Interesting External Papers

FRBB: Bubbles Happen

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a discussion paper by Kristopher S. Gerardi, Christopher L. Foote, and Paul S. Willen titled Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism About the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash:

Understanding the evolution of real-time beliefs about house price appreciation is central to understanding the U.S. housing crisis. At the peak of the recent housing cycle, both borrowers and lenders appealed to optimistic house price forecasts to justify undertaking increasingly risky loans. Many observers have argued that these rosy forecasts ignored basic theoretical and empirical evidence that pointed to a massive overvaluation of housing and thus to an inevitable and severe price decline. We revisit the boom years and show that the economics profession provided little such countervailing evidence at the time. Many economists, skeptical that a bubble existed, attempted to justify the historic run-up in housing prices based on housing fundamentals. Other economists were more uncertain, pointing to some evidence of bubble-like behavior in certain regional housing markets. Even these more skeptical economists, however, refused to take a conclusive position on whether a bubble existed. The small number of economists who argued forcefully for a bubble often did so years before the housing market peak, and thus lost a fair amount of credibility, or they make arguments fundamentally at odds with the data even ex post. For example, some economists suggested that cities where new construction was limited by zoning regulations or geography were particularly “bubble-prone,” yet the data shows that the cities with the biggest gyrations in house prices were often those at the epicenter of the new construction boom. We conclude by arguing that economic theory provides little guidance as to what should be the “correct” level of asset prices —including housing prices. Thus, while optimistic forecasts held by many market participants in 2005 turned out to be inaccurate, they were not ex ante unreasonable.

I’ll admit I was undecided about whether to highlight this paper in its own post, or simply to mention it in today’s market update … until I read the following:

It is instructive to read the logic of non-economists who looked at house price data in the same period. Paolo Pellegrini and John Paulson, whose wildly successful 2006 bet against subprime mortgages is now the stuff of Wall Street legend, made the following argument, as chronicled in Zuckerman (2009). First, they noted that house prices had deviated from trend:

Those facts are indisputable, but the logic that followed would have earned the two investors a zero on an undergraduate finance exam:

Ha-ha! I hope this gets quoted extensively by Fabulous Fabio and Alan Greenspan as they defend themselves against the charges that they bear personal responsibility for the Panic of 2007.

The authors don’t spare Krugman:

Krugman’s thesis seems to hinge on the idea that scarce coastal land is valuable and bubbles can only happen when assets are in short supply, but the whole point about bubbles is that the fundamentals of supply and demand do not matter. Thus, there is no reason why land in places where it is easy to build could not experience bubbles. Ex post, as we will explore at length, the places in the United States where the housing market most resembled a bubble were Phoenix and Las Vegas. According to recent research, both locations are characterized by relatively high housing-supply elasticities; unlike certain coastal areas, the two cities have an abundance of surrounding land on which to accommodate new construction.

The authors’ purpose is clear:

Ultimately, our paper argues that the academic research available in 2006 was basically inconclusive and could not convincingly support or refute any hypothesis about the future path of asset prices. Thus, investors who believed that house prices were going to fall could find evidence to support their position, while those who wanted to believe that house prices would continue to rise could not be dissuaded either. There were reasonable arguments on both sides.

One of the bubbleistas was Baker:

In addition to the divergence between rents and prices in the U.S. housing market, Baker also called attention to changes in demographic trends that could put additional downward pressure on house prices. He noted that during the 1970s and early 1980s, housing grew from about 17 percent of consumption to more than 25 percent, in large part due to increased demand for housing from the first baby boom cohorts, who were then entering adulthood. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the housing share of consumption remained relatively constant, consistent with the modest demographic changes taking place in the United States at that time. In the future, Baker argued, as the baby boomers entered retirement, housing demand—and hence prices—would likely fall.

This argument has been taken up by some researchers at BIS, as discussed on August 4.

Baker also supplied contemporary arguments against the Greenspan-dunnit thesis:

As we will
discuss in more detail below, many economists pointed to low interest rates as justifying higher housing prices, but Baker was skeptical of this claim. Nominal interest rates were indeed low in the early 2000s, as the Federal Reserve had adopted a loose monetary policy to combat the effects of the 2001 recession. However, Baker pointed out that nominal rates could not explain the divergence of housing prices from fundamentals, as it is the real interest rate (the difference between the nominal rate and expected inflation) that should influence prices.

Another very interesting point is:

The evolving landscape of mortgage lending is also relevant to an ongoing debate in the literature about the direction of causality between reduced underwriting standards and higher house prices. Did lax lending standards shift out the demand curve for new homes and raise house prices, or did higher house prices reduce the chance of future loan losses, thereby encouraging lenders to relax their standards? Economists will debate this issue for some time. For our part, we simply point out that an in-depth study of lending standards would have been of little help to an economist trying to learn whether the early-to-mid 2000s increase in house prices was sustainable. If one economist argued that lax standards were fueling an unsustainable surge in house prices, another could have responded that reducing credit constraints generally brings asset prices closer to fundamental values, not farther away.

