Market Action

November 8, 2007

Thursday! The day when the US Commercial Paper Outstandings get reported! The Fed reports that ABCP outstanding declined by $29.5-billion, a marked increase in pace over the past month, as deleveraging is quickly becoming a major issue in the States. Bloomberg provides a review.

Bernanke is clearly a reader of PrefBlog – his testimony to the Joint Economic Committe echoed what I’ve been saying about Super-Conduit:

So … if it works properly I think it would speed up the recognition of values in part because it would remove some of the risk of fire sales, of rapid drawing down of assets in some of these vehicles and allow the market to stabilize and begin to make a better longer term valuation of what these assets are worth.”

He added, “If that’s the way it works, and again it depends on execution, it would remove some overhang from the market, it would create a stable financing source for those assets and it ought not to be inconsistent with the price discovery process.”

Mainly, though, he just told the politicians on the committee to mind their own bees-wax. Good for him! He may have enough to worry about soon enough – there’s at least one analyst raising the spectre of 5% headline inflation as the Ghost of Christmas Present!

Despite this horrifying projection (noting that, gee, the projection for core inflation isn’t quite so bad), Treasuries were up on expectations of a Fed cut, as early indications point to a lousy Christmas for retailers

In SIV news that I missed yesterday … one of the SIVs affected by Moody’s mass review was Links Finance … proudly owned and operated by our very own Bank of Montreal:

Links Finance Corporation (US$1.9 billion of debt securities affected)

Mezzanine Capital Notes

New Rating: Aa2 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: Aa2

Standard Capital Notes

New Rating: A3 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: A3

Links Finance’s net asset value declined to 83% from 94% since Moody’s last review on September 5th. Moody’s review will focus on the potential for further market value deterioration.

Cheery, eh? There’s more:

Managers of structured investment vehicles don’t expect their business model to survive as the value of assets shrinks and the companies struggle to borrow, Moody’s Investors Service analysts said today.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Apropos of nothing, I ran across a Ministry of Finance puff-piece today, which made the claim:

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2001-2002 ranked Canadian banks among the soundest financial institutions in the world (see Chart 5). The soundness of the Canadian banking industry has been demonstrated many times over the past several years. Canadian banks weathered the debt difficulties of the less developed countries in the early 1980s, the decline in real estate values a decade later, and the Asian crisis in the late 1990s without experiencing any systemic problems.

… which was kind of cool. Our second place finish has been repeated in the 2007-2008 Report, although you have to poke around a bit to verify that. (hint: Country Analysis / Balance Sheet).

And, as far as preferreds go … another day of entirely reasonable volume but disappointing returns. The long corporates index is now yielding just a hair under 5.8%. So let me think about this. You can get the same pre-tax yield with better quality owning GWO.PR.H, at the closing bid. Potential tax benefits – or potential capital gains when others recognize the potential tax benefits – are merely icing on the cake. If this makes sense to anybody, please let me know.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.88% 4.87% 195,800 15.69 2 -0.1019% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 4.82% 84,428 15.80 8 -0.0450% 1,046.7
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 65,177 16.29 3 +0.0274% 1,044.9
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.01% 75,816 3.44 16 -0.1091% 1,029.2
Split-Share 5.22% 5.23% 87,953 3.93 15 -0.3404% 1,033.1
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.50% 61,326 3.55 4 -0.3540% 1,053.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.44% 81,078 5.20 11 -0.1211% 1,011.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.53% 5.57% 328,877 14.32 55 -0.1159% 913.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.2634% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.7746% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 20.48 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.4462% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.1726% Asset coverage of over 1.7:1 as of October 31 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 15.17 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00. OK, boys, over 7.50% interest-equivalent for well-secured three year paper. Whatever you say.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1693% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 21.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1471% Asset coverage of over 3.8:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.22% based on a bid of 19.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. At an interest-equivalency factor of 1.4, this has now cracked the magic 10% interest-equivalent mark!
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.0346% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ACO.PR.A OpRet -1.0101% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.65% based on a bid of 26.40 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0194% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.81 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5085% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 62,215 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.66 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 44,290 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 23,850 On the one hand, I’m pleased to see good volume on this thing. On the other hand, why did it go down? BAM.A was up today, so it’s not necessarily a question of a sudden reassessment of credit quality. Or maybe these BAM.PR.Ns have been used as an equity substitute and people are now switching to the real thing? That’s way too sophisticated! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 23,477 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 23,145 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 20.88 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update, 2007-11-09 Holy smokes! Yesterday I titled this “October 8” and have now changed it to, er, the right month. I had the day and year right! I must have been feeling nostalgic …

Issue Comments

GWO.PR.E / GWO.PR.X Issuer Bid Update

This has been rather a boring topic to update this year; in my last update I noted that there had been no purchases, unlike the good old days of substantial purchases.

