Market Action

December 3, 2007

Sorry – month-end is a busy time for me, so again, there’s not much colour today!

However, I was most interested in Accrued Interest’s essay on the implications of the Florida Money-Market Fund Freeze, together with the most recent Bloomberg story.

According to Bloomberg:

BlackRock, at a Tallahassee meeting today with officials from schools and cities in the Local Government Investment Pool, said it will recommend putting about 86 percent of the pool’s $14 billion of assets that have no risk of loss or default into a “fund A.” The remaining 14 percent will go into a “fund B,” said Simon Mendelson, chief operating officer of BlackRock’s cash management business.

“We want fund A to be really clean,” said Barbara Novick, vice chairman of BlackRock, who made the presentation with Mendelson. “We want to run it as a money-market fund.”

I don’t get it. When I look at the October 31 Holdings of the Florida fund, I don’t see 86% of the securities having “no risk of loss or defaults”. The only securities without default risk are central government securities denominated in the national currency (and their guarantees, if you want to be picky). Even then, “no risk” can be something of a relative term, as those who read about hyperinflation in the German Republic will remember:

The German Mark, the British shilling, the French franc, and the Italian lira all had about equal value, and all were exchanged four or five to the dollar. That was in 1914. In 1923, at the most fevered moment of the German hyperinflation, the exchange rate between the dollar and the Mark was one trillion Marks to one dollar, and a wheelbarrow full of money would not even buy a newspaper.

That was then and this is now, you say? I know a man with first-hand experience of Serbian hyperinflation:

In October of 1993 the created a new currency unit. One new dinar was worth one million of the old dinars. In effect, the government simply removed six zeroes from the paper money. This of course did not stop the inflation and between October 1, 1993 and January 24, 1995 prices increased by 5 quadrillion percent. This number is a 5 with 15 zeroes after it.

Many Yugoslavian businesses refused to take the Yugoslavian currency at all and the German Deutsche Mark effectively became the currency of Yugoslavia. But government organizations, government employees and pensioners still got paid in Yugoslavian dinars so there was still an active exchange in dinars. On November 12, 1993 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 1 million new dinars. By November 23 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 6.5 million new dinars and at the end of November it was 1 DM = 37 million new dinars. At the beginning of December the bus workers went on strike because their pay for two weeks was equivalent to only 4 DM when it cost a family of four 230 DM per month to live. By December 11th the exchange rate was 1 DM = 800 million and on December 15th it was 1 DM = 3.7 billion new dinars. The average daily rate of inflation was nearly 100 percent. When farmers selling in the free markets refused to sell food for Yugoslavian dinars the government closed down the free markets. On December 29 the exchange rate was 1 DM = 950 billion new dinars.

At the end of December the exchange rate was 1 DM = 3 trillion dinars and on January 4, 1994 it was 1 DM = 6 trillion dinars. On January 6th the government declared that the German Deutsche was an official currency of Yugoslavia. About this time the government announced a new new dinar which was equal to 1 billion of the old new dinars. This meant that the exchange rate was 1 DM = 6,000 new new dinars. By January 11 the exchange rate had reached a level of 1 DM = 80,000 new new dinars. On January 13th the rate was 1 DM = 700,000 new new dinars and six days later it was 1 DM = 10 million new new dinars.

So anyway, the moral of the story is: nothing is certain in this wicked world. There is default risk everywhere.

That being said, I find the holdings of the Florida fund rather surprising, in that (i) I don’t recognize a lot of the names held, and (ii) A lot of the names are of the form “XXX Funding LLC”. So, I’ll repeat, yet again, another moral we should all remember from the credit crunch: Diversify! Diversify! Diversify!

Without having had anything more than a casual once over of the Florida holdings, it seems to me that the managers were well diversified by name and tenor, but very poorly diversified by industry … I mean, geez, look at all those XXX Funding LLCs! You are not diversified if you have 1% of your portfolio in each of 100 different companies if each of those companies is in the business of manufacturing Britney Spears Fan Club kits.

