HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : January 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-01-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,355.8 1 2.00 3.47% 18.6 39M 3.48%
FixedFloater 2,289.0 6 2.00 3.18% 18.2 77M 5.12%
Floater 2,063.9 4 2.00 -22.71% 0.1 37M 4.12%
OpRet 1,882.3 18 1.67 2.66% 3.0 87M 4.62%
SplitShare 1,939.7 15 1.93 3.43% 2.6 51M 5.12%
Interest-Bearing 2,323.3 7 2.00 4.87% 1.4 65M 6.74%
Perpetual-Premium 1,479.5 47 1.70 4.31% 5.7 114M 5.13%
Perpetual-Discount 1,607.1 2 1.00 4.58% 16.2 1,897M 4.56%

Index Constitution, 2006-01-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2006-01-31, Post-rebalancing

Press Clippings

Globe & Mail: Dowdy Preferred Shares are Looking Mighty Seductive

Rob Carrick of the Globe and Mail has taken a look at the preferred share market and was kind enough to quote me extensively.

I liked the bit:

You won’t hear Mr. Hymas say so directly because he refuses to make a call on the market. But he does go so far as to offer this bit of wisdom: “Preferred shares are more attractive now than they usually are.”

It’s very frustrating, I know, for a journalist to ask a specialist – “Are these things going up?” and not get a straight answer!

Market Action

January 28, 2008

There were some very interesting tid-bits of news today. Naked Capitalism posted an article regarding some of the unintended consequences of Credit Default Swaps. I have commented on this news more thoroughly on the PrefBlog CDS Primer Post.

And the SocGen Futures Fiasco continues its fascination:

Europe’s largest futures exchange queried the bank about its trades as early as November.

“Eurex was alarmed by the size of the positions,” Prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin said at a press conference today, citing Kerviel. He said the trader was able to explain away the concerns.

Jean-Pierre Mustier, chief executive officer of Societe Generale’s corporate and investment bank, said on a conference call yesterday that trades by Kerviel that exceeded limits had been caught by the bank’s back office before.

“He would admit he had made a mistake, the transaction would be canceled and he would replace it by another one that would be controlled by another department,” Mustier said. “He wasn’t making more mistakes than other traders.”

The case has raised fresh doubts about risk management at the world’s biggest financial institutions and prompted calls for increased disclosure from French President Nicolas Sarkozy. He also suggested top managers should bear a greater share of the blame.

“When someone is very highly paid, even when it’s probably justified, you can’t avoid responsibility when there’s a major problem,” Sarkozy told reporters today after giving a speech outside Paris.

“There was clearly a fault in the bank’s control systems,” said Jean Peyrelevade, a former CEO of Credit Lyonnais and a member of the board of Barings when Leeson’s losses brought down the bank.

It pains me to have to quote Sarkozy actually saying something sensible on a topic related to capital markets, but hey – even a stopped clock is right twice a day!

Apparently, Kerviel didn’t take his vacations:

He took only four days off last August and postponed a vacation at the end of the year, Societe Generale said. Banks often make trading staff take time off so any concealed positions will become evident in their absence.

… and, although I can no longer find the link, was mentioned somewhere as having a departmental password that gave him some information. Well … maybe a departmental password is acceptable for access to the page that provides information about the staff Christmas party, but I can’t see any other rational use! And, of course, there’s the “calendar of the controls” issue that I mentioned on Friday.

There’s no real information available. It’s in the bank’s interest to make this guy out to be a combination of Einstein and Satan … it’s not in their interest to provide a full and dispassionate account of how the little accident occurred. This is particularly the case since given the short period of time since the discovery, the only people who really have a thorough knowledge of the situation and industry comparables are the ones with their asses on the line.

But really, it’s sounding to me more and more like everybody involved in the policy-making for the controls, from the department manager to the risk committee of the board of directors, now has the onus to explain why they should be allowed to keep their job.

Naked Capitalism also ruminates on the bond insurer bail-out and the failure of the ratings agencies to update the status of their reviews:

there is every reason to expect the rating agencies to knuckle under if Dinallo can raise a modest amount of dough, even as little as, say, $2 billion. The agencies through their mistakes have now created the situation where they could be the ones to Destroy the Financial World as We Know It. They will take any route offered to keep from pushing the button, in the hopes that either the economy will miraculously recover or other events will lead to credit repricing, so that the eventual downgrade of the insurers has far less impact than one now.