GWO has recently released their Third Quarter Financials and, at last, we see some activity on this front, albeit not much.

In their Statement of Cash Flows, page 10 of the PDF, they have indicated that $1-million was spent to purchase and cancel preferred shares in the third quarter; note 12 to the financials, on page 25 of the PDF, indicates that this represents the cancellation of 40,400 shares of GWO.PR.E (so there’s obviously some rounding of the cash amount!).

Not much, perhaps, but we are reminded on page 24, Note 11(b), of the redemption of GWL.PR.L subsequent to quarter-end, which was worth $50-million.

MAPF

MAPF Sustainable Income

I received a call today from a client who is most concerned about the preferred share market in general and Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund in particular. It will not have escaped notice that the fund price has been declining in recent months – when will it end?

However, the most important thing about fixed-income investing – and an investment in preferred shares is, for broad asset allocation purposes, an investment in fixed income – is that it is represents an investment in fixed income. A very circular definition to be sure, but I hope my meaning will be made plain shortly.

From now on, I will report sustainable dividends per unit as part of my regular portfolio disclosures. This number will be calculated as follows:

SustDiv = NAVPU * PortYield / Leverage

where

  • SustDiv is the expected income per unit per year
  • NAVPU is the Net Asset Value Per Unit
  • PortYield is the Yield-to-Worst of the Portfolio
  • Leverage is the degree of leverage in the portfolio

First – I should emphasize that “Leverage” should not be taken as meaning that the fund is leveraged on a regular basis. The fund can often hold relatively large cash balances, either positive or negative, to facilitate trading. If I attempt to purchase one security and sell another, I might not get filled on both sides to the same extent. If I don’t, I won’t force the cash to zero, by buying or selling something at whatever price it takes … I’ll (generally) wait until the next day and patiently wait until the market cooperates. These cash positions are normally wiped out fairly quickly – but when they exist at month end, the fund reporting can look a little odd! Note that in the table below, most of the “Leverage Factors” are less than 1.0, indicating that the fund was holding cash until it could be invested advantageously.

While the figures for Sustainable Income have been worked out in a mathematically precise manner, I must caution investors that these amounts will not necessarily be paid out to them in four equal installments annually. As may be seen from the historical distributions recorded on the Quarterly Performance Reporting Page, distributions are ‘lumpy’. This results from several factors:

  • Sometimes, the market wants to capture the dividend a lot more than I want to keep it! Let us say that an issue is fairly priced at $25.00 (flat) and earns a $0.30 dividend tomorrow. The market price should be $25.30. Sometimes, the market really wants to capture the dividend, and the price goes up to $25.40. Why would I keep the issue? Why not just sell, and take $0.40 as a capital gain, instead of $0.30 as a dividend? I don’t have a good answer for that … so I sell. Naysayers may whine that this requires me to have a fairly good idea of what the “fair price” is … but that’s what I do!
  • Sometimes I want to capture the dividend more than the market wants to keep it. Perhaps, in the above example, the market price of the issue is only $25.20. Well – I’ll be trying to buy it! If I can get it at that price then I will earn a $0.30 dividend right away and be left with an issue fairly priced at $25.00 … which is good business!
  • The fund does not exclusively seek to maximize yield. I do not blindly purchase whatever yields the most.
    • I might, for instance, trade so that while I’m giving up yield, I’m picking up credit (e.g., I might wish to sell a Pfd-2(low) issue at a yield of 5.00% in order to buy a Pfd-1 issue at a yield of 4.80%).
    • There might be other instances whereby I can increase my ‘fair value’ while decreasing yield … I might wish to sell a perpetual at 5.00% in order to buy a retractible at 4.80%.

The first item on the above list will have the effect of reducing the dividend distribution, but increasing the capital gain distribution. The second item will have the opposite effect. The third item will not have a direct effect on distributions, but will reduce my reported portfolio yield. When the trades are successful, each will have the effect of ultimately putting more money in the unitholders’ pockets.

The fund is managed with an objective of maximizing fair value. I am indifferent as to whether this comes in the form of dividends or capital gains; I am indifferent as to whether the quarterly distributions of dividends are bigger or smaller than average.

From the above discussion, it should be understood that these calculations are a guide, intended to illustrate the idea that expected income per unit will be fairly constant. Successful trading – as has occurred in the past – will lead, eventually, to excess distributions and hence, more units.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
April, 2007 9.4083 4.52% 0.89 $0.4778
May 9.3259 4.59% 0.95 0.4506
June 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
July 9.3627 5.10% 1.01 0.4728
August 9.3309 4.55% 0.89 0.4770
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
October, 2007 8.8084 5.71% 1.00 0.5030

Many will observe that this is much like one’s attitude should be when holding a bond, preferred share, or other fixed income vehicle directly: in the absence of credit disasters, it keeps on paying its agreed rate.

