Interesting External Papers

Elliott: Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements

On July 12 I briefly introduced a study by the Institute of International Finance forecasting ruin and desolation in the worst-case scenario of every single proposed banking regulation being imposed.

Additionally, my attention was drawn to a Wall Street Journal article by David Enrich, titled Studies Question Bank Capital Fears which pooh-poohed the entire notion, referring to studies by Douglas J. Elliott of the Brookings Institute and three mysteriously unnamed researchers at Harvard and UChicago.

So I’ve had a look at the paper by Douglas Elliott, titled Quantifying the Effects on Lending of Increased Capital Requirements. This paper was given a passing mention in the IIF paper, by the way.

Mr. Elliott first derives an equation giving the lower bound of the interest rate on a loan:

L*(1‐t) >= (E*re)+((D*rd)+C+A‐O)*(1‐t)

where
L = Effective interest rate on the loan, including the annualized effect of fees
t = Marginal tax rate for the bank
E = Proportion of equity backing the loan
re = Required rate of return on the marginal equity
D = Proportion of debt and deposits funding the loan, assumed to be the amount of the loan minus E
Rd = Effective marginal interest rate on D, including indirect costs of raising funds, such as from running a
branch network
C = The credit spread, equal to the probability‐weighted expected loss
A = Administrative and other expenses related to the loan
O = Other offsetting benefits to the bank of making the loan

He then assigns values to build a base case, then increases the proportion of equity while jiggling other numbers to estimate the effects on loan costs of this change.

Base Case and Possible Future per Elliott
Variable Base Case Possible Future
Equity 6% 10%
ROE 15% 14%
Proportion Debt 94% 90%
Cost of Debt 2.0% 1.8%
Credit Spread 1.0% 0.95%
Admin 1.5% 1.4%
Offsetting Benefits -0.5% -0.6%
Marginal Tax Rate 30% 30%
Loan Rate 5.17% 5.37%

He concludes that a hike in capital ratios from 6% to 10% will quite feasibly result in an increase in the loan rate of 20bp. Several variables were adjusted in this estimation:

Return on debt/deposits: Creditors ought also to be willing to drop their required returns at least modestly to reflect the lowered risk. On the deposit side, part of the adjustment might be a shift in deposit market share towards more efficient banks whose indirect cost of raising deposits is lower.

I don’t buy it. The bulk of deposits are explicitly federally insured anyway and the uninsured deposits are implicitly insured – I don’t believe uninsured depositors at US banks have yet lost a single dollar as a result of FDIC siezure. Thus, the entire 20bp reduction in the Cost of Debt will have to come from the wholesale funding markets and senior bonds. This claim will require a lot more backup than currently provided.

Credit spread: Banks ought to be able to reduce credit risk marginally by turning down less attractive loans and by imposing covenants or other features that reduce the bank’s risk of loss. The 5 basis point reduction was chosen because it appears achievable from changes in covenants and loan protections without the necessity to turn down more loans. Thus, the drop in loan supply appears unlikely to be significant.

I don’t buy it. People who “work” for banks may be a little on the otnay ootay ightbray side, if you get my drift, but I don’t believe that you can improve credit losses by 5bp simply by fiat. This claim is reminiscent of politicians who sweep into office promising more services and lower taxes, to be paid for with efficiency gains. I have no doubt but that efficiency can be improved … but show me first, OK?

Administrative costs and other benefits: These small changes would seem feasible, if banks found it necessary to alter the way they do business. This is one area where reductions in compensation could make a significant difference. Market share shifts could also account for a significant part of the change.

I don’t buy it. See above. I am particulary incensed that administrative costs are presumed to go down at the same time as extra covenants, etc, are being added to the loan terms. That doesn’t sound quite right.

So according to me, the possible future looks more like:

Base Case and Possible Future per Elliott
Variable Possible Future per Elliott Possible Future per JH
Equity 10% 10%
ROE 14% 14%
Proportion Debt 90% 90%
Cost of Debt 1.8% 2.0%
Credit Spread 0.95% 1.0%
Admin 1.4% 1.5%
Offsetting Benefits -0.6% -0.5%
Marginal Tax Rate 30% 30%
Loan Rate 5.37% 5.80%

So throwing out the more dubious changes adds 43bp on to loan cost, meaning the effect of increasing capital from 6% to 10% is not 20bp as Elliott claims, but more like 63bp according to me.

Who’s right? Who’s wrong? Who knows? There is no supporting detail in the paper that tracks the performance of the model through time. We don’t even know if the model accounts for enough of the truth to be worth-while, let alone how sticky the numbers are, or how well correllated they might be.

Anyway, according to this simple model, changing the base case in a manner with which I am more familiar, increasing capital from 6% to 10% raises the cost of a loan 63bp. 63bp! That’s a lot! Hands up everybody who doesn’t think 63bp on their mortgage is a lot!

I’m too much of an economic auto-didact to really know whether it’s strictly kosher to reverse engineer the Taylor Rule, but if we use a Taylor output gap coefficient of 0.5 then a tightening due to capital costs of 63bp means the output gap will grow by 126bp. And that’s a big number.

All in all, while the Elliott paper is interesting and provides a decent intuitive framework for a first stab at quantifying economic effects of bank capital increases, I don’t feel that there’s enough meat on these bones to justify a conclusion that we can hike bank capital and get away scot free.

And I’m still waiting for OSFI to quantify the bad effects of its insistence on high capital levels, together with the claimed good effects!