As with Canadian ABCP – I have nothing but sympathy for portfolio managers who held 5-10% in the sector; it looked pretty good to me too, and (with the exception of Apsley Trust) the credit quality was fine – it was simply the liquidity that suddenly disappeared. But too much of a good thing is simply too much.

Accrued Interest‘s conclusions as to how the whole affair will play out look entirely reasonable to me … with one quibble:

Finally, government money market funds will likely become permanently more popular.

Permanently? I have my doubts. There have always been periodic flights to quality in the investment world, and sooner or later investor greed beats investor fear and competition forces the assumption of increased risk.

In sort-of related news on the MLEC/Super-Conduit front, Harrier Finance and Carrera Capital are being bailed out by their so-called off-balance-sheet sponsors, to the tune of $11-billion and $4.8 billion, respectively.

“Every day that goes by we are seeing more restructuring and liquidity provision by sponsors,” [Dresdner Kleinwort analyst Priya] Shah said in an interview today. “The longer M-LEC takes, the less of a need there will be for it.”

Another day of good volume and positive returns! Holy smokes, can this be the preferred market we’re looking at?

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.87% 4.86% 111,120 15.72 2 +0.0000% 1,049.6
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 4.85% 98,454 15.73 8 +0.0258% 1,035.7
Floater 5.17% 5.25% 81,818 14.99 2 -1.4392% 956.9
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.54% 80,066 3.76 16 +0.0511% 1,032.3
Split-Share 5.34% 6.12% 91,819 4.08 15 +0.1062% 1,019.6
Interest Bearing 6.27% 6.57% 68,683 3.72 4 -0.3841% 1,061.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.29% 81,052 8.06 11 +0.0962% 1,009.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.60% 5.65% 348,477 14.42 55 +0.2623% 906.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -2.7328% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 according to the company. Pre-tax bid-YTW now 6.70% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.61 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.0979%  
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 20.20 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0323% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.4815% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.82% based on a bid of 17.81 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5334% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 24.50 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare +2.2727% Asset coverage of just under 4.0:1 as of October 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 22.50 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. For those keeping score, this compares with BNA.PR.A (6.10% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (7.65% to 2019-1-10).
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.4215% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 22.84 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.I FixFloat 884,942 Scotia crossed 884,000 at 24.43 … now, that’s a nice ticket in anybody’s books!
FAL.PR.A Ratchet 251,000 RBC crossed 250,000 at 24.50.
IQW.PR.C Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 161,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 214.30% (!) based on a bid of 17.90 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00 … but don’t count on it!.
BPO.PR.H Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 153,300 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 24.45. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.39% based on a bid of 24.33 and a softMaturity 2015-12-30 at 25.00.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 62,840 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 21.76 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 36,570 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 30,895 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-five other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

EN.PR.A : Partial Call for Redemption

Energy Split Corp. II Inc. has announced:

that in relation to its reorganization, the Company has called 186,000 ROC Preferred Shares for cash redemption on December 14, 2007 representing approximately 22.245% of the outstanding ROC Preferred Shares. The ROC Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis so that each holder of ROC Preferred Shares of record on December 13, 2007 will have approximately 22.245% of their ROC Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price of the ROC Preferred Shares will be equal to the lesser of (i) Unit Value as determined on the December 6, 2007 (the “Valuation Date”) and (ii) $25.00. As at the close of business today, Unit Value was $42.76.

Holders of ROC Preferred Shares that are on record for the dividend but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including December 16, 2007.

The Company is redeeming the 186,000 ROC Preferred Shares in order to increase the downside protection on the remaining ROC Preferred Shares to approximately 55%, as of November 30, 2007, in order to maintain the current rating of Pfd-2 (low) on the ROC Preferred Shares. There is no assurance that the rating will be maintained and the redemption and reorganization are not conditional on the rating being maintained. The redemption is taking place in accordance with the approval received from shareholders at the meeting approving the reorganization.