The RY.PR.F issue, for instance, is now quoted at 20.73, down a lot from its issue price of $25.00, but it’s still paying the same dividend now as when it started: $1.1125 annually. It would have been a lot nicer to have bought that dividend stream for $20.73, of course, rather than having paid $25.00 … but I can’t time the markets and I don’t think anybody else can either (as I have discussed elsewhere). What I do think MAPF can do – and what MAPF has historically been able to do – is to trade between issues, selling them when they’re ten cents expensive in order to buy something else that’s ten cents cheap, and passing those gains through to unitholders.

Market Action

November 7, 2007

It looks like the Super-Conduit MLEC is having difficulty getting started even as SIVs are getting shakier by the day. Naked Capitalism reprinted a piece about a downgrade today by Moody’s of 16 SIVs representing about 10% of the market; but only two capital notes were actually downgraded; the senior paper and other capital notes are merely (!) under review according to Moody’s:

Moody’s Investors Service announced today that it has substantially completed another review of the Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV) sector following continued market value declines of SIV portfolios since our most recent review completed on September 5th of this year. As a result of this review, Moody’s has confirmed the short term ratings of the senior debt programmes of Kestrel Funding PLC and Kestrel Funding LLC (which hold approximately US$3 billion of debt securities) that were on review for possible downgrade. Moody’s also downgraded, or placed on review for possible downgrade, the ratings of 28 debt programmes of 16 SIVs (which hold approximately US$33 billion of debt securities) as described below.

The ongoing liquidity crisis facing SIVs has continued almost unabated since September 5th, when Moody’s completed its last review of the sector. The inability of some of the SIVs to issue sufficient Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) or Medium Term Notes (MTNs) over a prolonged period has led to the crystallisation of mark-to-market losses in some cases and the potential for such losses to be realised in others.

Moody’s has taken certain rating actions as a result of deteriorating credit and other market conditions. It seems clear that the situation has not yet stabilised and further rating actions could follow. As with previous actions, the rating actions Moody’s has taken today in response to the current situation are not a result of any credit problems in the assets held by SIVs, but rather a reflection of the continued deterioration in market value of SIV portfolios combined with the liquidity crisis.

SIV senior note ratings continue to be vulnerable to the unprecedented large and sustained declines in portfolio value combined with a prolonged inability to refinance maturing debt. SIV capital note ratings will be affected primarily by further deterioration in the market value of the portfolio. The risk of realised losses on capital and even senior notes is likely to increase significantly if the SIV is placed in a position where it must sell assets rapidly in a “fire sale.”

A lot of the problems are related to turmoil at Citigroup; its support of its SIVs (through the purchase of $7.6-billion in commercial paper) was discussed yesterday. Even worse, Citigroup has increased its exposure to CDO-issued CP, which has had the effect of ballooning the amount of Level 3 ‘Mark-to-Make-Believe’ assets. Citigroup’s cost of borrowing, as proxied through Credit Default Swaps, is skyrocketting.

They’re all in trouble! Latest estimates (which may have been padded to make them more interesting) are that Wall Street will take massive writedowns:

U.S. banks and brokers face as much as $100 billion of writedowns because of Level 3 accounting rules, in addition to the losses caused by the subprime credit slump, according to Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc.

It would appear that at least some of the money written-off is finding its way into the profits of hedge funds:

Hedge funds returned 3.2 percent on average in October, the biggest gain in almost two years, as managers profited from rising stock prices and declining values of debt tied to home mortgages.

The monthly increase brought the advance to 12.3 percent so far this year, according to a report today from Chicago-based Hedge Fund Research Inc.

It should be noted that the dollar figures in the above paragraphs are US Dollars, not real money:

The dollar is “losing its status as the world currency,” Xu Jian, a central bank vice director, told a conference in Beijing. “We will favor stronger currencies over weaker ones, and will readjust accordingly,” Cheng Siwei, vice chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, said at the same meeting.

Chinese investors have reduced their holdings of U.S. Treasuries by 5 percent to $400 billion in the five months to August. China Investment Corp., which manages the nation’s $200 billion sovereign wealth fund, said last month it may get more of the nation’s reserves to invest to improve returns.

Analyst reactions to these specific remarks are split between yawning and mocking, but years of fiscal profligacy in the US are inexorably coming home to roost.  Maybe they should cut taxes again, or something. Giancarlo Corsetti provides a review of some possible outcomes; one scenario is

In their well-known work, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2005, 2007) propose the following scenario. Closing the US external deficit to within 5% of the US GDP will require the US terms of trade to fall between 5% and 15% – a surprisingly contained movement. By contrast, the fall in the internal relative price should be 3 to 5 times larger, namely the relative price of nontradeables inside the US must get between 20% and 30% cheaper.