Market Action

August 4, 2010

A provocative BIS working paper by by Előd Takáts is titled Ageing and Asset Prices:

The paper investigates how ageing will affect asset prices. A small model is used to show that economic and demographic factors drive asset, and in particular house, prices. These factors are estimated in a panel regression framework encompassing BIS real house price data from 22 advanced economies between 1970 and 2009. The estimates show that demographic factors affect real house prices significantly. Combining the results with UN population projections suggests that ageing will lower real house prices substantially over the next forty years. The headwind is around 80 basis points per annum in the United States and much stronger in Europe and Japan. Based on the analysis, global asset prices are likely to face substantial headwinds from ageing.

However, the estimates are still short of the Mankiw and Weil’s (1989) asset price meltdown projection, which would imply around 300 basis points per annum real house price decline.

These estimates are not real house price forecasts, but only estimates of the demographic impact on real house prices. As a number of other factors affect these prices, their movements can be very different from those implied by demographics. For instance, both Italy and Korea experienced strong real house price growth in spite of significant estimated demographic headwinds in the past forty years.

Remember Basis Yield Alpha Fund (last mentioned June 9)? They’re the guys who used their well-honed analytical skills and uncanny grasp of macro-economic trends to buy stuff that the dealer said was good, remember? Goldman is applying to have the boo-hoo-hoo dismissed on on jurisdictional grounds:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. asked a New York judge to dismiss a $1 billion lawsuit by Australian hedge fund Basis Capital, arguing that a June U.S. Supreme Court decision bars the claim.

Goldman Sachs argued that the suit is barred by the Supreme Court’s June 24 ruling in Morrison v. National Australia Bank. In that case, the high court held that U.S. securities laws don’t apply to the claims of foreign buyers of non-U.S. securities on foreign exchanges.

“This litigation presents a contract dispute between two foreign entities, executed abroad and governed by English law, and Morrison makes clear that it does not belong in this court,” New York-based Goldman said in a filing dated Aug. 2.

Passive/Active nomenclature is going to get even more blurred:

According to the application filed today, BlackRock will offer ETFs based on indexes that invest in some assets, known as long positions, and sell others to create short positions. The firm may later create funds that are based on indexes that exclusively hold short positions, the filing said.

BlackRock will initially create a 130/30 fund based on the MSCI USA Barra Earnings Yield index, according to the company’s application. This index uses mathematical models to buy companies with “positive earnings momentum” and sell short those that have negative earnings momentum, the filing said.

A passive fund that uses mathematical models to select securities? Ummmmm….

The Chinese could give the Europeans some lessons on stress-tests:

China’s banking regulator told lenders last month to conduct a new round of stress tests to gauge the impact of residential property prices falling as much as 60 percent in the hardest-hit markets, a person with knowledge of the matter said.

Banks were instructed to include worst-case scenarios of prices dropping 50 percent to 60 percent in cities where they have risen excessively, the person said, declining to be identified because the regulator’s requirement hasn’t been publicly announced. Previous stress tests carried out in the past year assumed home-price declines of as much as 30 percent.

Although mind you, there are persistent worries about Chinese loan quality, with staggering estimates of default risk.

I was going to make the following links into a full post … but that was three months ago! So here are some links on rights issues. Report to HM Treasury on the implementation of the recommendations of the Rights Issue Review Group

See also PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS: FINAL REPORT

summary of UK law:

If a company proposes to allot any relevant shares or relevant employee shares or grant any rights over them, those shares or rights must first be offered (for a period of at least 21 days) to the existing members in proportion to their existing holdings on terms no less favourable than are being offered to any third party. Where there are differing classes of shares, the relevant shares may first be offered to members of the relevant class if the Memorandum or Articles so require. Any shares not taken up must then be offered to the members of the company as a whole.
This does not apply to: …

I ran across some disturbing censored TV ads yesterday and was prompted to send the publishers an eMail:

Sirs,

I have viewed the videos at http://www.homefrontcalgary.com/tv-spots.html and found them quite disturbing – I am not surprised the authorities prefer images of kittens and bunnies.

However, I am curious regarding the efficiacy of the approach. The main message is addressed to the abuser, who has presumably been preached at many times in his life and will simply shrug off the message or rationalize his actions in some manner.

Would it not be better to address TV spots of this nature towards the abused woman, something along the lines of “You don’t need to tolerate this, your life can be better, here’s what to do:”?

Today I received a standardized response from them – sufficiently general as to indicate it is the response for any letter having to do with the videos. When even the do-gooders brush off your queries, you know you’re in trouble!

Another day of solid advances on the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 18bp and FixedResets gaining 5bp. The median weighted average yield on the latter class is now 3.39% … the fifth-lowest on record and within striking distance of the all-time low of 3.31%. Amusingly, the Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) remains steady at 50bp.