Another good point is:

If we have learned anything from this crisis, it is that large declines in house prices are always a possibility, so regulators and policymakers must take them into account when making decisions. A 30 percent fall in house prices over three years may be very difficult, if not impossible, to generate in any plausible econometric model, but a truly robust financial institution must be able to withstand one. The fact that so many professional investors as well as individual households ignored this possibility, even in 2006, suggests that we cannot allow investors to try to time market collapses.

All in all, most interesting and well balanced. Related posts on PrefBlog include:

As for me … I’ve always disclaimed any ability or interest in forecasting macroeconomic trends. But what I have said is … bad investments will hurt you. Concentration will kill you.

The Panic of 2007 wasn’t caused by Merrill Lynch et al. buying sub-prime paper. It was caused by the fact that they levered it up big time.

PrefLetter

August Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The August, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The August edition contains an appendix reviewing the theory of FixedReset pricing and presenting two related models that shown good explanatory power since April 2009.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the August 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the September, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close September 10 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on September 13.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

PrefLetter

August PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the August edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The August edition will contain an appendix discussing the relative pricing of FixedReset issues and the historical record of the pricing model that has been developed.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The August issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the July issue.

Market Action

August 13, 2010

Nothing happened today. BOR-RING!

It was a relatively quiet day in the Canadian preferred share market as well, where volume was below average. PerpetualDiscounts were about as flat as you can get, despite dominating the (reasonably short) performance table, which was in turn comprised entirely of losers. The Manulife PerpetualDiscounts, MFC.PR.B and MFC.PR.C had a horrible day; it appears that a number of holders wanted to sell after last week’s earnings release, but wanted to earn just one more dividend before getting out. Both issues made it onto the volume table as well.

It was left to FixedResets to provide the day’s entertainment and they managed to gain 5bp on the day, taking the median weighted average yield down to 3.35% – the second lowest on record, beaten only by March 26 … which, as many will know, marked the beginning of a severe slump in prices that lasted until the end of April.

I asked a Technical Analyst if 3.30% marked a Resistance Point, but after talking for half an hour he realized that not only was his chart upside down, but that the kids had been using it for tick tac toe. I’ll call him again next year and learn why it is now totally obvious that the market is currently about to … er … do whatever it’s going to do.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5786 % 2,054.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.5786 % 3,112.6
Floater 2.55 % 2.15 % 35,602 21.94 4 -0.5786 % 2,218.5
OpRet 4.88 % -1.50 % 100,455 0.21 9 0.0155 % 2,359.2
SplitShare 6.06 % -1.01 % 64,763 0.08 2 0.1675 % 2,288.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0155 % 2,157.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.57 % 94,556 5.60 7 0.1813 % 1,950.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.87 % 172,772 14.03 71 -0.0002 % 1,873.7
FixedReset 5.30 % 3.35 % 275,212 3.40 47 0.0490 % 2,237.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.35
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.54
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 15.05
Evaluated at bid price : 15.05
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 34,882 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 26,733 TD crossed 20,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.82
Bid-YTW : 3.29 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 25,975 Nesbitt crossed 20,400 at 19.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 19.15
Evaluated at bid price : 19.15
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 25,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 23,735 TD crossed 17,200 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 3.18 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 22,305 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-13
Maturity Price : 18.31
Evaluated at bid price : 18.31
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

August 12, 2010

Jump on the long corporate express!

Johnson & Johnson sold $1.1 billion of bonds at the lowest interest rates on record for 10-year and 30-year securities amid surging investor demand for the highest- rated corporate debt.

The drugmaker, in the first offering by a nonfinancial AAA rated company in 15 months, sold $550 million of 2.95 percent, 10-year notes and the same amount of 4.5 percent, 30-year bonds, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. That’s the lowest coupons for those maturities on record, according to Citigroup Inc. data going back to 1981.

The company’s 10-year debt yields 43 basis points more than similar-maturity Treasuries, and the 30-year bonds pay a spread of 68 basis points, Bloomberg data show. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.

Greece isn’t having much fun:

Greece’s recession deepened in the second quarter, according to official estimates released Thursday, as the country felt the painful consequences of the government’s drive to reduce its debt load with aggressive austerity cuts.

Gross domestic product declined by 1.5 per cent from the previous quarter as the government reduced spending. The unemployment rate, meanwhile, rose to 12 per cent in May from 11.9 per cent, the statistics agency said.

Manulife common took another hit today:

Worries about deteriorating economic conditions pushed the TSX financial sector down 1.56 per cent as TD Bank (TSX:TD) fell 90 cents to $70.82. Manulife Financial was down 62 cents or 4.62 per cent at $12.79 in heavy trading. Its stock has plunged 20 per cent since surprising investors with a $2.4-billion quarterly loss last week, followed by a downgrade by DBRS.

The PerpetualDiscount preferreds, MFC.PR.B and MFC.PR.C have underperformed their index sharply, but not ridiculously, since August 4, the day before the earnings announcement: -1.67% and -1.71% vs. +0.41%. However, they go ex-Dividend tomorrow and we may well see a rush for the exits.