I still don’t think a bailout is likely to succeed, despite the considerable costs of a bond guarantor downgrade. But the fact that the rating agencies will probably go along with any remotely plausible scheme means that a smoke and mirrors version might be put into place.

With respect to this particular tale, it is fascinating to learn that JPMorgan has increased its Ambac stake to 7.7% from 5.4%.

And, in news that will be not be welcomed by those speculating that BCE / Teachers will succeed, another LBO in the States has bitten the dust … but for a novel reason:

Blackstone Group LP’s $6.6 billion leveraged buyout of credit-card payments processor Alliance Data Systems Corp. may collapse because bank regulators have placed “unacceptable” requirements on the acquisition.

Alliance Data plunged 35 percent in New York trading today after Blackstone said conditions requested by the U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency would impose “unlimited and indefinite” liability on the firm. It will try to keep the deal alive, the New York-based company said in an e-mailed statement.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. also regulates Alliance Data because it operates an industrial bank. Before today, Alliance Data shares had dropped more than 10 percent four times since Nov. 29 on speculation the transaction will be reworked or abandoned. Three times Alliance Data issued public statements that the two sides were working to complete the deal.

Now, I don’t believe that banking regulators have any direct involvement in BCE / Teachers, but this deal’s collapse seems to have had a ripple effect anyway! BCE was down $1.34 on the day, to close at $34.95.

The TSX is late again with my daily prices. The indices (and HIMIPref™) are being updated at various odd hours, but will be unavailable on a daily basis until the data becomes available at a reasonable time.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : December 2005

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2005-12-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,366.6 1 2.00 3.58% 18.4 46M 3.59%
FixedFloater 2,284.7 6 2.00 3.43% 2.1 89M 5.10%
Floater 2,058.5 4 2.00 -16.67% 0.1 40M 3.94%
OpRet 1,881.6 18 1.67 2.56% 3.1 87M 4.61%
SplitShare 1,950.8 14 1.93 3.30% 2.7 63M 5.03%
Interest-Bearing 2,323.4 7 2.00 4.80% 1.5 62M 6.74%
Perpetual-Premium 1,479.4 46 1.72 4.16% 4.4 121M 5.11%
Perpetual-Discount 1,632.5 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2005-12-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2005-12-30, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

SNH.PR.U : Partial Call for Redemption

SNP Health Split Corp. has announced:

that it has called 220,849 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on February 11, 2008 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 19.162% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 571,698 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on February 8, 2008 will have approximately 19.162% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be US$25.00 per share.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including February 11, 2008.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on February 11, 2008. From and after February 11, 2008 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

SNH.PR.U is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Market Action

January 25, 2008

The bond insurance business gets more interesting every day! Naked Capitalism has two pieces on it today, the first attempting to quantify the problem:

Bill Ackman of hedge fund Pershing Square has gotten a considerable amount of flack for his outspoken, negative views of the bond insurers, particularly MBIA and Ambac, which his firm has shorted. Ackman has been circulating a detailed analysis that estimates that the additional equity needed to maintain an AAA rating at the two biggest firms is roughly $15 billion.

This calculation is sharply contested by new rating agency Egan Jones (which also downgraded MBIA to a B+, a junk rating) which says the industry needs more than an order of magnitude more capital, namely $200 billion.

Egan-Jones was mentioned in PrefBlog on November 7. As a subscription-based credit advisor, they have an interest in saying exciting things … which is not to say they’re wrong, of course, but it is something to keep in mind. They received NRSRO status in December.

Naked Capitalism also takes a rather gloomy view of the New York Insurance Regulator’s bail-out facilitation – even gloomier than the one I remarked on yesterday. Until shown otherwise, I’m just going to assume the whole NY bail-out thing is plain-and-simple grandstanding … Mr. Dinallo, the head of the NY regulator, learned all about grandstanding in his last regulatory job:

Superintendent Dinallo served at the Office of Attorney General Eliot Spitzer from 1999 to 2003. As Chief of the Securities Bureau, he was charged with combining that bureau with the Real Estate Finance Bureau. The resulting Bureau was named the Investment Protection Bureau to reflect its focus, and Mr. Dinallo was named its first Chief. In that capacity, he led the reinvigorated Bureau’s investigations into the Wall Street Cases – conflicts of interest in the financial services industry, including research analyst cases and the spinning of hot initial public offerings. He produced more than 40 major civil and criminal matters, and led the Bureau through the beginning of the mutual fund industry investigations.