This is going to end in tears.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.84%, equivalent to 8.18% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates now yield about 5.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (aka the Seniority Spread) now stands at about 270bp, a small (and perhaps meaningless) tightening from the 275bp reported on July 30.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0783 % 2,080.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0783 % 3,151.3
Floater 2.51 % 2.13 % 36,738 22.04 4 -0.0783 % 2,246.1
OpRet 4.89 % -0.37 % 109,713 0.24 9 0.2970 % 2,353.7
SplitShare 6.16 % 1.70 % 73,424 0.08 2 0.4908 % 2,251.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2970 % 2,152.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.53 % 103,216 5.68 7 0.2436 % 1,943.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.81 % 5.84 % 183,319 14.08 71 0.1761 % 1,866.1
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.39 % 295,117 3.42 47 0.0529 % 2,232.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-09-03
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : -7.19 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 70,795 RBC sold two blocks to anonymous: 11,800 at 27.87 and 14,400 at 27.86. RBC then crossed 18,800 at 27.82.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.77
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 36,900 RBC crossed 30,000 at 20.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.19
Evaluated at bid price : 20.19
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 34,535 Desjardins bought 10,000 from anonymous at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 26,981 National crossed 14,500 at 20.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 20.12
Evaluated at bid price : 20.12
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 25,903 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.46
Evaluated at bid price : 24.74
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 24,280 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-04
Maturity Price : 24.88
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

ALB.PR.A Considering Reorg Potential

Allbanc Split Corp. II has announced:

The Company announced today that its Board of Directors has retained Scotia Capital to advise the Company on a possible extension and reorganization of the Company. There is no guarantee that after such review an extension will be proposed or if proposed, will be approved by shareholders.

It will be convenient for the company to work with Scotia Capital, seeing as how they’re the sponsor!

ALB.PR.A is scheduled to mature 2011-2-28. In a reorganization it could be refunded or extended – it could go either way, but given that the issue yield is only 4.25% – and it’s trading above par! – I suggest that an attempt to extend is likely. But we will see!

ALB.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a partial call for redemption. ALB.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

August 3, 2010

European banks have a lot of refinancing to do:

Banks in Europe’s most indebted nations need to refinance $122 billion of bonds this year, likely paying high interest costs even after receiving a clean bill of health from regulators.

Italy’s Intesa Sanpaolo SpA has the most debt coming due at $28 billion, followed by UniCredit SpA with $21 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Italian banks must refinance a total $69 billion of bonds this year and $157 billion in 2011, while Spanish lenders have $28 billion and $73 billion of debt that needs to be paid.

Banks in so-called peripheral European countries from Greece to Ireland have been largely shut out of debt markets since April amid concern their governments will struggle to cut budget deficits.

The extra yield investors demand to own European financial- company bonds has climbed 0.5 percentage point to 2.17 percentage points from a 29-month low on April 16, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s EMU Financial Corporate Index.

Spanish bank spreads average 333 basis points, 62 percent wider than at the beginning of April. Portuguese lenders’ margins average 495 basis points, 85 percent wider, while Irish financial debt pays a 585 basis-point margin, 35 percent more. Italian bank spreads are 218 basis points, an increase of 34 percent compared with four months ago.

With many frozen out of the bond market, banks in the peripheral countries are relying on the European Central Bank for the bulk of their funding. Spanish lenders, which account for 10.5 percent of assets in the EU financial system, borrowed a record 126.3 billion euros from the Frankfurt-based ECB in June, the most recent Bank of Spain data show.

The Americans found out during the S&L Crisis that there is a vital difference between “illiquid” and “insolvent” banks, and that the Fed should not prop up the latter. Have the Europeans learnt the same lesson?

There are encouraging reports from Greece:

Prime Minister George Papandreou has raised taxes, cut wages and overhauled the state-run pension system, while braving months of strikes against the measures that helped shrink the budget gap by 45 percent in the first half. Sustaining the effort and qualifying for another 9 billion euros of EU-IMF funds will be complicated by a recession that has been deepened by his steps.

For Papandreou, abiding by the EU-IMF recommendations may trigger further protests. Both institutions have said part of the inflation jump is from a lack of competitiveness that can be addressed in part by opening up professions deemed “closed,” such as trucking.

Truckers last week starved Greek gas stations of fuel as they opposed the government’s plan to issue the first new licenses since 1971. The strike was called off on Aug. 1 after the government commandeered trucks and said the drivers would be prosecuted. Papaconstantinou has pledged to push ahead with changes to open up professions ranging from pharmacists to architects.

“Closed professions will open,” he said in Parliament on July 28. “They will open because prices must fall. They will open because this will help the budget of each household and they will open because that is how the country’s growth will be helped.”

I’m not sure how far their deficit numbers can be trusted, but increased competition amongst previously closed shops has to be a good thing.

There is the possibility that US Banks are finally putting their excess reserves to work, buying Mortgage-Backeds:

Large U.S. commercial banks added $51.4 billion of so- called agency mortgage-backed securities in the two weeks ended July 21, according to the latest data released by the Federal Reserve. The holdings fell from $696.6 billion in the middle of 2009 to $687.2 billion on July 7 even as the lenders’ portfolios of Treasuries and agency corporate debt grew $104 billion.

Large banks, which now hold $736.8 billion of the securities, avoided the debt as the Fed’s $1.25 trillion of buying drove down yield premiums to record lows relative to 10- year Treasuries, and acquisitions by private investors then restrained spreads.
Fannie Mae’s current-coupon notes, or those trading closest to face value, yield 3.54 percent as of 12:37 p.m. in New York, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s 0.64 percentage point more than 10-year Treasuries, up from a record low of 0.54 percentage point reached July 30, Bloomberg data show.

Checking accounts, among the means through which banks raise money that they can invest in securities, pay depositors 0.53 percent on average, according to Bankrate.com data. Rates on the accounts typically vary based in part on the Fed’s target rates. A rise in banks’ deposits, which Fed data show growing for large banks by $37 billion from April 21, has contributed to their desire to invest more in mortgage securities, [Barclays analyst Derek] Chen wrote.

