Issue Comments

Reset Percentage for IQW.PR.D Announced

Quebecor has announced:

the fixed dividend rate for its Series 3 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares (TSX:IQW.PR.D) (the “Series 3 Preferred Shares”) will be equal to 150% of the yield on five-year non-callable Government of Canada bonds to be determined on November 9, 2007.

150%! Given that 5-year Canadas are now yielding about 4.40%, that implies that – in the absence of market movement in the next three weeks – the reset rate will be 6.6%, or $1.65, an increase from the current level of $1.538.

It appears that Quebecor would really prefer its IQW.PR.D holders to continue to elect fixed-rate, and not to exercise their right to convert to the ratchet-rate issue … which may be expected to pay 100% of prime for the next five years, given their recent downgrade to ‘deep junk’.

The rate will be set November 9. I’ll post more then; but for now it looks as if fixed-rate is the way to go on this pair.

Publications

Research : Perpetual Misperceptions

There are a number of misperceptions held among otherwise sophisticated investors regarding perpetual preferred shares. Now that the October edition of Canadian Moneysaver has been published, I can release this article, which attempts to address two of them, published in their September edition.

Look for the research link!

Update, 2007-10-15: An assiduous commenter asks how much the numbers would have changed without rebalancing … so I’ve done the calculation.

Effect of Rebalancing
Index Performance
March 30 – July 31, 2007
Index With Rebalancing Without Rebalancing
PerpetualPremium -3.56% -4.54%
PerpetualDiscount -8.76% -9.14%

The difference is not as much as my correspondent suspected! Raw data (showing the returns for the period March 30-July 31) has been uploaded for reader inspection for both the PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium indices.

The relatively small difference between the rebalanced and non-rebalanced indices illustrates the point that there is a very sharp point of inflection between “Premium” and “Discount” perpetuals; once that point is crossed, duration changes significantly and the price reaction to yield changes becomes much more like one group than the other, with very little “grey area” between the two camps.

Update, 2007-10-15, later: The immediately preceeding paragraph is nonsense. Sorry!

Update, 2009-1-29: Assiduous Reader PN writes in and says:

I have found your PrefBlog website to be an extremely useful source of information on preferred shares. I have recently delved back into the preferred share market after concentrating on common shares over the last 25 years.

I am continuing to debate the pros and cons of perpetual discounts vs. 5-year fixed resets. In this regard I found your “Perpetual Misconceptions” article in the September 2007 edition of the Canadian Moneysaver to be very useful. I liked Table 1 so much that I reproduced it as a Excel Spreadsheet so I could compute implied future yields for different x and y values (where the resultant return is x% and the current perpetual return is y%). In doing so I discovered a slight discrepancy in the calculation of the discount factors in your Table 1. For a 2% return you have
calculated the discount factor after year 1 as 1.00-.02= .9800 rather than 1/(1.02)=.9804 The small error is continually compounded for years 2 to 20. I was wondering why you choose not to use the generally accepted mathematical formula for discount rates?

I have attached a spreadsheet based on two sets of calculations: the first is based on the generally accepted mathematical formula and the second is based on your computations for Table 1. You can see the results are only very slightly different for the 2% and 5% rates you have chosen and would not affect any of the conclusions you have drawn in your article.

My question is a very minor point and I am sure you must have a good reason for your calculation of the discount factors. I am just wondering what was your reasoning was?

Well, PN, there’s a very simple answer to your question: I am an idiot.

I cannot, at this point, remember anything much about the preparation of this article; what may have happened is that a rough draft of the table made it into the final product without thorough checking; the checking being performed in a cursory fashion because, as you say, the errors are small and the conclusion robust. Let’s just pretend that we’re seeking a total return of 2.04% and that that figure is cited on the table title, shall we?

PN has won a complimentary issue of PrefLetter.