However, Barclays Capital has opined that there may be very serious knock-on effects should the insurers fail:

Banks that raised $72 billion to shore up capital depleted by subprime-related losses may require another $143 billion should credit rating firms downgrade bond insurers, according to analysts at Barclays Capital.

Banks will need at least $22 billion if bonds covered by insurers led by MBIA Inc. and Ambac Assurance Corp. are cut one level from AAA, and six times more for downgrades by four steps to A, Paul Fenner-Leitao wrote in a report published today. Barclays’ estimates are based on banks holding as much as 75 percent of the $820 billion of structured securities guaranteed by bond insurers.

I will have to do some more research into the bank capital regulations … it seems to me that having such levels of exposure to single names should attract a concentration charge on capital … I’m honestly not sure whether or not it does.

And Naked Capitalism draws to my attention (very good crop today, Yves!) an opinion piece by Willem Buiter, who is something of a regular on this blog:

Even with a few days worth of hindsight, the Fed’s out-of-sequence, out-of-hours 75 basis points cut in the target for the Federal Funds rate continues to look extraordinary and deeply misguided. Indeed, it looks less and less like a decisive pre-emptive move in response to unexpected bad news designed to meet the Fed’s triple mandate of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates, than a knee-jerk panic reaction to a global stock market collapse.

Did the sharp global decline in stock values at the beginning of this week reflect a rational re-assessment of fundamentals? The only two candidate explanations I have heard are (a) that the collapse was probably triggered by concerns about the financial viability of the monolines and (b) that it was intensified by the unwinding by SocGen of the long equity positions taken by its employee of the year (not!). I find neither explanation convincing. If the collapse was a spurious, non-fundamental event, there is no reason for the Fed to react to it. The ability of the Fed to meet its fundamental objectives is seriously undermined if it is perceived as the poodle of the equity markets.

So sign up another member of the “But what about inflation?” camp.

Assiduous Readers will be familiar with my grumpiness about US Fiscal policy – the last six years have been permanent stimulation – but I’m in good company:

[Harvard Professor Jeffrey Frankel] explains:

“In 2001, very aggressive monetary and fiscal expansion reduced the severity and length of the recession. It is true that this time as well the Fed has been busy cutting interest rates and the government is working on a fiscal stimulus. But this time, before long, our policy makers will run into constraints. The government can’t keep cutting taxes, because the national debt is too high, the path of future deficits too steep, and the costs of the baby boomers’ retirement too imminent. The federal government needs to retain the confidence of the bond markets.

“This is different from 2001, which we entered with a record budget surplus, allowing room for stimulus. Similarly, the Fed can’t keep cutting interest rates because the dollar has been falling steeply, and America needs to retain confidence of foreign investors who are financing our deficits. This is different from 2001, when the dollar was strong, inflation was all but dead, and the Fed could cut interest rates by [5.5 percentage points].”

A few more details – and a bit more rational commentary – is emerging regarding the SocGen stock futures fiasco:

But a top French presidential advisor revealed that Kerviel had positions of more than 50 billion euros (73 billion dollars) — more than the bank’s current market capitalisation of 35.9 billion euros.

Many experts said it was difficult to believe a lone trader could have successfully hid such colossal losses.”

“The feeling in the dealing rooms is that it is not possible for an individual to do all that. They think Societe Generale has overdone the fraud to cover up some bad market operations,” said Elie Cohen, an economy professor and research director for the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS).

One example of such feelings as were noted by Elie Cohen is:

Let’s get this straight: the MainSwamp media (who are such profoundly ignorant whip-kissers that they think that the wankfest at Davos is worth reporting on) would have you believe that a single trader whose entire remuneration package (including bonuses) was 100k euro, had such free rein that he could rack up positions with aggregate losses of A$9 bill, with nobody noticing. (To get to an aggregate loss of A$9 bill, you need an actual position larger than that, no?)

A bank with owners equity of about $20 billion, and its processes are so poor that such a thing could happen? The Banque de France – who audits every bank every year, and knows if an individual Frenchman passes a bad cheque – knew nothing of it?

Sorry lads – no sale.

What has happened here, I bet, is that SocGen has found an internal culprit, and is hanging as large an amount on him as they think they can get away with. So this geezer might have sent $100 mill to Money Heaven – that amount could possibly be hidden for a week or so – and the Bank has used him as a scapegoat and has attributed half its subprime-related losses to him rather than the subprime book.

