Miscellaneous News

Toronto Star : Preferreds may hold bargains

The Toronto Star published an article today on preferreds, pointing out:

Banks’ preferred shares at current prices are now yielding close to 6 per cent – much more than one can earn on bank deposits. The tax credit on dividend income makes yield even more attractive.

That extra yield does not come without risk, of course. Prices of preferred shares could fall, as happened in May when there was a sudden rise in long-term interest rates.

There wasn’t really a lot of meat on the bones of this story – but I will admit I’m pleased to see media exposure for the asset class! I have to say, though, that “close to 6 per cent” for banks’ preferreds is a little overly enthusiastic.

I should also point out that comparing the yield on bank prefs to bank deposits is a little fishy – bank deposits are not just senior to prefs, they’re insured; and there’s a certain amount of term extension involved when withrawing deposited money to buy a discounted perpetual! Nitpicking, perhaps, but I always get worried when comparisons of this sort are made … there are many retail investors who will figure that if 20% exposure is good, then 40% must be better and 100% is best of all!

Hat tip: Financial Webring Forum.

Market Action

November 12, 2007

A quiet day, with bond markets closed for Rememberance Day.

There is speculation the Fed will move to explicit inflation targetting … but the WSJ can’t make up its mind. At a Bank of Canada conference in 2006, Alan Blinder, a former Fed Vice Chairman, commented on evolution of Bernanke’s thinking on the subject to that date.

There are some heavy-weight predictions of a US slowdown floating around, linked by both Naked Capitalism and WSJ. Willem Buiter points out that the banks are feeling some strain:

At the end of October 2007, the net worth of commercial banks in the US (as reported by the Fed) stood at just under $ 1.1 trillion (against assets of $10.7 trillion). Tier 1 capital stood approximately at $964 bn. While quite a significant share of the mortgage-related losses will be born by financial institutions other than commercial banks, such as investment banks, commercial banks’ capital will take a significant hit.

The combination of losses and unintended asset accumulation may depress the banks’ capital ratios to the point that dividends and share repurchases are threatened and even rights issues may have to be contemplated. All that does not do much for their willingness to engage in new lending, including to the real economy.

The single best thing that could happen would be for the true magnitude of the losses suffered by banks and other exposed parties to be revealed and put in the P&L. Until what happens, fear of getting stuck with the hot potato makes banks unnaturally unwilling to extend credit against the kind of collateral that they would not have thought about twice accepting at the beginning of the year.

Noriel Roubini, while acknowledging the banks’ problems, considers the wealth effect and increased difficulty of Home Equity Withdrawal to be more important.

Naked Capitalism points out that there is mass confusion over Super-Conduit, what it is supposed to be doing and whether there is economic reason to expect it to work … but quite frankly, I can’t be bothered to discuss the situation much any more. There’s no information – merely rumours. I’ll talk about it when there’s something to talk about.

But there is some related news illustrating the problem. Readers with exceptional memories may remember Ottimo Funding, briefly mentioned here on August 21:

Mortgage companies without any sub-prime on their books, such as Ottimo Funding LLC, are experiencing financing difficulties.

Well, it’s gone bust:

Ottimo Funding Ltd., whose name is Italian for “excellent,” started selling its $2.8 billion of mortgage bonds this week after being unable to raise debt financing in the commercial paper market, according to three people with knowledge of the sale.

The securities being auctioned are rated AAA and backed by Alt-A mortgages, a credit class above subprime, according to Standard & Poor’s. The sale probably won’t generate enough cash to fully repay investors who bought short-term debt from the fund, the ratings firm said last week.

As far as I can make out from S&P ratings reports, Ottimo was one of several Extendible asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits with no or partial third-party liquidity support – in other words, it was like a Canadian ABCP issuer, relying on credit enhancement and extendability to avoid liquidity squeezes.

In a fascinating report, the Asset Management firm Legg Mason has disclosed it is bailing one of its MMFs out of ABCP trouble:

Legg Mason Inc. invested $100 million in one of its money-market funds and arranged $238 million in credit for two others as a cushion against potential losses on commercial paper linked to subprime mortgages.

In related problems, E-Trade is in trouble:

Chief Executive Officer Mitchell Caplan’s strategy of building E*Trade’s bank by tripling loans outstanding backfired as borrowers fell behind on payments and U.S. home prices declined.