The Canadian preferred share market was strong today on average volume, with PerpetualDiscounts up 10bp and FixedResets up 15bp. The win by the FixedResets took their yield to the sixth-lowest of all time, just a hair higher than the recent low set on August 4.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2361 % 2,066.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2361 % 3,130.7
Floater 2.53 % 2.14 % 37,065 21.97 4 -0.2361 % 2,231.4
OpRet 4.88 % 1.41 % 104,205 0.21 9 0.0986 % 2,358.8
SplitShare 6.07 % -1.70 % 66,993 0.08 2 0.8870 % 2,284.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0986 % 2,156.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.81 % 5.54 % 97,808 5.66 7 -0.1584 % 1,946.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.81 % 174,581 14.04 71 0.0992 % 1,873.7
FixedReset 5.30 % 3.39 % 278,778 3.40 47 0.1498 % 2,236.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.97
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 22.07
Evaluated at bid price : 22.21
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.79
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 50,800 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
RY.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 37,618 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 36,890 Nesbitt crossed 35,200 at 26.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 27,420 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 24.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 26,100 Desjardins crossed 10,000 at 25.26.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 24,850 Nesbitt crossed 10,500 at 21.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-12
Maturity Price : 20.98
Evaluated at bid price : 20.98
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

SBN.PR.A Warrant Prospectus Filed

S Split Corp has announced:

that it has filed a final short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of its Class A Shares. Each Class A shareholder of record on August 23, 2010 will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held.

Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price of $19.13.

The Toronto Stock Exchange has conditionally approved the listing of the Warrants under the symbol SBN.WT.A and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof. It is expected that the Warrants will commence trading on August 19, 2010 and will remain trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date of January 17, 2011.

The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Fund invests in a portfolio of common shares of The Bank of Nova Scotia.

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they announced that they were going to try again with the warrants. SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Update, 2010-10-9: The warrants have been issued:

Under the warrant offering, the Fund issued one Warrant for each Class A Share of the Fund held by holders of record on August 23, 2010. Each Warrant entitles its holder to acquire one Unit at a subscription price of $19.13 commencing on August 24, 2010 and ending on the expiry date of January 17, 2011. The Warrants trade on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol SBN.WT.A and will continue trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date.

Issue Comments

WFS.PR.A on Review-Negative by DBRS; Warrant Prospectus Filed

DBRS has announced that it:

has today placed the Pfd-4 (high) rating of the Preferred Shares issued by World Financial Split Corp. (the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications.

In February 2004, the Company raised gross proceeds of approximately $471 million by issuing 18.85 million Preferred Shares at $10 each and an equal number of Class A Shares at $15 each.

The NAV and the dividend income of the Portfolio have declined significantly over the past few years because of the high Portfolio concentration in global financial institutions. The current dividend income of the Portfolio does not fully cover the Preferred Share distribution; however, less than one year remains until the termination of the Company, mitigating the negative impact of the shortfall.

The NAV of the Company declined over the past four months, dropping from $13.35 on March 31, 2010, to $11.60 on July 31, 2010. The current downside protection available to the Preferred Shareholders is approximately 14% (as of July 31, 2010). As a result of the decreased protection available to the Preferred Shares, the rating has been placed Under Review with Negative Implications. The resolution of the Under Review status will depend on the performance of the Portfolio during August and September.

The final redemption date for both classes of shares issued is June 30, 2011.

I must say, I find the “Review-Negative” status a little surprising for a SplitShare corporation. I mean, the whole rating process is supposed to be formula driven, isn’t it? What are they reviewing? It’s not like the company has announced surprisingly poor earnings and they have to wait a month until they can meet management.

Waiting for performance for August and September to be learnt? That doesn’t make any sense to me at all. What is the percentage chance, NOW, of the issue defaulting?

But I suppose they had to say something – the warrant issue prospectus was filed today:

World Financial Split Corp. (the “Fund”) is pleased to announce that it has filed a final short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of its Class A Shares. Each Class A shareholder of record on August 23, 2010 will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held.

Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price of $11.43.

The Toronto Stock Exchange has conditionally approved the listing of the Warrants under the symbol WFS.WT.A and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof. It is expected that the Warrants will commence trading on August 19, 2010 and will remain trading until noon (Toronto time) on the expiry date of January 17, 2011.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they announced preparations for the warrant issue. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Market Action

August 11, 2010

The FOMC was gloomy yesterday; the BoE is gloomy today:

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said inflation will probably slow below the bank’s target in 2012 and growth will be weaker than previously forecast, signaling the U.K. economy may need more emergency stimulus.

Inflation will be about 1.5 percent in two years, below the 2 percent goal, the central bank said in its quarterly Inflation Report today. Inflation will undershoot the target even if the bank keeps its benchmark interest rate at the current 0.5 percent, the forecasts show. Growth may peak at a 3 percent annual pace instead of the 3.6 percent rate forecast in May.

The full inflation report uses the highly-touted fan charts that were recommended for central bank communications a few years back.


Click for big

An Assiduous Reader draws my attention to the 3Q10 Report of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee:

The bulk of the reduction in coupon issuance should continue to be in the two-year, three-year, five-year and seven-year maturities. Although this is broadly consistent with the Committee’s desire to increase the average maturity of the outstanding debt, some felt that given the meaningful progress thus far, reductions in ten-year notes and thirty-year bonds could be justified.

