Issue Comments

XMF.PR.A Announces Reorg Details

M-Split Corp. has announced:

In connection with the reorganization, the Company’s investment manager, Quadravest Capital Management Inc. (“Quadravest”), will be lowering its annual management fee from 0.55% to 0.45% per annum of the net asset value of the Company. In addition, the discount to net asset value applicable to monthly redemptions of Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares and Capital Shares will be decreased from 4% to 3% and this discount will be paid to Quadravest and not retained by the Company. These measures are intended to lower ongoing expenses of the Company and improve trading prices of the Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares and Capital Shares relative to net asset value for the Company.

Shareholders are being given a special retraction right as a result of the approval of this capital reorganization, which is in addition to the regular monthly retraction at the end of February and the dissent rights which Shareholders had in respect of the special meeting under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario).

Shareholders who do not wish to remain invested in the Company under its reorganized share structure will have until 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on February 26, 2010 to provide the Company with notice through their CDS participant that they wish to have their Priority Equity Shares or Class A Shares redeemed pursuant to this special retraction right. On such a special retraction, each holder of a Priority Equity Share will receive the lesser of (i) 96% of the net asset value per Unit of the Company at the retraction date, and (ii) $7.63 per Priority Equity Share (representing the volume weighted average trading price (“VWAP”) of the Priority Equity Shares on the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) for the 20 trading days ending on February 2, 2010); while holders of Class A Shares will receive the lesser of (i) 4% of the net asset value per Unit of the Company at the retraction date, and (ii) $0.46 per Class A Share (representing the VWAP of the Class A Shares on the TSX for the 20 trading days ending on February 2, 2010). Shareholders interested in exercising such retraction right should contact the CDS Participant through which they hold the Shares for further information and instructions as to how to exercise this right. Shareholders should note that the requirements of any particular CDS Participant may vary, and that Shareholders may need to inform their CDS Participant of any intention to exercise this retraction right in advance of the February 26 deadline.

If more Class A Shares are tendered for retraction under the special retraction right than Priority Equity Shares, the outstanding Priority Equity Shares will be consolidated so that following the retraction pursuant to this special retraction right there would be an equal number of Priority Equity Shares and Class A Shares outstanding. Similarly, if more Priority Equity Shares are tendered for retraction than Class A Shares, the outstanding Class A Shares will be consolidated so that again there would be an equal number of Priority Equity Shares and Class A Shares outstanding following implementation of the special retraction. The Company may implement this consolidation by adjusting the number of Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares, 2011 Warrants and 2012 Warrants to be issued to holders of Priority Equity Shares (in the event a consolidation of Priority Equity Shares is required) or by adjusting the number of Capital Shares to be issued to holders of Class A Shares (in the event a consolidation of Capital Shares is required).

The Company has the discretion not to proceed with this capital reorganization, notwithstanding it has been approved by Shareholders. The Company expects that it will exercise its discretion in this regard only if the number of Priority Equity Shares or Class A Shares being retracted pursuant to the special retraction right is such that the number of Shareholders remaining, or the number of Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares and Capital Shares to be issued and outstanding following implementation of the capital reorganization, is insufficient to meet the listing requirements of the TSX in respect of the Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares and Capital Shares.

The NAVPU as of January 29 is 8.50 net of accrued dividends for the preferred shareholders according to the company, so the ability to retract at 7.63 is no great shakes. It is a total disgrace that the capital unitholders are being allowed to retract at over thirty cents; this displays the spinelessness of preferred shareholders who voted for this plan.

XMF.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when the reorganization was approved. XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

XCM.PR.A Announces Reorg Details

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

In order to elect one of the two investment options, Shareholders must ensure that they make their election through their CDS Participant, in accordance with such participant’s election process and timing, so that the election is received by Computershare Investor Services Inc. no later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto Time) on February 26, 2010 (the “Notice Deadline”).

Shareholder should note that the requirements of any particular CDS Participant may vary, and that Shareholders may need to inform their CDS Participant of any intention to elect in advance of the February 26 deadline.

If an Election Notice is not received from a Shareholder by the Notice Deadline, the Shareholder will be deemed to have elected to transfer to into the New Commerce Split Fund. Shareholders are advised to contact their financial advisers if they need assistance in making an investment decision in respect of this election.