Bhatia estimated that E*Trade will post a loss in the fourth quarter after setting aside $500 million in extra money for bad loans and writedowns. Clients in the company’s brokerage unit may shift their accounts to rivals, while deposits at the bank could erode, said Bhatia, who cut his rating on the stock to “sell” from “hold.”

Citigroup is downgrading E*Trade “based on the higher probability of a run on the bank,” Bhatia said.

But let’s keep things in perspective. While there is lots of pain, while some people are losing their jobs, others their houses and an overall slowdown in forecast by some … Wall Street is still on track for a great year. They take risks and when it works against them the numbers are huge … but when they work out – as, by and large, they did in the first half of the year – the numbers are even bigger.

At least one Wallaby Street player is doing pretty well too:

Macquarie Group Ltd., Australia’s biggest securities firm, said first-half profit climbed 45 percent to a record on higher trading income and increased fees from mergers and acquisitions.

Net income rose to a record A$1.06 billion ($931 million), or A$4.02 a share, in the six months to Sept. 30, from A$730 million, or A$3.01 a share, a year earlier, the Sydney-based bank said in statement today. That beat the $1.03 billion median estimate of four analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

It was a quiet day for prefs with relatively light volume … not only were the bond markets closed, but all eyes were on stocks and currencies! It was good to see BAM.PR.N among the volume leaders … but a continuing puzzle to see it among the loss leaders as well!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.85% 4.84% 172,671 15.72 2 0.0000% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 82,226 15.79 8 +0.1173% 1,047.6
Floater 4.49% 3.01% 63,626 10.67 3 +0.1234% 1,046.7
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.02% 75,512 3.39 16 +0.1131% 1,030.7
Split-Share 5.22% 5.25% 88,030 4.16 15 -0.1132% 1,034.3
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.52% 61,685 3.53 4 -0.0506% 1,050.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.82% 5.29% 78,988 5.95 11 +0.0896% 1,012.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.54% 5.58% 319,856 14.08 55 -0.0405% 912.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.3605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 18.85 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.0304% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 18.25 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet +1.2400% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.52% based on a bid of 25.31 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 26,080 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 22,870 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 20.68 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 21,675 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 18.25 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 18,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 21.17 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 18,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : April, 2003

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-4-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,380.6 1 2.00 -0.01% 0.08 317M 3.49%
FixedFloater 2,031.7 9 2.00 3.56% 17.1 86M 5.45%
Floater 1,705.0 7 1.85 3.90% 17.1 87M 4.22%
OpRet 1,624.6 30 1.26 3.98% 2.4 116M 5.36%
SplitShare 1,581.4 9 1.78 4.38% 3.7 50M 5.68%
Interest-Bearing 1,940.9 9 2.00 6.18% 1.4 142M 7.86%
Perpetual-Premium 1,237.7 18 1.39 5.57% 6.6 248M 5.71%
Perpetual-Discount 1,378.8 11 1.73 5.80% 14.1 114M 5.77%

Index Constitution, 2003-04-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-04-30, Post-rebalancing

PrefLetter

November, 2007, Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The November edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the November, 2007 issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the December, 2007 issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close December 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on December 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

PrefLetter

November PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the November edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The November issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

Market Action

November 9, 2007

Well, there’s a day and a half!

US T-Bill yields plunged again and Fed Funds futures are now showing certainty of a cut to 4.25% in January, down from the current 4.5%. In what may be assumed to be related news, the Bank of Canada intervened to boost the overnight rate – presumably, there’s a lot of cash-equivalent money looking for a home.

There are alarming reports of gloomy consumers, but the direct catalyst is, as usual, more bad news from the banks. CIBC, ‘bank most likely to walk into a sharp object’, is taking a $463-million CDO/RMBS writedown, which offsets their gains from the VISA restructuring (TD has managed to hang on to its profit). Rumours that Barclays is looking at a big write-off triggered a temporary collapse of their share price, but they staggered back to more usual levels by the end of London’s trading day – Barclays’ CEO has stated “his refusal to comment on subprime writedowns indicates there is no truth to speculation about losses that wiped 29 percent off the bank’s market value in the past month”. Wachovia has disclosed $1.7-billion mark-to-market losses in October alone. Nouriel Roubini somewhat gleefully forecasts a total of $500-billion on a mark-to-market basis.

