Issue Comments

BMT.PR.A to be Redeemed on Schedule

BMONT Split Corp. has announced:

The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be redeemed by the Company on August 5, 2009 (the “Redemption Date”) in accordance with the redemption provisions as detailed in the prospectus dated July 29, 2004. Pursuant to these provisions, the Preferred Shares will be redeemed at a price per share equal to the lesser of $27.45 and the net asset value per unit. The Capital Shares will be redeemed at a price for every two shares equal to the amount by which the net asset value per unit exceeds $27.45.

A further press release will be issued by the Company in connection with the redemption prices on July 31, 2009. Payment of the amounts due to holders of Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on August 5, 2009.

Given that the NAV is currently $47.30, redemption at par seems like a pretty good bet.

BMT.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in February, when it was downgraded to Pfd-4 by DBRS. At the time, the NAV was $30.77 … what a difference!

BMT.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the “Scraps” sub-index on both volume and credit concerns.

Market Action

July 15, 2009

Apparently there has been a “credit line run” on CIT:

Regulators tried to craft a rescue package late yesterday as CIT customers, prompted by reports of possible bankruptcy, drained $750 million from credit lines on Monday and Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

The U.S. may let CIT transfer assets to its bank in Utah, and the Federal Reserve would let CIT pledge some assets at its discount window while the company tries to refinance debt, the newspaper said.

This type of run was discussed in the post A Question of Liquidity: The Great Banking Run of 2008

At the company’s request, the NYSE halted trading, “pending news”. Reuters had no news, but plenty of speculation:

U.S. officials are considering giving CIT Group Inc (CIT.N) a temporary loan as part of an aid package to help the lender avoid collapse, a source familiar with regulators’ thinking said on Tuesday.

The temporary loan is one option being considered to give CIT room to strengthen its balance sheet by raising additional capital through debt or equity, said the source who requested anonymity because the plans could change.

Other options include access to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s discount window and asset transfers, the source said. The source said there was no guarantee a plan would be reached.

But just after 6pm, CIT aanounced everything had fizzled:

CIT Group Inc. (NYSE: CIT), a leading provider of financing to small businesses and middle market companies, today announced that it has been advised that there is no appreciable likelihood of additional government support being provided over the near term.

The Company’s Board of Directors and management, in consultation with its advisors, are evaluating alternatives.

And in California they’re singing Whoops! I did it again:

Moody’s Investors Service yesterday lowered California’s credit rating two steps to Baa1 from A2 and said its evaluation may be reduced further unless legislators quickly solve the cash crisis.

The BofA/Merrill investigation continues:

Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said letting Bank of America Corp. scuttle its takeover of Merrill Lynch & Co. last year was “unthinkable,” and his remarks about ousting management were “appropriate.”

Paulson “intended to deliver a strong message” to Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis in December “that it would be unthinkable for Bank of America to take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable legal basis and which would show a lack of judgment,” the former official said in remarks prepared for a congressional hearing tomorrow. The text was obtained today by Bloomberg News.

Paulson told Lewis on Dec. 21 that backing out of the deal “would show a colossal lack of judgment and would jeopardize Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and the financial system,” according to the testimony. Paulson confirmed he had told Lewis the Fed might remove management and the board of the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank if they failed to complete the takeover of New York-based Merrill Lynch.

Seems to me that Paulson is preparing to talk out of both sides of his mouth. If backing out would have showed misjudgement, why is Treasury presenting an insurance bill for $4-billion?

Bank of America Corp., the largest U.S. bank by assets, benefited from implied federal backing on about $118 billion of Merrill Lynch & Co. assets and owes the government compensation, the chairman of a House of Representatives committee studying the purchase of Merrill said.

“If you or anyone at Bank of America made a commitment, verbal or otherwise, to enter into this deal with the United States government, I urge you to honor that commitment,” Edolphus Towns, a New York Democrat, said in a letter yesterday to Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis that was obtained by Bloomberg News. “It is the right thing to do.”

Regulators say Bank of America owes at least part of a $4 billion fee it agreed to pay in January because the company benefited from U.S. backing on Merrill assets such as mortgage- backed bonds, Bloomberg News reported on July 13, citing people familiar with the matter.