… and a bit more delicately:

“That’s when he made his first mistake,” said Jean-Pierre Mustier, head of investment banking at Societe Generale. “He no longer knew the type and calendar of the controls.”

The trading loss raises questions about the bank’s risk management procedures.

“I find it really improbable that this trader was not abetted by at the very least incompetence, if not assistance from others,” said Joseph Mason, a risk-management researcher and professor of finance at Drexel University in Philadelphia. “Ultimately, we’re talking about a breakdown of fundamental operational controls.”

“Calendar of the controls”? No wonder SocGen’s lost so much. And finally (hat tip: Financial Webring Forum), Jim Sinclair reviews the data and offers the opinion:

The USD $7,000 million loss reported as an action of a junior trader hiding a losing position for a considerable amount of time as stated is total bull.

You would have to be totally IGNORANT of market mechanics to buy that plausible denial.

The public and much of the media are.

The reported loss was a buyout of a failed to or chosen not to perform derivative.

One theory regarding the mechanics of the scheme that has been suggested to me is that the trader was writing single puts on multiple futures/forward contracts rather than multiple puts on single futures/forward contracts, then fiddling with the documentation to make it look like one put = one contract, rather than the actual one put = multiple contracts.

Well, that may be. I responded that most cases like this aren’t very complicated, really. It’s usually just a matter of dumb stealing from dumber. Or, perhaps, dumber turning a blind eye, as long as dumb was making money.

I’ll admit, one thing that makes me a little nervous about the whole episode is the continued emphasis on his background in operations:

Kerviel drew on knowledge he acquired during six years in Societe Generale’s back office, where he went to work in 2000 after completing a degree in market operations at the University of Lyon II, according to an alumni Web page. He had to breach five levels of controls to get away with his trades, Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer said at a press conference yesterday.

His “intimate and perverse” knowledge of the bank’s controls let him avoid detection, co-Chief Executive Officer Philippe Citerne told reporters.

This is the type of thing that might make a particularly overbearing, paternalistic and incompetent regulator (please don’t cry, Assiduous Readers, some such do exist) forbid such transitions.

I came up through operations. It was while working in operations on starvation wages that I got interested in finance. The background has served me well … back-office bullshitters find I’m asking them questions they’d rather not answer, on occasion. I’m hardly alone in this; the traditional manner of becoming a trader is by first becoming a traders’ clerk – something I wish I’d know when I got my first full-time operations job and spent several years kicking myself for asking for the higher-paying dead-end choice.

But we’ll see.

There’s a new inhabitant of litigation-land!

this move by New York City and State to sue lead manager Goldman, 25 other underwriters and accounting firms over a Countrwide stock offering is routine securities fraud, in this case making misrepresentations about the company’s prospects. No one has yet to develop a legal theory to go after Goldman for the move that has many offended, being net short subprime related debt while continuing to sell them to investors. And the latter is unlikely to go anywhere (saver perhaps serving as fodder for Congressional investigations) because that action didn’t violate any securities laws.

There is no indication as yet as to whether the New York City and State portfolio managers have even been asked as to whether they did a due diligence.

Well folks …. sorry! Prices are not yet available from the TSX and I’m going out for dinner. I’ve been keeping the HIMIPref™ indices up to date, by the way, after cramming in the prices at odd hours, just not reporting them. But I’ll see what I can do over the weekend to – at least – get today’s index levels up.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : November 2005

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2005-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,355.2 1 2.00 3.65% 18.2 45M 3.66%
FixedFloater 2,258.8 6 2.00 3.20% 2.0 71M 5.40%
Floater 2,050.9 4 2.00 -22.71% 0.1 39M 3.98%
OpRet 1,888.9 18 1.68 2.34% 3.2 87M 4.57%
SplitShare 1,937.8 14 1.93 3.42% 2.8 61M 5.04%
Interest-Bearing 2,321.6 9 2.00 4.84% 1.1 77M 6.59%
Perpetual-Premium 1,466.1 46 1.72 4.31% 5.9 127M 5.12%
Perpetual-Discount 1,617.9 0 0 0 0 0 0

Index Constitution, 2005-11-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2005-11-30, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

PFD.PR.A : Normal Course Issuer Bid

Not content with suffering a 38% retraction of units, Charterhouse Preferred Share Index Corp. has announced:

that the Toronto Stock Exchange has accepted the Corporation’s Notice of Intention to make a normal course issuer bid. The Corporation will have the right to purchase under the bid up to a maximum of 137,182 Preferred Shares (representing 10% of the Corporation’s public float) commencing January 29, 2008. As at January 24, 2008, there were 1,380,276 Preferred Shares of the Corporation issued and outstanding and the Corporation’s public float was 1,371,826 Preferred Shares. In any 30 day period, no more than 27,605 Preferred Shares (representing 2% of the Corporation’s issued and outstanding Preferred Shares) may be purchased under this normal course issuer bid.