PrefLetter

October, 2007, Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The October edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the October, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the November, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close November 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on November 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Market Action

October 12, 2007

There’s no commentary today, I’m afraid! What with PrefLetter production, seeing whether the IIF had anything interesting to say, admitting that I cannot time the markets and so on, I’m just running out of time!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.71% 4.66% 681,528 15.94 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.76% 104,131 15.85 7 -0.3002% 1,038.5
Floater 4.51% 4.20% 75,432 10.73 3 -0.0134% 1,041.0
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.99% 76,085 3.20 15 +0.0058% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.15% 4.84% 84,493 4.27 15 -0.0135% 1,045.0
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.37% 56,439 3.63 4 -0.0248% 1,051.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.66% 5.45% 95,481 8.25 17 -0.0404% 1,014.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.40% 5.44% 321,718 14.77 47 -0.0440% 931.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.6601% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.6264% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 22.38 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.1538% Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of September 28 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.48 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-01 at 10.28.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1384% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 22.58 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.0077%  
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium +1.1327% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 25.00 and a call 2012-1-19 at 25.00.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.6471% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 584,870 New issue settled today; it did better than I thought it would, closing at 24.81-82, 20×124. This may be due to the fact that it was the first of the recent bank 5.25% perps to be announced; together with the fact that BNS issues are relatively scarce, a fair amount of the new issue may have found its way into ‘real money’ accounts. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 24.81 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat 71,169 Scotia crossed 70,000 at 24.75.
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium 66,316 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 25.46 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 38,650 DS crossed 35,000 at 23.62. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 23.62 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 33,900 Nesbitt bought 11,500 from DS at 21.35. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were nine other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : November 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,593.5 1 2.00 4.07% 17.4 79M 4.05%
FixedFloater 1,888.0 9 2.00 4.26% 16.5 257M 5.53%
Floater 1,490.2 5 1.80 3.66% 17.4 46M 3.81%
OpRet 1,505.5 33 1.18 4.08% 2.1 104M 5.88%
SplitShare 1,536.3 8 1.87 5.74% 5.5 98M 6.26%
Interest-Bearing 1,750.6 8 2.00 6.81% 2.5 175M 7.78%
Perpetual-Premium 1,146.8 6 1.49 5.41% 5.7 111M 5.71%
Perpetual-Discount 1,323.5 10 1.49 5.56% 14.4 269M 5.62%

Index Constitution, 2001-11-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-11-30, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

FAL.PR.A / FAL.PR.B / FAL.PR.H Upgraded by DBRS

DBRS has announced:

DBRS has today upgraded the ratings of Xstrata plc, Xstrata (Schweiz) AG, Xstrata Capital Corporation A.V.V., Falconbridge Limited, and Xstrata Finance (Canada) Limited (collectively Xstrata or the Company) to A (low). The rating action results from the Company’s strengthening financial profile over the last twelve months, with Xstrata’s financial profile now brought in line with its business profile (which was strengthened substantially last year with the Falconbridge, Cerrejón and Tintaya acquisitions).

DBRS expects high commodity prices (driven by strong market demand/supply fundamentals) to allow the Company to continue generating strong cash flows from operations. Going forward, DBRS expects the Company to use its strong cash flows to finance its expansionary capex program, its acquisition program and possibly to continue to reduce its debt levels. The Company’s credit metrics are expected to remain at current levels for the mid term.

Falconbridge Preferreds continues to be rated P-2(low) by S&P.

As previously reported, Falconbridge’s dividends are “eligible”.

PrefLetter

October PrefLetter is in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the October edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The October issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

Reader Initiated Comments

Reflections on a Bull

My bullish correspondent has been busy and gleefully siezed on my comment yesterday that:

There was good volume in the preferred share market today … and continued declines in the perpetual sector which, quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand.

rate, the steepening in the past three weeks is stupendous. This is really strange!

and says that he is interested in my comments on his view that:

this is due to  the Commercial paper/subprime scare ….

