortgage-backed bonds, people familiar with the matter said. The Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank says it owes the Treasury nothing, according to the people, who declined to be identified because the negotiations are confidential.
The major subindices squeaked out another win today, amidst good volume.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.0558 % | 1,154.8 |
| FixedFloater | 7.20 % | 5.44 % | 36,966 | 16.71 | 1 | -0.3121 % | 2,132.4 |
| Floater | 3.30 % | 3.86 % | 75,038 | 17.74 | 3 | -0.0558 % | 1,442.7 |
| OpRet | 4.99 % | -2.91 % | 121,368 | 0.09 | 15 | 0.1391 % | 2,210.5 |
| SplitShare | 6.13 % | 4.54 % | 92,439 | 4.15 | 4 | 0.1855 % | 1,912.9 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1391 % | 2,021.3 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0571 % | 1,758.3 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.30 % | 6.31 % | 157,272 | 13.43 | 71 | 0.0571 % | 1,619.4 |
| FixedReset | 5.57 % | 4.28 % | 536,622 | 4.28 | 40 | 0.0786 % | 2,064.1 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| SLF.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | -1.28 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 18.46 Evaluated at bid price : 18.46 Bid-YTW : 6.57 % |
| GWO.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | -1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 22.84 Evaluated at bid price : 23.07 Bid-YTW : 6.45 % |
| SLF.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | -1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 16.96 Evaluated at bid price : 16.96 Bid-YTW : 6.71 % |
| GWO.PR.I | Perpetual-Discount | -1.10 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 18.02 Evaluated at bid price : 18.02 Bid-YTW : 6.31 % |
| NA.PR.O | FixedReset | 1.14 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-03-17 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.42 Bid-YTW : 4.21 % |
| RY.PR.W | Perpetual-Discount | 1.31 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 20.13 Evaluated at bid price : 20.13 Bid-YTW : 6.20 % |
| BAM.PR.J | OpRet | 1.63 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2018-03-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.76 Bid-YTW : 7.54 % |
| CL.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 2.95 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 24.16 Evaluated at bid price : 24.46 Bid-YTW : 6.44 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| RY.PR.I | FixedReset | 98,909 | RBC crossed two blocks of 40,000 each at 25.50. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 25.50 Evaluated at bid price : 25.55 Bid-YTW : 4.47 % |
| RY.PR.Y | FixedReset | 66,665 | National bought 14,600 from anonymous at 27.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-12-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.65 Bid-YTW : 4.21 % |
| TD.PR.G | FixedReset | 62,560 | Scotia crossed 24,800 at 27.62; National bought 10,800 from Nesbitt at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.60 Bid-YTW : 3.88 % |
| TD.PR.S | FixedReset | 57,245 | RBC crossed 15,000 at 24.95. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 24.95 Evaluated at bid price : 25.00 Bid-YTW : 4.22 % |
| BMO.PR.M | FixedReset | 52,880 | Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 25.38. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-13 Maturity Price : 25.31 Evaluated at bid price : 25.36 Bid-YTW : 4.26 % |
| BNA.PR.D | SplitShare | 46,575 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-07-09 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.90 Bid-YTW : 7.40 % |
| There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
July Edition of PrefLetter Released!
The July, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.
The July edition contains a relatively long appendix which discusses Negative Convexity and its effect on the pricing of PerpetualDiscounts.
As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.
Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 17.
PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.
Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!
Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!
Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.
