Issue Comments

RY.PR.T Not Treated Like Royalty on First Day

The new Royal Bank Fixed-Reset, 6.25%+406 announced February 26 was soft on its opening day.

It traded 361,200 shares in a range of 24.70-82 before closing at 24.76-77, 10×214.

As is its wont, Royal has not announced the take-up, or lack thereof, of the greenshoe option.

Update, 2009-3-12: There are 11-million shares outstanding according to the TSX; announced size was 8-million + 3-million greenshoe; therefore the greenshoe was fully exercised.

Miscellaneous News

NAIC Notes

Therese M. Vaughan, 2009-3-5:

As has been well documented, large complex financial institutions with insurance operations – like AIG – have produced systemic risks within the economy. The insurance businesses in these holding companies have thus far been adequately protected by state insurance regulations.

Florida Senate, Interim Project Report 2002-204:

According to the NAIC, the “…RBC formula produces a regulatory minimum amount of capital that is tailored to each specific company.” [Mike Barth, “Ranking Insurers by RBC Results: Still Not Such A Smart Move,” NAIC Research Quarterly, April 1995, p. 46.] The RBC formula is not meant to be used as a tool to compare or rank insurers. The risk-based capital system is just one of many tools a regulator uses for evaluating the solvency of an insurer. Insurers are prohibited from advertising the results of these calculations, and the department is prohibited from using the information in rate making. The department is authorized to use the reports solely for monitoring the solvency of insurers and assessing the need for corrective action with respect to insurers.

The annual statement submitted to the department includes some of the results of the risk-based formula, such as the authorized control level risk-based capital and a company’s total adjusted capital. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has stated “…that public disclosure of the results of the formulas…is an appropriate means of providing consumers with valuable information about the capital adequacy of insurance companies.” [ibid]

Key results of the risk-based capital formula are included in an insurer’s annual statement, which is a public record.

NAIC Research Quarterly and Index

Mike Barth, in NAIC Research Quarterly, 1995:

The risk-based capital requirements for insurers, as embodied in the life/health and property/casualty formulas, as well as the Risk-Based Capital for Insurers Model Act, were developed by the NAIC to distinguish adequately capitalized companies from inadequately capitalized companies. The NAIC believes that public disclosure of the results of the formulas, as indicated by the Authorized Control Level RBC and a company’s Total Adjusted Capital, is an appropriate means of providing consumers with valuable information about the capital adequacy of insurance companies.

There is, however, no formula available that says how much capital in excess of the RBC minimums is “good,” how much is “better,” or how much is “best.”

Table 1 presents the most compelling reason for disallowing the practice of making RBC comparisons between adequately capitalized companies. The first five companies listed on the table are among the largest life insurance companies in terms of asset size. Their RBC results from 1993 and 1994 were taken from the Five Year History page of the 1994 annual statement filing. The second set of five companies were selected for comparison for two reasons: (a) each of these companies had a higher 1993 RBC ratio than the first five companies, and (b) each of these companies had a much worse ratio in 1994. In fact, three of the companies in the second group would trigger one of the regulatory intervention levels in 1994 and the other two would trigger the trend test. Those that have advocated using RBC ratios to rank insurers, to make loan decisions, to make underwriting decisions on whether to extend reinsurance, or to make a recommendation on selecting one insurer’s products over another’s should examine these results closely and then ask themselves if the use of RBC ratios for those purposes is really such a smart decision.

NAIC Annual Filings

Issue Comments

IGM.PR.A: S&P Affirms Rating but "Outlook Negative"

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

it revised its outlook on IGM Financial Inc. (IGM) to negative from stable. At the same time, Standard & Poor’s affirmed its ratings on IGM, including the ‘A+/A-1’ long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings.

The negative outlook is based on our view of continuing uncertainties in 2009 that could lead to lower AUM and as such, to a lower basis for recurring revenues. We could lower the ratings if additional events during 2009 result in further, significant reductions in AUM, such as ongoing weak equity market performance or increased customer redemptions. We could revise the outlook to stable if there is evidence that markets (and as such, levels of AUM) stabilize at current levels or even improve. We believe that IGM’s strong balance sheet and prudent management still provide it with strong financial flexibility and mitigate the currently reduced levels of AUM and revenues. A
negative outlook is not necessarily a precursor to a downgrade or a CreditWatch placement. A negative outlook means that we consider there to be at least a one-in-three probability of a downward movement in a long-term counterparty credit rating over the intermediate term.