“Downside protection of 55%” has the same meaning as “Asset Coverage of 2.22:1” … as assets worth $2.22 can lose 55% of their value and still be worth $1.00.

This announcement is in accord with the previously announced plan.

EN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is not included in any of the indices due to low average volume. There are a mere 1,209,398 shares outstanding, according to the Toronto Stock Exchange.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing : November 30, 2007

 

HIMI Index Changes, November 30, 2007
Issue From To Because
TOC.PR.B Floater Scraps Volume
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
BAM.PR.G FixFloat Scraps Volume
BCE.PR.T Scraps FixFloat Volume
NA.PR.K PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.E PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price

Index performance for November has been posted previously.  

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance, November 2007

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for November was:

Total Return, November 2007
Index Performance
Ratchet +0.03%
FixFloat -0.54%
Floater -6.60%
OpRet +0.51%
SplitShare -2.37%
Interest +0.35%
PerpetualPremium +0.12%
PerpetualDiscount -0.07%

The FloatingRate index was adversely affected by having two of its three constituents (BAM.PR.B & BAM.PR.K) among the five worst performing issues in the universe in the past month.

The performance of the SplitShare index was very odd, being dragged down by three issues that performed appallingly:

Extreme Performances in SplitShare Index
November 2007
Issue November
Total
Return
Yield
October 31
Yield
November 30
BNA.PR.C -8.46% 6.47% 7.62% 
BNA.PR.B -9.59% 5.30% 6.90%
FTU.PR.A -8.53% 4.93% 7.12%

The effect of these three miserable performances was to drag the SplitShare index total return down by approximately 1.75%. The strange behaviour of the BNA issues during the month has been discussed in another post

Claymore has published NAV data for CPD and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to November 30
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
August 31 19.04      
September 25 18.76 0.2185 -0.32% -1.23%
September 28, 2007 18.59   -0.91%
October 31 18.19   -2.15% -2.15%
November 30, 2007 17.97   -1.21% -1.21%
Quarterly Return -4.52%

The DPS.UN NAV for November 28 has been published, so we can calculate the November-ish returns for it:

DPS.UN NAV Return, November-ish 2007
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
October 31 $21.35    
November 28 $21.07 $0.00 -1.31%
Adjustment for November stub-period +0.17%
Estimated November Return -1.14%
CPD had a NAV of $17.94 on November 28 and $17.97 on November 30. The estimated end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.17%, which is added to the DPS.UN total return in order to estimate the return for November.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for September and October to derive:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-November-ish, 2007
September-ish -0.92%
October-ish -1.86%
November-ish -1.14%
Three-months-ish -3.87%

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performing Issues : November, 2007

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “November 30”)
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -14.21% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.16% based on a bid of 16.90 and a limitMaturity.
 
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -11.20% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.00% based on a bid of 19.27 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -10.60%  
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) -9.68%  
BNA.PR.B SplitShare Pfd-2(low) -9.59% Asset coverage of just under 4.0:1 as of October 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.90% based on a bid of 22.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.E OpRet Pfd-1(low) +3.07% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.74% based on a bid of 25.68 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) +3.47% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 24.86 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low)  +3,83% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium Pfd-1(low) +3.88% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.82% based on a bid of 25.80 and a call 2008-1-30 at 25.75.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing Pfd-2 +5.94% Asset coverage of 1.6+:1 as of November 30, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.88 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.

The variance of returns was even more bizarre this month than it was in October! The underperformance of the E-L Financial issues, ELF.PR.F & ELF.PR.G is very surprising.

