Issue Comments

IQW.PR.C Conversion Continues

Quebecor World has announced:

on or prior to June 27, 2008, it received notices in respect of 744,124 of its remaining 2,507,153 issued and outstanding Series 5 Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares (TSX: IQW.PR.C) (the “Series 5 Preferred Shares”) requesting conversion into the Company’s Subordinate Voting Shares (TSX: IQW).

In accordance with the provisions governing the Series 5 Preferred Shares, registered holders of such shares are entitled to convert all or any number of their Series 5 Preferred Shares into a number of Subordinate Voting Shares effective as of September 1, 2008 (the “Conversion Date”), provided such holders gave notice of their intention to convert at least 65 days prior to the Conversion Date. The Series 5 Preferred Shares are convertible into that number of the Company’s Subordinate Voting Shares determined by dividing Cdn$25.00 together with all accrued and unpaid dividends on such shares up to August 31, 2008 by the greater of (i) Cdn$2.00 and (ii) 95% of the weighted average trading price of the Series 5 Preferred Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange during the period of twenty trading days ending on August 28, 2008.

The next conversion date on which registered holders of the Series 5 Preferred Shares will be entitled to convert all or any number of such shares into Subordinate Voting Shares is December 1, 2008, and notices of conversion in respect thereof must be deposited with the Company’s transfer agent, Computershare Investor Services Inc., on or before September 26, 2008.

This continuing conversion shows the value (to the company, and to the existing common shareholders) of the use of a minimum price to avoid ‘death spiral’ conversion. The last price of IQW.PR.C is $1.65; the last price of the IQW is $0.185 … but the face value ($25.00) plus accumulated dividends of IQW.PR.C is used as the numerator in the conversion, with the minimum of $2.00 per common share used as the denominator. In the last conversion, the ratio was 13.146875 common per preferred converted.

Update: See also previous post for IQW.PR.C.

Interesting External Papers

Credit Spreads: Structural Model Deluxe

It has long been a criticism of the structural Merton models of default that they calculate credit spreads that are much lower than those observed in the market. The Bank of England and the Bank of Canada take what I feel is a sensible course and ascribe the excess spread to liquidity concerns.

Liquidity, however, is a kind of touchy-feely concept and there is a yearning to quantify credit spreads such that, ideally, every single beep could be assigned to some kind of rational formula, base largely on default probability. In the Bank of Canada paper referenced above, the authors note:

Recent research that expands structural models by including them in a broader macroeconomic setting has shown that credit-risk premiums may, in fact, account for a larger portion of the overall spread than indicated by the “traditional” structural model (Chen 2008). This suggests that the results of “traditional” structural models such as that used in this study should be interpreted with caution, and should focus on the direction in which risk factors evolve, rather than on the specific values of the relative contributions of the factors.

The Chen paper is available on-line: Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure:

This paper addresses two puzzles about corporate debt: the “credit spread puzzle” – why yield spreads between corporate bonds and treasuries are high and volatile – and the “under-leverage puzzle” – why firms use debt conservatively despite seemingly large tax benefits and low costs of financial distress. I propose a unified explanation for both puzzles: investors demand high risk premia for holding defaultable claims, including corporate bonds and levered firms, because (i) defaults tend to concentrate in bad times when marginal utility is high; (ii) default losses are also higher during such times. I study these comovements in a structural model, which endogenizes firms’ financing and default decisions in an economy with business-cycle variation in expected growth rates and economic uncertainty. These dynamics coupled with recursive preferences generate countercyclical variation in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses. The credit risk premia in my calibrated model are large enough to account for most of the high spreads and low leverage ratios. Relative to a standard structural model without business-cycle variation, the average spread between Baa and Aaa-rated bonds rises from 48 bp to around 100 bp, while the average optimal leverage ratio of a Baa-rated firm drops from 67% to 42%, both close to the U.S. data.

He points out:

One can not resolve the puzzles simply by raising the risk aversion. While a higher risk aversion does push up the credit spreads, it increases the equity premium dramatically. Moreover, a higher risk aversion actually increases the leverage ratio. It does increase the expected costs of financial distress, which leads to lower optimal coupon rate lower and higher interest coverage. However, a drop in debt value comes with a bigger drop in equity value, resulting in a higher leverage ratio.