Additionally, excess reserves are down by a preliminary $35-billion in the period June 2 – July 28. Who knows? Maybe this new-found interest in RMBS is a tiny step towards James Hamilton’s archetypal car loans.

The SEC’s Department of Making Prospectuses Longer has been working overtime:

U.S. regulators said mutual funds aren’t telling investors enough about why they use derivatives, with some funds providing “generic” disclosures and others failing to explain how the products affect performance.

Regulators said they are concerned that the use of derivatives has increased in the mutual-fund industry without shareholders comprehending the risks or investment strategies. Some funds offer information that “may not be consistent with the intent” of required registration forms, the Securities and Exchange Commission wrote in a July 30 letter to the Investment Company Institute, the industry’s biggest trade group.

The SEC also raised concerns about “abbreviated” disclosures that give investors a false sense of security about how much funds rely on derivatives.

Speaking of the SEC, former Countrywide CEO Mozila is fighting his battles in (gasp!) court:

“The undisputed evidence establishes, and the SEC now admits, that stockholders understood Countrywide’s underwriting guidelines expanded over time,” lawyers for Mozilo and the two other defendants said in the filing.

The SEC admitted in response to inquiries from the defendants’ lawyers that information about its riskier loans was reflected in the company’s stock price, according to Mozilo’s filing. Countrywide provided information about those loans in prospectus supplements for mortgage-backed securities sold in the secondary market, Mozilo said in the filing.

John McCoy, a lawyer for the SEC, didn’t immediately return a call seeking comment.

The SEC sued Mozilo in June 2009, saying he publicly reassured investors about the quality of Countrywide’s loans while he issued “dire” internal warnings and sold about $140 million of his own Countrywide shares. Mozilo wrote in an e-mail that Countrywide was “flying blind” and had “no way” to determine the risks of some adjustable-rate mortgages, according to the SEC complaint.

I don’t have a view on Mozilo’s guilt or innocence … but I have a view on the desirability of the SEC getting a black eye!

Interesting article about Somali piracy, but the world has become awfully wussy. Julius Caesar knew what to do about pirates; so did Thomas Jefferson.

Premier Dad has clearly identified “morons” as a crucial demographic for the next election with his ‘Zero-Brains’ policy on young drivers and alchohol. “Better enforcement tools for the police!” cheer the dimwits. “So much more efficient than the silly old court system!”. After all, police would never abuse their authority, would they? And they always tell the truth, right? So what do we need the courts for, anyway?

The Canadian preferred share market moved up today on light trade, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 2bp and FixedResets gained 16bp, taking the median weighted average yield to worst of the latter class all the way down to 3.44%. That’s the eighth lowest yielding close on record … can we push past the 3.31% mark, set March 26? Stay tuned! The Bozo Spread (Current Yield PerpetualDiscounts less Current Yield FixedResets) remains in its range at 51bp … which makes me laugh.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1438 % 2,081.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1438 % 3,153.8
Floater 2.51 % 2.13 % 37,296 22.01 4 0.1438 % 2,247.9
OpRet 4.87 % 3.41 % 101,589 0.32 10 0.1865 % 2,346.7
SplitShare 6.19 % 3.81 % 73,746 0.08 2 0.5148 % 2,240.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1865 % 2,145.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.67 % 104,287 5.62 7 0.0623 % 1,938.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.88 % 177,094 14.09 71 0.0211 % 1,862.9
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.44 % 299,261 3.42 47 0.1588 % 2,231.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 22.90
Evaluated at bid price : 23.73
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 20.62
Evaluated at bid price : 20.62
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 19.35
Evaluated at bid price : 19.35
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 25.58
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.87
Bid-YTW : 3.20 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 161,227 Scotia crossed blocks of 25,300 shares, 30,000 and 10,000, all at 25.75. RBC crossed 19,500 at 25.75, and Scotia closed by crossing 49,600 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.58
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 30,000 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 27,505 RBC crossed 22,600 at 27.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 27,040 RBC crossed 20,000 at 27.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.56
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 26,258 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 21,101 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-03
Maturity Price : 21.68
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
There were 14 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

IFRS on Discounting Rate of Insurance Contracts

The Globe & Mail published an article today, Insurers cry foul over pending rule changes, highlighting a problem that I’m not sure exists:

A key sticking point is the “discount rate,” or interest rate, that insurers use to calculate the current value of payments that they will have to make to customers in the future.

The rate that Canadian insurers are using basically allows them to take credit now for investment performance that they hope to achieve in the future, the IASB argues. Instead, it says, they should be using a current risk-free rate (essentially measured by the return on government bonds). Since that rate is lower, the Canadian insurers’ liabilities will rise when the change kicks in, and it will be especially painful in areas such as life annuities or whole life non-participating insurance, when the insurers value payments that they owe customers decades from now.

That hasn’t been lost on the IASB. Both Julie Dickson, the head of Canada’s banking and insurance regulator, and Jim Flaherty, the Finance Minister, wrote to the international accounting body earlier this year asking it to consider the impact on the Canadian sector.

To my total lack of surprise, I was unable to find the letters from Dickson or Flaherty published anywhere. So much nicer to do things in private, doncha know.

However, the issue has been bubbling for a while. A presentation by Rubenovitch in April 2008 (about six months before they nearly blew up), Manulife decried:

Asymmetrical accounting for asset and liability and earnings volatility that is not relevant and that will not ultimately be realized

which would result if long-term obligations were to be discounted at the risk-free rate, stating, quite rightly that this:

Assumes liquidity required and overstates liability

The problem is, of course, that government bonds do not simply reflect the “risk free rate”. They also represent the liquidity premium. You cannot get a risk-free rate without also losing the liquidity premium and attempts to disentangle the two aspects of corporate bond pricing came to grief during the Panic of 2007 (see chart 3.16 of the BoE FSR of June 2010 and note the amusing little gap in the x-axis).