Finally, the Committee felt that growing TIPS from roughly $80 billion gross issuance in fiscal year 2010, to over $100 billion in fiscal year 2011, was still appropriate.

The presentation (see attached) highlights that municipal bonds outstanding rose over the last decade by $1 trillion to $2.8 trillion. Despite some of the recent headline risks and the challenging economic outlook, the member concluded the municipal market appears to be in reasonably good condition. Broadly, municipalities still have a low probability of default, historically high recoveries, low absolute cost of funds, access to a broader investor base via the Build America Bonds program, and a largely unlevered existing retail investor base. Implicit in this analysis is the Federal government’s willingness to intervene in the event the municipal market ceases to function.

…the presentation (see attached) highlights the absence of mortgage hedging needs as a stabilizing force underpinning long term yields. In addition, the member referenced the secular increase in demand for long duration assets from asset managers, insurance companies, and pension funds. Furthermore, cyclically, the member showed that investor confidence in the path of central bank policy rates tends to anchor long term yields.

The seeds of something very interesting may have been planted in Greece:

Slovakia’s parliament rejected the nation’s participation in a loan for Greece after the month-old government overturned the previous Cabinet’s policy and said poor countries shouldn’t pay for the profligacy of richer peers.

Of the 84 lawmakers present in the Bratislava-based assembly, one voted in favor while 69 were against and 14 abstained, reversing a decision by the previous Cabinet to lend Greece 816 million euros ($1.1 billion). The funds were to be part of a loan package pledged by the European Union to help Greece avoid a default. The current Slovak government of Iveta Radicova, which took office last month, is against the aid.

The vote breaks the euro region’s unity in handling the sovereign-debt crisis, though the decision won’t prevent Greece from drawing the loan.

Assiduous Readers will remember the whispers that Lehman failed in part because its peers wouldn’t give it emergency relief, which in turn was because it did not participate in the Long Term Capital Management bail-out of 1998. Now, I like to think that the full story is a little more hard-nosed and a little less school-girlish than that … but I will agree it may have had some influence.

The SEC/CFTC inquiry into the Flash Crash is continuing:

As part of the SEC and CFTC review of market events on May 6, we are pursuing two related courses of inquiry. The first is empirical and data driven. SEC staff have been reviewing raw transaction and order data, order book “snapshots,” trade summaries, information about broken trades, and information related to initiation of LRPs and self-help. The second is focused on extensive interviews with market participants — their first-hand accounts of what occurred on May 6 and their responses to those events. These efforts will culminate in an SEC-CFTC joint report that will be presented to this Committee for its consideration next month and, of course, shared with the public, as well.We are considering, as well, whether other steps are appropriate to reduce the risk of sudden disruptions and clearly erroneous trades, including deterring or prohibiting the use of “stub” quotes by market makers.

The comments have been published. BlackRock wants:

We believe those reforms should include:

  • Uniform “circuit breakers” for stocks and ETFs across all exchanges;
  • Making exchange trade error cancellation rules less arbitrary and more transparent in a manner that does not discourage liquidity providers from providing liquidity at times of market stress
  • Clearer guidelines for inter-market order routing rules
  • Replacing “stop loss” orders with “stop loss limit” orders to specify a limit price; and
  • Expanding the role of lead market makers to ensure orderly market functioning.

TD Ameritrade makes the startling revelation:

The firm has noted previously that the May 6th market event demonstrated that today’s markets contain many players who use their liquidity opportunistically – applying it when in their favor, but pulling it during times of market duress.

… and defends stop orders without any quantification:

Finally, as to the specific allegation that retail market orders and stop orders contributed to the downturn, I can tell you from TD Ameritrade’s perspective, such orders are important to our clients, and looking at our own data, we do not believe there is any factual basis to assert that these types of orders contributed to the problem. In fact, TD Ameritrade clients’ market and stop orders were within average daily volume, on a percentage basis. Prohibiting market and stop orders would be a significantly adverse, misguided, and unnecessary over-reaction to the underlying causes of the May 6th market event, which would unduly deny to retail investors the access to the markets that they enjoy today.

Knight Capital, on the other hand, highlights stop orders:

When the S&P 500 traded at 1120, stop orders were triggered and the market traded lower. When the market did not promptly bounce back, buyers became sellers and the market traded down another 5% -6%. During this period, the NYSE triggered its liquidity refreshment points (LRPs) in a number of securities. Orders were then routed away from the NYSE to other destinations where liquidity in certain stocks was thinner and prices wider.

Invesco has a different view:

As an institution, we have long understood the significant risk of using market orders particularly as the market has become more fragmented. We abandoned their use many years ago in favor of marketable limit and limit orders. In light of the events of May 6 and the continuing issues small market orders have had in the market (i.e., electing newly imposed single-stock circuit breakers on WPO, CSCO, C, APC), Invesco strongly supports the examination of the current practices surrounding the use of market orders, particularly the use of “stop loss” orders. We would recommend at the very least that exchanges or broker dealers who continue to use market orders do so using collars on the market orders they submit. A collared market order should only allow execution of the order within a certain percentage of the reference price (i.e., 3% from the last sale). This would give their clients some level of protection from the impact market orders can have in the current environment and would likely reduce or altogether eliminate the issue of small share amounts triggering circuit breakers.