It’s almost a relief to see news of the first CDO liquidation:

Carina is the first CDO to begin unwinding after a slump in the credit worthiness of the underlying assets, S&P said. Thirteen others have informed S&P of an event of default, a precursor to liquidation. A widespread fire sale by CDOs, which package asset-backed securities and resell them in pieces, may further exacerbate declines in subprime-mortgage securities.

As these structures unwind it will become easier to sort out the winners from the losers … and easier for investors to price the assets!

On November 7 I made the comment:

Even worse, Citigroup has increased its exposure to CDO-issued CP, which has had the effect of ballooning the amount of Level 3 ‘Mark-to-Make-Believe’ assets. Citigroup’s cost of borrowing, as proxied through Credit Default Swaps, is skyrocketting.

I should make this more clear; banking & investment strategy is sometimes a little more complicated than can be summarized in a couple of casual sentences – particularly when discussing an institution that has more capital in the business than the Canadian Big Five-and-a-Half put together. It is not necessarily a Bad Thing for Citigroup to accumulate CDO paper and Level 3 assets. Panic has hit the markets and panics are the perfect time for an organization that has already done its homework to make an absolute killing taking unwanted assets off other people’s hands.

However, there are knock-on effects. If this same panic causes their borrowing costs (as proxied by CDS levels) to increase beyond the expected winnings, then the strategy becomes defunct. No matter how stupid the market is being in increasing the funding costs of such an investor. Blind fear in the marketplace can paralyze even a well-prepared investor.

What’s needed is for “real money” investors (those who will be perfectly happy holding on to the paper until maturity, like pension funds, retail investors and such, since they’re not completely at the mercy of mark-to-market; as opposed to “hot money” investors who want to flip it next week) to step up and buy the stuff. I suspect, however, that any pension fund manager who suggests such a plan at this stage of the game to an ordinary, unsophisticated pension board will get a blank stare and a chuckle instead of a mandate.

But at least one major player has gone bottom-fishing in the bond-insurers market:

MGIC Investment Corp. and PMI Group Inc., the two largest U.S. mortgage insurers, rose in New York trading after insurer Old Republic International Corp. disclosed it became the biggest investor in each company.

More news on the bond insurers’ front, as well. Fitch is reviewing the bond insurance industry, which may need to raise capital at one of the worst possible times to do so (typical!). Josef Ackerman, CEO of Deutsche, warns of a very strong impact on financial assets if a downgrade comes to pass, as has been previously stated by Accrued Interest. Naked Capitalism passes on the report that Fitch is outraged by the Financial Times misuse of technical terms in reporting the concerns … in times like this, when a misplaced comma in a Bernanke speech could cost billions, the technical guys want precision above all else! Two major municipal refinancings have been delayed due to market instability.

Naked Capitalism has a very good piece about Cuomo’s investigation of WaMu regarding possibly deliberately inflated appraisals of properties. I didn’t discuss it at the time, thinking it was just minor league grandstanding, but it seems more serious – especially since it appears Cuomo knows little about the business – or is disingenuously overstating his case. Lockhart’s letter, linked by Naked Capitalism, is priceless; Accrued Interest translates the refined prose into more every-day language.

However, I must take issue with Naked Capitalism’s characterization of the GSEs::

Cuomo astoundingly called the GSEs investment banks, and as the article points out, raises doubts about the value of their even though they are government backed. Huh? That is likely the basis for Lockhart’s “you may not understand remark.”

The last thing the securities market needs is doubts being cast on the creditworthiness of Freddie’s and Fannies’ paper.

GSEs are not, in fact, government backed. There is certainly a market perception that they are government backed … but if push comes to shove, Congress can let them rot. There is a very dangerous ambiguity in Fannie & Freddie’s status that should be clarified; they walk like banks, talk like banks and write cheques like banks – they should be regulated like banks. I often link to James Hamilton’s presentation to the Jackson Hole conference which addressed the issue: now I’ll link to it again. Speaking of Fannie Mae, they too aren’t doing too well in the current environment:

Fannie Mae, the biggest source of money for U.S. home loans, said its third-quarter loss more than doubled to $1.39 billion as a deepening housing slump increased mortgage delinquencies.