The U.S. provided the bank $20 billion in capital plus the asset guarantees to keep Lewis from abandoning the takeover of Merrill Lynch.

The discussion in the US regarding the regulatory approach to the size of banks is getting more heated, but there’s nothing really new:

The FDIC will propose slapping fees on the biggest bank holding companies to the extent that they carry on activities, such as proprietary trading, outside of traditional lending. The idea goes beyond the Obama administration’s regulation-overhaul plan, which would have the Fed adjust capital and liquidity standards for the biggest firms, without any pre-set fees.

“What we have suggested is financial disincentives for size and complexity,” Bair said in a July 9 interview. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers last month that restricting size is a “legitimate” option.

PerpetualDiscounts closed today with a median bid-YTW of 6.27%, equivalent to 8.78 interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates remain at around 6.4% – well, maybe just a smidgen higher – and so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread has narrowed in a little over the week, to about 235bp; still in excess of levels seen throughout most of the Credit Crunch.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3630 % 1,159.0
FixedFloater 7.25 % 5.47 % 35,355 16.67 1 -0.6623 % 2,118.3
Floater 3.29 % 3.87 % 74,956 17.71 3 0.3630 % 1,447.9
OpRet 4.98 % -3.07 % 131,275 0.09 15 0.1701 % 2,217.9
SplitShare 6.10 % 4.21 % 97,584 4.15 4 0.1413 % 1,920.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1701 % 2,028.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4090 % 1,772.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.25 % 6.27 % 160,573 13.53 71 0.4090 % 1,632.8
FixedReset 5.56 % 4.29 % 556,091 4.25 40 -0.0271 % 2,067.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.22
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 21.91
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.58
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 10.23
Evaluated at bid price : 10.23
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.77
Evaluated at bid price : 18.77
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 15.66
Evaluated at bid price : 15.66
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.03
Evaluated at bid price : 19.03
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 188,605 Nesbitt crossed 100,000; Scotia crossed 17,900; Nesbitt bought 16,700 from Scotia; and RBC crossed 20,000; all at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 141,452 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.18
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 93,004 RBC sold 10,000 to Nesbitt and crossed 50,000; both blocks at 28.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.01
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 84,601 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 83,143 Scotia crossed blocks of 28,900 and 25,000, both at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet 76,401 RBC crossed 75,700 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-08-14
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : -3.16 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

GPA.PR.A: Also Hit by Lear Credit Event

Global Credit Pref Corp has announced:

that it received a credit event notice today from The Toronto-Dominion Bank with respect to Lear Corp. as a result of that entity failing to make the $38 million required interest payments within the 30 day grace period on its 8.5% and 8.75% senior notes.

Global Credit Pref Corp. is a mutual fund corporation that issued 10-year redeemable, retractable cumulative preferred shares. The Company has exposure, by way of an equity forward sale agreement, to a structured credit linked note issued by The Toronto-Dominion Bank and held by Global Credit Trust, the return on which is currently linked to the credit performance of 122 reference entities, subsequent to the removal of Lear Corp. (the “CLN Portfolio”).

The return on the credit linked note is linked to the number of defaults experienced over its term among the reference entities in the CLN Portfolio. The credit linked note has been structured so that it is unaffected by the first net losses on the CLN Portfolio up to 5.12% of the initial value of the CLN Portfolio (initially representing defaults by 11 reference entities in a CLN Portfolio comprised of 129 reference entities). The net loss on a reference entity that defaults is calculated as the percentage exposure in the CLN Portfolio to such reference entity reduced by a 40% fixed recovery rate. Following the credit event, the credit linked note will be able to withstand approximately 5 further credit events in the CLN Portfolio. Global Credit Pref Corp.’s capacity to return $25.00 per preferred share on the scheduled redemption date of September 30, 2015 and the payment of quarterly fixed cumulative preferential distributions of $0.3281 per preferred share (a 5.25% yield on the original subscription price of $25.00 per preferred share) will not be affected by this credit event.

