Market Action

July 27, 2006

Index Current Yield (at bid) YTW Average Trading Value Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.21% 4.22% 93,792 17.01 2 -0.3969% 994.1
Fixed-Floater 5.23% 3.92% 101,384 7.48 5 0.3426% 1,003.3
Floater 4.55% -13.57% 59,955 6.44 5 0.0163% 1,001.8
Op. Retract 4.74% 3.35% 79,575 2.94 18 0.0154% 995.5
Split-Share 5.18% 4.17% 48,195 3.02 14 -0.2103% 998.3
Interest Bearing 6.85% 5.05% 66,536 2.20 7 0.1540% 1,011.2
Perpetual 5.19% 4.50% 191,523 6.93 54 0.0509% 1,004.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
DFN.PR.A SplitShares -1.66% 9,500 shares traded
BCE.PR.A FixedFloater +1.34% 2,900 shares trade. It went ex-dividend today … did someone forget?
MST.PR.A SplitShares 1.55% 6,088 shares traded. Gapped from 10.30-40 to 10.46-50
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C Perpetual 135,540 70,000 share internal cross by BMO @24.15; BMO bought 61,600 shares from Dundee at 24.15 in seven trades in last few minutes of session.
HSB.PR.D Perpetual 126,750 BMO internal cross of 125,000 shares @26.00
BNS.PR.K Perpetual 110,040 BMO crossed 100,000 shares @25.20
TD.PR.O Perpetual 105,900 BMO crossed 100,000 @25.20
PWF.PR.A Floater 103,625 BMO crossed 100,000 @25.30

There were 15 issues with volume in excess of 10,000 shares.

Market Action

July 26, 2006

Index Current Yield (at bid) YTW Average Trading Value Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.17% 4.19% 96,309 17.05 2 +0.0200% 998.0
Fixed-Floater 5.19% 4.17% 99,950 11.2 5 0.0004% 999.8
Floater 4.55% -12.93% 60,535 6.45 5 -0.2771% 1,001.6
Op. Retract 4.74% 3.40% 79,912 2.99 18 0.0305% 995.3
Split-Share 5.16% 4.11% 48,834 2.96 14 0.1034% 1,000.4
Interest Bearing 6.85% 5.06% 67,184 2.20 7 -0.1400% 1,009.6
Perpetual 5.19% 4.53% 193,028 6.98 54 0.1018% 1,004.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
AL.PR.E Floater -1.05% 1,800 shares traded
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
RY.PR.W Perpetual 176,230 Jennings crossed 147,500 @25.35
CM.PR.C Perpetual 110,378 BMO bought 100,000 from Scotia @26.90, which was the closing bid. At this price, the YTW of this issue is 2.54%
MFC.PR.B Perpetual 46,730 BMO crossed 44,000 @ 24.55
SLF.PR.B Perpetual 45,550  
PIC.PR.A SplitShare 21,925  
BNS.PR.K Perpetual 12,255  

There were 13 issues with volume in excess of 10,000 shares.

Market Action

July 25, 2006

Index Current Yield (at bid) YTW Average Trading Value Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.16% 4.17% 100,269 17.09 2 +0.0802% 997.8
Fixed-Floater 5.19% 4.16% 100,032 13.50 5 0.2057% 999.8
Floater 4.54% -15.19% 61,553 6.45 5 0.0407% 1,004.4
Op. Retract 4.74% 3.35% 80,532 2.98 18 0.1594% 995.0
Split-Share 5.17% 4.18% 48,741 3.03 14 -0.0569% 999.4
Interest Bearing 6.85% 5.02% 66,919 2.21 7 0.2830% 1,011.1
Perpetual 5.19% 4.57% 194,134 7.01 54 0.1012% 1,003.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.00% 1,600 shares traded
WN.PR.B OpRet +1.50% 2,741 shares traded … YTW is now only 3.29%
HSB.PR.D Perpetual +1.17% 5,600 shares traded – RBC bought all day. A retail broker getting excited, maybe?
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.C Perpetual 263,565 Gained 0.25% on day
BC.PR.C Fixed Floater 167,749 Gained 0.32% on day
CM.PR.C Perpetual 114,690 BMO bought 10,000 from Scotia @26.91, then crossed 68,550 @27.00 on delayed delivery. The YTW at the closing bid of 26.91 is only 2.50% pretax.

There were 20 issues with volume in excess of 10,000 shares.