The guts of the argument is:

First, marginal utilities are high in recessions, which means that the default losses that occur during such times will affect investors more. Second, recessions are also times when cash flows are expected to grow slower and become more volatile. These factors, combined with higher risk prices at such times, imply lower continuation values for equity-holders, which make firms more likely to default in recessions. Third, since many firms are experiencing problems in recessions, asset liquidation can be particularly costly, which will result in higher default losses for bond and equity-holders. Taken together, the countercyclical variation in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses raises the present value of expected default losses for bond and equity-holders, which leads to high credit spreads and low leverage ratios.

Frankly, I don’t consider the paper very satisfying. While the argument appears sound, the actual model is too highly parameterized to allow for high confidence in the outputs; in other words, I fear that a variation of data mining has come into play. Additionally, I am highly suspicious of arguments that assume the market is rational and that an objective evaluation of default risk is (essentially) the only factor determining credit spreads. That’s not what I see in the market.

What I see is a lot of segmentation (some investors will not buy corporates. Some investors will buy corporates, but will dump and run at the first whiff of difficulties) and a high liquidity premium – these are two factors not considered in the model.

Market Action

June 26, 2008

Tireless researchers in PrefBlog’s Department of Things That Don’t Really Make a Whole Lot of Sense have been looking at the various Commerce issues lately…

CM Perpetuals
Issue Dividend Quote Pre-Tax
Bid-YTW
CM.PR.J 1.125 17.63-83 6.39%
CM.PR.I 1.175 18.70-79 6.29%
CM.PR.H 1.200 19.07-19 6.30%
CM.PR.G 1.350 21.51-73 6.28%
CM.PR.P 1.375 22.22-43 6.17%
CM.PR.E 1.400 23.01-48 6.08%
CM.PR.D 1.4375 23.40-62 6.14%

So not only do we have the slope of the yields being in the wrong direction (see my articles on Convexity and Perpetual Hockey Sticks) but … doesn’t the spread seem a little … er … extreme to anybody? It’s almost as much as the spread on Westons that attracted comment last year!

The best performance of the day came from HPF.PR.B, which closed at 10.50-74, 12×23 … up 4.79% bid/bid. All 8,800 shares traded were bought by Nesbitt … could this be related to the Annual Retraction?

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.24% 3.86% 47,881 0.08 1 +0.3842% 1,118.4
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 4.54% 62,504 16.21 7 +0.0801% 1,046.0
Floater 4.09% 4.09% 71,448 17.23 2 +0.2008% 936.4
Op. Retract 4.89% 2.93% 216,362 2.84 16 -0.0278% 1,051.8
Split-Share 5.34% 5.79% 66,490 4.14 15 -0.0705% 1,045.6
Interest Bearing 6.14% 4.15% 46,926 2.01 3 +0.2346% 1,121.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.93% 4.61% 332,503 10.32 13 -0.2470% 1,013.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.98% 6.03% 221,554 13.86 59 -0.3069% 881.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -3.5426% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.0408% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 18.72 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.1951% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 20.05 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.0556% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.39% based on a bid of 17.63 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.O OpRet -2.0408% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 24.00 and a softMaturity 2013-6-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.9483% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.8200% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.84% based on a bid of 19.42 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.8037% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% based on a bid of 23.41 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.6216% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.5271% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.29% based on a bid of 18.70 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1386% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 19.97 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1134% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.45% based on a bid of 19.54 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.0909% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 19.04 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount -1.0843% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 24.63 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0545% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.19% based on a bid of 22.65 and a limitMaturity.
STW.PR.A InterestBearing +1.0945% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of June 19, according to Middlefield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 10.01 and a call 2009-1-31 at 10.00.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.3656% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.08% based on a bid of 23.01 and a limitMaturity.
SBC.PR.A SplitShare +1.3958% Asset coverage of just under 2.1:1 as of June 19, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.88% based on a bid of 10.13 and a hardMaturity 2012-11-30 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.4957% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 19.00 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet +1.5287% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 23.91 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.7975% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 21.22 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 68,350 Anonymous bought 36,000 from Nesbitt at 21.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 21.17 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 47,919 RBC crossed 34,100 at 19.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.84% based on a bid of 19.40 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 45,970 RBC crossed 37,800 at 20.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 44,575 RBC crossed 35,100 at 20.95. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.06% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
ACO.PR.A OpRet 42,220 CIBC crossed 41,900 at 26.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.12% based on a bid of 26.55 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.