These prefs are currently rated P-5(low)/Watch Negative by S&P. RPB.PR.A was not the only synthetic affected by the Lear event!

GPA.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™. The last mention on PrefBlog was with respect to its downgrade to P-5.

Market Action

July 14, 2009

More nonsense from Congress about user-pay credit ratings:

“We are not going to correct this problem if in the future they can let us down again by the user paying the ratings agency for the value of their valuation,” Mr. Kanjorski said.

While Mr. Kanjorsky did not go into specifics on how the ratings agencies might be compensated for their analysis in the future — currently, they get paid by the debt issuers, which many see as a huge conflict of interest — the lawmaker did mention that in the past, it was the user that paid for the rating.

CIT’s problems are two-fold: first, it has to deal with deteriorating credit quality of its assets – like every other lender, particularly in America – and second, it has been shut out of the bond market for well over a year. The second is usually related to the first, of course, but the descent to hell was so swift, so deep, so thorough and so extended that I think there’s other things going on. The bond market simply isn’t all that smart, y’know? I suggest technical factors like, f’rinstance, forced liquidation of CPDOs (they’ve been out of the news for a while, since 2008-9-4): CIT was a favoured ingredient of CDOs and I assume the same could be said for CPDOs – although that thought must be marked “speculative”. The potential for a near-term credit event could have widespread impact:

CIT Group Inc (CIT.N) tops the list of names in portfolios of European synthetic CDOs rated by Standard & Poor’s, which would mean widespread default losses in the nearly $600 billion market if it files for bankruptcy.

S&P said in late 2008 that 1,053 European synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) — 66 percent — included CIT, a New York-based lender to small and mid-sized businesses, in their portfolios of credit default swaps (CDS).

Meanwhile, in the underlying CDS market, net notional exposure to CIT amounted to $3.465 billion in the week ended July 3, according to data from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp (DTCC).

Given that CIT is a member of the CDX IG, which is the main U.S. investment-grade CDS index, “further developments are likely to be a focus for the market in the near term”, Deutsche Bank credit strategists wrote.

Out of the 1,000 top reference entities in the CDS market listed by the DTCC, CIT ranked 34th in net notional exposure.

Excluding sovereign CDS, it ranked 19th among corporate names after General Electric Capital Corp (GEA.N) and mostly banks including Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE), Morgan Stanley (MS.N) and Goldman Sachs (GS.N).

DBRS downgraded CIT today.

I’ve been reporting the CIT news as it comes in, but California is also dreamin’:

California had its credit rating, already the lowest of all U.S. states, cut for the second time in as many weeks over lawmakers’ failure to close a $26 billion deficit that left the most-populous U.S. state issuing IOUs to creditors.

Moody’s Investors Service said it lowered California’s credit rating two steps to Baa1 from A2 and said it could be reduced further if legislators don’t quickly address the state’s cash problem. The new grade is three levels above non-investment grade. Fitch Investors on July 6 lowered its evaluation of California’s general obligation bonds by two steps to BBB from A-, placing the debt two ranks above so-called high-yield, high- risk junk ratings.

Even with the credit rating tumbling, investors say there is little risk of default. California Controller John Chiang resorted to issuing IOUs to insure that the state would have enough cash to make payments that have the highest priority under the state constitution, including those on its bonds, if there is a prolonged battle over the budget. Chiang said the IOUs mean the state should have funds to meet those obligations through September.

All the way through September, eh? Wow.