To translate these figures into the current macroeconomic stance, keep in mind that, over time, productivity growth is faster in manufacturing (producing most tradables) than in services (mostly nontradables). These productivity differentials across sectors mean that the price of manufacturing decline steadily in terms of services. Now, relative to these long-run trends, we should see the price of US services drop by about one third in terms of US manufacturing, as the US eliminates their current account deficit.

… while another is …

Results from numerical exercises developed in joint work with Martin, and Pesenti, suggests that closing the US current account deficit (from 5% of GDP to zero) could lead to a combination of lower US consumption (-6%), and higher US employment (+3%), relative to trend. This would then correspond to a rate of real dollar depreciation of the order of 20% – close to what we have experienced so far.

We shall see! I will admit to having something of a bias in favour of Rogoff’s work – but only because he’s a chess player. I will have to ensure that bias doesn’t affect anything else!

To keep things interesting, there are predictions of bond-insurer failure:

MBIA may lose $20.2 billion on guarantees and securities holdings, Sean Egan, managing director of Egan-Jones, said on a conference call today. ACA Capital may take losses of at least $10 billion; New York-based Ambac may reach $4.3 billion; mortgage insurers MGIC Investment Corp. and Radian Group Inc. may see losses of $7.25 billion and $7.2 billion, respectively, Egan said.

“There is little doubt that the credit and bond insurers face massive losses over the next few quarters and many will be capital challenged,” Egan said.

Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s will downgrade the ratings only after problems have become more obvious, Egan said.

Surprise!  Egan-Jones is a subscription-based rating service. Note that failure of an insurer could have serious knock-on effects in the US Municipals market.

Preferreds continued their recent showing of decent volume, but it seems like everybody was too busy financing their next trip to Buffalo by selling common shares to be fussed much about preferreds, which were … off a tad, but only technically.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.89% 4.88% 191,608 15.68 2 +0.1844% 1,047.1
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 84,445 15.81 8 +0.0617% 1,047.1
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 63,970 16.29 3 +0.0137% 1,044.6
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.84% 75,327 3.55 16 +0.0324% 1,030.4
Split-Share 5.21% 5.16% 87,587 4.18 15 +0.0034% 1,036.6
Interest Bearing 6.26% 6.34% 61,870 3.56 4 +0.4343% 1,057.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.82% 5.40% 80,902 6.05 11 -0.1415% 1,012.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.53% 5.56% 332,539 14.33 55 -0.0391% 914.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.3773% Asset coverage of 3.83+:1 as of July 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.08% (!) based on a bid of 20.05 and a hardMaturity 2019-01-10 at 25.00.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.0776% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 22.95 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.3001% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of November 2, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.37% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.35 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 244,100 Nesbitt crossed 232,500 at 23.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 23.22 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 159,530 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 22.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 50,645 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 21.83. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium 38,725 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 25.90 and a call 2012-7-1 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 37,580 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : February 2003

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-2-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,406.2 3 2.00 4.28% 14.6 184M 4.67%
FixedFloater 2,006.3 10 2.00 4.22% 16.1 95M 5.68%
Floater 1,630.4 6 1.82 3.65% 17.5 66M 4.00%
OpRet 1,601.3 29 1.27 3.95% 2.4 128M 5.46%
SplitShare 1,573.4 10 1.70 4.77% 3.8 43M 5.73%
Interest-Bearing 1,922.5 9 2.00 6.20% 1.5 128M 7.80%
Perpetual-Premium 1,214.1 12 1.49 5.73% 6.3 279M 5.84%
Perpetual-Discount 1,358.7 16 1.55 5.78% 14.2 207M 5.84%

Index Constitution, 2003-02-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-02-28, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

MUH.PR.A : Term Extension Proposal

Mulvihill has announced:

MCM Split Share Corp. (the “Company”) announced today that its Board of Directors has approved a proposal to extend the life of the Company for an additional 5 years to February 1, 2013.
    The final redemption date for the Class A Shares and Preferred Shares of the Company is currently February 1, 2008 and the Company proposes to implement a reorganization (“Reorganization”) which will allow shareholders to retain their investment in the Company for up to an additional five years. As part of the Reorganization, the Preferred Shares will be renamed the “Priority Equity Shares” and the Company will adopt a portfolio protection plan for the benefit of the holders of such shares. The dividend entitlement of the shares will remain unchanged at 5.50% per annum (on the $15.00 original issue price).
Class A Shareholders will benefit from a unique, highly leveraged investment in a blue-chip portfolio, and will receive distributions initially set at approximately 10% per annum on the net asset value of the Class A Shares. The Company believes that the Reorganization will allow shareholders to maintain their investment in the Company for up to a further five years on a basis which will better enable it to meet its investment objectives for both classes of shares.
    Holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares will retain their annual and monthly retraction rights originally provided to them. In addition, if the Reorganization is approved, shareholders will be given a special retraction right to cause the Company to redeem their Class A Shares and/or Preferred Shares at net asset value on January 31, 2008.