The purpose of the issuer bid is to enable the Corporation to acquire Preferred Shares at prices which are less than the net asset value per Preferred Share at the time of purchase. The Board of Directors believes that such purchases of Preferred Shares pursuant to the bid would be in the best interests of the Corporation. The Corporation will not purchase any Preferred Shares under the bid if the price of such shares would equal or exceed the net asset value per Preferred Share at such time.

I am probably a little dense, but I do not see any reporting of the NAVPS on the sponsor’s website.

They do, however, link to a rather tragic graph:

Their one-year performance (and it is not clear whether they measure performance by market price of PFD.PR.A or by its NAV) is -10.17% and the three-year annualized performance is -4.07%. I’ll stick to active management, thank you!

Issue Comments

ABK.PR.C Redemption to be Funded by New Issue

Allbanc Split Corp has announced:

that holders of its Class A Capital Shares have approved a share capital reorganization allowing holders of Class A Capital Shares, at their option, to retain their investment in the Company after the scheduled redemption date of March 10, 2008. The reorganization will permit holders of Class A Capital Shares to extend their investment in the Company beyond the redemption date of March 10, 2008 for up to an additional 5 years. The Class A Preferred Shares will be redeemed on the same terms originally contemplated in their share provisions and have been called for redemption on March 10, 2008.

Holders of Class A Capital Shares who do not wish to continue their investment in the Company after March 10, 2008 must give notice that they wish to exercise their special retraction right and how they wish to be paid for their shares on or prior to February 15, 2008. Holders of Class A Capital Shares who retract their Class A Capital Shares will be paid on March 10, 2008.

The reorganization will involve the extension of the originally scheduled redemption date, a special retraction right to enable holders of Class A Capital Shares to retract their shares as originally contemplated should they not wish to extend their investment and the creation of a new class of shares to be known as the Class B Preferred Shares in order to provide continuing leverage for the Class A Capital Shares. The reorganization will become effective provided that holders of at least 180,000 Class A Capital Shares (before giving effect to the stock split) retain their Class A Capital Shares and do not exercise the special retraction right.

I see no indication as yet regarding the terms of the “Class B Preferred Shares”.

The redemption of ABK.PR.C has previously been announced.

Update, 2008-2-19: The company has announced:

today that the final condition required to extend the term of the Company for an additional five years to March 8, 2013, has been met. Holders of Class A Capital Shares previously approved the extension of the term of the Company subject to the condition that at least 180,000 Class A Capital Shares remain outstanding after giving effect to the special retraction right (the “Special Retraction Right”). Under the Special Retraction Right, 66,684 Class A Capital Shares have been tendered to the Company for retraction on March 10, 2008. Holders of these shares will receive a retraction price equal to the amount if any, by which the Unit Value exceeds $60.80. Holders of the remaining 332,342 Class A Capital Shares (representing 83.3% of the currently issued and outstanding Class A Capital Shares) will continue to hold their investment in the Company. After giving effect to the four-for-one share subdivision, it is expected that 1,329,368 Class A Capital Shares will remain outstanding. The Class A Preferred Shares will be redeemed by the Company on March 10, 2008 in accordance with their terms at a price per share equal to the lesser of $60.80 and the Unit Value. In order to maintain the leveraged “split share” structure of the Company, the Company will offer new Class B Preferred Shares pursuant to a preliminary prospectus dated January 30, 2008.

The preliminary prospectus has been published on SEDAR, but all of the interesting parts have been left blank.

Primers

Banks' Capital Structure: Tier 2A and Tier 2B

Assiduous Readers will be familiar with Banks Subordinated Debt, but perhaps not so much with the difference betwee Tier 2A and Tier 2B Capital.