There were twenty-one other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Interesting External Papers

BoC Financial System Review, June 2008: Credit Spreads

The Bank of Canada released the June 2008 Financial System Review on June 12. One of the three “Highlighted Issues” was Canadian Corporate Investment Grade Spreads.

The authors first define their terms, making a basic point that surprisingly few investors understand:

In general, two important components drive variations in corporate yield spreads. One is the expected loss from default, the other relates to risk premiums. This latter component can be further decomposed into two types: a credit-risk premium and an illiquidity premium. The expected loss from default generally reflects the fundamentals of the firm, such as the degree of leverage and its ability to generate a stable stream of profits. The credit-risk premium is related to the variability of, or uncertainty about, potential loss from default. Both the credit-risk premium and the expected loss from default are affected by changes in macroeconomic activity. When combined, these two components comprise the part of the yield spread attributed to default-related credit risks.

The illiquidity premium, a non-credit-risk factor, relates to a lack of general market liquidity. Moreover, the credit-risk and illiquidity premiums, like other risk premiums, can vary with any change in the risk appetite of investors and are therefore likely to be positively correlated over time.

They decompose the components of the corporate spread vs. governments using a structure “Merton” model, very similar to the BoE research previously reported on PrefBlog – the BoE is thanked for supplying code in note 16. For investment-grade firms issuing Canadian Corporate Bonds (they do not define their universe more precisely than this) they conclude:

As of 21 May 2008, while the actual spread was 179 basis points, the expected loss, credit-risk premium, and illiquidity premium were 20, 34, and 125 basis points, respectively. Comparable figures for end-July 2007 were 85, 21, 5, and 59 basis points, respectively. The increase in the investment-grade credit spread can thus be attributed to an increase in the credit-risk and illiquidity premiums above their recent historical norms.

… while noting:

The credit-risk component reached its peak level of 89 basis points in March 2008, and the illiquidity premium reached its peak level of 125 basis points in May 2008.

Much of the increase is due to the “high proportion of financial firms (approximately 55% of the index in 2007).”

There are some very illuminating graphs:

I will note that, as of June 25 according to Canadian Bond Indices and the HIMIPref™ Indices:

  • 30-Year Canadas yielded 4.06%
  • Long Corporates yielded ~6.05%
  • PerpetualDiscounts yielded 6.01% as a dividend
  • PerpetualDiscounts yielded 8.41% interest equivalent (at 1.4x)

See Party Like It’s 1999! for further discussion of the PerpetualDiscount Interest-Equivalent / Long Corporate spread.

Regulatory Capital

HIMI Comments on OSFI's Cumulative Tier 1 Proposal

I have sent a letter to OSFI commenting on their Draft Advisory, which proposes to allow cumulative in-kind coupons on Innovative Tier 1 Capital.

This letter reflects information previously mentioned on PrefBlog:

It also builds on the comments made in:

Market Action

June 25, 2008

James Hamilton of Econbrowser provides an interesting piece on how big a contribution could oil speculation be making? … his conclusion:

We were only able to buy 19.9 mb/d in the first quarter when we offered a price near $100. So why would it have been possible to secure the 21 mb/d that consumers would likely have wanted at a price of $72?

Given these data, I think it is impossible to argue that the volume of futures market purchases alone could be the reason why oil prices went up this year. A key and necessary element of any speculation-based interpretation must be some explanation for the factors governing the physical quantity of oil being supplied to the market.