Data Changes

TD.PR.N

Mea culpa.

 I was doing some checks of the Operating Retractibles when I found that there was an error in the option schedule for TD.PR.N.

The last redemption period, to redeem at $25.00 until the end of time, begins on 2013-04-30, not 2012-04-30.

The change has been made on the server.

Issue Comments

HPF.PR.B Credit Rating

I just don’t understand the DBRS credit rating on this issue at all.

 Essentially, the company has two classes of preferred shares and one class of “common”. They have invested the proceeds in a portfolio … part of this portfolio has been sold forward to a counterparty in order to guarantee the return of principal for the senior preferred shares. Got that?

 OK, a simplified balance sheet, as of December 31, 2005, of this Split Share Corporation looks like this:

Assets (thousands, CAD)  
Pledged Portfolio 25,173
Other Assets 29,250
Total Assets 54,423
 
Liabilities (thousands, CAD)  
Misc. 850
Senior Pfd 33,068
Junior Pfd 19,445
Equity 1,060
Total Liabilities and Equity 54,423

Now, maybe to you and me, things look pretty dicey for the “Junior Preferreds” (Note that these are really called the “Series 2”). After all, they’re owed $19,445M on redemption and there’s only $20,505 to cover it – a coverage ratio of just 1.05:1.

But DBRS claims that the coverage ratio is 1.46:1 and, as far as I have been able to tell (and confirmed in a telephone call last March), here’s how they’ve done it: the amount due on maturity to the senior prefs is $33,068M, right? And that’s covered off by the forward agreement, right? And the portfolio to be delivered under the forward agreement is on the balance sheet for $25,173M, right?

 Therefore, DBRS concludes, there’s $7,895M guaranteed capital appreciation sitting right there! The forward contract has an intrinsic value of $7,895M ! So, for analytical purposes, in order to calculate the coverage for the Junior prefs, just stick another $7,895M into equity against the notional forward contract value, and then come up with a coverage ratio of:

Notional Junior Asset Coverage
Presumed Calculation to agree with DBRS Figures
Balance sheet value of Junior Prefs
(thousands, CAD)
19,445
Balance sheet equity 1,060
Off-balance-sheet equity from forward contract 7,895
Total value to cover Junior Prefs 28,400
Asset Coverage
(28,400 / 19,445)
1.46

Now, this calculation is absolutely nonsensical, of course, but as far as I could tell from the DBRS press release and from talking to their analyst, that’s exactly what they did.

‘Why is this nonsensical?’, you ask.

Well, there’s the small matter of the dividends that have to be paid on the Senior prefs. If you’re going to defease the principal repayment on the seniors, you can’t just forget all about the dividends due. They pay 5.85% annually …. they’re not due until June 29, 2012 …. where’s Mr. Calculator? … essentially, that payment stream of $0.1218 monthly has a present value of about $7.50 / share, or a total of about $10-million when discounted at 5.85%.

Knock $10-million off the amount available to cover the Juniors … and, hey, looky-looky! They’re in the red, with an asset coverage ratio of 0.95:1 !

Let’s try it another way, since that doesn’t look so good. Let’s just forget about the damn forward agreement and assign it a value of $0. That’s almost as bad: there is now $20,505 to cover $19,445 … asset coverage is 1.05:1.

It just doesn’t work. If you’re going to consider the Senior’s defeased, you have to defease all of it, not just the principal, and the dividend stream is just way too much.

 So what does an asset coverage of 1:1-ish mean for most companies? Let’s put it this way: on August 19, 2002, Sixty Split (SXT.PR.A) got downgraded to Pfd-4 when its coverage ration reached 1.28:1.

How these HPF.PR.Bs are maintaining their DBRS rating of Pfd-2(low) [Stable] is something I just don’t understand.

Note Added: In case anybody has the idea that dividends on the securing portfolio will offset the dividends to be paid on the senior shares, I’ll quote from the prospectus:

Under the Series 1 Forward Agreement, all dividends and distributions, including extraordinary distributions, declared and paid on the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio securities will be paid to the Company and the amount payable on the Termination Date may be correspondingly reduced. In order to minimize the likelihood that such dividends or distributions will be paid, the Company intends to acquire non-dividend paying shares of Canadian public companies for the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio. If any such dividends or distributions are declared on securities in the Series 1 Repayment Portfolio, the Series 1 Forward Agreement may be amended to provide that replacement securities acceptable to the Counterparty be substituted for the securities in respect of which the dividend or distribution has been declared to preserve the value of the forward transaction prior to the occurrence of such event.