Haug and Taleb on Black-Scholes
Espen Gaarder Haug & Nassim Nicholas Taleb have produced a highly entertaining – but, alas, somewhat less than informative – polemic: Why We Have Never Used the Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Formula:
Options traders use a pricing formula which they adapt by fudging and changing the tails and skewness by varying one parameter, the standard deviation of a Gaussian. Such formula is popularly called “Black-Scholes-Merton” owing to an attributed eponymous discovery (though changing the standard deviation parameter is in contradiction with it). However we have historical evidence that 1) Black, Scholes and Merton did not invent any formula, just found an argument to make a well known (and used) formula compatible with the economics establishment, by removing the “risk” parameter through “dynamic hedging”, 2) Option traders use (and evidently have used since 1902) heuristics and tricks more compatible with the previous versions of the formula of Louis Bachelier and Edward O. Thorp (that allow a broad choice of probability distributions) and removed the risk parameter by using put-call parity. 3) Option traders did not use formulas after 1973 but continued their bottom-up heuristics. The Bachelier-Thorp approach is more robust (among other things) to the high impact rare event. The paper draws on historical trading methods and 19th and early 20th century references ignored by the finance literature. It is time to stop calling the formula by the wrong name.
The tone of the paper is evident in the first angry footnote:
For us, practitioners, theories should arise from practice.
Footnote: For us, in this discussion, a practitioner is deemed to be someone involved in repeated decisions about option hedging, not a support quant who writes pricing software or an academic who provides “consulting” advice.
The main thrust of the article is that the premise of the Black-Scholes model is incorrect:
Referring to Thorp and Kassouf (1967), Black, Scholes and Merton took the idea of delta hedging one step further, Black and Scholes (1973):
If the hedge is maintained continuously, then the approximations mentioned above become exact, and the return on the hedged position is completely independent of the change in the value of the stock. In fact, the return on the hedged position becomes certain. This was pointed out to us by Robert Merton.
This may be a brilliant mathematical idea, but option trading is not mathematical theory. It is not enough to have a theoretical idea so far removed from reality that is far from robust in practice.
The authors point out that
- Option trading has been around for a long time
- The only way to hedge options properly is with other options, due to pricing discontinuities
- Put-Call Parity is the basic theoretical foundation of proper hedging
The second main point of the article is that, consistent with the idea that only options are a proper hedge against options, the job of an options trader is not to value options based on some theory; it is to make money with a market-neutral book:
In that sense, traders do not perform “valuation” with some “pricing kernel” until the expiration of the security, but, rather, produce a price of an option compatible with other instruments in the markets, with a holding time that is stochastic. They do not need topdown “science”.
…
This raises a critical point: option traders do not “estimate” the odds of rare events by pricing out-ofthe-money options. They just respond to supply and demand. The notion of “implied probability distribution” is merely a Dutch-book compatibility type of proposition.
They conclude:
One could easily attribute the explosion in option volume to the computer age and the ease of processing transactions, added to the long stretch of peaceful economic growth and absence of hyperinflation. From the evidence (once one removes the propaganda), the development of scholastic finance appears to be an epiphenomenon rather than a cause of option trading. Once again, lecturing birds how to fly does not allow one to take subsequent credit.
This is why we call the equation Bachelier-Thorp. We were using it all along and gave it the wrong name, after the wrong method and with attribution to the wrong persons. It does not mean that dynamic hedging is out of the question; it is just not a central part of the pricing paradigm.
I must point out that Mr. Taleb’s rose-tinted vision of the good old days – while probably quite true in most respects – do not square completely with what I have read in other sources.
If I recall correctly, Morton Schulman recounted in his book “Anybody can still be a millionaire” his adventures as partner in a small Toronto brokerage in the … late ’60’s? early ’70’s?. He and his partners were willing to write puts and became, he says, amazingly popular with his New York counterparts because there was bottomless demand for them.
July Issue of PrefLetter Now in Preparation
The markets have closed and the July edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.
PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents (two of them recently added); the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.
The July edition will contain a longer than usual appendix; an explanation – with lots of charts! – of the concept of Convexity as it applies to PerpetualDiscounts.
Additionally, those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on attendance at, or later viewing of, my seminars.
PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.
The July issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the July Issue.
July 10, 2009
Bloomberg has a little more speculation regarding the CIT death-spiral:
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. is unwilling to guarantee CIT Group Inc.’s bond sales because the commercial lender’s credit quality is worsening, according to people familiar with the regulator’s thinking.