Invesco also wants examination of HFT:

Additionally, regulators should act to address the increasing number of order cancellations in the securities markets. It has been theorized that as many as 95% of all orders entered by high frequency traders are subsequently cancelled. Incentives that currently exist for market participants to route orders to particular venues, such as liquidity rebates, and any related conflicts of interest that may arise due to these incentives also need to be examined.

Dow Jones has a report focussing on market-making obligations titled DJ New Obligations For Market Liquidity Providers Questioned:

Getco LLC, Virtu Financial LLC and Knight Capital Group Inc. (KCG) have proposed to the SEC a range of new rules for market makers. The rules under consideration could include a requirement for market makers to provide quotes to buy or sell a stock no more than 10% above or below the current price.

Mendelson said new market making obligations would increase costs for retail and institutional investors. “On those rare occasions when markets are severely disrupted, market-maker obligations will accomplish nothing,” he said. “Let’s not do it here. It will just add a burden for investors.”

Me, I think the whole concept of allowing special privileges to market makers in exchange for obligations of any type really needs to be examined. It is at least generally accepted as ludicrous that the obligations can be met with a stub-quote.

But to get total insanity, you need a politician and Senator Charles Schumer fills the void:

Many institutional investors and trading firms left the market that day as volatility peaked during the session, according to an SEC investigation detailed Wednesday during a joint hearing held by the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. A final report on the flash crash is due in September.

Sen. Schumer said in his letter that any trader or firm making markets in 25 or more stocks or exchange-traded funds ought to bear trading obligations, according to a draft seen by Dow Jones Newswires.

His recommendations for market makers closely align with several proposals made last month by trading firms Knight Capital Group Inc., Getco LLC and Virtu Financial LLC.

Market makers are traders who stand ready to take the other side of an incoming order. The evolution of markets has seen the practice evolve into a competitive industry dominated by computer-driven trading systems.

The SEC must update its definition of market makers to account for this shift, Sen. Schumer said. He proposed requiring such participants to quote prices between the highest bid and lowest offer for a certain period of the trading day, depending on the stock.

I don’t see anything remotely like this proposal in the Knight Capital letter on the Flash Crash, it’s in another letter entirely, Comment Letter on File No. S7-02-10, which is the Concept Release on Equity Market Structure. I wish journalists would realize that their beloved quill pen era has gone for good, and start footnoting their damn stories.

I’ve suggested Dubai on occasion as an alternative financial centre for hedge funds et al. Well, they’ll have to reform their justice system a little:

In all, about 40 percent of the 1,200 people in Dubai Central Prison have been convicted of defaulting on bank loans, Human Rights Watch said in a report in January. Even after completing their sentences, the New York-based group said, prisoners are likely to remain in jail until their debt is paid off, unlike in the U.S. or the U.K., where debtors’ prisons were abolished in the 19th century.

Over-lengthy sentences and insufficiently developed laws for prosecuting financial crime threaten to discourage investment in Dubai, said Habib al-Mulla, the former chairman of the Dubai Financial Services Authority, an industry regulator. The U.S. State Department said in a March report that while the country’s constitution guarantees an independent judiciary, the U.A.E. court system remains “subject to review by the political leadership.” Defendants can spend months without being charged and are often unfairly denied bail, according to lawyers.

The European sovereign debt crisis is bad enough for Spain, but the regions are being hit worse:

Catalonia, which accounts for a fifth of Spanish gross domestic product, has been shut out of public bond markets since March and the extra yield it pays over national government debt has almost tripled this year. Galicia, in the northwest, has asked to freeze payments of debt it owes the central government and the Madrid region postponed a bond sale last month.

Spain’s regions, which borrowed at similar rates to the central government before the global credit crisis started in 2007, are key players in Zapatero’s drive to get his budget in order and push down the country’s borrowing costs. They control around twice as much spending as the state, employ more than half of all public workers and piled on debt during the recession.

The yield on 10-year Spanish government bonds has dropped 78 basis points to 4.102 percent since June 16. The extra return investors demand to hold the debt rather than German equivalents was at 168 basis points yesterday, down from a euro-era high of 221 points two months ago.

Banks are nevertheless charging Catalonia more for loans than the building companies stung by Spain’s construction slump.

The region, which attracts more tourists than any other in Spain, paid 300 basis points more than three-month Euribor for 1 billion euros of four-year bank loans last month, a spokesman said. Fomento de Construcciones & Contratas SA, Spain’s fourth- largest builder, said on Aug. 2 it agreed to pay a 260-basis point spread to extend 1.1 billion euros of loans until 2014.