Assiduous Readers will remember I recommended against the Reorg but that it passed anyway. Bloodied but unbowed, I now recommend that holders of XCM.PR.A elect to receive units in the “Original Commerce Split Fund”, since I don’t really see any financial advantage on a portfolio perspective that would justify the recapitalization of the company with preferred share-holder money without the extant capital unitholders being wiped out.

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

ALB.PR.A: Partial Call for Redemption

Allbanc Split Corp. II has announced:

that it has called 441,030 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on February 26, 2010 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 11.683% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the special annual retraction of 882,060 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on February 25, 2010 will have approximately 11.683% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $25.00 per share.

In addition, holders of a further 911,822 Capital Shares and 455,911 Preferred Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on February 26, 2010. As a result, a total of 1,793,882 Capital Shares and 896,941 Preferred Shares, or approximately 21.201% of both classes of shares currently outstanding, will be redeemed.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including February 26, 2010.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on February 26, 2010. From and after February 26, 2010 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any right in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

ALB.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was upgraded to Pfd-3(high) by DBRS. ALB.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Market Action

February 11, 2010

The Fed is plotting its exit strategy:

The Federal Reserve is in talks with money-market mutual funds on agreements to help drain as much as $1 trillion from the financial system as policy makers prepare for the first interest-rate increase since June 2006, according to a person familiar with the discussions.

The central bank is looking to the $3.2 trillion money- market mutual-fund industry because the 18 so-called primary dealers that trade directly with the Fed have a capacity limited to about $100 billion, estimates Joseph Abate, a money-market strategist at Barclays Capital in New York.

The Fed is also considering reverse repurchase agreements with mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, said the person familiar with the discussions. Freddie Mac spokeswoman Sharon McHale declined to comment. Fannie Mae spokesman Brian Faith also declined to comment.

Meanwhile, the situation in Europe is having knock-on effects:

Investment-grade debt sales are drying up and returns on high-yield bonds have turned negative for the year as investors wait to see whether Europe will bail out Greece.

Borrowers in the U.S. and Europe sold $3.94 billion of high-grade securities this week, the least this year and less than … the average $52.9 billion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Investors are avoiding credit risk as European Union leaders meet to hammer out an aid package for Greece. While relative borrowing costs in the U.S. remained steady yesterday and prices to insure against defaults fell, Huntsville, Alabama- based telephone service provider ITC Deltacom Inc. canceled a $325 million bond sale, citing “current market conditions.”

Corporate bonds have returned 1.39 percent this year, according to the Merrill index. Junk bonds lost 1.58 percent so far this month, the most in a year, the bank’s U.S. High Yield Master II Index shows.

The High Frequency Traders are taking over!:

Getco LLC, the high-frequency trading specialist founded a decade ago, agreed to become a so- called designated market maker at the New York Stock Exchange, a move that will add liquidity as the biggest U.S. equity venue seeks to halt share losses.

Getco purchased rights to handle floor trading in 350 stocks from Barclays Plc, according to a statement today from NYSE Euronext, owner of the New York Stock Exchange. The designation means Getco will be obligated to buy and sell shares at the national best bid and offer price, as well as participate in opening and closing trading sessions.

The agreement formalizes Getco’s role as a market maker with the NYSE after acting as one on electronic platforms through computer-driven strategies that produce hundreds of buy and sell orders every second.

This is a pleasant change from the usual state of affairs; normally it would be a big bank buying a private technology firm, rather than selling a chunk of their business to it. As far as I can tell from Getco’s website it’s a private company founded by two guys who, being capable of thought, were not suitable for employment at a big bank.

Off Topic! Giambrone has decided he does not wish to be laughingstock of Toronto for the next ten months, but will concentrate his efforts on solidifying his status as laughingstock of the TTC. Despite his young age, he has a distinguished record of sticking his hand up when Mayor Miller tells him to.