The FDIC, which has backed $274 billion in bond sales under its Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program since Nov. 25, is concerned that standing behind CIT debt would put taxpayer money at risk, said the people, who declined to be identified because the application process is private.
The federal agency, run by Chairman Sheila Bair, is in discussions with CIT about how the lender can strengthen its financial position to get approval, including raising capital, said one of the people. New York-based CIT’s measures to improve its credit quality, such as by transferring assets to its bank, have been insufficient, the person said.
Comrade Obama is proposing extraordinary powers for the SEC:
The Obama administration is seeking to give the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission power to prohibit pay practices at brokerages and investment advisers and broader authority to bar individuals from work in the industry.
The Treasury Department today sent Congress legislation that would let the SEC ban “sales practices, conflicts of interest and compensation schemes” deemed harmful to investors. The measure authorizes the agency to remove individuals who violate rules from all aspects of the industry, rather than just a specific segment such as selling securities or managing money.
…
The measure gives the SEC authority to reward whistle blowers who give the agency tips about those violating all securities laws. The SEC currently has power to pay individuals who provide the agency with tips on insider-trading violations.
Super! Paid informers! Just the thing that’s needed to further improve society’s moral fibre!
No response or acknowledgement from MFC regarding my queries on the MLI IT1C issue. What a surprise!
Continued gains, albeit pretty small ones, for preferred shares today. Volume dropped off a bit.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0558 % | 1,155.4 |
| FixedFloater | 7.05 % | 5.42 % | 36,904 | 16.43 | 1 | 0.1299 % | 2,139.1 |
| Floater | 3.30 % | 3.85 % | 76,185 | 17.76 | 3 | 0.0558 % | 1,443.5 |
| OpRet | 5.00 % | -3.78 % | 121,805 | 0.09 | 15 | -0.2696 % | 2,207.5 |
| SplitShare | 6.14 % | 4.68 % | 85,535 | 4.16 | 4 | -0.4563 % | 1,909.3 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -0.2696 % | 2,018.5 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.0831 % | 1,757.3 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.31 % | 6.29 % | 157,676 | 13.46 | 71 | 0.0831 % | 1,618.5 |
| FixedReset | 5.57 % | 4.32 % | 497,852 | 4.29 | 40 | 0.0403 % | 2,062.5 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| BAM.PR.H | OpRet | -1.76 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2012-03-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.10 Bid-YTW : 5.69 % |
| PWF.PR.J | OpRet | -1.69 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2011-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.25 Evaluated at bid price : 25.56 Bid-YTW : 3.85 % |
| PWF.PR.G | Perpetual-Discount | -1.32 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 22.18 Evaluated at bid price : 22.45 Bid-YTW : 6.58 % |
| CGI.PR.B | SplitShare | -1.12 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-03-14 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.51 Bid-YTW : 4.26 % |
| CM.PR.P | Perpetual-Discount | -1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 21.63 Evaluated at bid price : 21.63 Bid-YTW : 6.38 % |
| GWO.PR.F | Perpetual-Discount | 1.39 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 23.08 Evaluated at bid price : 23.33 Bid-YTW : 6.37 % |
| SLF.PR.E | Perpetual-Discount | 1.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 17.15 Evaluated at bid price : 17.15 Bid-YTW : 6.63 % |
| RY.PR.C | Perpetual-Discount | 1.90 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 19.32 Evaluated at bid price : 19.32 Bid-YTW : 6.05 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| BNA.PR.D | SplitShare | 130,102 | Recent new issue. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-07-09 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.91 Bid-YTW : 7.38 % |