Well, for what it’s worth, Mr. Bull, I think you’re right. I think we are seeing the confluence of a lot of factors:

  • Retail is avoiding assets that they don’t understand – and retail, in general, doesn’t understand preferred shares very well.
  • Retail is avoiding volatile assets – and perpetuals have certainly been showing volatility in the past six months.
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes in which they have recently been burnt – there were a lot of new issues last spring, much of it probably sold to unsophisticated investors who watched the market prices tank before they’d even received their monthly statement
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes which have not performed well in recent memory – performance of preferreds in general and perpetuals in particular has not been stellar for the past year or so
  • Retail is attempting to time the market. They are waiting for the bottom, therefore they will wait until they’re sure that prices are going up, therefore, probably, they will miss most of any rally that happens.

But, Mr. Bull, I want you to pay particular attention to my caveat: For what it’s worth.

  • How can any of the above statements be proven? If I were to say that relatively high spreads recently were due to the Tri-Lateral Commission acting under the orders of the Illuminati, how would you prove me wrong?
  • What predictive value does any of those statements have? They explain everything, cannot be falsified, and predict nothing.

I think we can agree that spreads are relatively high. And given this view, I will agree that a rational investment allocation model – for instance, one that says that the proportion of preferreds in a portfolio will be within a certain range – should probably be on the over-allocation side while long corporate bonds should be on the under-allocation side.

But the world is chaotic. We can formulate a beautiful asset allocation strategy … and tomorrow little green men from Mars will arrive with the secret of unlimited safe energy, requiring only extract of squid’s brain to run, which will give rise to a bull market in seafood and bear markets almost everywhere else.

So I make a deliberate attempt to avoid calling the market. Not because I don’t think I’m smart enough, but because there are too many random factors, too many of Colin Powell’s Unknown Unknowns, to make such an exercise a useful expenditure of time. Instead, I concentrate on weighing small differences between the various preferred share issues … up, down, I don’t care what the market does, as long as I do a nickel better, I’m happy. I can compare apples to apples, and give you good advice as to which one will be better. I cannot compare apples to squid’s brains.

If anybody tells you differently … find out why. Chances are, they’ve got great explanations and poor results.

Update: As if by magic, Accrued Interest has posted on this theme today.

Sub-Prime!

Sub-Prime! The IIF Weighs In

My interest was attracted by an article in the National Post, Banking group slams asset-backed securities market; the print headline is “Banks ‘Asleep at Switch'”; neither headline appears to be reporting on the purported substance of the story, a letter from the IIF, addressed to the chairman of the International Monetary and Finance Committee, that has been released on their website.

OK – first question: Who is the IIF? It is the Institute of International Finance, Inc., which claims to be “the world’s only global association of financial institutions”. I can’t remember having heard of them before. According to their annual report, they have annual revenue of about $25-million; certainly enough to hire a few analysts and buy sandwiches for their meetings, but hardly heavyweight. By way of comparison, the CFA Institute, to which I belong and which is notable mainly for its lack of relevance to my life, has annual revenue of a little over $100-million.

Now to look at their recommendations (bolded) with my commentary (plain):