A special meeting of holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares has been called and will be held on December 12, 2007 to consider and vote upon the proposal. Further details of the proposal will be outlined in an information circular to be prepared and delivered to holders of Class A Shares and Preferred Shares in connection with the special meeting. The Reorganization is also subject to all required regulatory approvals.

The shares are tracked by HIMIPref™ and are a constituent of the SplitShare Index. Asset coverage, which has been discussed before, is a pretty skimpy 1.5+:1 as of October 31, according to Mulvihill. DBRS hasn’t published a single word about the issue in over five years … they’re currently rated at Pfd-2, but according to me they’re Pfd-2(low) with a negative trend AT BEST and should probably be Pfd-3 or Pfd-3(high).

Miscellaneous News

Covered Bonds

RBC has issued covered bonds – denominated in Euros.

Covered bonds are a financing that offers increased protection to the lender and decreased funding costs for the issuer. The issuer sets up a mortgage pool and securitizes it – so far, this is just an ABS. However, there is full recourse to the issuer in the event that the pool does not cover repayment of the debt. The high regard with which covered bonds’ credit quality is held is reflected in their Basel II risk-weights – there are a number of different options for the calculation, but basically, covered bond holdings are added to risk weighted assets at between 40%-50% of the charge that would be incurred by holding the issuing bank’s senior unsecured debt.

I am advised that RBC was able to sell their issue for “midswaps + 11bp” (a measure with which I am not very familiar), a rate that will can be swapped back into Canadian at Canadas + 65bp for their five year paper. This compares to GoC +88bp for CIBC’s recent five-year deposit note issue.

So, based on the Canadian Curve, and allowing a few bp for the credit differential between CIBC and RBC, 5-year covered bonds can be issued 20bp through deposit notes! This is cheap financing!

These issues have recently been authorized for Canadian Banks, to a limit of 4% of total assets after consideration by the OSFI:

We note that covered bonds — debt obligations issued by a deposit taking institution (DTI) and secured by assets of the DTI or of any of its subsidiaries — provide a number of benefits but also raise concerns. For example, covered bonds can improve funding diversification and lower costs. However, they also create a preferred class of depositors, reducing the residual level of assets available to be used to repay unsecured depositors (including the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation) or other creditors in the event of insolvency, depending on the amount issued and the nature of credit enhancements.

RBC’s issue has been rated AAA by DBRS:

The rating is based on several factors. First, the Covered Bonds are senior unsecured direct obligations of Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), which is the largest bank in Canada and rated AA and R-1 (high) by DBRS. Second, in addition to a general recourse to RBC’s assets, the Covered Bonds are supported by a diversified collateral pool of first-lien prime conventional residential mortgages in Canada. Third, the Covered Bonds benefit from several structural features, such as a reserve fund, when applicable, and a minimum rating requirement for swap counterparties, servicer and cash manager. Fourth, the underlying collateral originated by RBC is of a high credit quality with a low credit loss historically. And, lastly, the final maturity date on the Covered Bonds can be extended for an additional 12 months, if required, which increases the likelihood the Covered Bonds can be fully repaid.

Despite the above strengths, the Covered Bonds have the following challenges. First, a weakened housing market in Canada could result in higher losses and lower recovery rates than those used for credit enhancement determinations. This is mitigated by the home equity available and conservative underlying asset values. Secondly, RBC may be required to add mortgages to maintain the collateral pool, incurring substitution and potentially credit-deterioration risk. These risks are mitigated by the ongoing monitoring of the pledged assets to ensure the over-collateralization available is commensurate with the AAA-rating assigned. Third, there is a liquidity gap between the scheduled payment of the Covered Bonds and the repayment of underlying mortgage loans over time. This risk is mitigated by the over-collateralized collateral pool and the build-up of a reserve fund if RBC’s rating falls below A (high) or R-1 (middle) and the extendible maturity date for an additional 12 months, if required. And lastly, there is no specific covered bond legislative framework in Canada, unlike in many European countries. This is mitigated by the contractual obligations of the transaction parties, supported by the opinions provided by legal counsel to RBC and a generally creditor-friendly legal environment in Canada.

A Fact Book regarding covered bonds is available from the European Covered Bond Council.

Update: OK, got it. The “midswaps” stuff bothered me because RBC seems so proud of themselves for being to issue 11bp over. Top-Quality banks ARE the interest-rate-swaps rate … bank debt should normally trade AT the swaps rate (except for weak banks, which would trade over); covered debt should therefore trade THROUGH swaps.