| CM.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 39,183 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 18.48 Evaluated at bid price : 18.48 Bid-YTW : 6.52 % |
| TD.PR.S | FixedReset | 33,930 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-10 Maturity Price : 24.86 Evaluated at bid price : 24.91 Bid-YTW : 4.23 % |
| MFC.PR.E | FixedReset | 33,860 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-10-19 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.65 Bid-YTW : 5.19 % |
| GWO.PR.E | OpRet | 25,221 | RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.75. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2009-08-09 Maturity Price : 25.50 Evaluated at bid price : 25.75 Bid-YTW : -5.67 % |
| HSB.PR.E | FixedReset | 22,755 | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-07-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.55 Bid-YTW : 4.43 % |
| There were 31 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
S&P Announces TXPR Index Revision
Standard & Poor’s has announced (although not yet on their official index news page):
the following index changes as a result of the semi-annual S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index Review. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, July 20, 2009
| TXPR Revision 2009/7 Additions |
|||
| Ticker | HIMIPref™ SubIndex |
DBRS Rating |
Last Index Action |
| BMO.PR.P | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| BCE.PR.F | Scraps (FixFloat) |
Pfd-3(high) | Deleted July 2008 |
| BAM.PR.P | FixedReset | Pfd-2(low) | |
| CCS.PR.D | Scraps (FixedReset) |
Pfd-3 | |
| CIU.PR.B | FixedReset | Pfd-2(high) | |
| FTS.PR.E | Scraps (OpRet) |
Pfd-3(high) | Deleted Jan. 2009 |
| HSB.PR.E | FixedReset | Pfd-2(high) | |
| IAG.PR.C | FixedReset | Pfd-2(high) | |
| MFC.PR.E | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| MFC.PR.D | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| RY.PR.R | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| RY.PR.X | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| TD.PR.G | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | |
| WN.PR.E | Scraps (PerpDis) |
Pfd-3 | |
| WN.PR.C | Scraps (PerpDis) |
Pfd-3 | |
| TXPR Revision 2009/7 Deletions |
||||
| Ticker | HIMIPref™ SubIndex |
DBRS Rating |
Last Index Action |
|
| BMO.PR.L | PerpDis | Pfd-1(low) | Added Jan. 2009 | |
| BCE.PR.C | Scraps (FixFloat) |
Pfd-3(high) | ||
| BAM.PR.O | OpRet | Pfd-2(low) | Added Jan. 2009 |
|
| FTS.PR.C | Scraps (OpRet) |
Pfd-3(high) | Added Jan. 2009 |
|
| MFC.PR.B | PerpDis | Pfd-1(low) | ||
| MFC.PR.C | PerpDis | Pfd-1(low) | ||
| NSI.PR.D | Scraps (OpRet) |
Pfd-2(low) | Added Jan. 2009 |
|
| POW.PR.C | PerpDis | Pfd-2(high) | Added July 2007 |
|
| RY.PR.B | PerpDis | Pfd-1(low) | ||
| RY.PR.W | PerpDis | Pfd-1(low) | ||
| TD.PR.S | FixedReset | Pfd-1(low) | Added July 2008 |
|
| TCA.PR.Y | PerpDis | Pfd-2(low) | ||
| WN.PR.A | PerpDis | Pfd-3 | ||
| "Deletions" without a listed "Prior Action" are Originals | ||||
The net effect of these changes (counting solely by issue count, not by the undisclosed index weight; and counting HIMIPref™ "Scraps" issues according to their bracketted ‘would be’ subindex) are:
| TXPR Net Changes by Issue July 2009 |
|||
| Category | Adds | Deletions | Net |
| Class | |||
| FixedReset | 11 | 1 | +10 |
| FixFloat | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| OpRet | 1 | 3 | -2 |
| PerpDis | 2 | 8 | -6 |
| Credit | |||
| Pfd-1(low) | 6 | 6 | 0 |
| Pfd-2(high) | 3 | 1 | +2 |
| Pfd-2(low) | 1 | 3 | -2 |
| Pfd-3(high) | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Pfd-3 | 3 | 1 | +2 |
All in all – and bearing in mind that I am not looking at the (unavailable) weightings, only at the issue counts – it looks like the index is increasingly dominated by the FixedReset structure, and that credit quality has declined marginally.