The net loss was caused by a $2.24 billion decline in the value of derivative contracts and $1.2 billion in credit losses among the $2.7 trillion of mortgage assets Fannie Mae owns or guarantees, the Washington-based company said today in a U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filing.

Fannie Mae has a minimum capital requirement of $30-billion and maintains a 30% surplus over this figure. So say they’ve got twice the capital of Royal Bank (Fannie Mae is far more highly leveraged, due to the inadequacies of the legislation) … can you imagine the consternation if Royal Bank lost $700-million in a quarter?

A relatively calm day for preferreds, with good volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.87% 4.85% 178,816 15.71 2 0.0000% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.85% 4.82% 83,859 15.79 8 -0.0251% 1,046.4
Floater 4.49% 3.02% 65,567 10.66 3 +0.0441% 1,045.4
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.07% 76,109 3.64 16 +0.0294% 1,029.5
Split-Share 5.21% 5.18% 88,994 3.93 15 +0.2320% 1,035.5
Interest Bearing 6.30% 6.49% 61,650 3.54 4 -0.2005% 1,051.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.30% 80,477 5.95 11 +0.0191% 1,011.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.54% 5.57% 325,672 14.09 55 -0.0505% 912.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.1134% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 18.99 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet -1.5748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.83% based on a bid of 25.00 and a softMaturity 2014-3-30 at 25.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.0753% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.66% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.20 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.0827% Asset coverage of over 2.9:1 as of October 31 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.27 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1241% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.59 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.A OpRet +1.2946% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.73% based on a bid of 25.82 and a softMaturity 2015-12-18 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 218,007 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 20.53 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 123,295 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 102,500 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 10.07. Asset coverage of just over 2.7:1 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.79% based on a bid of 10.05 and a hardMaturity 2008-12-1 at 10.00.
EN.PR.A SplitShare 46,100 “Anonymous” bought 42,000 from E-Trade at 25.08. This one’s a little strange, so pay attention! Asset coverage is just over 1.8:1, according to Scotia Managed Companies. It is due for a hardMaturity at 25.00 on 2007-12-16. It currently pays $1.0628 annually, but this will reset to $1.25 if the proposed reorganization goes through. If the proposed reorganization goes through, the company will execute a partial redemption to get the coverage ratio up to 2.2:1. I’m not even going to TRY calculating a pre-tax bid-YTW!
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 39,700 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 24.27. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 24.27 and a limitMaturity.

There were eighteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

EN.PR.A Dividend Rate Set at 5.00% … Maybe!

As previously reported, the management of EN.PR.A is attempting to extend the term on this split-share corporation … why not, it’s a lot cheaper than having to underwrite a new one!

In accordance with the plan, Scotia Managed Companies announced today:

that pursuant to the Company’s reorganization the new fixed distribution rate on the ROC Preferred Shares is 5.00%. This represents an increase of 0.75% over the current fixed rate of 4.25% of the ROC Preferred Shares. If the reorganization is successful and based on the $25.00 issue price of the ROC Preferred Shares, holders of ROC Preferred Shares will be entitled to quarterly fixed distributions of $0.3125 effective December 16, 2007.

The new fixed distribution rate was determined based on a formula approved by holders of Capital Yield Shares and holders of ROC Preferred Shares at a special meeting held October 23, 2007. The formula provided for the rate to equal the greater of (i) 5.00% and (ii) the Government of Canada three year bond rate as at November 9, 2007 plus 0.75%, rounded down to the nearest 0.05%.

The reorganization will only be implemented if a minimum of 1,280,000 Capital Yield Shares remain issued and outstanding following exercise of the Special Retraction Right by holders on or before November 16, 2007. If this condition is not satisfied, the Company will redeem the Capital Yield Shares and the ROC Preferred Shares on December 16, 2007 as originally contemplated.

If the reorganization is implemented the ratio of Capital Yield Shares to ROC Preferred Shares will continue to be two-to-one and the asset coverage on the ROC Preferred Shares will be set at approximately 2.2 times to extend the current Pfd-2(low) rating. In order to achieve this, the Company may redeem ROC Preferred Shares which are not surrendered for retraction pursuant to the Special Retraction Right. The reorganization is not conditional on the rating being maintained.

So, now the preferred shareholders will know what they’re voting on, anyway! Frankly, 5% looks a little skimpy – not horrible, but a little skimpy – given the other three-year-ish split share paper that’s currently available.