IGM.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™. It is incorporated in the OperatingRetractible sub-index.

Market Action

March 6, 2009

OSFI is busily cementing its reputation as a bastion of political expediency:

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, or OSFI, Canada’s banking regulator, plans to delve into the way that pay packages are designed at a variety of levels throughout banks. The goal is to prevent excessive risk taking by bankers in search of big bonuses, a behaviour that has been fingered as a key contributor to the U.S. banking meltdown.

What a complete joke. OSFI is incapable of running the simplest of simulations – they were astonished that underprovisioning for explected losses had an effect on the Assets-to-Capital multiple calculation, despite years of testing beforehand – and now they’re going to micro-manage bonuses; well, it gets headlines, anyway, and extends the bureaucratic empire.

CEBS is running a consultation process on the topic (the public meeting should be a hoot!), but OSFI already knows everything, so can’t be bothered.

This micro-management will result in the continued growth of hedge funds and the shadow-banking sector (almost certainly outside Canada) and, while it may prevent the occasional small collapse, will end up the same way every other politically inspired feel-goodism project ends up: a lot of money for well-connected consultants, no effect on those who make hiring decisions regarding how many ex-regulators need to be hired to sit on the compensation committee, further stifling of creativity … and a much larger eventual collapse when the chickens finally come home to roost. As they will, since the regulatory capture inherent in micromanagement means that small errors will be papered over with rule changes, interpretations and exemptions until they become … large errors.

However, this will come after the next election, so who cares? Bonus control is simply a method of grandstanding.

Paul Volcker has made some remarks interpreted as nostalgia for Glass-Steagall:

“Maybe we ought to have a kind of two-tier financial system,” Volcker, who heads President Barack Obama’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board, said today at a conference at New York University’s Stern School of Business.

Commercial banks would provide customers with depository services and access to credit and would be highly regulated, while securities firms would have the freedom to take on more risk and practice trading, “relatively free of regulation,” Volcker said.

Volcker’s remarks indicated his preference for reinstating some of the divisions between commercial and investment banks that were removed by Congress’s repeal in 1999 of the Great Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act.

Volcker’s proposals, included in a January report he wrote with the Group of 30, would allow commercial banks to continue to do underwriting and provide merger advice, activities traditionally associated with investment banking, he said.

I couldn’t agree more; I have argued for some time that what we really need is a three-tier financial system, with a rock-solid banking core surrounded by a layer of investment banks and brokerages, surrounded in turn by a wild-n-wooly world of hedge-funds and shadow banks.

I would not support legislating the differences. I will support a regulatory regime that offers a choice between business models: traditional banking or traditional investment banking. The former (core) model would focus on long-term lending and impose a high capital charge for trading and investment operations; the latter model would impose capital charge penalties for long-term positions.

Bankers can’t trade. Bankers can barely manage to bank!

Another cruddy day for equities, particularly insurers:

Canadian stocks fell to a five-year low as the highest U.S. unemployment rate in a quarter century reinforced concern that the global recession will hurt profits and deplete financial companies’ capital.

Manulife, the country’s biggest insurance company, dropped 3.5 percent to C$9.65, the lowest intraday price since March 2000. The stock fell 25 percent this week.

Sun Life, Canada’s third-largest insurer, fell 2.7 percent to C$15.68 after it had its credit rating cut to A+ from AA- by S&P, which said declining stock and bond prices may reduce earnings. Great-West Lifeco Inc., the nation’s second-biggest insurer, fell 6.7 percent to C$12.12, the lowest since May 2000.

Canadian insurance stocks have fallen 46 percent this year on speculation that losses on securities will force them to sell stock or cut dividends to bolster capital. Wells Fargo, the fourth-largest U.S. bank, cut its quarterly dividend by 85 percent in a move to save $5 billion a year.