2.2.1. Hybrid capital instruments (Tier 2A)
Hybrid capital includes instruments that are essentially permanent in nature and that have certain characteristics of both equity and debt, including:
• Cumulative perpetual preferred shares
• Qualifying 99-year debentures
• Qualifying non-controlling interests arising on consolidation from tier 2 hybrid capital instruments
• General allowances (see section 2.2.2.)
Hybrid capital instruments must, at a minimum, have the following characteristics:
• unsecured, subordinated and fully paid up
• not redeemable at the initiative of the holder
• may be redeemable by the issuer after an initial term of five years with the prior consent of the Superintendent
• available to participate in losses without triggering a cessation of ongoing operations or the start of insolvency proceedings
• allow service obligations to be deferred (as with cumulative preferred shares) where the profitability of the institution would not support payment

Limited life instruments (Tier 2B)

Limited life instruments are not permanent and include:
• limited life redeemable preferred shares
• qualifying capital instruments issued in conjunction with a repackaging arrangement
• other debentures and subordinated debt
• qualifying non-controlling interests arising on consolidation from tier 2 limited life instruments

Limited life capital instruments must, at a minimum, have the following characteristics:
• subordination to deposit obligations and other senior creditors
• an initial minimum term greater than, or equal to, five years

Limits defined by the OSFI are:

The following limitations will apply to capital elements after the specified deductions and adjustments:
• A strongly capitalized institution should not have innovative instruments and non-cumulative perpetual preferred shares that, in aggregate, exceed 25% of net tier 1 capital.
• Innovative instruments shall not, at the time of issuance, comprise more than 15% of net tier 1 capital. If at any time this limit is breached, the institution must immediately notify OSFI and provide an acceptable plan showing how the institution proposes to quickly eliminate the excess.
• The amount of capital, net of amortization, included in tier 2 and used to meet credit and operational risk capital requirements shall not exceed 100% of net tier 1 capital.
• Limited life instruments, net of amortization, included in tier 2B capital shall not exceed a maximum of 50% of net tier 1 capital.
• Tier 2 and tier 3 capital used to meet the market risk capital requirements must not – in total – exceed 200% of the net tier 1 capital used to meet the market risk capital requirements.
• Tier 2 and tier 3 capital cannot – in total – normally exceed 100% of the institution’s net tier 1 capital. This limit cannot be exceeded without OSFI’s express permission, which will only normally be granted where an institution engages mainly in business that is subject to the market risk capital charge.

As has been noted, the limit on non-common-equity elements of Tier 1 Capital has been raised to 30%.

Update, 2008-2-12: I also note the OSFI July, 2007, Advisory (an “FRE” is a “Federally Regulated Entity”):

The maximum amount of innovative instruments that a FRE can have outstanding is being increased to 20% of net Tier 1 capital. A maximum of 15% of net Tier 1 can be included in the innovative Tier 1 category with the balance, a maximum of 5% of net Tier 1 eligible for inclusion in Tier 2B. Any portion of the innovative Tier 1 instruments permissible within Tier 2B can thereafter be transferred to the innovative Tier 1 category as room becomes available.

In addition, and without limiting the application of the preceding paragraph, subordinated debt issued by Non-Consolidated Financing Entities will be eligible for inclusion in Tier 2B capital provided the conditions set out in Section 5 of this Advisory are met. The sum of this subordinated debt and innovative Tier 1 instruments included in Tier 2B capital of the FRE must not exceed the greater of 5% of net Tier 1 of the FRE or the dollar amount obtained when the 5% limit is calculated at its ultimate controlling FRE (the “innovative overflow”). Any portion of the “innovative overflow” composed of subordinated debt issued by Non-Consolidated Financing Entities permissible within Tier 2B cannot, at any time, be transferred to the innovative Tier 1 category.

Tier 2B capital in aggregate will continue to be limited to 50% of net Tier 1 capital. OSFI’s Interim Appendix to Guideline A-2 (Banks/T&L/Life) states that “[a] strongly capitalized FRE should not have innovative instruments and perpetual non-cumulative preferred shares that, in aggregate, exceed 25% of its net Tier 1 capital.” FREs need not include the amounts of innovative Tier 1 instruments that are included in Tier 2B, in the calculation of the 25% limitation on preferred shares and innovative instruments in Tier 1.

If, at any time after issuance, a FRE’s ratio of innovative instruments (included in a FRE’s innovative Tier 1 category) to net Tier 1 capital exceeds 15%, and/or if the “innovative overflow” exceeds the allowable level as described above, the FRE must immediately notify OSFI. The FRE must also provide a plan, acceptable to OSFI, showing how the FRE proposes to eliminate the excess (or excesses if it breaches both limits) as soon as possible. A FRE will generally be permitted to continue to include such excess(es) in the respective category(ies) until such time as the excess(es) is (are) eliminated in accordance with its plan.