But I can’t see that the rules actually require insurers to use government rates as their discounting rate. The relevant portion of the IFRS exposure draft states (emphasis added):

30 An insurer shall adjust the future cash flows for the time value of money, using discount rates that:
(a) are consistent with observable current market prices for instruments with cash flows whose characteristics reflect those of the insurance contract liability, in terms of, for example, timing, currency and liquidity.
(b) exclude any factors that influence the observed rates but are not relevant to the insurance contract liability (eg risks not present in the liability but present in the instrument for which the market prices are observed).

31 As a result of the principle in paragraph 30, if the cash flows of an insurance contract do not depend on the performance of specific assets, the discount rate shall reflect the yield curve in the appropriate currency for instruments that expose the holder to no or negligible credit risk, with an adjustment for illiquidity (see paragraph 34).

34 Many insurance liabilities do not have the same liquidity characteristics as assets traded in financial markets. For example, some government bonds are traded in deep and liquid markets and the holder can typically sell them readily at any time without incurring significant costs. In contrast, policyholders cannot liquidate their investment in some insurance contract liabilities without incurring significant costs, and in some cases they have no contractual right to liquidate their holding at all. Thus, in estimating discount rates for an insurance contract, an insurer shall take account of any differences between the liquidity characteristics of the instruments underlying the rates observed in the market and the liquidity characteristics of the insurance contract.

I don’t see anything unreasonable about this.

The Globe & Mail had reported earlier:

Despite their disappointment in the rules, at least some Canadian insurance executives say they are still optimistic that they will succeed in making their case as it appears that the draft is very preliminary and that the IASB is open to feedback. The insurers intend to present the accounting board with figures that demonstrate the impact the rules will have on their results.

I will be most interested in seeing those figures, particularly their derivation of the discount rate. Detail please!

KPMG comments:

Aspects of the proposed insurance model which are likely to attract debate include determining a discount rate for obligations based on their characteristics as opposed to the return on invested assets, and the treatment of changes in assumptions driving the measurement of the insurance obligation. The effects of changes in assumptions, whether financial such as interest rates or non-financial such as mortality and morbidity rates, would be required to be recognised in the statement of financial position and the statement of comprehensive income each reporting period.

Neil Parkinson, KPMG’s Insurance Sector Leader for Canada, emphasized the implications for Canadian insurers: “The IASB’s proposals would affect how all insurers measure their profitability and their financial position, and would likely result in greater volatility in many of the key measures they report. This volatility would be magnified for longer term insurance products, and is of particular concern for Canadian life insurers.”

I don’t see anything on the insurance companies’ websites themselves.

One way or another, this is an issue well worth following. Volatility in key measures? Great! Lets have a little more volatility in key measures and a little less “Whoopsee, we need $6-billion and a rule-change TODAY, came out of nowhere, honest!”

Update: Reaction in the UK is soporific:

Peter Vipond, director of financial regulation and taxation at the Association of British Insurers, said current insurance accounting methods have been inconsistent and haven’t adequately captured “the economics of the industry.”

“We are pleased that the IASB aims to offer a modern approach based on current measures that may offer investors a clearer view of insurers’ obligations and performance,” Vipond said in an e-mailed statement.

I believe – but am not sure! – that UK insurers use gilts to hedge annuities much more than corporates, in which case this change won’t make too much difference to them.

Update, 2010-8-4: Price-Waterhouse highlights the volatility issue:

Gail Tucker, partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, added:

“Industry reaction will be divided on these proposals. They will create increased volatility in insurer’s reported results going forward, as market movements will now affect reported profit. There will also be significant changes to the presentation of the income statement which stakeholders will need to take the time to understand. Today’s developments will also cast their net wider than the insurance industry, affecting all companies that issue contracts with insurance risk, such as financial guarantee contracts.

“Given the profound impact of these proposed changes, it is vital insurers work closely with industry analysts to make sure they fully understand the changes and what insurers’ accounting will look like going forward. As there is only a small window during which the industry has an opportunity to influence the final outcome of these proposals, insurers need to act now in assessing the implications of the new model on both their existing contracts and business practices.”

Update 2010-8-9: The MFC Earnings Release 2Q10 sheds some light (a little, anyway) on their objections:

We determine interest rates used in the valuation of policy liabilities based on a number of factors, as follows:
(a) we make assumptions as to the type, term and credit quality of the future fixed income investments;
(b) to reflect our expected investable universe, we adjust the publicly available benchmarks to remove the issues trading extremely tight or wide (i.e., the outliers);
(c) we assume reinvestment rates are graded down to average long-term fixed risk free rates at 20 years; and
(d) consistent with emerging best practices we limit the impact of spreads that are in excess of the long-term historical averages.

In other words. they are making an implicit assumption that they are always perfectly hedged.