And preferreds were not immune…

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5594 % 791.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -2.5594 % 1,280.4
Floater 4.92 % 6.37 % 65,178 13.26 3 -2.5594 % 989.1
OpRet 5.29 % 5.15 % 146,952 3.92 15 0.5838 % 2,038.3
SplitShare 6.98 % 9.27 % 55,250 4.83 6 0.0625 % 1,589.8
Interest-Bearing 6.42 % 16.00 % 39,056 0.77 1 -3.2091 % 1,829.8
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6842 % 1,440.8
Perpetual-Discount 7.49 % 7.49 % 170,162 11.90 71 -0.6842 % 1,327.0
FixedReset 6.22 % 5.95 % 495,796 13.66 30 -0.2536 % 1,779.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -6.86 % Not as bad as it looks, but still pretty bad! Traded 13,891 shares in a range of 14.75-30 before the bids ran out and it closed at 14.25-80, 2×1.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.25
Evaluated at bid price : 14.25
Bid-YTW : 8.86 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -6.51 % Crunch! Traded 16,397 shares in a range of 14.00-74 before closing at 13.79-00, 2×2.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 13.79
Evaluated at bid price : 13.79
Bid-YTW : 8.74 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -5.48 % Traded 7,424 shares in a range of 6.99-30 before closing at 6.90-00, 10×26.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 6.90
Evaluated at bid price : 6.90
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -5.13 % At least this one managed to catch a bid towards the end! Traded 4,200 shares in a range of 14.73-50 before closing at 14.80-37, 11×2.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.80
Evaluated at bid price : 14.80
Bid-YTW : 8.22 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -4.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 4.88 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -4.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 13.20
Evaluated at bid price : 13.20
Bid-YTW : 8.46 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -4.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 7.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.00
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -3.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.41
Evaluated at bid price : 14.41
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -3.58 % Asset coverage of 1.0+:1 as of February 27, according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 5.93
Bid-YTW : 21.97 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -3.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 13.60
Evaluated at bid price : 13.60
Bid-YTW : 8.77 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -3.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 13.15
Evaluated at bid price : 13.15
Bid-YTW : 8.59 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -3.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 15.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.00
Bid-YTW : 7.80 %
STW.PR.A Interest-Bearing -3.21 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of Feb. 26 based on Capital Units at 2.37 and 1.98 Capital Units per Preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2009-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.35
Bid-YTW : 16.00 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -3.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 15.77
Evaluated at bid price : 15.77
Bid-YTW : 8.28 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -2.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 15.85
Evaluated at bid price : 15.85
Bid-YTW : 8.44 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.30
Evaluated at bid price : 17.30
Bid-YTW : 8.28 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -2.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 23.41
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.25
Evaluated at bid price : 19.25
Bid-YTW : 7.93 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 8.23 %
SLF.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 13.01
Evaluated at bid price : 13.01
Bid-YTW : 8.59 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.52
Evaluated at bid price : 17.52
Bid-YTW : 7.03 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount -1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 16.03
Evaluated at bid price : 16.03
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.45
Evaluated at bid price : 17.45
Bid-YTW : 7.49 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 15.60
Evaluated at bid price : 15.60
Bid-YTW : 8.33 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.54 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of February 28, according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.29
Bid-YTW : 9.27 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.13
Evaluated at bid price : 14.13
Bid-YTW : 8.01 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.25
Evaluated at bid price : 14.25
Bid-YTW : 8.10 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.72
Evaluated at bid price : 19.72
Bid-YTW : 7.22 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 8.24 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
BNS.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.70
Evaluated at bid price : 18.70
Bid-YTW : 7.14 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 4.77 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 7.47 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 15.75
Evaluated at bid price : 15.75
Bid-YTW : 7.76 %
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.15
Bid-YTW : 5.97 %
RY.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 4.59 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 18.72
Evaluated at bid price : 18.72
Bid-YTW : 7.16 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.37
Evaluated at bid price : 19.37
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 19.03
Evaluated at bid price : 19.03
Bid-YTW : 7.69 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 17.35
Evaluated at bid price : 17.35
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 21.50
Evaluated at bid price : 21.50
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 3.27 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of February 28 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 9.97 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 4.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 14.84
Evaluated at bid price : 14.84
Bid-YTW : 9.15 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 8.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.40
Bid-YTW : 10.16 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.I FixedReset 452,475 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 262,889 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 254,196 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 24.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
CM.PR.A OpRet 101,350 TD bought 22,500 from Nesbitt at 25.75 and 15,900 from CIBC at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-04-05
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : -0.33 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 66,182 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 48,933 Nesbitt crossed 39,400 at 16.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-03-06
Maturity Price : 16.75
Evaluated at bid price : 16.75
Bid-YTW : 7.65 %
There were 26 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

TD.PR.I Settles Below Par; Greenshoe Fully Exercised

The TD 6.25%+415bp Fixed-Reset announced last week has settled, with a 3-million share greenshoe exercise added to the initial announcement of 8-million shares.