I have been advised that due to the credit crunch, market impact costs (or “new issue concession” to be more particular) are such that being able to issue EUR 2-billion at only 11bp over is, indeed, something of an achievement.

Update, 2012-12-21: CMHC has released the Canadian Registered Covered Bond Programs Guide.

Market Action

November 6, 2007

The big news recently has been the Citigroup writedowns, ouster of the CEO and downgrade by Moody’s (to Aa2 from Aa1). Accrued Interest is experiencing deja vu … the search for sub-prime exposure after the writedowns is like the search for fishy accounting after Enron. Naked Capitalism points out that while both Merrill and Citi have taken huge write-downs, Citigroup has done nothing to reduce its exposure.

Nouriel Roubini thinks this is the tip of the iceberg (as does CreditSights) and pays particular attention to mark-to-make-believe accounting. Accrued Interest explains the rating volatility of CDOs with a simple model. Giovannini and Spaventa attribute the snowballing effects of the credit crunch to the information gap between investors and exposures and propose some solutions – most of which impose extemely onerous supervision. While none of the following elements is explicitly spelled out in their paper, or unequivocally endorsed, I interpret the remarks as proposing:

  • licensing of mortgage brokers
  • regulation of credit rating agencies and inspection of their models
  • standardization of products traded over-the-counter
  • increased disclosure of bank exposures under Basel II

The first three recommendations are inappropriate in the context of bank regulation. While these matters may well be desirable from other perspectives – and should be argued within the context of those perspectives – they have little to do with the regulation for the purpose of ensuring the stability of the banking system. Even the fourth suggestion is far too prescriptive for a free market: I suggest that the policy objective would be met by stating simply that any instrument for which the banks’ assigned credit profile cannot be verified due to material information not disclosed to the regulators should be charged to risk-weighted assets as if it were equity. This is sufficiently punitive that:

  • the policy objective of encouraging transparency will be served
  • the stability of the banking system will not be compromised by debt-rated securities that behave with, shall we say, greater volatility and less liquidity than most debt.

Meanwhile, Citigroup filed its third-quarter ’07 10-Q today, chock-full of interesting information!

The current lack of liquidity in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) market and the resulting slowdown of the CP market for SIV-issued CP have put significant pressure on the ability of all SIVs, including the Citi-advised SIVs, to refinance maturing CP.

While Citigroup does not consolidate the assets of the SIVs, the Company has provided liquidity to the SIVs at arm’s-length commercial terms totaling $10 billion of committed liquidity, $7.6 billion of which has been drawn as of October 31, 2007. Citigroup will not take actions that will require the Company to consolidate the SIVs.

Master Liquidity Enhancing Conduit (M-LEC)

In October 2007, Citigroup, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of America initiated a plan to back a new fund, called the Master Liquidity Enhancing Conduit (M-LEC) that intends to buy assets from SIVs advised by Citigroup and other third party institutions. This is being done as part of an effort to avert the situation where the SIVs will be forced to liquidate significant amounts of mortgage-backed securities, resulting in a broad-based repricing of these assets in the market at steep discounts.

SIVs, including those advised by Citigroup, have experienced difficulties in refinancing maturing commercial paper and medium-term notes, due to reduced liquidity in the market for commercial paper.

Well! As far as I know, that’s the first official admission that the Citigroup SIVs are in enough trouble that they’re going to sell to Super-Conduit (MLEC), assuming that Super-Conduit ever gets off the ground! This may not be a death-blow to my thesis that Super-Conduit = Vulture, but it’s a pretty good hit!

In a similar development that I missed on its publication October 18, there is speculation that BMO has purchased $13-billion of its own ABCP.

Citigroup has previously announced:

Citi also announced that, while significant uncertainty continues to prevail in financial markets, it expects, taking into account maintaining its current dividend level, that its capital ratios will return within the range of targeted levels by the end of the second quarter of 2008. Accordingly, Citi has no plans to reduce its current dividend level. 

But Accrued Interest – a bond guy after my own heart – has looked at the various impairments of the various banks with the horror that only a bond guy who’s afraid he won’t get paid can muster and has made a modest proposal:

This leaves the surviving banks with better pricing power and/or ability to dictate lending terms. Overall, the long-term prospects for banks should be quite positive.However, in order to realize this long-term opportunities, banks must find a way to survive the current contagion with as much capital preserved as possible. Long-term shareholders appreciate this need for capital preservation. It would not serve shareholders interests to sell assets at fire-sale levels to raise capital. Nor would shareholders benefit from a bank being forced to issue new equity shares, particularly at a time when equity prices are weak.

There is one obvious way for banks to retain more capital: eliminate the dividend.

We shall see if any of them take him up on it!

