HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMI Preferred Indices : September 1997

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1997-09-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,536.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,544.9 6 2.00 3.05% 18.0 516M 5.10%
Floater 1,446.3 6 1.83 3.48% 18.0 154M 3.80%
OpRet 1,352.1 29 1.24 3.88% 4.3 107M 6.16%
SplitShare 1,357.4 2 1.51 4.57% 5.1 87M 5.28%
Interest-Bearing 1,352.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Premium 1,226.3 4 1.00 2.04% 1.88 120M 7.96%
Perpetual-Discount 1,170.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Market Action

February 15, 2007

Hell. I have just realized that instead of copying February 14 as a template, I have instead over-written it. All that deathless prose, gone! Sorry.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.07% 4.08% 28,150 17.28 1 0.0000% 1,044.0
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 3.47% 89,478 8.17 7 +0.0339% 1,042.8
Floater 4.46% -24.20% 55,828 3.32 5 +0.0315% 1,051.3
Op. Retract 4.71% 2.28% 77,183 2.08 18 -0.0268% 1,031.0
Split-Share 5.09% 1.70% 273,487 2.64 14 -0.0213% 1,044.7
Interest Bearing 6.48% 3.47% 58,743 2.36 5 +0.2675% 1,037.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.06% 3.76% 227,505 5.06 51 +0.0312% 1,053.0
Perpetual-Discount 4.52% 4.56% 1,178,412 16.27 11 +0.0693% 1,058.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
There were no index-included issues with significant price moves today.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 84,315 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at $25.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.55% based on a bid of $25.01 and a limitMaturity.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 163,312 Scotia crossed 100,000 @ 10.70, then Desjardins bought 25,000 from RBC in two tranches at the same price. Desjardins then crossed 25,000 at $10.70. Nice to see some action in this issue … it’s a perennial favourite of mine. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.70% based on a bid of $10.70 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at $10.00. That’s an interest-equivalent of nearly 5.2% at the Ontario Equivalency … not bad for a Pfd-2 (DBRS) with a known maturity of less than five years!
GWO.PR.X OpRet 51,974 I’m not such a big fan of this one … pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.57% based on a bid of $27.55 and a call 2009-10-30 at $26.00. Given the issuer bid, it doesn’t seem likely to me that it will survive to its softMaturity 2013-9-29 to yield 3.20% (especially considering that one can buy GWL bonds maturiting in 2018 to yield about 4.75% – do the math, people!) … but it takes two to make a market!
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 50,480 Recent new issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.53% based on a bid of $24.90 and a limitMaturity.
WN.PR.E PerpetualPremium (but not for long, I suspect!) 43,178 Credit Watch Negative! Nesbitt crossed 11,500 at $24.65, CIBC bought 14,500 from Nesbitt at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.88% based on a bid of $24.61 and a limitMaturity. Weston bonds maturing in 2031 are now trading to yield about maybe 5.85% (interest) Make of that what you will.

There were nineteen other “$25 p.v. equivalent” index-included issues with over 10,000 shares traded today.

Data Changes

ENB.PR.D Redemption Completed

ENB.PR.D, an interest bearing preferred security, was redeemed today as previously noted. They had, presumably, no difficulty in finding the money for the redemption, what with their recent equity issue and my January gas bill.

This leaves the interestBearing index bereft of all operating companies; it is now populated solely by split-share corporations.

It now remains to be seen whether they will also redeem ENB.PR.A, a perpetual that is currently part of the PerpetualPremium index. This issue has been mentioned as occasionally drifting into negative YTW territory; it’s currently redeemable at $25.25, but will be redeemable at par in December.

Oops! There is actually one remaining operating company issue left in the interestBearing index … BAM.PR.T. However, it is virtually certain that BAM.PR.T will be redeemed in June, so I was only off by five months!

Miscellaneous News

David Berry Saga Continues

The story so far … David Berry was an extremely successful preferred share trader at Scotia, made all kinds of money for them and took a large chunk of it home.

Then things went sour and you can take your choice of stories:

(i) Scotia found out that he was being naughty and fired him

(ii) Scotia decided they were paying him too much and made mountains out of regulatory molehills to avoid paying severance when they fired him

Berry now has a $100-million-plus lawsuit outstanding against the bank, which has now filed a statement of defense:

The 18-page statement said “Berry engaged in serious misconduct in his trading, including violating securities rules.”

“He successfully hid his conduct from Scotia for a period of time. His misconduct breached fundamental terms of his employment with Scotia and was just cause for his termination.”

It also says that from “June, 2004, through April, 2005, RS requested that Scotia provide information to it in respect of specific trades Berry had made.”