The issue did not choose the best of all possible days to commence trading, but traded an eminently respectable 452,475 shares in a range of 24.72-89 before closing at 24.85-87, 64×20.

TD.PR.I is tracked by HIMIPref™. It has been added to the Fixed-Reset subIndex.

Issue Comments

CM.PR.M Closes Soft; No Greenshoe

CIBC has announced:

that it completed the offering of 8 million non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares Series 37 (the “Series 37 Shares”) priced at $25.00 per share to raise gross proceeds of $200 million.

The offering was made through a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC World Markets Inc. The Series 37 Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the ticker symbol CM.PR.M.

The Series 37 Shares will yield 6.5% per annum, payable quarterly, for an initial period ending July 31, 2014. On July 31, 2014, and on July 31 every five years thereafter, the dividend rate will reset to be equal to the then current five-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 4.33%.

As noted in the new issue announcement, the size was the 8-million shares announced above, plus a 3-million share greenshoe.

The issue cannot be labelled a complete failure, however, as it traded 262,889 shares in a range of 24.60-78 before closing at 24.62-71, 10×20.

CM.PR.M is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is included in the Fixed-Reset subindex.

Issue Comments

STW.PR.A: Normal Course Issuer Bid

STRATA Income Fund has announced:

its intention to make a normal course issuer bid for its Capital Units and Preferred Securities through the facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”). This normal course issuer bid is intended to commence on March 10, 2009 and will terminate on March 9, 2010. In accordance with the Declaration of Trust by which STRATA is governed, market purchases pursuant to its normal course issuer bid may be effected by the Fund.

The Fund had 7,637,608 Capital Units and 3,843,054 Preferred Securities issued and outstanding as at February 27, 2009. STRATA may, during the 12 month period commencing March 10, 2009 purchase on the TSX up to 763,760 Capital Units and 364,498 Preferred Securities, being 10% of the public floats of 7,637,608 Capital Units and 3,644,980 Preferred Securities, respectively, and may not, in any 30 day period, purchase more than 152,752 Capital Units and 76,861 Preferred Securities, being 2% of the respective securities issued and outstanding. STRATA will hold in treasury for resale all capital units and preferred securities purchased pursuant to the bid. As at February 27, 2009, STRATA had purchased 55,600 Capital Units and 48,900 Preferred Securities at an average price of $2.92 per Capital Unit and $9.04 per Preferred Security under its previously approved normal course issuer bid.

The quoted figures imply that there are 1.99 Capital Units per Preferred Security. The Capital Unit NAV was $2.37 on February 26, implying asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of that date.

The capital units closed at 1.49-70, 4×3 today, while the preferreds were at 9.35-74, 1×7. It would appear that the NCIB is, in fact, beneficial to unitholders of both types.

STW.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the Capital Units’ distribution was reduced.

STW.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and included in the Interest-Bearing sub-index.

Issue Comments

S&P Downgrades SunLife by One Notch on Bond Scale

Standard & Poor’s has announced that it has:

lowered its ratings on Toronto-based Sun Life Financial Inc. (TSX: SLF; Sun Life Financial) and its rated Canadian and U.S. operating companies by one notch. These operating subsidiaries now have long-term counterparty credit and financial strength ratings of ‘AA’ and include: Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada; Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.); and Sun Life Insurance & Annuity Co. of New York (collectively known as Sun Life). The long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on Sun Life Financial are ‘A+/A-1’. At the same time, we removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed Feb. 17, 2009. The outlook is negative. The ratings and outlook on Sun Life’s Hong Kong subsidiary, Sun Life Hong Kong Ltd. (A+/Stable/–) remain unchanged.

“The downgrade reflects our assessment of the deteriorating business and macroeconomic conditions that in our opinion have placed increased pressure on Sun Life Financial’s earnings, investments, and capital adequacy position,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Donald Chu. More specifically, we expect the deterioration within the global equity and credit markets will likely result in a lower level of fee generation by Sun Life Financial’s significant wealth management and asset management operations, increased hedging and borrowing cost, and added pressure on the investment portfolio in the next 12-18 months.