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance: July 2010

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for July, 2010, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
July 2010
Three Months
to
July 30, 2010
Ratchet +1.48% -3.04%
FixFloat +0.25% ** -2.74% **
Floater +0.25% -6.79%
OpRet +0.28% +1.69%
SplitShare +2.33% +4.50%
Interest +0.28%**** +1.69%****
PerpetualPremium +1.09%* +6.29%*
PerpetualDiscount +2.67% +9.55%
FixedReset +1.78% +4.71%
* The last member of the PerpetualPremium index was transferred to PerpetualDiscount at the May, 2010, rebalancing; the June performance is set equal to the PerpetualDiscount index; the index was repopulate (from the PerpetualPremium index) at the June rebalancing.
** The last member of the FixedFloater index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2010, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the Floater index
**** The last member of the InterestBearing index was transferred to Scraps at the June, 2009, rebalancing; subsequent performance figures are set equal to the OperatingRetractible index
Passive Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +1.57% +5.16%
DPS.UN +2.05% +5.77%
Index
BMO-CM 50 +1.87% +5.11%
TXPR Total Return +1.70% +5.40%

Unofficial data for TXPR indicates a total return of +1.70% for July, indicating a rather large tracking error of 55bp for CPD on the month, probably due to the semi-annual July rebalancing. No accounting had been made in the original post for the change to monthly distributions. This error has now been corrected. The tracking error for July is therefore 13bp – still rather large, but much smaller than the estimate that did not account for the distribution.

The pre-tax interest equivalent spread of PerpetualDiscounts over Long Corporates (which I also refer to as the Seniority Spread) ended the month at 275bp, a significant decline from the 290bp recorded at June month-end. Long corporate yields increased slightly, to 5.5% from 5.45%. I would be happier with long corporates in the 6.00-6.25% range, but what do I know? The market has never shown any particular interest in my happiness.

Charts related to the Seniority Spread and the Bozo Spread (PerpetualDiscount Current Yield less FixedReset Current Yield) are published in PrefLetter.

The trailing year returns are starting to look a bit more normal.


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But I suggest that eventually yields will make a difference:


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Floaters have had a wild ride


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FixedReset volume declined during the month after their burst of activity in April when they performed poorly. Volume may be under-reported due to the influence of Alternative Trading Systems (as discussed in the November PrefLetter), but I am biding my time before incorporating ATS volumes into the calculations, to see if the effect is transient or not.


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Compositions of the passive funds were discussed in the September, 2009, edition of PrefLetter.

Claymore has published NAV and distribution data (problems with the page in IE8 can be kludged by using compatibility view) for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to July, 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
April 30 16.11      
May 31 16.26     +0.93%
June 25 16.47 0.21 +2.58% +2.58%
June 30, 2010 16.47 0.00 0.00%
July 27 16.62 0.069 +1.33% +1.57%
July 30, 2010 16.66 0.00 0.24%
Quarterly Return +5.16%

Claymore currently holds $462,433,680 (advisor & common combined) in CPD assets, up about $18-million from the $444,847,391 reported last month and up about $88-million from the $373,729,364 reported at year-end. The monthly increase in AUM of about 3.95% is larger than the total return of +1.15%, implying that the ETF experienced net subscriptions in July.

The DPS.UN NAV for July 28 has been published so we may calculate the approximate July returns.

DPS.UN NAV Return, July-ish 2010
Date NAV Distribution Return for sub-period Return for period
June 30, 2010 19.85      
July 28, 2010 20.21     +1.81%
Estimated July Ending Stub +0.24% **
Estimated July Return +2.05% ***
**CPD had a NAVPU of 16.62 on July 28 and 16.66 on July 30, hence the total return for the period for CPD was +0.24%. The return for DPS.UN in this period is presumed to be equal.
*** The estimated July return for DPS.UN’s NAV is therefore the product of two period returns, +1.81% and +0.24% to arrive at an estimate for the calendar month of +2.05%

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for May and June:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-July-ish, 2010
May-ish +0.22%
June-ish +3.42%
July-ish +2.05%
Three-months-ish +5.77%
Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: July 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

July 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “July 30”)
TRI.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) -1.06%  
BAM.PR.H OpRet Pfd-2(low) -1.04% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.21% based on a bid of 25.65 and a call 2010-10-30 at 25.25.
BAM.PR.J OpRet Pfd-2(low) -1.02% Recently deleted from TXPR. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.82% based on a bid of 26.08 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30.
BAM.PR.O OpRet Pfd-2(low) -0.39% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.08% based on a bid of 25.75 and optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -0.32% Recently deleted from TXPR. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 24.88 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) +4.71% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 21.95 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low) +5.18% The third-best performer in June. Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 6.30% based on a bid of 19.10 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.J FixedReset Pfd-1(low) +5.36% The third-worst performer in June, which was due to a disappearing bid and lackadaisical market-making. Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 3.36% based on a bid of 27.31 and a call 2014-1-30 at 25.00..
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low) +5.36% Now with a pre-tax bid-TTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 20.87 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(low) +5.74% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.34% based on a bid of 18.99 and a limitMaturity.

It’s interesting to see the BAM OpRet issues dominating the lower end of the monthly returns …. one is tempted to think that BAM.PR.J declined due to the TXPR rebalancing, and the other OpRets went down due to swaps triggered by the initial decline.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: July 2010

HIMI Index Changes, July 30, 2010
Issue From To Because
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
GWL.PR.O Scraps PerpetualPremium Volume
BAM.PR.E Ratchet Scraps Volume
CM.PR.R OpRet Scraps Volume

The strong performance of Straight Perpetuals over the past two months means that the PerpetualPremium index has been repopulated, albeit lightly and weakly. Unfortunately, however, low volumes on BAM.PR.E have resulted in its relegation to the Scraps index, leaving Ratchets as an empty set.