In May, 2005, the statement said RS issued a “warning letter to Berry in respect of the specific trading it had reviewed. While RS determined at that point that there was insufficient evidence to support breaches and so no formal proceedings were commenced, RS specifically warned Berry that it was concerned about a particular instance of trading ‘as it contains elements of manipulative and deceptive trading …’ “

Mr. Berry was suspended on June 20. The statement said that on that day there were “18 trading transactions that did not comply with UMIR [uniform market integrity rules].”

RS has yet to file any allegations against Mr. Berry.

Today’s Financial Post has a summary of the differences between the parties.

I have no idea where the truth lies. It would not surprise me to learn that a trader bloated with hubris and a desire to execute his clients’ wishes to earn a fat fee would break some rules. It would also not surprise me to learn that Scotia put an army of lawyers on the paperwork and ecstatically screamed “Gotcha!” when it found an uncrossed T.

For the duration of his tenure as King of Pref Traders, Berry was blessed with huge amounts of capital. You could call Scotia at any time of the trading day and ask to know a price for any block of any size of any preferred and a price would be put on it. An extremely lousy price, way off market, to be sure, but a price at which you could trade – instantly.

Data Changes

BNA.PR.A / BNA.PR.B / BNA.PR.C : Feb '07 Dividend Dates Estimated

BAM Split Corp. has joined Manulife on this month’s lengthy list of irritations by not having declared their dividends as yet.

On the basis of recent dividends I am currently assuming that the relevant dates are 2/20, 2/22 and 3/7 but these dates should be considered tentative in the extreme.

I will confirm these dates when available from either the company or the TSX.

Data Changes

CM.PR.J : Not as Bad as Expected

The new issue from CIBC commenced trading today and on heavy volume of 807,580 shares closed at $24.87-88, 30×100.

CIBC announced that

Following the successful sale of the initially announced
10 million Series 32 Shares, the underwriters exercised an option to purchase
an additional 2 million shares.

The securityCode for this issue is A42019, replacing the preIssue code of P25005. A reorgDataEntry has been input to reflect the change.

curvePrice calculations for it and the comparables previously examined are:

Curve Prices (and other info) on CM.PR.J and comparables
Data CM.PR.J CM.PR.I CM.PR.H RY.PR.D
Price due to base-rate 23.05 23.72 23.95 23.17
Price due to short-term -0.47 -0.48 -0.50 -0.48
Price due to long-term 1.23 1.26 1.30 1.25
Price due to Liquidity 1.43 1.48 1.49 1.48
Price due to error 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02
Price due to Credit Spread (Low) -0.54 -0.55 -0.56 NA
Curve Price $24.75 $25.46 $25.72 $25.40
Quote 2/14 $24.87-88 25.50-52 25.86-98 25.01-08
Annual Dividend $1.125 $1.175 $1.20 $1.125
After-Tax YTW 3.61% 3.56% 3.42% 3.62%
Pre-Tax YTW 4.54% 4.48% 4.30% 4.56%

Note that due to recalculation of the yield curve, the values for the components of the curve price are not directly comparable to the components previously reported; but, of course, each reported calculation is internally consistent.

This issue has been added to the PerpetualDiscount index – the current composition of this index has been uploaded.

Issue Comments

Asset Coverage Ratio on the SXT.PR.A Split-Share

A perplexed reader of my article on Split-Shares has eMailed to query:

Your article on Split Shares in Canadian Moneysaver indicates that “Asset Coverage Ratio” is an important metric. Could you provide some details on how you calculate the asset coverage ratio? Is it simply the total NAV divided by the call price of the Preferred split?

to which I answer … yes. Although I prefer to state the equation as “Total assets available divided by total assets required.”

For example, let’s look at SXT.PR.A, which gets mentioned in this blog occasionally due to its negative yield-to-worst. Financial data is available to September 15, 2006 from the manager’s website and may be stated as:

Sixty-Split Balance Sheet, September 15, 2006
Assets  
 Investment portolio, at market value 87,536,712
 Distributions receivable 170,277
 Cash and short-term investments 91,207
  87,798,196
Liabilities  
 Due to related party 69,060
 Accrued liabilities 129,280
 Preferred Shares 38,396,950
  38,595,290
Capital Shareholders’ Equity  
 Share capital 30,803,768
 Retained Earnings 18,399,138
  49,202,906
Unit Value
Number of Units Outstanding 1,535,878
Unit Value $57.04
Redemption Value per Preferred Share (25.00)
Net Asset Value per two Capital Shares $32.04
A Unit consists of two Capital Shares and One Preferred Share. Preferred shares are redeemable every March 15 until 2011. All preferred shares outstanding on March 15, 2011 will be redeemed by the Company at a price per share equal to the lesser of $25.00 and the Unit Value.