The negative outlook reflects our view that further deterioration could occur within the group’s investment portfolio. We could lower the ratings if our assessment of the company’s investment portfolio and its ability to absorb future losses within its existing capital cushion weakens, if improvement is not seen within the U.S. operations and/or if the global equity markets remain in a deep and prolonged decline. We could revise the outlook to stable if we believe that the group’s core after-tax operating earnings are likely to remain above C$1.75 billion on a normal run rate basis, the fixed charge ratio is likely to remain better than 8x, and asset quality issues will be less significant than its North American peers

The SunLife preferreds outstanding (SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E) were downgraded to A- on the bond scale (from A), which did not change their quality as measured on the preferred scale, where it remains at P-1(low).

All the outstanding SunLife preferreds are tracked by HIMIPref™ and included in the PerpetualDiscount sub-index.

Regulatory Capital

1Q09 Bank Capitalization Summary

Important Bank Ratios
1Q09
Value BNS BMO NA RY CM TD
Equity 16,379 14,872 3,740 20,949 8,786 14,179
RWA 239,700 192,965 57,312 273,561 122,400 211,715
Equity/RWA 6.83% 7.71% 6.53% 7.66% 7.18% 6.70%
Tier 1 Rat 9.50% 10.21% 10.00% 10.60% 9.80% 10.10%
CapRat 11.40% 12.87% 14.00% 12.50% 14.80% 13.60%
ACM 18.62X 15.78X 17.0X 17.5X 17.7X 16.9X

The deductions from Tier 1 Capital for Securitization, Substantial Investments, etc., are deducted from Shareholders’ Equity as well; in other words, the equity reported here is equal to the Net Adjusted Tier 1 Capital less preferreds and less Innovative Tier 1 Capital.

RWA is Risk-Weighted-Assets.

Equity / RWA is … well, you figure it out.

Tier 1 Rat is the Tier 1 Capital Ratio, as reported.

CapRat is the Total Capital Ratio as reported

ACM is the Assets to Capital Multiple, usually as reported, but estimated for those banks who did not make this disclosure.

HIMI Preferred Indices

PerpetualDiscount Yield Distribution

Rather an odd thing happened with the HIMIPref™ PerpetualDiscount Indices today … compare the published index data:

HIMIPref™ PerpetualDiscount Index
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Date Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
March 4 7.34 % 7.46 % 172,278 12.03 71 -0.1996 % 1,354.8
March 5 7.44 % 7.43 % 172,255 12.00 71 -1.3749 % 1,336.1

See that? It’s most peculiar … The PerpetualDiscount index got hammered today, down 1.37% which would normally be expected to be about equivalent to a 10bp uptick in yields … but the reported YTW was actually down 3bp! Today, anyway, the mean current yield did a far better job of explaining the total return of the index.

So I had a little look …

There’s nothing particularly surprising about the distribution – one would normally expect to see the top credits clustered in a top credits’ zone, with the distribution showing a positive skew as they tail off into the … er … not-quite-top credits’ zone (although, I hasten to add, all members of the index are rated Pfd-2(low) or higher by DBRS).

But it must be remembered that I report the Median-by-Weight YTW. This was done on purpose; the problem I found while experimenting with various formats was that reporting mean-by-weight caused immense volatility in the data, as outliers had a large effect on the calculated number. This is not so much a problem with the PerpetualDiscounts index now that it has 71 members, but can be a problem with smaller data sets.

Anyway, for better or worse, I report Median-by-Weight; and today the Median-by-Weight is W.PR.H with a yield of 7.43%.

Now let’s look at the gaps between each of these issues:

And – you guessed it! The gap between W.PR.H and the next higher yielding issue (GWO.PR.I, 7.53%) is 10bp, as large a gap as you get in the important range of yields. A few pennies worth of price changes, and GWO.PR.I would have been the median issue and the return of -1.37% would have been matched with a reported increase in median YTW of 7bp … not a perfect modified-duration-approved relationship; but then, it isn’t supposed to be.

I can’t, at this point, think of any way to use this insight; but the more little odd factoids one understands, the better chance there is of achieving a useful understanding.