The Canadian preferred share market edged higher on good volume today, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 9bp and FixedResets up 6bp.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.82%, equivalent to 8.15% at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.4% (!) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (also called the Seniority Spread) now stands at about 275bp, a small (and perhaps meaningless) widening from the 270bp reported August 4.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1833 % 2,071.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1833 % 3,138.1
Floater 2.53 % 2.14 % 38,588 21.99 4 -0.1833 % 2,236.7
OpRet 4.88 % -1.47 % 105,764 0.22 9 -0.0857 % 2,356.5
SplitShare 6.12 % -1.47 % 67,917 0.08 2 -0.1897 % 2,264.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0857 % 2,154.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.50 % 98,183 5.66 7 0.1927 % 1,949.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.79 % 5.82 % 175,951 14.05 71 0.0868 % 1,871.9
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.41 % 281,088 3.40 47 0.0623 % 2,233.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.87
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-11
Maturity Price : 23.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 89,915 RBC crossed blocks of 23,700 and 50,000, both at 20.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.21
Evaluated at bid price : 20.21
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 49,512 Desjardins crossed 16,500 at 27.35; RBC crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.20
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 40,210 RBC crossed 29,900 at 27.12.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 37,565 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 35,725 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 20.96.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-11
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 31,150 TD crossed 21,600 at 19.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-11
Maturity Price : 19.39
Evaluated at bid price : 19.39
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

August 10, 2010

On August 6 I reported that one guy with a good track record was calling for low Fed rates for a long time. Another guy with a good track record seems to think otherwise:

Warren Buffett shortened the duration of bonds held by his Berkshire Hathaway Inc. after warning that deficit spending could force inflation higher.

Twenty-one percent of holdings including Treasuries, municipal debt, foreign-government securities and corporate bonds were due in one year or less as of June 30, Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire said in a filing Aug. 6. That compares with 18 percent on March 31, and 16 percent at the end of last year’s second quarter.

Econbrowser‘s Menzie Chinn discusses the inflation/deflation arguments in his post From Disinflation to Deflation?.

I have long advocated the consolidation of Money Market Funds into the balance sheets of their sponsoring institutions, but the industry declares (and their future employees in the regulators’ offices accept) that credit risk can be completely eliminated via box-ticking. Now Moody’s reports on the scale of support required during the crisis:

At least 36 money-market funds in the U.S. and about 26 in Europe had to be supported during the global financial crisis, according to a report from Moody’s Investors Service.

At least 20 managers pumped more than a combined $12.1 billion into their prime funds, or money funds that can invest in corporate debt, during the crisis from August 2007 till December 2009, according to the report.

Dan Hallett had a piece in the Globe today titled Some tax-friendly investing alternatives to RRSPs in which he was kind enough to mention my firm:

There are two preferred share mutual funds (from Omega Funds and Manulife/AIC), an ETF from Claymore and a pooled fund from Hymas Investment Management Inc.

Dan was even more effusive in his blog post, Tax Friendly Bond Exposure:

Hymas Investment Management’s Malachite Aggressive Preferred fund, however, deserves a special mention. While it is only available to accredited investors – i.e. it is sold by Declaration of Trust, not by Prospectus – the fund offers more transparency than any prospectus-sold mutual fund. For example, while mutual funds now refuse to show trading summaries (because they don’t have to), Hymas freely posts statements of portfolio transactions on his website.

Hymas, who previously ran the GBC Bond Fund, also boasts a track record that is nothing short of superb. With large investors having exited the preferred share market over the past 15 years, the opportunity grew for astute investors like Hymas to capitalize on this inefficient market. While we have yet to complete our formal work on Hymas and his fund, there is a lot to like. You can also peek into Hymas’ brain by checking out his blog – PrefBlog.

Thanks, Dan! Note that a lot of other clients were run at the time of GBC Bond Fund – GBA had $1.7-billion under management.

There’s a new trend in the States that uncovers a peculiar ethical question:

Harvey Collier, a mortgage broker in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, says he gets as many as 10 calls a month from people planning to default on their loans. The twist: They first want financing to buy another home.

Real estate professionals call it “buy and bail,” acquiring a new house before the buyer’s credit rating is ruined by walking away from the old one because it’s “underwater,” or worth less than the mortgage. It’s an attempt to escape payments on a home whose value may never recover while securing a new property, often at a lower price with a more affordable loan.

About 12 percent of residential-loan defaults in February were strategic, meaning homeowners decided not to make payments even though they could afford to, New York-based Morgan Stanley said in an April 29 report.

People who choose to default typically have lost $100,000 or more in property value, said Brent White, a law professor at the University of Arizona in Tucson. No data exist on strategic defaults done in tandem with buy-and-bail purchases.

Buy and bail is most often pursued by people with big enough paychecks and low enough debt to qualify for two homes, according to Mark Goldman, a broker at Cobalt Financial Corp. in San Diego.

“We’re always looking for ways to discourage the practice of buy and bail, but it still seems to be going on,” said Brad German, a Freddie Mac spokesman. “It ultimately leads to higher costs for everyone as investors and others look for ways to price in the risk.”

Even if owners have underwater loans, walking away is unethical, said Scott LeForce, president of Realty World Northern California Inc.

“A loss of value doesn’t mean you have permission to run from your obligations,” he said.

In about two-thirds of U.S. states, including Florida, lenders may pursue a borrower after foreclosure by seeking a deficiency judgment allowing a lien on new property for the amount still owed on a previous mortgage. In states such as California and Arizona, lenders may not have that option if the original home was a primary residence.

“Making it possible to pursue people who do this particular kind of default would go a long way to addressing the buy-and-bail problem,” said Jay Brinkmann, chief economist for the Mortgage Bankers Association in Washington.