So that’s the balance sheet, now to calculate the asset coverage ratio: the “Accrued Liabilities” and the “Due to a Related Party” liabilities stand in front of the preferred shareholders at liquidation time, but preferred shareholders stand in front of the Capital Unit Holders.

As it states on the balance sheet, the amount of money required to cover the obligations to Preferred Shareholders is $38,396,950. However, the amount available is the amount set aside, plus whatever is currently allocated to those behind us in line … so the amount available is $38,396,950 + $49,202,906 = $87,599,856.

With $87,599,856 available to cover an obligation of $38,396,950, the asset coverage ratio is 2.28:1, which is to say, for every dollar of obligation, there’s $2.28 in the kitty. Which leaves us preferred shareholders feeling reasonably secure that the company will be able to meet those obligations.

Another way to calculate this number is just as the reader who inspired this post suggested: the NAV per Unit (including the preferred shares) is $57.04; the preferred share obligation is $25.00; division gives 2.28.

DBRS usually expresses this ratio in terms of “Downside Protection”. They are asking essentially the same question but phrasing it as “How much of the total assets of the fund can be lost before the preferred shareholders feel pain”? Therefore, in this example, they are calculating the value:

Downside Protection = 1 – (Pref Obligation / NAVPU)
= 1 – (25 / 57.04)
=1 – 0.438
=0.562

They therefore say the “Downside Protection” is 56.2%.

Try it out! We have $57.04. We lose 56.2% of it, or $32.06. This leaves us with $24.98 (which is just a rounding error for $25.00), just enough to cover the obligation. The company can lose 56.2% on its investments and still cover the preferred share obligation.

Note, however, that “Asset Coverage Ratio” is not the only thing that must looked at! One must also consider the “Income Coverage Ratio” … but that’s dealt with briefly in the article and can be examined in more detail here at another time.

And, of course, one must always bear in mind that these calculations only examine whether the company will be able to meet its obligations. They do not consider whether we can buy the rights to those obligations at an attractive price. Yes, we’re pretty sure that the company is good for the $25.00. However, the SXT.PR.A issue is currently quoted at $25.83-12 in the marketplace and has a negative yield-to-worst.

By way of analogy, let’s say we’ve checked out a five dollar bill very thoroughly. We’ve convinced ourselves that it’s not a forgery. As far as we’ve been able to tell, with all our analysis, we’ll be able to take that $5 bill to the bank or anywhere else we like! But even with all that assurance, we’re not going to pay $5.25 for it!

Issue Comments

DBRS Removes Some Split Corps. from Review

previously noted that DBRS had placed a number of Income-Trust-Based Split-Share Corporations under review, following the Hallowe’en Massacre. They announced on February 1 that some of these reviews are now completed.

Income-Trust-Based Split-Shares Under Review Nov/06
Ticker HIMI Index Current Rating Disposition
FCI.PR.A Pfd-2 Remain under review until DBRS has final information about the merger.
FCF.PR.A Pfd-2
FCN.PR.A Pfd-2
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing Pfd-2
ASI.PR.A Pfd-2 (low) “remains Under Review with Developing Implications as the downside protection (38% currently) continues to experience erosion.”
STW.PR.A InterestBearing Pfd-2 (low) Removed from review with no change in rating.
ES.PR.B
EN.PR.A
Pfd-2 (low) Removed from review with no change in rating.
EN.PR.A
ES.PR.A
Scraps Pfd-2 (low) “remain Under Review with Developing Implications as the downside protection (39% currently) has exhibited volatility due to its exposure to the oil and gas sector.”

Update, 2007-09-05: After posting regarding the downgrade of ES.PR.B, I realized that the original table (now shown with strikethroughs) was incorrect. The correct ticker symbols have been inserted in bold

Issue Comments

BBD.PR.B / BBD.PR.D Update

It’s been three months (to the day!) since I looked at this pair, so I thought I’d update the calculations.

Strategy: Short BBD.PR.B, Long BBD.PR.D
Item 11/14 Calculation Effect Notes
Initiate Position +$1.40 +$0.90 Will depend on trading prices, obviously
Net Dividend -0.10 -0.07 Assumes Prime Constant – decline in prime will reduce loss. Total Dividends on Bs = $0.75; Ds = $0.6845
Cost of Margining -0.855 -$0.62 Need to put up 150% on the short = $30.45, can borrow 50% on the long = $9.70, have to put up $20.75, don’t get any interest on this because you’re retail scum and don’t get institutional rates, and call your opportunity cost @ 6% for 6 months = $0.. NOTE: Different brokers perform their short-margin requirements in different ways and I am not familiar with all of the methodologies! If they insist that you have to have the full $27.40 cash in the account not earning interest; or if they charge you interest on your margin-reducing long side, this calculation will not be applicable and the cost of margining will change accordingly! ENSURE YOU KNOW HOW YOUR BROKER WILL CHARGE YOU BEFORE PUTTING ON THE POSITION!
Commission -0.10 -$0.10 A nickel a side each way to put the position on – the custodian will do the conversion for free. At least, we hope so
Total Net Profit (Loss) $0.345 $0.11  