Thank you S&P! I LOVE indices that are easy to beat! The churning helps a lot, too … keep it going!
July 9, 2009
Bradford & Bingley is defaulting on its sub-debt:
— Bradford & Bingley Plc’s failure to pay interest on some of its subordinated bonds will trigger settlement of credit-default swaps linked to about $414 million of the nationalized mortgage lender’s debt.
Dealers and investors agreed today that the Bingley, England-based company’s decision not to pay interest on 125 million pounds ($202 million) of 6.625 percent subordinated bonds maturing 2023 was a “credit event,” the International Swaps and Derivatives Association said on its Web site.
The ruling will prompt an auction to settle credit swap contracts even though the U.K. government changed the terms of the bank’s nationalization in February, allowing it to miss coupon payments without that constituting a default. Bradford & Bingley said in May it didn’t intend to pay interest on the notes, which form part of the bank’s so-called lower Tier 2 capital.
This shows the authorities’ determination to make holders of capital paper suffer, a major factor in the DBRS revision of its rating methodology.
The more I think about the recent MLI Tier 1 Issue, the less I understand it. I have updated my discussion of the issue with some questions sent to MFC’s Investor Relations department.
S&P should be revising the TXPR index soon – but I still don’t see any announcement on their index news page. The last revision was announced 2009-1-9, while last summer’s revision was announced 2009-7-11 (which included the addition of a called issue, FAL.PR.H, which was later quietly dropped).
The Credit Crunch isn’t over yet, as evidenced by Fun ‘n’ Games regarding the pricing of senior debt of CIT, a TARP beneficiary. CIT has, for all intents and purposes, been locked out of the bond market for well over a year and has been downgraded to just above, or below, junk status by the ratings agencies (depending on which ones you listen to; Fitch has them at single B). They were able to issue a short-term TALF-eligible securitization in early June; 2Q09 results will be announced on July 23.
The Boston Fed has released another Policy Briefing (they’ve been busy this week!), this one regarding A Proposal to Help Distressed Homeowners: A Government Payment-Sharing Plan:
This public policy brief presents a proposal, originally posted on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in January of this year, designed to help homeowners who are unable to afford mortgage payments on their principal residence because they have suffered a significant income disruption and because the balance owed on their mortgage exceeds the value of their home. These homeowners represent a subset of the population of distressed homeowners, but according to our research they face an elevated risk of default and are unlikely to be helped by current foreclosure-reduction programs. The plan is a government payment-sharing arrangement that works with the homeowner’s existing mortgage and provides a significant reduction in the homeowner’s monthly mortgage payment. The plan does not involve principal reduction. Two options are presented; both are designed to help people with negative equity and a significant income disruption, such as job loss. In one version, the assistance comes in the form of a government loan, which must be repaid when the borrower returns to financial health. The second version features government grants that do not have to be repaid. In either case, the homeowner must provide evidence of negative equity in the home and of job loss or other significant income disruption. The costs of the plan are moderate, and the benefits should help not only the participating homeowners but also the housing industry, the financial markets, and the economy more broadly.
Another strong day for preferreds, with FixedResets outperforming yet again. I’m finding the yields on those things increasingly difficult to believe! When will it end?
PerpetualDiscounts closed to yield 6.30%, equivalent to 8.82% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield 6.4%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now 242bp, tightening in a little from the 250bp they recorded June 30.
| HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices Values are provisional and are finalized monthly |
|||||||
| Index | Mean Current Yield (at bid) |
Median YTW |
Median Average Trading Value |
Median Mod Dur (YTW) |
Issues | Day’s Perf. | Index Value |
| Ratchet | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | -1.1047 % | 1,154.8 |
| FixedFloater | 7.06 % | 5.44 % | 37,286 | 16.41 | 1 | 0.2604 % | 2,136.3 |
| Floater | 3.30 % | 3.86 % | 76,735 | 17.75 | 3 | -1.1047 % | 1,442.7 |
| OpRet | 4.99 % | -3.46 % | 123,150 | 0.09 | 15 | 0.1074 % | 2,213.4 |
| SplitShare | 6.11 % | 5.30 % | 80,170 | 4.17 | 4 | 0.6606 % | 1,918.1 |
| Interest-Bearing | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1074 % | 2,024.0 |
| Perpetual-Premium | 0.00 % | 0.00 % | 0 | 0.00 | 0 | 0.1619 % | 1,755.8 |
| Perpetual-Discount | 6.31 % | 6.30 % | 157,000 | 13.46 | 71 | 0.1619 % | 1,617.1 |
| FixedReset | 5.57 % | 4.32 % | 498,531 | 4.29 | 40 | 0.2948 % | 2,061.6 |
| Performance Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Change | Notes |
| BAM.PR.B | Floater | -2.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 10.25 Evaluated at bid price : 10.25 Bid-YTW : 3.86 % |
| BAM.PR.K | Floater | -1.82 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 10.26 Evaluated at bid price : 10.26 Bid-YTW : 3.86 % |
| BAM.PR.J | OpRet | -1.23 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2018-03-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 21.61 Bid-YTW : 7.63 % |
| RY.PR.H | Perpetual-Discount | 1.01 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 23.90 Evaluated at bid price : 24.10 Bid-YTW : 5.95 % |
| TD.PR.I | FixedReset | 1.07 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-08-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.46 Bid-YTW : 4.07 % |
| GWO.PR.I | Perpetual-Discount | 1.11 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 18.20 Evaluated at bid price : 18.20 Bid-YTW : 6.24 % |
| RY.PR.R | FixedReset | 1.35 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-03-26 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.87 Bid-YTW : 3.78 % |
| RY.PR.Y | FixedReset | 1.40 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-12-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.60 Bid-YTW : 4.24 % |
| BAM.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | 1.44 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 15.51 Evaluated at bid price : 15.51 Bid-YTW : 7.74 % |
| MFC.PR.B | Perpetual-Discount | 1.61 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 18.89 Evaluated at bid price : 18.89 Bid-YTW : 6.23 % |
| CGI.PR.B | SplitShare | 1.78 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Soft Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-03-14 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 25.80 Bid-YTW : 3.99 % |
| BAM.PR.O | OpRet | 2.05 % | YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Option Certainty Maturity Date : 2013-06-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 23.91 Bid-YTW : 6.33 % |
| Volume Highlights | |||
| Issue | Index | Shares Traded |
Notes |
| BMO.PR.O | FixedReset | 412,350 | RBC crossed 84,800 at 28.00, then three more blocks of 100,000 each at the same price. Nice tickets! YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-06-24 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.96 Bid-YTW : 4.33 % |
| BNA.PR.D | SplitShare | 261,515 | New issue settled today. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Hard Maturity Maturity Date : 2014-07-09 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 24.99 Bid-YTW : 7.30 % |
| BNS.PR.T | FixedReset | 150,965 | Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 27.80. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-05-25 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.80 Bid-YTW : 3.69 % |
| TD.PR.G | FixedReset | 123,110 | Desjardins crossed 15,700 at 27.61, then 84,300 at 27.60. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Call Maturity Date : 2014-05-30 Maturity Price : 25.00 Evaluated at bid price : 27.65 Bid-YTW : 3.82 % |
| SLF.PR.A | Perpetual-Discount | 111,235 | Scotia crossed 50,000 at 17.90; TD crossed 48,100 at the same price. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 17.87 Evaluated at bid price : 17.87 Bid-YTW : 6.71 % |
| BNS.PR.N | Perpetual-Discount | 66,890 | Scotia crossed 40,000 at 21.30. YTW SCENARIO Maturity Type : Limit Maturity Maturity Date : 2039-07-09 Maturity Price : 21.20 Evaluated at bid price : 21.20 Bid-YTW : 6.21 % |
| There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares. | |||