A rip-roaring day for the preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts regaining ground vs. the somewhat-less-strong-but-still-quite-strong FixedResets, on good volume throughout.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 1,154.8
FixedFloater 7.20 % 5.43 % 35,826 16.72 1 0.0000 % 2,132.4
Floater 3.30 % 3.88 % 74,449 17.68 3 0.0000 % 1,442.7
OpRet 4.99 % -0.65 % 122,282 0.09 15 0.1651 % 2,214.2
SplitShare 6.11 % 4.04 % 93,096 4.15 4 0.2288 % 1,917.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1651 % 2,024.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4169 % 1,765.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.28 % 6.29 % 160,222 13.48 71 0.4169 % 1,626.1
FixedReset 5.56 % 4.27 % 556,679 4.25 40 0.1945 % 2,068.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 10.10
Evaluated at bid price : 10.10
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.06
Evaluated at bid price : 19.06
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 20.86
Evaluated at bid price : 20.86
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 15.51
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.74
Evaluated at bid price : 19.74
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.13
Evaluated at bid price : 19.13
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 24.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.04
Evaluated at bid price : 18.04
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 61,928 National bought 49,500 from Nesbitt at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 25.51
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 52,782 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.20, then another 22,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 1.79 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 47,616 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from National at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 43,950 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 18.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 43,231 RBC crossed 21,900 at 20.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 20.22
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 41,993 Scotia crossed 37,100 at 23.29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

BIS Tweaks Capital Rules

The Bank for International Settlements has tweaked its capital rules, announcing:

At its 8-9 July meeting, the newly expanded Basel Committee on Banking Supervision approved a final package of measures to strengthen the 1996 rules governing trading book capital and to enhance the three pillars of the Basel II framework.

Most of the modifications have to do with securitizations. The document Enhancements to the Basel II framework gives the details; the most interesting – to me! – extracts are:

During the recent market turmoil, several banks that provided LFs to ABCP programmes chose to purchase commercial paper issued by the ABCP conduit instead of having the conduit draw on its LF. The LF provider then risk weighted the ABCP based on the paper’s external rating. As a result, the LF provider benefited from the external rating on the commercial paper when assigning a risk weight to that paper, even though the rating was due in large part to the bank’s own support of the conduit in the form of the LF.

That particular loophole has been plugged!

In a nod to the political needs of the Canadian government, GMD facilities (which became one of the scapegoats for the non-bank ABCP fiasco) have been eliminated:

More specifically, paragraph 580 states that banks may apply a 0% CCF to eligible liquidity facilities that are only available in the event of a general market disruption (ie where more than one SPE across different transactions are unable to roll over maturing commercial paper, and that inability is not the result of an impairment in the SPEs’ credit quality or in the credit quality of the underlying exposures). Paragraph 638 states that an eligible liquidity facility that can only be drawn in the event of a general market disruption is assigned a 20% CCF under the SF. That is, an IRB bank is to recognise 20% of the capital charge generated under the SF for the facility.

The framework has been changed to eliminate paragraphs 580 and 638, in the SA and IRB Approach, respectively. This eliminates any favourable treatment accorded to market disruption liquidity facilities under Basel II.

I asked OSFI if they had any examples of a GMD line causing problems for a bank when the the GMD line was independent of reputational concern. With their customary aplomb, OSFI has declined to answer the question.

The section on Supervision discusses reputational risk:

Reputational risk can be defined as the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding (eg through the interbank or securitisation markets).

A bank should incorporate the exposures that could give rise to reputational risk into its assessments of whether the requirements under the securitisation framework have been met and the potential adverse impact of providing implicit support.

Reputational risk also arises when a bank sponsors activities such as money market mutual funds, in-house hedge funds and real estate investment trusts (REITs). In these cases, a bank may decide to support the value of shares/units held by investors even though is not contractually required to provide the support.

For instance, to avoid damaging its reputation, a bank may call its liabilities even though this might negatively affect its liquidity profile. This is particularly true for liabilities that are components of regulatory capital, such as hybrid/subordinated debt.

By providing implicit support, a bank signals to the market that all of the risks inherent in the securitised assets are still held by the organisation and, in effect, had not been transferred. Since the risk arising from the potential provision of implicit support is not captured ex ante under Pillar 1, it must be considered as part of the Pillar 2 process.

There are also changes to calculation of market risk for the trading book:

In October 2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) released guidelines for computing capital for incremental default risk for public comments. At its meeting in March 2008, it reviewed comments received and decided to expand the scope of the capital charge. The decision was taken in light of the recent credit market turmoil where a number of major banking organisations have experienced large losses, most of which were sustained in banks’ trading books. Most of those losses were not captured in the 99%/10-day VaR. Since the losses have not arisen from actual defaults but rather from credit migrations combined with widening of credit spreads and the loss of liquidity, applying an incremental risk charge covering default risk only would not appear adequate. For example, a number of global financial institutions commented that singling out just default risk was inconsistent with their internal practices and could be potentially burdensome.