  • Going forward, market participants, including those currently not regulated, need to take the lead to enhance due diligence and strengthen credit discipline. Senior management of financial firms has a critical role to play in this context. As supervisors and central banks are also reviewing some of their approaches, we encourage them to do so in a focused manner so as to avoid possible overreaction. Meaningless.
  • ratings agencies should, in cooperation with market participants, review their approaches, including possible changes in ratings to clarify what is being assessed. Even after taking this into account, investors will be well advised to keep in mind that external ratings are just one component of a sound internal risk management system, not a substitute for it. Meaningless.
  • A top priority of market participants should be to develop conventions to value these complex financial instruments [structured credit], to ensure that the benefits of financial innovation for the efficiency of markets are fully realized.. This is more than just a little bit wierd. After implying that part of the problem was over-reliance on external credit ratings, they want to encourage reliance on external pricing? Let’s just have a little bit more cheerful anarchy in the markets and a little bit less reliance on Bloomberg’s analysis, shall we?
  • central banks should provide greater clarity about the modalities of the exercise of their role as lenders of last resort in times of crisis; expand the range of acceptable collateral and clarify policies as to haircuts; and increase the availability of cross-border collateralization. Recent events also suggest that central banks might consider the scope for better coordination of the timing and the maturities of their liquidity injections, while taking account of differences in market circumstances. I don’t know about this one. It strikes me that a little bit of uncertainty is good for the markets … let’s keep moral hazard to a minimum. Expanding the range of acceptable collateral – on a permanent basis, not just the temporary relaxation of recent times – is something that is often discussed; has been for years; probably since the start of central banking! I am comfortable with the current system that the central banks will accept only the highest quality, most liquid securities as collateral, with discretion to relax these rules whenever they feel like it. Central banks cannot and should not have the slightest concern about few speculators, overloaded with wierd stuff, going bankrupt; the concern should be restricted to the functioning of the overall market as chiefly expressed in the operations of a core group of strongly capitalized banks.
  • To minimize such problems in the future, disclosure practices [regarding banks exposures to structured credit and their credit line committments to customers] need to be improved so as to allow investors and other market participants to properly assess and price risk, thus effectively exercising market discipline. I don’t know about this one. It’s difficult to argue against such a motherhood issue as disclosure, but too much is enough, already! Presumably, the central banks have authority to require disclosure when disbursing emergency funds; I think it would be quite sufficient to ensure that banks have the ability to provide such disclosure if, as and when they feel like it, without actually making such disclosure mandatory.
  • [The IMFC should] explicitly encourage prompt but deliberative efforts involving official and private financial institutions to evaluate pragmatic approaches that will continue to support financial innovation, while reducing the risk of a recurrence of the current problems. Well, what’s to say? This may be code, encouraging the current IMFC to boldly go where no IMFC has gone before, but it may just be motherhood. In any event, this recommendation seems rather devoid of substance.
  • In view of current conditions and expectations, the IMFC, in its discussions of the global outlook, should stress the importance of central banks striking a delicate balance now Sounds good to me!
  • to reinforce the commitment to the coordination process in the achievement of agreed goals. Recent events have clearly demonstrated how market-driven adjustments in the face of excesses and imbalances can impose large and unexpected systemic costs. This should be a matter of concern to both leading industrialized and emerging market countries. They should have more meetings? Possibly sponsored by the IIF?
  • We believe that the IMF and the World Bank could play valuable roles in this area [of developing regulations for Sovereign Wealth Funds]. This looks like more political code. No comment until I’ve heard more.
  • Therefore, the IMF should reaffirm the importance of policy vigilance on the part of emerging market authorities as well as work closely with them to help implement needed structural reforms and further develop local capital markets. The identification and possible mitigation of risks associated with external borrowing in local banking and corporate sectors is an area that deserves attention. Greater transparency and strong investor relations programs, as emphasized by the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, should also be encouraged. This appears to be a simple reiteration of motherhood statements.

All in all, rather a disappointing letter. My guess is that they felt they had to say something, but they had to say it without offending any of their members. I’m rather surprised that the National Post gave such prominence to it.

Update: Related to this story is news that the US Treasury is:

talking with Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks about a plan to jump-start the asset-backed commercial paper market.

Policy makers are concerned that investors remain reluctant to purchase the paper even if the loans that back them are sound, said a U.S. government official, who declined to be identified.

The discussions over the past two weeks have focused on structured investment vehicles, the units set up by banks and hedge funds to finance purchases of assets including subprime mortgage securities, said the official and a banker with knowledge of the deliberations. One plan under consideration would involve setting up a consortium backed by several of the biggest financial companies, the banker said.