EN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is not included in any of the indices due to low average volume. There are a mere 1,209,398 shares outstanding, according to the Toronto Stock Exchange.

HIMIPref™ and PrefInfo information will not be updated until it is known whether the reorganization has been effected. This should be announced on or just after November 16.

Miscellaneous News

S&P to Time the Markets?

It’s a short line in a short presentation … but it carries a lot of implications:

First, what can we do differently in the future? Self-reflection is the key. It is now clear that some of the assumptions we made with respect to rating U.S. RMBS backed by subprime mortgages were insufficient to stand up to what actually happened. In addition, some have questioned whether our detailed analytical processes led us to wait too long to react to data that suggested a deviation from the expected trends. So we are focusing on getting in place the data, analytics, and processes to enhance our ability to anticipate future trends and process information even more quickly. [emphasis added – JH]

This is a little bit scary. I’ve done a lot of quantitative modelling – my entire professional career has been spent doing quantitative modelling – and I can tell you two things:

  • Quantitative models do not do well when there is a trend change. This is because there is a lot more noise than signal in the market-place; a quant system will pick up the first one, two, three standard deviations as an exception that will revert before it changes the figure it takes as a base.
  • Ain’t nobody can predict a trend change with reproducible accuracy. At best, you can pick up on the stress on the system implied by your data and assign a probability to the idea that it’s a trend change … e.g., when housing prices decline by 2% in a quarter, there might be a 25% chance that it’s a trend change as opposed to a 75% chance that it’s just noise. Which is not to say that estimating the chances of a change in trend is not useful; but which does mean that assigning a lot of weight to the idea that house prices will continue to decline by 2%/quarter over the medium term is quite aggressive

I will have to see how S&P fleshes out this idea – and how much disclosure they make of their future projections as part of the credit rating process.

With respect to projecting trend changes, lets look at one of the more respective organizations in the business – the National Bureau of Economic Research. How well do they do in determining trend changes? As they say:

On November 26, 2001, the committee determined that the peak of economic activity had occurred in March of that year. For a discussion of the committee’s reasoning and the underlying evidence, see http://www.nber.org/cycles/november2001. The March 2001 peak marked the end of the expansion that began in March 1991, an expansion that lasted exactly 10 years and was the longest in the NBER’s chronology. On July 16, 2003, the committee determined that a trough in economic activity occurred in November 2001. The committee’s announcement of the trough is at http://www.nber.org/cycles/july2003. The trough marks the end of the recession that began in March 2001.

So it took the NBER over a year and a half to look at all the data and determine where the bottom was. And S&P – under pressure by thousands of bozos who could have predicted the credit crunch ever-so-much-better, except that nobody asked them to – is going to try and predict the future?

It’s a scary thought – I hope that the implementation of the plans outlined in the S&P presentation is very, very restrained.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : March 2003

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2003-3-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,355.4 2 2.00 4.78% 0.08 517M 4.10%
FixedFloater 1,990.6 9 2.00 4.11% 16.1 82M 5.51%
Floater 1,687.0 6 1.82 3.63% 17.4 105M 4.10%
OpRet 1,610.7 29 1.27 4.10% 2.6 130M 5.39%
SplitShare 1,586.3 9 1.78 4.39% 3.8 55M 5.65%
Interest-Bearing 1,910.4 9 2.00 6.88% 1.4 151M 7.99%
Perpetual-Premium 1,218.6 13 1.38 5.74% 6.6 225M 5.85%
Perpetual-Discount 1,339.8 15 1.59 5.92% 14.0 165M 5.82%

Index Constitution, 2003-03-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2003-03-31, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

November 8, 2007

Thursday! The day when the US Commercial Paper Outstandings get reported! The Fed reports that ABCP outstanding declined by $29.5-billion, a marked increase in pace over the past month, as deleveraging is quickly becoming a major issue in the States. Bloomberg provides a review.

Bernanke is clearly a reader of PrefBlog – his testimony to the Joint Economic Committe echoed what I’ve been saying about Super-Conduit:

So … if it works properly I think it would speed up the recognition of values in part because it would remove some of the risk of fire sales, of rapid drawing down of assets in some of these vehicles and allow the market to stabilize and begin to make a better longer term valuation of what these assets are worth.”