OK – for the life of me, I don’t understan why buy-and-bail should be considered an ethical problem. The lender either has recourse, or he doesn’t have recourse. That’s the lender’s decision (possibly affected by state law) … why has Freddie Mac, one of the largest mortgage lenders in the world, joined the boo-hoo-hoo brigade?

Assiduous Readers will remember that one reason why I consider Brookfield’s debt to be not as scary as the consolidated balance sheets might otherwise indicate is because most of it’s non-recourse. I don’t think they’ve ever sent their lenders jingle-mail, but H&R REIT has:

[Mortgages Payable on Demand in Note 8 of the 2009 Annual Report] Relates to 10 non-recourse mortgages to the REIT for income properties in which the tenants, Boscov’s Department Stores, Circuit City and Bruno’s Supermarkets, LLC, have filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The REIT has handed over control of seven of these income properties to the lenders and therefore expects to be released from any further obligations under these non-recourse mortgages upon the transfer of title to the lenders.

Is H&R REIT unethical? Not if they’ve fulfilled their contract. So why are the buy-and-bail guys unethical? Why are big-time lenders, with their multiple billions, legions of lawyers and thousands of whip-smart MBAs pleading for sympathy and rule-changes because they are completely unable to write a contract competently? Why doesn’t Freddie Mac differentiate between recourse and non-recourse mortgages when pricing and repackaging mortgages. I just don’t get it. But then, quite a lot has happened in the past few years that I just don’t get.

The FOMC Statement was gloomy:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in June indicates that the pace of recovery in output and employment has slowed in recent months. Household spending is increasing gradually, but remains constrained by high unemployment, modest income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Business spending on equipment and software is rising; however, investment in nonresidential structures continues to be weak and employers remain reluctant to add to payrolls. Housing starts remain at a depressed level. Bank lending has continued to contract. Nonetheless, the Committee anticipates a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability, although the pace of economic recovery is likely to be more modest in the near term than had been anticipated.

To help support the economic recovery in a context of price stability, the Committee will keep constant the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities at their current level by reinvesting principal payments from agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in longer-term Treasury securities.1 The Committee will continue to roll over the Federal Reserve’s holdings of Treasury securities as they mature.

Voting against the policy was Thomas M. Hoenig, who judges that the economy is recovering modestly, as projected. Accordingly, he believed that continuing to express the expectation of exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period was no longer warranted and limits the Committee’s ability to adjust policy when needed. In addition, given economic and financial conditions, Mr. Hoenig did not believe that keeping constant the size of the Federal Reserve’s holdings of longer-term securities at their current level was required to support a return to the Committee’s policy objectives.

Due consideration of the Panic of 2007 has resulted in action that has been successful in reducing unemployment:

The FDIC board today also approved creation of two new divisions to help carry out the agency’s responsibilities under the regulatory overhaul. The Office of Complex Financial Institutions will oversee bank-holding companies with more than $100 billion in assets and non-bank firms deemed systemically important by the new Financial Stability Oversight Council.

The office will be responsible for liquidating failed bank- holding companies and non-bank firms.

The agency also established a Division of Depositor and Consumer Protection to help enforce rules that will be created by the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. The FDIC will be responsible for policing banks with less than $10 billion in assets.

There’s a rather odd US court battle over Germany’s sovereign default:

Germany must face a lawsuit over bonds defaulted under Adolf Hitler in the 1930s, a U.S. appeals court ruled, saying the nation isn’t immune from the claims and that American courts have jurisdiction to decide whether the bonds are enforceable.

World Holdings LLC, based in Tampa, Florida, claimed it owns a “significant number” of $208 million in bonds sold to U.S. purchasers following World War I and has been rebuffed when it sought repayment by the German government. The firm is seeking “hundreds of millions of dollars” in the suit, said Michel Elsner, an attorney for the investors.

Germany sold the bonds in an effort to finance rebuilding following the conclusion of the war, according to court papers. By the mid-1930s, after Hitler became chancellor, Germany had stopped making payments on the bonds in the run up to World War II, according to the ruling issued yesterday by a federal appeals court in Atlanta.

The case is World Holdings LLC v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 09-14359, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Atlanta).

It’s not quite as ludicrous as it sounds … it’s another one of those nightmarish lawsuits that seeks to maintain property rights despite interim government action, war, looting …

DBRS today confirmed thirty-eiqht split share ratings:

Each of the Issuers has invested in a portfolio of securities (the Portfolio) funded by issuing two classes of shares – dividend-yielding preferred shares or securities (the Preferred Shares) and capital shares or units (the Capital Shares). The main form of credit enhancement available to the Preferred Shares is a buffer of downside protection. Downside protection corresponds to the percentage decline in market value of the Portfolio that must be experienced before the Preferred Shares would be in a loss position. The amount of downside protection available to the Preferred Shares will fluctuate over time, based on changes in the market value of the Portfolio.

Canadian equity performance has been relatively stable in 2010 to date, following the extraordinary decline and rebound experienced during 2008 and 2009. The difference between the minimum and maximum values of the S&P/TSX Composite Index observed during 2010 is approximately 10% of the average level, compared with roughly 40% in 2009 and 60% in 2008. The increased stability in prices has contributed to today’s confirmation of the Preferred Share ratings.