Market Action

November 30, 2007

An extremely busy day to finish the month!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.86% 4.84% 112,447 15.75 2 +0.0614% 1,049.6
Fixed-Floater 4.91% 4.93% 98,259 15.62 8 -0.1617% 1,035.4
Floater 4.84% 4.91% 59,518 15.59 3 +0.0592% 970.9
Op. Retract 4.88% 2.47% 80,591 3.81 16 -0.0406% 1,031.8
Split-Share 5.34% 6.23% 92,352 4.09 15 +0.1093% 1,018.5
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.52% 69,058 3.75 4 -0.1081% 1,065.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.86% 5.34% 91,238 8.05 11 -0.0066% 1,008.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.61% 5.65% 348,050 14.20 55 +0.2244% 904.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -4.3478% Asset coverage of 4.0:1 according to the company. Pre-tax bid-YTW now 6.90% based on a bid of 22.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat -1.5748%  
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.1765% Asset coverage of 2.4+:1 as of November 29, according to Brompton. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 10.08 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.08.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.1696% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.16% based on a bid of 16.90 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.0932% Asset coverage of 4.0:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.62% based on a bid of 19.00 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.1213% Asset coverage of 1.9+:1 as of November 22, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 9.92 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing +1.1518% Asset coverage of 2.1+:1 as of November 28, according to Faircourt. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.11% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.66 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1526% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 21.94 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.2013% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.2195% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.4829% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 20.53 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.7632% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 20.20 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.9311% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 24.28 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.1530% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.2774% Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of November 23, 2007, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% based on a bid of 9.88 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +2.5961% Asset coverage of 2.3:1 as of November 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +2.6667% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of November 15, according to . Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.12% based on a bid of 9.24 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
IQW.PR.C Scraps (would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 456,020 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 209.05% (annualized!) based on a bid of 17.80 and a softMaturity 2008-2-29 at 25.00. But don’t count on it!
NTL.PR.F Scraps (would be Ratchet, but there are credit concerns) 376,393  
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 221,500 Scotia crossed 200,000 at 24.71. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 24.62 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 142,760 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 24.42 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 69,809 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 22.58 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 54,830 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 54,830 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 20.80 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventy-four other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : May 2004

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2004-05-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,352.5 1 2.00 2.50% 21.0 69M 2.52%
FixedFloater 2,151.8 8 2.00 2.45% 19.5 81M 5.32%
Floater 1,947.1 6 2.00 2.63% 20.0 65M 2.90%
OpRet 1,707.6 22 1.46 4.05% 3.9 136M 4.86%
SplitShare 1,734.1 16 1.81 4.58% 4.0 54M 5.44%
Interest-Bearing 2,089.1 10 2.00 6.08% 2.4 128M 7.32%
Perpetual-Premium 1,321.3 25 1.52 5.45% 6.1 173M 5.70%
Perpetual-Discount 1,523.0 7 2.00 5.64% 14.3 150M 5.55%

Index Constitution, 2004-05-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2004-05-31, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

BIG.PR.A : Partial Call for Redemption

Big 8 Split Inc. has announced:

it has called 10,584 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on December 14, 2007 representing approximately 0.4% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of holders of 10,584 Capital Shares exercising their special annual retraction rights. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that holders of record of Preferred Shares on the close of business on December 13, 2007 will have approximately 0.5% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $25.00 per share. Holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to and including December 14, 2007.

In addition, holders of a further 91,096 Preferred and Capital Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on December 14, 2007. As a result, a total of 101,680 Preferred and Capital Shares, or approximately 4.3% of both classes of shares currently outstanding will be redeemed.

Payment of the amount due to retracting shareholders will be made by the Company on December 14, 2007. From and after December 15, 2007 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

BIG.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

FBS.PR.B : Partial Call for Redemption

5Banc Split Inc. has announced:

it has called 1,350,696 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on December 14, 2007 representing approximately 10% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of holders of 1,350,696 Capital Shares exercising their special annual retraction rights. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that holders of record of Preferred Shares on the close of business on December 13, 2007 will have approximately 10% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $10.00 per share. Holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to and including December 14, 2007.