 

Note also that:

The Company will pay dividends on the Offered Shares primarily from net realized capital gains, including premiums from writing covered call options on the securities held in the Managed Portfolio in which it is permitted to invest and from distributions and interest received on that portion of the Managed Portfolio invested in securities of Income Funds and debt securities.

In other words, they’re not going to get any covered call income from the securing portfolio, either, and finally: 

In order to achieve the Company’s regular monthly dividends on the Series 1 Shares and Series 2 Shares, the Company will be required to generate an average annual return on the Managed Portfolio of approximately 12% if the value of the Managed Portfolio is maintained intact until the Termination Date

Well, DBRS apparently thinks they can do it! Let’s hope so, because there’s not much room for error.

Market Action

July 24, 2006

Index Current Yield (at bid) YTW Average Trading Value Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.14% 4.16% 103,936 17.13 2 +0.0802% 997.0
Fixed-Floater 5.20% 4.17% 95,964 13.49 5 0.0869% 997.8
Floater 4.54% -15.38% 61,155 6.43 5 0.2491% 1,004.0
Op. Retract 4.75% 3.48% 80,782 2.99 18 -0.0679% 993.4
Split-Share 5.17% 4.23% 49,600 3.10 14 -0.0009% 999.9
Interest Bearing 6.87% 5.30% 66,930 2.21 7 -0.0233% 1,008.2
Perpetual 5.20% 4.61% 195,623 7.02 54 0.0520% 1,002.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
TDS.PR.B SplitShare -1.05% 2,990 shares traded, which was enough to blow through the bid. Some traded at 28.01, a penny above the 52-week low, but it closed at 28.25-49. Not much size on the bid, though!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
WN.PR.E Perpetual 304,550 Huge volume for a pref! But 300,000 of this was an internal cross [both sides of the trade were controlled by the same asset manager] by BMO @24.00.
RY.PR.W Perpetual 258,700 Second day of good volume. 175,000 was an internal cross by BMO @25.40; 38,100 was a CSH Cross by Global (cash trade, not three-day-settlement) @25.88; and 38,100 (presumably the same 38,100) was a cross by Global @25.57. Closed at 25.31-56. Man, did the purchaser of that CSH transaction get screwed! Perhaps it was a buy-in notice?
SLF.PR.C Perpetual 179,650 175,000 internal cross by BMO @24.02
TD.PR.M OpRet 175,500 175,000 internal cross by BMO @27.30
TD.PR.O Perpetual 112,700 100,000 internal cross by BMO @25.25

A busy day for BMO, if no-one else! If they were able to charge a nickel a share on the crosses, then they went home with a warm, fuzzy feeling. Somebody’s rejigging his pref portfolio!

RY.PR.A closed at 24.18-25, while RY.PR.B ended at 24.45-50, so perhaps things are beginning to normalize a little … at least so far as that particular pair is concerned!

 There were 20 issues with volume in excess of 10,000 shares.

 Update, 2006-07-27: Just realized! The ex-date for the RY.PR.W was July 24, so the purchaser of the CSH – settled RY.PR.W got the dividend of $0.30625.

HIMIPref News

Why not always buy the highest valued shares?

PrefBlog Reader Drew asked on the Comments and Requests: HIMIPref thread:

Thanks for the response. One of the reasons for my question is that I noticed recently that HIMIPref gives high valuation scores to a couple of the operating retractibles, specifically those of GWO and MFC, but instead of recommending them for purchase it recommends a perpetual issue with a lower valuation score. I do own several split share issues but no operating retractibles. Is it likely that HIMIPref is recommending the lower valuation issue due to overall portfolio risk considerations?

Well, I responded on the wrong thread, initially, but I’ll reprint it here:

 There are a number of possibilities:

(i) It may be due to weight constraints set in your constraints specifications file. It is possible to set this file such that, for instance, you would hold only perpetuals.