You see that, everybody? DBRS says volatility has gone away forever or, if not forever, than at least through the cycle! Yay!

Volume increased to above-average levels in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 11bp and FixedResets down 3bp on the day.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2099 % 2,075.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2099 % 3,143.9
Floater 2.52 % 2.13 % 40,174 22.01 4 0.2099 % 2,240.8
OpRet 4.88 % -1.45 % 106,156 0.22 9 -0.0899 % 2,358.5
SplitShare 6.11 % -2.15 % 68,494 0.08 2 0.5724 % 2,268.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0899 % 2,156.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.82 % 5.58 % 98,667 5.60 7 0.0170 % 1,945.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.80 % 5.82 % 175,838 14.05 71 0.1074 % 1,870.3
FixedReset 5.31 % 3.44 % 281,698 3.40 47 -0.0268 % 2,232.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-10
Maturity Price : 24.21
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-10
Maturity Price : 21.25
Evaluated at bid price : 21.25
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.93
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
NA.PR.P FixedReset 77,020 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 74,320 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 28.05; anonymous crossed 31,900 at 28.00. Desjardins crossed 20,000 at 28.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 59,560 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
CM.PR.A OpRet 55,675 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-09-09
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : -5.42 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 34,725 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-08-10
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 32,075 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.74.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.74
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
New Issues

New Issue: ALA FixedReset 5.00%+266

AltaGas has announced:

that it will issue 6,000,000 Cumulative Redeemable Five-Year Fixed Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (the “Series A Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25 per Series A Preferred Share (“the Offering”) for aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million on a bought deal basis with a syndicate of underwriters, led by TD Securities Inc., RBC Capital Markets and CIBC World Markets Inc.

Holders of the Series A Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly fixed dividend for the initial period ending on but excluding September 30, 2015 (the “Initial Period”) at an annual rate of 5.00%, payable on the last day of March, June, September and December, as and when declared by the board of directors of AltaGas. The first quarterly dividend payment is payable on December 31, 2010 and shall be $0.4589 per Series A Preferred Share. The dividend rate will reset on September 30, 2015 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.66%. The Series A Preferred Shares are redeemable by AltaGas, at its option, on September 30, 2015 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter.

Holders of Series A Preferred Shares will have the right to convert all or any part of their shares into Cumulative Redeemable Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series B (the “Series B Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on September 30, 2015 and on September 30 of every fifth year thereafter. Holders of Series B Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a cumulative quarterly floating dividend at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 2.66%, as and when declared by the board of directors of AltaGas.

The Offering is expected to close on or about August 19, 2010. Net proceeds will be used to reduce outstanding indebtedness under AltaGas’ credit facilities, thereby strengthening AltaGas’ balance sheet and giving it the financial flexibility to support, among other things, construction activities related to the Forrest Kerr project.

The Series A Preferred Shares will be issued pursuant to a prospectus supplement that will be filed with securities regulatory authorities in Canada under AltaGas’ short form base shelf prospectus dated July 15, 2010. An application has been made to list the Series A Preferred Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange as of the closing date. The Offering is subject to receipt of all necessary regulatory and stock exchange approvals.

More junk! This is rated Pfd-3 by DBRS and P-3 by S&P

Update: According to DBRS:

DBRS has today assigned a rating of Pfd-3 with a Stable trend to AltaGas Ltd.’s (AltaGas or the Company) $200 million Cumulative Redeemable Five-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (Series A Preferred Shares), with a dividend rate of 5.0% per annum, payable quarterly for the initial five-year period ending September 30, 2015. The dividend rate will reset on September 30, 2015, and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 2.66%. The Series A Preferred Shares are redeemable by AltaGas on September 30, 2015, and on September 30 every five years thereafter.

The Series A Preferred Shares are being issued under the Prospectus Supplement dated August 10, 2010 to the Short Form Base Shelf Prospectus dated July 15, 2010, and are expected to settle on August 19, 2010. The Series A Preferred Shares will rank equally with any future preferred shares of the Company and the net proceeds from the offering will be used for repayment of outstanding bank indebtedness and for general corporate purposes.

Update: Tim Kiladze of the Globe writes in AltaGas quenches retail investors’ thirst for yield:

With a 5 per cent coupon, investors got more than double the five-year Canada bond yield.

And they ate it up. There was such strong demand that lead manager TD Securities upsized the offering to $200-million. (RBC Dominion Securities and CIBC World Markets were co-leads.)

The deal serves as another reminder that retail investors typically can’t participate in corporate debt issues, so to them preferred shares and stocks/units with sustainable yields look very attractive right now.

Retail can’t usually participate directly in corporate debt issues, no. But there are plenty of good ETFs out there with low MERs that can.

Preferred shares … with sustainable yields look very attractive right now. Quite right; they do. Trouble is, this isn’t one of them. It’s callable at par September 30, 2015. This is A SHORT-TERM ISSUE, unless they get into serious trouble, in which case it will be a long term issue. In either case, calling the yield “sustainable” is, shall we say, something of a stretch.