So, a lot of the potential profit from this trade has been arbitraged away already, even for those potential participants who don’t have to worry about tax effects. Mind you though, for those investors who own BBD.PR.B as a long-only investment (a course of action I don’t recommend, given the credit rating) … why not switch?

I’ve updated the graphs of the flatBidPrices and the differences thereof.

Market Action

February 13, 2007

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.07% 4.08% 30,505 17.29 1 -0.2790% 1,040.3
Fixed-Floater 4.81% 3.53% 91,487 8.17 7 -0.2171% 1,041.4
Floater 4.46% -25.92% 55,802 6.55 5 +0.0062% 1,052.2
Op. Retract 4.71% 2.44% 76,596 2.11 18 +0.0443% 1,029.7
Split-Share 5.09% 1.43% 281,421 2.65 14 -0.0596% 1,044.2
Interest Bearing 6.69% 4.32% 75,321 3.86 6 -0.0161% 1,036.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.04% 3.70% 228,848 5.10 51 -0.0565% 1,051.1
Perpetual-Discount 4.53% 4.57% 1,041,992 16.24 10 +0.1088% 1,057.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
WN.PR.C PerpetualPremium -1.0903% On credit watch negative. This happened on volume of 12,400 shares, fairly high for this issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of $25.40 and a call 2014-7-31 at $25.00
SXT.PR.A SplitShare -1.0728% Well – who knows? Maybe somebody noticed that the pre-tax bid-YTW on this issue is negative – and not by just a little bit, seeing as it’s callable 2007-3-15 at $25.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -8.12% based on a bid of $25.82 and a call 2007-4-14 (allowing for the MATURITY_NOTICE_PERIOD) at $25.00. Who knows? This issue has been discussed before and what I said then still goes!
AL.PR.E FloatingRate +1.4981% This is a strange issue, defying logic. In the first place, it has a strange dividend calculation: Greater of a & b, where b is lesser of c and d; a is 72% of index, c is 100% of index, d is Flat Rate 7.5% (#6)”. So it pays 100% of Canadian Prime. Pretty good, except it’s currently callable, and has been callable since January 1, 1993. It’s not like they’re short of money – they spent $466-million repurchasing common shares in 2006, and had net debt issuance of $179-million. According to a DBRS comment dated October 3, 2006, “Following the Pechiney acquisition in 2003, when leverage (gross debt-to-capital) reached a peak level of 50.6%, Alcan has aggressively reduced debt and attained the Company’s stated leverage target of 35% as of June 30, 2006”. So why are these prefs still alive? And why is anybody willing to take a chance and pay $27.00 for them? Sometimes this world doesn’t make any sense to me.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
WN.PR.B OpRet 247,886 Credit watch negative! RBC crossed 50,000 at $26.02, TD crossed 121,900 at $26.02, Desjardins crossed 25,000 at $26.02 and finally TD crossed 50,000 at $26.02. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.67% based on a bid of $26.00 and a softMaturity 2009-06-30. Sure, the credit watch isn’t pleasant … but the interest-equivalent is 5.14% at an equivalency factor of 1.40. Loblaws bonds (maturing 2010) are trading at about 36bp over Canadas, call it 4.46%. Seems a little disconnected to me. But sometime soon I’ll be discussing the Weston issues in comparison with what happened to poor old Bombardier … the pref market can over-react like crazy!
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 111,075 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.54% based on a bid of $24.76 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualPremium 83,925 Canaccord crossed 50,000 at $25.45 and followed up with another 16,600 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.49% based on a bid of $25.49 and a call 2016-3-1 at 4.49%.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualPremium 71,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.45% based on a bid of $25.85 and a call 2014-10-30 at $25.00.
GWO.PR.X OpRet 66,728 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.60% based on a bid of $27.52 and a call 2009-10-30 at $26.00. Even if it lasts until the softMaturity of 2013-9-29, the yield is only 3.22%. Putnam or no Putnam, GWO has paid $27.37 for these in the past year, so making it past the first call date seems a little iffy to me. If only I understood about CL.PR.B … then I’d be happier …

There were twenty-one other “$25 p.v. equivalent” index-included issues with over 10,000 shares traded today.