A good day for prefs, with perpetuals resuming their upward trend of the past week … but splitShares went out of style today, with some large declines.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.90% 4.90% 198,443 15.64 2 +0.0205% 1,045.2
Fixed-Floater 4.86% 4.82% 86,602 15.81 8 +0.0162% 1,046.5
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 63,916 16.29 3 -0.0404% 1,044.5
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.69% 76,087 3.33 16 +0.1195% 1,030.0
Split-Share 5.21% 5.04% 87,815 4.18 15 -0.3894% 1,036.6
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.43% 62,376 3.55 4 -0.3251% 1,052.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.81% 5.32% 80,642 4.91 11 +0.0098% 1,014.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.56% 5.56% 334,666 14.34 55 +0.2964% 914.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -1.5625% Asset coverage of 3.83+:1 as of July 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.38% based on a bid of 25.20 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.5496% Same coverage of BNA.PR.A, above. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 20.33 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
ASC.PR.A SplitShare -1.4141% Asset coverage of just under 2.3:1 as of November 2, according to AIC. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.17% based on a bid of 9.76 and a hardMaturity 2011-5-31 at 10.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.3889% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of November 2, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.59% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.23 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.2808% Asset coverage of 2.4+:1 as of October 31, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 10.02 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium +1.0039% I pointed out yesterday just how laughably overpriced these things are, and what happens? Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.21% based on a bid of 26.16 and a call 2008-7-1 at 26.00.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0779% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 20.63 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount (for now!) +1.1689% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 25.10 and either a call 2012-1-5 at 25.00, or a limitMaturity, take your pick. Or, more to the point, get given the issuer’s pick.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.2077% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 20.95 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.4199% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 25.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.5016% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 21.63 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.7410% Well! It’s been a while since we saw this issue at this end of the performers’ list! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.45% based on a bid of 18.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.8923% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 91,550 Nesbitt crossed 85,000 at 24.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 24.55 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 91,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 24.82 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 83,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 66,955 Scotia bought 16,000 from DS at 24.35. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 24.30 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 53,000 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 22.60 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

ENB.PR.A : DBRS Puts Ratings on "Negative Trend"

DBRS has announced:

DBRS has confirmed the ratings on the Medium-Term Notes & Unsecured Debentures (long-term debt) and Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares (preferred shares) of Enbridge Inc. (Enbridge or the Company) at “A” and Pfd-2 (low), respectively, with the trends changed to Negative from Stable.

The rating confirmations and trend changes to Negative on the long-term debt and preferred share ratings reflect the following:

(1) The Company’s ongoing capital expenditure program (including $6.5 billion of committed and $2.5 billion of “in development” liquids pipelines projects over the 2007 to 2011 period, and the potential for additional projects that would raise the total to $12.2 billion) continues to increase, reflecting principally higher costs than originally anticipated and the addition of new projects. This will require substantial external funding, including debt issuance, potential asset monetization and equity financing over the medium term.

The preferreds continue to be rated P-2 by S&P.

The bonds are at A (negative trend) by DBRS, A- by S&P. Moody’s doesn’t rate the prefs, but downgraded the bonds from A3 to Baa1 in March 2007. Fitch rates neither.

Update: ENB.PR.A has been previously noted as an issue occasionally trading at a negative Yield-to-Worst. At its current quote of 24.96-08, this isn’t a major concern – but it is callable at par commencing December 2, so there’s not much upside to the issue.

Sub-Prime!

Canadian ABCP : Massive Downgrade for Apsley Trust

On October 17, DBRS placed Apsley Trust under Credit Review Negative:

Approximately 7% ($1.8 billion by funding amount) of the CDO transactions in the Affected Trusts under the Montreal Accord consist of U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS); however, 49% of these CDO transactions, or approximately $900 million, is held by Apsley, consisting of a $400 million transaction and a $500 million transaction, each fully funded (unleveraged).

The $400 million transaction synthetically references pools of 2005 and 2006 vintage U.S. non-prime residential mortgages. In accordance with our CDO rating methodology, DBRS has relied in the past on ratings from other major rating agencies as inputs to our model. Over the past several months, the reference entities for these U.S. RMBS transactions have been downgraded several times. Until now, all of the $1.8 billion CDO exposure to U.S. residential mortgages in the Affected Trusts met all of the minimum requirements for a AAA rating. Recently, however, one rating agency took the largest single-day rating action yet with respect to the U.S. non-prime residential mortgage market when it downgraded 2,187 U.S. RMBS bonds on October 11, 2007.

The result was that Apsley’s $400 million U.S. non-prime residential transaction experienced rating downgrades for almost half of the underlying credits, with an average cut of four rating levels for each security being downgraded. DBRS is currently analyzing the full effect of these rating actions and has subsequently placed Apsley Trust Under Review with Negative Implications. Based on the current ratings of the underlying bonds, DBRS believes that the $500 million transaction held by Apsley continues to be AAA but is monitoring it closely; additional downgrades or losses in the underlying bonds could result in significant downgrades in that transaction as well. DBRS is also reviewing the practice of using other rating agencies’ ratings in its ratings of structured finance transactions.