We’re hearing from a number of experts asserting that there’s no reason why the oil price should have gone up. I wish one of them would tell me where an extra million barrels per day in supply is supposed to come from.

Accrued Interest looks at the question of oil prices and their relationship to general inflation:

So over a period of three decades, it was rare that a move in Core CPI would not be mirrored in headline CPI. If one was elevated, the other was elevated. If one was tame, the other was tame.

However, the 21st century hasn’t followed the same pattern. From 2000-2008, the correlation between total CPI and Core CPI has broken down: only 7.6% measured monthly and 21.4% measured annually. This despite the energy portion of CPI rising at a 1970’s style 9.5% annualized. During the current decade, there has been no particular relationship between total inflation and core inflation.

What does this mean? The data is telling you that rising energy and food prices have been due to supply and demand conditions in those markets. Not classic inflation, which is a monetary phenomenon. In other words, rising oil is indeed due to strong demand from emerging markets and a lack of new supply. Not the weak dollar or loose monetary policy.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.23% 4.25% 49,839 16.92 1 -0.1179% 1,114.1
Fixed-Floater 4.80% 4.54% 62,691 16.17 7 +0.0877% 1,045.2
Floater 4.10% 4.10% 71,263 17.21 2 -1.9324% 934.5
Op. Retract 4.87% 2.69% 85,637 2.74 15 -0.1430% 1,052.1
Split-Share 5.32% 5.79% 66,645 4.13 15 +0.2725% 1,046.3
Interest Bearing 6.12% 4.47% 47,237 2.29 3 -0.2300% 1,118.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.91% 4.55% 342,014 9.55 13 +0.0902% 1,016.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.95% 6.01% 221,425 13.87 59 -0.0314% 884.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.4096%  
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.0408% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 18.72 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.6701% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 23.55 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.4759% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 22.03 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.4563%  
BAM.PR.H OpRet -1.3540% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 25.50 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2500% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 19.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.2152% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 19.21 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.2002% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 22.70 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1615% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 23.52 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C OpRet -1.1000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 19.78 and a limitMaturity.
STW.PR.A InterestBearing -1.0827% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of June 19 according to Middlefield Group Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.52% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 10.05 and a hardMaturity 2009-12-31 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0270% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.88% based on a bid of 23.61 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.0395% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 24.30 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.1777% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 31 according to the company Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.30% based on a bid of 19.76 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.3309% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.14% based on a bid of 16.75 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.1053% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 19.40 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.J OpRet 103,000 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 25.71. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.26% based on a bid of 25.71 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 57,025 RBC crossed 50,000 at 20.65. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 50,767 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.10% based on a bid of 18.35 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 32,675 RBC crossed 25,000 at 20.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 20.85 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 31,400 RBC bought 10,000 from Nesbitt at 20.36, then crossed 10,000 at 20.40. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.76% based on a bid of 20.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

BAM.PR.O Hits Market: Bam! Oh!

Brookfield Asset Management has announced:

the completion of its previously-announced Class A Series 21 preference share issue in the amount of C$150 million.

Brookfield Asset Management Inc. issued 6 million Cumulative Class A Preference Shares, Series 21, at a price of C$25 per share with a yield of 5.00% per annum. The net proceeds will be utilized for general corporate purposes. The Series 21 Preference Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on June 25, 2008 under the symbol BAM.PR.O.

They had to announce it, otherwise nobody would have noticed: the new issue traded 4,250 shares today, all at 24.50, closing at 24.50-55, 1×10. There were seven trades in the most sluggish opening day since … er … the last one.

Mind you, the issue itself isn’t all that terrible. Comparables are:

BAM Retractibles
Issue Quote
6/25
Bid
Yield
to
Worst
End-Date
BAM.PR.H 25.50-90 5.17% SoftMaturity
2012-3-30
BAM.PR.I 25.24-35 5.32% SoftMaturity
2013-12-30
BAM.PR.J 23.55-77 6.23% SoftMaturity
2018-3-30
BAM.PR.O 24.50-55 5.50% SoftMaturity
2013-6-30

The issue suffered through its timing, having been announced on June 16 during the Swoon in June.