The incremental risk charge (IRC) is intended to complement additional standards being applied to the value-at-risk modelling framework.

This is a major issue for insurers. Assiduous Readers may recall that one of the issues regarding capital adequacy of insurers is their practice of estimating bond risk without consideration of price; if the rating – or their internal analysis – indicated a 0.1% chance of default, say, that’s what was used for risk purposes, regardless of whether the bond was trading at governments +10bp or governments +500bp. To some extent this is rational; to some extent it ain’t. The question of how forcefully this idea is applied to the investment book of insurers will be a fascinating subject over the next few years.

These BIS tweaks further extend into the calculation of market risks.

Market Action

July 13, 2009

CIT has hired a bankruptcy specialist:

CIT Group Inc., the century-old lender to 950,000 businesses that has been unable to persuade the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. to guarantee its debt sales, hired bankruptcy specialist Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP as an adviser amid a plunge in its stock and bonds.

CIT has stated:

in response to recent media reports regarding its pending Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) application with the FDIC, confirmed that its application to participate in the TLGP remains outstanding. CIT continues to be in active dialogue with the government. There can be no assurance that CIT’s application will be approved by the FDIC, nor as to the timing or terms of any such determination.

and

today confirmed that it remains in active discussions with its principal regulators on a series of measures to improve the company’s near-term liquidity position.

Among the matters being discussed are the Company’s application to participate in the FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. The Company is also actively discussing liquidity solutions that do not involve access to the TLGP program, such as the near-term transfer of assets into CIT Bank through Section 23A waivers and the transfer of its Vendor Finance and Trade Finance businesses into CIT Bank; these transfers if approved would enhance CIT’s liquidity position

After the bell, it was reported that:

The U.S. government is in advanced discussions to give aid to CIT Group Inc., the Wall Street Journal reported on its Web site, without saying where it got the information.

One option would have the FDIC backing the company’s debt, according to the newspaper.

The fallout from the BofA/Merrill takeover continues to be fascinating:

Regulators contend Bank of America owes at least part of a $4 billion fee it agreed to pay in January — even without a completed legal document — because the company benefited from implied U.S. backing on about $118 billion of Merrill Lynch assets, such as mortgage-backed bonds, people familiar with the matter said. The Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank says it owes the Treasury nothing, according to the people, who declined to be identified because the negotiations are confidential.

The major subindices squeaked out another win today, amidst good volume.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0558 % 1,154.8
FixedFloater 7.20 % 5.44 % 36,966 16.71 1 -0.3121 % 2,132.4
Floater 3.30 % 3.86 % 75,038 17.74 3 -0.0558 % 1,442.7
OpRet 4.99 % -2.91 % 121,368 0.09 15 0.1391 % 2,210.5
SplitShare 6.13 % 4.54 % 92,439 4.15 4 0.1855 % 1,912.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1391 % 2,021.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0571 % 1,758.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.30 % 6.31 % 157,272 13.43 71 0.0571 % 1,619.4
FixedReset 5.57 % 4.28 % 536,622 4.28 40 0.0786 % 2,064.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 18.46
Evaluated at bid price : 18.46
Bid-YTW : 6.57 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 22.84
Evaluated at bid price : 23.07
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 16.96
Evaluated at bid price : 16.96
Bid-YTW : 6.71 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 18.02
Evaluated at bid price : 18.02
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 20.13
Evaluated at bid price : 20.13
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 24.16
Evaluated at bid price : 24.46
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 98,909 RBC crossed two blocks of 40,000 each at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 66,665 National bought 14,600 from anonymous at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.65
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 62,560 Scotia crossed 24,800 at 27.62; National bought 10,800 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset 57,245 RBC crossed 15,000 at 24.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 24.95
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.22 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 52,880 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 25.38.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-13
Maturity Price : 25.31
Evaluated at bid price : 25.36
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 46,575 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
PrefLetter

July Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The July, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The July edition contains a relatively long appendix which discusses Negative Convexity and its effect on the pricing of PerpetualDiscounts.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Interesting External Papers

Haug and Taleb on Black-Scholes

Espen Gaarder Haug & Nassim Nicholas Taleb have produced a highly entertaining – but, alas, somewhat less than informative – polemic: Why We Have Never Used the Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing Formula:

Options traders use a pricing formula which they adapt by fudging and changing the tails and skewness by varying one parameter, the standard deviation of a Gaussian. Such formula is popularly called “Black-Scholes-Merton” owing to an attributed eponymous discovery (though changing the standard deviation parameter is in contradiction with it). However we have historical evidence that 1) Black, Scholes and Merton did not invent any formula, just found an argument to make a well known (and used) formula compatible with the economics establishment, by removing the “risk” parameter through “dynamic hedging”, 2) Option traders use (and evidently have used since 1902) heuristics and tricks more compatible with the previous versions of the formula of Louis Bachelier and Edward O. Thorp (that allow a broad choice of probability distributions) and removed the risk parameter by using put-call parity. 3) Option traders did not use formulas after 1973 but continued their bottom-up heuristics. The Bachelier-Thorp approach is more robust (among other things) to the high impact rare event. The paper draws on historical trading methods and 19th and early 20th century references ignored by the finance literature. It is time to stop calling the formula by the wrong name.

The tone of the paper is evident in the first angry footnote:

For us, practitioners, theories should arise from practice.

Footnote: For us, in this discussion, a practitioner is deemed to be someone involved in repeated decisions about option hedging, not a support quant who writes pricing software or an academic who provides “consulting” advice.

The main thrust of the article is that the premise of the Black-Scholes model is incorrect:

Referring to Thorp and Kassouf (1967), Black, Scholes and Merton took the idea of delta hedging one step further, Black and Scholes (1973):

If the hedge is maintained continuously, then the approximations mentioned above become exact, and the return on the hedged position is completely independent of the change in the value of the stock. In fact, the return on the hedged position becomes certain. This was pointed out to us by Robert Merton.

This may be a brilliant mathematical idea, but option trading is not mathematical theory. It is not enough to have a theoretical idea so far removed from reality that is far from robust in practice.

The authors point out that

  • Option trading has been around for a long time
  • The only way to hedge options properly is with other options, due to pricing discontinuities
  • Put-Call Parity is the basic theoretical foundation of proper hedging

The second main point of the article is that, consistent with the idea that only options are a proper hedge against options, the job of an options trader is not to value options based on some theory; it is to make money with a market-neutral book:

In that sense, traders do not perform “valuation” with some “pricing kernel” until the expiration of the security, but, rather, produce a price of an option compatible with other instruments in the markets, with a holding time that is stochastic. They do not need topdown “science”.

This raises a critical point: option traders do not “estimate” the odds of rare events by pricing out-ofthe-money options. They just respond to supply and demand. The notion of “implied probability distribution” is merely a Dutch-book compatibility type of proposition.

They conclude:

One could easily attribute the explosion in option volume to the computer age and the ease of processing transactions, added to the long stretch of peaceful economic growth and absence of hyperinflation. From the evidence (once one removes the propaganda), the development of scholastic finance appears to be an epiphenomenon rather than a cause of option trading. Once again, lecturing birds how to fly does not allow one to take subsequent credit.

This is why we call the equation Bachelier-Thorp. We were using it all along and gave it the wrong name, after the wrong method and with attribution to the wrong persons. It does not mean that dynamic hedging is out of the question; it is just not a central part of the pricing paradigm.

I must point out that Mr. Taleb’s rose-tinted vision of the good old days – while probably quite true in most respects – do not square completely with what I have read in other sources.

If I recall correctly, Morton Schulman recounted in his book “Anybody can still be a millionaire” his adventures as partner in a small Toronto brokerage in the … late ’60’s? early ’70’s?. He and his partners were willing to write puts and became, he says, amazingly popular with his New York counterparts because there was bottomless demand for them.