In addition, holders of a further 585,270 Preferred and Capital Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on December 14, 2007. As a result, a total of 1,935,966 Preferred and Capital Shares, or approximately 14% of both classes of shares currently outstanding will be redeemed.

Payment of the amount due to retracting shareholders will be made by the Company on December 14, 2007. From and after December 15, 2007 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

FBS.PR.B is tracked by HIMIPref™ with the securityCode A29001. It is currently included in the HIMIPref™ SplitShare Index. It is also currently included in the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index but will be removed in January.

Last January, the company very proudly announced the underwriters’ greenshoe had been exercised … sic transit gloria mundi.

Regulatory Capital

RY Tier 1 Capital : October 2007

Royal Bank has released its Fourth Quarter, 2007, Report and Supplementary Information; I will analyze this in the same format as was has been recently done for NABMO and TD.

Step One is to analyze their Tier 1 Capital, reproducing the summary produced last year:

RY Capital Structure
October, 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Total Tier 1 Capital 23,383 21,478
Common Shareholders’ Equity 95.2% 98.1%
Preferred Shares 10.0% 6.3%
Innovative Tier 1 Capital Instruments 14.9% 15.0%
Non-Controlling Interests in Subsidiaries 0.1% 0.1%
Goodwill -20.3% -19.5%

Next, the issuance capacity (from Part 3 of last year’s series):

RY
Tier 1 Issuance Capacity
October 2007
& October 2006
  2007 2006
Equity Capital (A) 17,545 16,911
Non-Equity Tier 1 Limit (B=A/3) 5,848 5,637
Innovative Tier 1 Capital (C) 3,494 3,222
Preferred Limit (D=B-C) 2,354 2,415
Preferred Y/E Actual (E) 2,344 1,345
New Issuance Capacity (F=D-E) 10 1,070
Items A, C & E are taken from the table
“Capital”
of the supplementary information;
Note that Item A includes Goodwill and non-controlling interest
Item B is as per OSFI Guidelines
Items D & F are my calculations.

We can now show the all important Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios!

RY
Risk-Weighted Asset Ratios
October 2007
& October 2007
  Note 2007 2006
Equity Capital A 17,545 16,911
Risk-Weighted Assets B 247,635 223,709
Equity/RWA C=A/B 7.09% 7.56%
Tier 1 Ratio D 9.4% 9.6%
Capital Ratio E 11.5% 11.9%
A is taken from the table “Issuance Capacity”, above
B, D & E are taken from the Supplementary Report
C is my calculation.

Note that, as with all banks examined thus far, the Equity/RWA ratio and Tier 1 Ratio have both deteriorated over the year, but for NA and RY the Total Capital Ratio has also declined. RY’s Subordinated Debt outstanding has been fairly constant over the past year, although $1-billion-odd of direct subordinated debt has been replaced with “Trust Subordinated Notes”. These are described in RY’s Second Quarter 2007 Report – seems to me that RY was able to get away with an extraordinarily low rate of interest on them – about 5bp over 7.5 year deposit notes, as far as I can make out.

And, of course, RY has done quite a bit of opportunistic – and very well timed! – preferred share issuance in the past fiscal year: RY.PR.C (settled 2006-11-1), RY.PR.D, RY.PR.E, RY.PR.FRY.PR.G

It is disappointing to see the deterioration in the Equity/RWA ratio over the year – I consider this to be a measure of the safety of the preferred shares, as it is the “total risk” of the bank’s assets (as defined by the regulators) divided by the value of capital junior to preferreds (which therefore takes the first loss). It is by no means anything to lose a lot of sleep over, as it still remains strong – the preferreds are better protected than the sub-debt of a lot of global banks – but … geez, the direction’s wrong!

I won’t discuss the annual results to any great extent – there will be innumerable reports over the next few months released by analysts with a great deal more time to spend on the matter than I have.