Regulatory Capital

NBC Asset Trust issues Asset-Based Tier 1 Paper

National Bank has announced:

that NBC Asset Trust, a subsidiary of National Bank, and National Bank have filed a preliminary prospectus with the securities regulatory authorities in each of the provinces of Canada with respect to a public offering of Trust Capital Securities – Series 2 (“NBC CapS II – Series 2”) by NBC Asset Trust.

The NBC CapS II – Series 2 will be offered by a syndicate of underwriters including National Bank Financial Inc., acting as lead underwriter.

Subject to receipt of final approval from the regulatory authorities, the NBC CapS II – Series 2 will constitute Tier 1 capital of National Bank. This source of financing will also allow National Bank to optimize its capital structure. The net proceeds of the offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

In addition, although no definitive decision has been made, in connection with the offering, National Bank is considering making funds available to NB Capital Corporation to effect the redemption of all the outstanding 8.35% Non-Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred Stock, Series A of NB Capital Corporation, which currently qualify as Tier 1 capital of National Bank, in accordance with their redemption provisions. This redemption would be subject to the completion of the NBC CapS II – Series 2 offering by NBC Asset Trust, the determination by National Bank to make funds available to NB Capital Corporation for the redemption, the approval of the redemption by the Board of Directors of NB Capital Corporation, any applicable regulatory approvals and the issuance of a redemption notice by NB Capital Corporation specifying the redemption date and other relevant information regarding the redemption. The 8.35% Non-Cumulative Exchangeable Preferred Stock, Series A will cease to be included in the regulatory capital of National Bank upon completion of the NBC CapS II – Series 2 offering by NBC Asset Trust.

This is not something I would normally highlight in PrefBlog, but the nature of the security is of interest. According to the prospectus (on SEDAR):

The Trust proposes to issue and sell to investors pursuant to this prospectus (the “Offering”) transferable trust units called Trust Capital Securities – Series 1 or “NBC CapS II – Series 1”, each of which represents an undivided beneficial ownership interest in the Trust Assets (as defined herein), comprised of Residential Mortgages, Mortgage Co-Ownership Interests, Mortgage-Backed Securities, Eligible Investments (each as defined herein) and contractual rights of the Trust in respect of the activities and operations of the Trust.

So it’s ASSET-BACKED, not loan backed. This issue simply goes further to show that cumulative coupons to enable the issuance of Loan Based Tier 1 paper are not necessary; OSFI should rescind its ill-advised draft advisory, which rescues the loan-backed structure at the expense of non-cumulativity.

Market Action

June 24, 2008

An interesting bit of NRSRO news today … the Treasury is jumping on the bandwagon, albeit with an afterthought that makes sense:

There must be changes in credit-rating companies’ practices, as well as in the way corporations use those ratings, he said

“The users of their services must rely less on, and appreciate more, the limitations of ratings products,” he said.

Bloomberg’s afraid to admit that the full speech has been posted by the Treasury department … I wish the media would quit these coy little games! He went on to say:

To aid in accomplishing this goal, a second private-sector group is outlining further steps that issuers, underwriters, and credit rating agencies can take to ensure the integrity and transparency of ratings, and to foster the appropriate use of ratings in risk assessment. The Asset Managers’ Group at SIFMA is leading this effort. They are exploring issues including: use and quality of ratings; business models; and credit rating agency independence. We expect their work to be completed by the end of July.

Once identified and assessed, risks must be better managed. During the past year, many financial institutions, money managers, and investors simply failed to appreciate the magnitude and nature of risks on their books. This inability to aggregate risk and transparently address public concerns led to even further uncertainty, volatility, and dislocations. We need improved risk management practices by investors and financial institutions.

Great. Better Living Through More Rules. More box-ticking to do and (inevitably) an increasingly vicious regulatory response towards asset managers unlucky enough to be invested in the cause celebre of the day.

Also on the credit ratings front, Naked Capitalism takes a dim view of the latest (rumoured) rules to decrease blind reliance on ratings in regulation of Money Market Funds.

Bloomberg has picked up on the story.