The remaining transactions in Apsley consist of $1.5 billion of leveraged super-senior transactions that reference corporate obligations. These transactions continue to be rated AAA from a probability of default perspective and continue to perform well. As of today, DBRS does not expect that these transactions will suffer losses and considers them to be strong from a credit and ratings migration perspective.

Today, the other shoe dropped:

DBRS has today downgraded the ratings of Apsley Trust (Apsley) Class A, Series A from R-1 (high) Under Review with Negative Implications to R-4 Under Review with Developing Implications; Class E, Series A from R-1 (high) Under Review with Negative Implications to R-4 Under Review with Developing Implications; Class FRN, Series A from AAA Under Review with Negative Implications to BB Under Review with Developing Implications.

At inception the portfolio of 80 reference obligations consisted of 50% BBB and 50% BBB (low) obligations as rated by DBRS and other Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs).

Recent negative rating actions taken by other rating agencies in the U.S. RMBS sector affected 36 of the 80 obligors referenced in the Transaction with an average rating cut of four rating levels. The cumulative effect of the downgrades to the credits referenced by the Transaction has been to push the attachment point to maintain a AAA rating through the current actual attachment point of the Transaction. The Transaction can therefore no longer maintain a AAA rating. In addition, due to observed slowdowns in prepayment speeds, DBRS has revised its term assumption in respect of the Transaction to seven years.

DBRS generally rates ABCP at the rating level of the lowest rated transaction funded by the ABCP. As the six other CDO transactions funded by Apsley remain AAA, the Transaction is now the lowest-rated transaction and its rating will therefore determine the highest-possible rating for Apsley overall.

Using the DBRS CDO Toolbox and applying the current ratings of the reference obligations and a revised assumption as to the term of the reference portfolio, a long-term rating of BB has been assigned to the Transaction by DBRS. The DBRS Long-Term to Short Term Mapping Table indicates that a rating of R-4 is appropriate for ABCP that is funding a BB rated transaction.

As mentioned above, in addition to the Transaction, there is another $500 million CDO transaction funded by Apsley that is 100% exposed to U.S. non-prime RMBS. This transaction has retained a sufficient stability cushion above the attachment point to maintain a AAA rating at this time. However, considering the speed at which the Transaction lost its stability cushion above AAA, future rating actions of similar size and severity by other NRSROs may cause the $500 million U.S. non-prime RMBS transaction to suffer a similar deterioration. As a result, DBRS continues to monitor this transaction closely. Additional downgrades or losses in the underlying bonds could result in a significant downgrade of this transaction. If a downgrade of this transaction below the BB range were to occur, further rating action in regard to Apsley would become necessary.

The five remaining CDO transactions representing $1.5 billion of funding by Apsley reference corporate obligations. These transactions continue to be rated AAA from a probability of default perspective and continue to perform well. DBRS does not expect that these transactions will suffer losses and considers them to be strong from a credit and ratings migration perspective.

Wow. That was fast!

Update, 2007-11-6: It is interesting to note from The Information Memorandum for Apsley Trust that:

Apsley Trust™ (the “Trust”) is a trust established under the laws of the Province of Ontario pursuant to a settlement deed made as of November 24, 2005 between Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp. in its capacity as trustee (collectively with its successors and assigns in such capacity, the “Issuer Trustee”; any reference to the Trust herein includes the Issuer Trustee acting in its fiduciary capacity as Issuer Trustee) and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation, as settlor.  The office of the Issuer Trustee for administering the activities of Apsley Trust™ is located at 141 Adelaide Street West, Suite 330, Toronto, Ontario M5H 3L5.

and from an August press release that:

Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation is a subsidiary of Quanto Financial Corporation, a private Canadian financial institution with offices in Montreal, Toronto and Calgary and representatives in Vancouver and Winnipeg. The principal shareholders of Quanto Financial Corporation are National Bank Financial, Deutsche Bank Canada and Redfern Equity Capital Partners.

The announcement of inauguration of Apsley Trust includes the paragraph:

Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp. is the Issuer Trustee of Apsley Trust. The Issuer Trustee is independent from the Issuers, the Financial Services Agent, the Administrative Agent, the Indenture Trustee, and other service providers to the Trust.

… but frankly, I don’t know what that means.

Update #2, 2007-11-6: The unnamed rating agency with the mass downgrade on October 11 was Moody’s. I briefly discussed the downgrade at the time.

Update #3, 2007-11-6: Accrued Interest has produced a simple example illustrating the volatility of CDO quality. More discussion has been referenced here.