He added, “If that’s the way it works, and again it depends on execution, it would remove some overhang from the market, it would create a stable financing source for those assets and it ought not to be inconsistent with the price discovery process.”

Mainly, though, he just told the politicians on the committee to mind their own bees-wax. Good for him! He may have enough to worry about soon enough – there’s at least one analyst raising the spectre of 5% headline inflation as the Ghost of Christmas Present!

Despite this horrifying projection (noting that, gee, the projection for core inflation isn’t quite so bad), Treasuries were up on expectations of a Fed cut, as early indications point to a lousy Christmas for retailers

In SIV news that I missed yesterday … one of the SIVs affected by Moody’s mass review was Links Finance … proudly owned and operated by our very own Bank of Montreal:

Links Finance Corporation (US$1.9 billion of debt securities affected)

Mezzanine Capital Notes

New Rating: Aa2 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: Aa2

Standard Capital Notes

New Rating: A3 on review for possible downgrade

Previous Rating: A3

Links Finance’s net asset value declined to 83% from 94% since Moody’s last review on September 5th. Moody’s review will focus on the potential for further market value deterioration.

Cheery, eh? There’s more:

Managers of structured investment vehicles don’t expect their business model to survive as the value of assets shrinks and the companies struggle to borrow, Moody’s Investors Service analysts said today.

Sic transit gloria mundi.

Apropos of nothing, I ran across a Ministry of Finance puff-piece today, which made the claim:

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2001-2002 ranked Canadian banks among the soundest financial institutions in the world (see Chart 5). The soundness of the Canadian banking industry has been demonstrated many times over the past several years. Canadian banks weathered the debt difficulties of the less developed countries in the early 1980s, the decline in real estate values a decade later, and the Asian crisis in the late 1990s without experiencing any systemic problems.

… which was kind of cool. Our second place finish has been repeated in the 2007-2008 Report, although you have to poke around a bit to verify that. (hint: Country Analysis / Balance Sheet).

And, as far as preferreds go … another day of entirely reasonable volume but disappointing returns. The long corporates index is now yielding just a hair under 5.8%. So let me think about this. You can get the same pre-tax yield with better quality owning GWO.PR.H, at the closing bid. Potential tax benefits – or potential capital gains when others recognize the potential tax benefits – are merely icing on the cake. If this makes sense to anybody, please let me know.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.88% 4.87% 195,800 15.69 2 -0.1019% 1,046.0
Fixed-Floater 4.82% 4.82% 84,428 15.80 8 -0.0450% 1,046.7
Floater 4.50% 4.53% 65,177 16.29 3 +0.0274% 1,044.9
Op. Retract 4.87% 4.01% 75,816 3.44 16 -0.1091% 1,029.2
Split-Share 5.22% 5.23% 87,953 3.93 15 -0.3404% 1,033.1
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.50% 61,326 3.55 4 -0.3540% 1,053.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.83% 5.44% 81,078 5.20 11 -0.1211% 1,011.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.53% 5.57% 328,877 14.32 55 -0.1159% 913.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.2634% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.7746% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.96% based on a bid of 20.48 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.4462% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.1726% Asset coverage of over 1.7:1 as of October 31 according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 15.17 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00. OK, boys, over 7.50% interest-equivalent for well-secured three year paper. Whatever you say.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1693% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 21.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.1471% Asset coverage of over 3.8:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.22% based on a bid of 19.82 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. At an interest-equivalency factor of 1.4, this has now cracked the magic 10% interest-equivalent mark!
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.0346% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ACO.PR.A OpRet -1.0101% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.65% based on a bid of 26.40 and a call 2008-12-31 at 26.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0194% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.81 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5085% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 20.86 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 62,215 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 20.66 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 44,290 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 23,850 On the one hand, I’m pleased to see good volume on this thing. On the other hand, why did it go down? BAM.A was up today, so it’s not necessarily a question of a sudden reassessment of credit quality. Or maybe these BAM.PR.Ns have been used as an equity substitute and people are now switching to the real thing? That’s way too sophisticated! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 23,477 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 23,145 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 20.88 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-three other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Update, 2007-11-09 Holy smokes! Yesterday I titled this “October 8” and have now changed it to, er, the right month. I had the day and year right! I must have been feeling nostalgic …