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during July 2010
Issue Action Index Because
FFH.PR.G Add Scraps New Issue
NPP.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue
Market Action

July 30, 2010

There was a very good essay (which means: “one that I agree with”) in The Economist of July 24 titled Too many laws, too many prisoners that included the information:

For bringing some prescription sleeping pills into prison, he was put in solitary confinement for 71 days. The prison was so crowded, however, that even in solitary he had two room-mates.

Comrade Peace Prize is touting the automaker bail-out (far more expensive than the banking bail-out, but probably cheaper than the Fannie/Freddie bail-out):

Heading into a congressional election season in which polls show the public skeptical about the $84.8 billion rescue and anxious about economy, Obama is using the backdrop of Detroit- area plants owned by GM and Chrysler to promote what he says is an industry revival that has saved more than a million jobs.

“We are going to get all the money back that we invested in those car companies,” Obama said on ABC’s “The View” program.

For sure the money will be paid back! All GM needs is more subsidies:

The price tag? About $41,000. Luxury car prices for a car that is much more about what is under the hood than between the doors. Comfort and feature-wise, the volt is more like a Focus than a Lexus. For that kind of sticker-price you can get a BMW convertible, a Cadillac CTS or a number of well-known luxury cars. This creates a problem in making the desired electric vehicle commercially viable.

In order to compensate for the high cost and the desire to have a more ‘green’ economy, the Federal government implemented a $7,500 tax credit for electric vehicles, reducing the overall price of the Volt to $33,500. That’s right, much like the abomination that was the “Cash for Clunkers” program, our federal government is spending other people’s tax dollars to subsidize the purchase of cars by people who might otherwise choose to buy something else. By doing so they hope that the price tag will be more acceptable to potential buyers.

At least with Cash for Clunkers this taxpayer money was spread around the industry. In this case, however, the qualifying candidates for the program are narrow indeed, although it has provided a boon to the golf cart industry by allowing this subsidy to be given to purchasers of road-worthy golf carts, if equipped with side mirrors and seat belts (wittily referred to by the Wall Street Journal as a “Cash for Clubbers” program).

Still, even after the tax break, the Volt remains a pricey alternative to the typical gasoline-only cars.

Why do we subsidize the auto industry? Because they’re good jobs. Why are they good jobs? Because they’re subsidized.

Moody’s is increasingly dubious regarding whether Iceland is investment grade:

Moody’s is “taking it too far,” Economy MinisterGylfi Magnusson said in an interview yesterday, after the rating service cut the outlook on Iceland’s Baa3 foreign currency debt to negative. Moody’s said it will lower the rating to junk if a June court ruling banning some foreign loans hurts the recovery or forces the government to raise debt levels by bailing out the banks.

Iceland’s financial crisis was exacerbated by banks that borrowed in currencies such as Japanese yen and Swiss francs to take advantage of lower interest rates, then repackaged them as kronur loans for clients. The krona has lost 38 percent against the yen and 30 percent against the franc since Sept. 15, 2008. The government is struggling to pay down a gross debt burden that will swell to 150 percent of economic output this year, Moody’s estimates.

The prospect that Iceland’s economy will return to growth next year is “subject to significant downside risks,” Moody’s said. The economy contracted 6.5 percent in 2009 and will probably shrink a further 2.6 percent this year, the central bank estimates. Output will expand 3.4 percent in 2011, the bank said in its latest forecast in May.

CIBC has reopened some USD covered bond deals:

DBRS has today assigned ratings of AAA to the Series CB5 (Tranche 2) and Series CB7 (Tranche 2) covered bonds issued under the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) Global Public Sector Covered Bond Programme (the Programme). The USD 400 million Series CB5 (Tranche 2) covered bonds are a re-opening of the existing Series CB5 (Tranche 1) covered bonds and have the same coupon rate (2.00%) and maturity date (February 4, 2013). Similarly, the USD 600 million Series CB7 (Tranche 2) covered bonds are a re-opening of the existing Series CB7 (Tranche 1) covered bonds and have the same coupon rate (2.60%) and maturity date (July 2, 2015). All covered bonds issued under the Programme (the Covered Bonds) rank pari passu with each other.

I wasn’t able to learn the price at which these went out the door, but was able to learn that they were issued as Rule 144a private placements: so retail can go suck eggs, the regulators have destroyed the market.

And now Toronto hosts Caribana again – complete with its perennial funding problems, despite the fact that it brings a tidal wave of cash into the city. Meanwhile, the totally synthetic Luminato is awash in cash (like its cousin, Nuit Blanche) despite having an economic impact, as near as I can figure, of half a dozen extra coffees being sold so the ribbon cutters can stay awake during each others’ speeches. But synthetic events are just so much easier to control than grass-roots ones, don’t you agree? And provide employment for the right sort of people. But anyway, have fun at Caribana, everyone – and if you’re under thirty, kiss a girl for me!

The month ended on a somnolent note, with very quiet trading in the Canadian preferred share market. PerpetualDiscounts gained 4bp and FixedResets were up 10bp, taking the median weighted average yield to worst on the latter class down to 3.46% – the eighth-lowest on record. All seen lower market yiels were at the end of March, 2010.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.89%, equivalent to 8.25% interest at the standard 1.4x conversion factor. Long Corporates now yield about 5.5%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) is now 275bp, a surprising increase from the 265bp recorded on July 28. Corporates have been on wheels!