(ii) More likely, it is due to the relative riskDistance between the various issues. Essentially, the valuation pick-up is divided by the risk distance and it is this value that must exceed the hurdle in order for the trade to be recommended. The risk distance between a perpetual and another perpetual will normally be greater than that between a perpetual and a retractible.
The concept of risk distance was introduced on the basis that issues are more easily compared the more similar they are. In other words, you can discriminate more easily between two high quality perpetual issues than you can between a hiqh quality perpetual and a low quality split share. The second trade will have a higher risk distance than the first; the second may well have a higher raw valuation pick-up but a lower trade score.
In the “Issue Method” of trade evaluation, this concept is used by the system in an effort to ensure that each individual trade, once recommended, has an equal chance of being profitable.
In the “Portfolio Method”, risk distance is measured from the pre-trade portfolio to the index and then from the post-trade portfolio to the index, in an effort to ensure that a portfolio mis-match of risk characteristics from the index is justified by excess expected return.

HIMIPref News

What about risk control?

Prefblog reader Drew asks on the Comments and Requests: HIMIPref thread:

My impression is that HIMIPref does not merely select the most attractive issues for purchase but rather factors in the relative risks between different categories of preferred shares – chiefly retractible versus perpetual – with a view to constructing a safer portfolio than if the focus was placed solely on the most attractive issues. Is my impression correct?

This impression is essentially correct. A lot of thought has gone into the risk control aspects of HIMIPref, although the exercise of these controls is much more explicit when optimizing according to the portfolio method than with the issue method.

 With the parameterization currently supplied with HIMIPref for the issue method, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the potential for trading profits and the value of each issue relative to its price given all its risk attributes. Thus, the primary comparison for a split-share, for example, is other split shares; comparisons to perpetuals have a great influence, but are less important. It is unlikely that any class of shares could have so many issues far above the curve that they totally dominate other classes … after all, if there were too many issues like this, then the curve itself would move!

Thus, a certain amount of diversification of risk-attributes is built into the trading model. Should the subscriber wish it, this diversification can be amplified or reduced, by fiddling with the constraintSpecificationRecord that resides on the client-side.

Market Action

July 21, 2006

Index Current Yield (at bid) YTW Average Trading Value Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.13% 4.14% 105,226 17.17 2 -0.2200% 996.2
Fixed-Floater 5.21% 4.16% 95,800 13.49 5 0.0401% 996.9
Floater 4.55% -16.23% 62,137 6.44 5 0.1185% 1001.5
Op. Retract 4.74% 3.46% 81,046 3.08 18 0.2040% 994.1
Split-Share 5.17% 4.08% 50,179 2.80 14 0.1054% 999.9
Interest Bearing 6.86% 5.29% 66,397 2.22 7 +0.0366% 1,008.4
Perpetual 5.20% 4.65% 195,398 6.86 54 0.0815% 1,001.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
Boring! Not a single index-included issue gained or lost more than 1%!
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual 97,662  
RY.PR.W Perpetual 31,800 Scotia crossed 25,000 @ 25.60 … issue up 0.24% on day
MFC.PR.B Perpetual 15,050  
BC.PR.C FixedFloater 10,752  

A fairly quiet day – the volume highlight was definitely the TCA.PR.Y, trading over $5-million worth, but there wasn’t really a lot of movement.

 Scotia’s cross of 25,000 RY.PR.W is interesting … the closing YTW was 4.70%, compared with the 4.87% at which the RY.PR.B closed. Not a precise swap, certainly, since the RY.PR.B only traded 9,202 shares but could perhaps be related. The YTW of the RY.PR.W is based on a call in March, 2014, at $25.00. It pays a nickel more than the RY.PR.B and has a similar redemption schedule, simply shifted to be 18 months earlier.

As noted in the post BNA.PR.A, an error was fixed today, with the effect that it is now calculated to have a YTW of 5.05% at its price of 26.01-30 based on a call in October, 2006, at 25.75. Yesterday, it had been calculated to have a YTW of -13.1% at pretty much the same price.

The change in this issue has changed the average calculated YTW of the splitShare index markedly. What can I say? Sometimes these things really do have a grossly negative YTW!

Data Changes

BNA.PR.A

I was writing a piece about negative Yield-to-Worst as it affected index reporting and decided that I should check BNA.PR.A to see how much of it had been redeemed to date … to my horror, I found that the terms of the issue had been changed on 2003-08-21 and I’d missed it.

The change has been put through to the server-side data. If any clients happen have a position in this issue, the security code will have to be changed on the client-side transactions and holdings files. The old Security Code was A37700; the new code is A37702.

 The only information I’ve found on this change of terms has been in SEDAR and I can’t link to anything there according to the Terms of Use.

 As for the YTW after the change … well, let’s just say it’s not negative any more!