It’s all craziness. The Portfolio Manager is responsible for Everything. He may, or may not, wish to rely on Credit Rating Agency advice … although, as I have argued, it would be really nice if the Friendly Regulators did not ensure that Credit Rating Agencies have better access to information than us ordinary mortals.

The root of the trouble is this: performance doesn’t matter. Salesmen have taken over the industry and all they need is something to package and sell … whether the package is any good or not is something that really doesn’t enter into the question. If the regulators wish to avoid blow-ups and improve the quality of investment advice, then they must track performance. Anybody with a license to trade with discretion, or who is part of a team of advisors helping the PM to trade with discretion, should be reporting performance versus a benchmark. And that performance should become part of the regulatory record that is published by the regulators forever. No more burying of unsuccessful funds; no more coyness regarding long term results.

The Credit Rating Agencies, for instance, publish their track records going back 20 years. When was the last time any Assiduous Reader saw a stockbroker’s 20-year track record? Or saw a brokerage provide half the self-analysis that the NRSRO’s routinely produce?

When discussing the teleportation of US Municipal ratings to the global scale in Be Careful What You Wish For!, I suggested one flaw in the analysis was the assumption that all newly-indistinguishable credits would trade as if they were top-quality; Accrued Interest points out that there is hazard on the issuer side too:

The high ratings standards for municipals encourages some measure of fiscal conservatism. This is especially true for Aaa-rated credits, where loss of the rating would be politically embarrassing. Of course, municipalities are downgraded all the time, but clearly local politicians would rather maintain their rating than not. If the overwhelming majority of general obligation issuers are going to be rated Aaa anyway, that incentive is greatly reduced. In other words, a state like Georgia (rated Aaa) is currently incented to maintain its austerity. But if they could slide all the way down to California’s level (currently A1) and still be rated Aaa, they’ll probably do it.

But the rating hysteria is regulator/politician driven – neither group is notable for thinking things through.

The recently issued L.PR.A traded 24,250 shares today in a range of 23.00-24.40, closing at 24.00-15, 2×5. Nice range, eh? It does not reflect well on either the market maker or the underwriters. Those who sold today at 23.00 should be writing letters of complaint to the TSX regarding the day’s thoroughly appalling market-making.

Let’s see if these overpaid jokers can get it right tomorrow, when, I suspect, the excitement will be regarding BAM Flambé.

Another good day today, although not exceptional. Very good crossing volume in some of the near-term Operating Retractibles.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.21% 4.23% 51,881 16.95 1 +0.1180% 1,115.5
Fixed-Floater 4.80% 4.54% 63,571 16.17 7 +0.1884% 1,044.3
Floater 4.02% 4.02% 68,866 17.38 2 -0.2407% 952.9
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.20% 86,356 2.54 15 -0.1476% 1,053.6
Split-Share 5.34% 5.83% 67,430 4.13 15 -0.5931% 1,043.4
Interest Bearing 6.11% 3.59% 47,111 2.00 3 -0.2000% 1,121.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.91% 4.59% 349,437 9.54 13 +0.2151% 1,015.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.94% 6.01% 221,570 13.85 59 +0.2223% 884.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.8398% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 23.95 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -1.5625% Downgraded yesterday … but still Pfd-2(low)! Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.34% based on a bid of 9.45 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.2833% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.64% based on a bid of 20.00 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.0891% Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of June 19, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 9.99 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.Z Fixfloat +1.0381%  
BMO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.79% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0989% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1688% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 23.37 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount +1.1837% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.3158% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 23.10 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.4665% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.86% based on a bid of 19.11 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.I OpRet 286,200 CIBC crossed 275,000 at 25.18, then another 10,200 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.06% based on a bid of 25.17 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.00.
ACO.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 217,707 CIBC crossed 217,700 at 26.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.10% based on a bid of 26.55 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 172,595 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.80% based on a bid of 25.60 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
CM.PR.R OpRet 144,950 Nesbitt crossed every single share in three tranches, all at 26.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.11% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2008-7-24 at 25.75.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount 29,785 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.80. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.74% based on a bid of 24.79 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-three other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.