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HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.89 % 2.96 % 23,089 20.14 1 0.0000 % 2,078.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0262 % 3,149.2
Floater 2.52 % 2.14 % 38,827 22.00 4 0.0262 % 2,244.6
OpRet 4.88 % 3.59 % 92,059 0.33 11 0.1416 % 2,342.3
SplitShare 6.22 % 2.87 % 73,865 0.08 2 0.0000 % 2,229.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1416 % 2,141.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.94 % 5.75 % 105,684 1.79 4 -0.1085 % 1,937.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.89 % 178,057 14.03 73 0.0406 % 1,862.5
FixedReset 5.32 % 3.46 % 307,644 3.43 47 0.1013 % 2,227.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-30
Maturity Price : 24.39
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 30,873 RBC crossed 25,000 at 20.06.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-30
Maturity Price : 19.98
Evaluated at bid price : 19.98
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 25,985 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.08
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 23,651 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.91
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 23,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-30
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 19,947 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-30
Maturity Price : 20.08
Evaluated at bid price : 20.08
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 16,570 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-07-30
Maturity Price : 24.65
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
There were 11 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

BPO to Reshuffle Assets, Become Pure Office Play

Brookfield Properties has announced:

a strategic repositioning plan to transform itself into a global pure-play office property company. The plan includes the acquisition of an interest in a significant portfolio of premier office properties in Australia from Brookfield Asset Management (BAM: NYSE, TSX, Euronext) as well as the divestment of Brookfield Properties’ residential land and housing business.

Brookfield Properties has agreed to enter into a transaction with Brookfield Asset Management whereby Brookfield Properties will pay Brookfield Asset Management A$1.6 billion (US$1.4 billion) for an interest in 16 premier Australian office properties comprising 8 million square feet in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth which are 99% leased. The properties have a total value of A$3.8 billion (US$3.4 billion).

Brookfield Properties will fund the transaction from available liquidity of US$1.3 billion and from a US$750 million subordinate bridge acquisition facility from Brookfield Asset Management, which will be repaid from the completion of some or all of the following: asset sales, including a sell down of Brookfield Properties’ equity interest in its publicly-listed company Brookfield Office Properties Canada (TSX: BOX.UN), or other financing or capital activities.

A supplemental information package relating to this transaction is available on Brookfield Properties’ website at www.brookfieldproperties.com.

As a further step in the strategy of converting Brookfield Properties into a global pure play office company, the company announced that it intends to divest of its residential land and housing division. To this end, Brookfield Properties intends to commence discussions with Brookfield Homes Corporation (NYSE: BHS) regarding the possible merger of these operations with Brookfield Homes. Should the merger proceed, Brookfield Properties’ equity interest in the residential business would be converted into a listed security in the merged entity which Brookfield Properties would then dispose of through an offering to its shareholders. Brookfield Asset Management would commit to acquire any shares of the merged entity that are not otherwise subscribed for in the offering, thereby ensuring that Brookfield Properties will successfully dispose of its residential interests and receive full proceeds.

The pricing supplement is titled Australia Office Portfolio Transaction and is of great interest:

BPO’s interest in the Portfolio will be acquired through a Total Return Swap entitling BPO to the net cash flows and any changes in the value of the properties

  • This structure preserves the benefit of property-level financing and will allow for efficient transfer of this Portfolio at a future date into a different ownership entity, e.g. public vehicle or private fund in order to continue BPO’s asset management strategy
  • BPO will be property manager for the portfolio and will make or approve all significant decisions relating to the properties, including refinancingsand other decisions relating to the property debt
  • BPO will be responsible for additional capital requirements and will be entitled to any proceeds from refinancings from the properties
  • BPO will have an option to acquire the properties at anytime

The total return swap concept is fascinating, but I haven’t yet thought through all the implications, particularly since the contract is with the parent.

On the whole, the deal seems to me to be a continuation of the basic Brookfield philosophy of accumulating assets at the parent level and then pushing them into subsidiaries; attracting co-investors and increasing (non-recourse!) leverage along the way. It hasn’t been too long since they last did this, with the BPP conversion to a REIT.

BPO has several series of preferreds outstandng: BPO.PR.F, BPO.PR.H, BPO.PR.I, BPO.PR.J, BPO.PR.K, BPO.PR.L and BPO.PR.N.

Update: This is credit-neutral, according to DBRS:

The rating confirmation also takes into consideration that, from a financial risk perspective, the Acquisition is expected to have a neutral impact on the Company’s balance sheet ratios. DBRS expects Brookfield to fund the Acquisition with available liquidity, including un-drawn bank facilities ($788 million) and a cash balance ($475 million) totalling approximately $1.3 billion and from a $750 million bridge facility provided by BAM. Over the next several quarters, DBRS expects Brookfield to repay this bridge facility with a combination of proceeds from the following: a sell-down of the Company’s interest in Brookfield Office Properties Canada (the REIT; of which the Company currently owns a 91% interest), asset sales and other capital activities. As a result, DBRS estimates that the Company’s debt-to-capital ratio will remain close to 55% (including preferred shares) and EBITDA interest coverage should modestly improve to the 2.35 times range (including capitalized interest). This level of interest coverage remains at the low end of the range for the current rating category. However, DBRS takes comfort in the fact that Brookfield has made good progress in improving its overall financial flexibility position and that office fundamentals in the Company’s core markets are showing signs of improvement.

Overall, DBRS believes that the Acquisition complements Brookfield’s existing high-quality office portfolio and offers an immediate and sizeable presence in a new market. Over time, DBRS expects Brookfield to grow this platform, which should further benefit leasing initiatives and tenant retention rates.