Another good day for the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 16bp while FixedResets squeezed out a gain of 1bp. Volume was relatively light and the market was well-behaved, with only four entries in the Performance highlights table – two of them BAM Floaters.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.02 % 3.66 % 28,664 20.22 1 -0.0533 % 1,830.3
FixedFloater 5.71 % 3.78 % 36,626 19.24 1 0.1577 % 2,769.5
Floater 2.03 % 1.76 % 38,858 23.14 4 0.7656 % 2,266.5
OpRet 4.84 % -2.50 % 104,903 0.09 13 0.0501 % 2,324.3
SplitShare 6.31 % 3.87 % 139,570 0.08 2 0.2181 % 2,128.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0501 % 2,125.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.09 % 90,251 2.00 7 0.3623 % 1,903.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.82 % 5.85 % 167,620 14.07 69 0.1596 % 1,811.3
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.54 % 314,315 3.78 42 0.0131 % 2,183.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-11
Maturity Price : 16.50
Evaluated at bid price : 16.50
Bid-YTW : 2.40 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-11
Maturity Price : 16.37
Evaluated at bid price : 16.37
Bid-YTW : 2.42 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-11
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 432,970 I hadn’t realized these things were going out of style! Nesbitt bought two blocks from RBC, of 15,400 and 31,900 shares, both at 26.40, then bought 10,000 from Desjardins at the same price. RBC crossed 18,500 at 26.40, then Nesbitt bought blocks of 10,000 and 50,000 shares from Desjardins at the same price. RBC crossed 24,000 at 26.40, then Nesbitt bought 10,000 from Desjardins at the same price. RBC crossed 24,000 and Desjardins crossed 120,000 at … the same price. Nesbitt bought 30,000 from anonymous at 26.40, then RBC bought 20,000 from Desjardins at … the same price. Finally, Nesbitt at last showed some initiative and crossed 40,000 at 26.45. Maybe a PM somewhere has decided that 3.21% to call isn’t really all that hot a yield.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 89,784 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 62,602 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 20.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-11
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 62,530 TD crossed 35,000 at 27.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.89
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 57,190 Desjardins bought 17,000 from CIBC at 27.92 and crossed the same number at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.89
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 40,720 Desjardins crossed 31,600 at 20.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-11
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

DBRS: YPG's Reorganization Harmless

Dominion Bond Rating Service has announced:

that Yellow Media’s conversion, as described, is not expected to have any impact on its current R-1 (low), BBB (high), BBB and Pfd-3 (high) credit ratings. DBRS notes that its credit ratings remain supported by: (1) a manageable business risk profile to date, with Yellow Media’s Directories segment (more than 90% of EBITDA) exhibiting stable results, while cyclical pressure remains evident in its Vertical Media segment (less than 10% of EBITDA), and (2) the improvement in its financial risk profile, which has been a direct result of debt reduction efforts afforded by its reduced distribution rate in May 2009.

Additionally, DBRS notes that since Yellow Media lowered its distribution in 2009, the Company has improved its financial risk profile by reducing leverage to end 2009 with debt-to-EBITDA of roughly 2.57 times, down from 2.91 times at the end of 2008. The Company also announced that it plans to continue deleveraging during this transitional period.

While reduced leverage helps to support Yellow Media’s financial risk profile, DBRS notes that its ratings are largely based on its business risk profile. While there are significant risks on the horizon as the Company repositions its businesses to adapt to an increasingly digital world, to date DBRS has seen no evidence that this transformation has materially changed the Company’s business risk profile – that is, it retains its leading position as the incumbent directory company across Canada, servicing more than 400,000 local small and medium-sized enterprises.

YPG’s press release is titled Yellow Pages Income Fund Provides Clarity on Path to Conversion to a Corporation

YPG has four preferred share issues outstanding: YPG.PR.A & YPG.PR.B (Operating Retractible) and YPG.PR.C & YPG.PR.D (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and all are relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit concerns.

Market Action

February 10, 2010

PrefBlog’s influence over global capital markets is proved yet again as Temasek is setting up an in-house investment firm:

Temasek Holdings Pte, Singapore’s state investment firm, is setting up a wholly owned multibillion dollar investment company with its own money, three people with knowledge of the matter said.

Seatown Holdings International will employ a multistrategy to invest in assets from stocks to bonds, targeting absolute returns, the people said, asking not to be identified because the information is private.

In-house is the only way to go for outfits that are big enough. Hire the best people, hold them accountable for results, let all layers of management concentrate on returns … you’ll do fine.

This is completely off-topic, but Toronto Distric School Board trustee Josh Matlow is in trouble again:

The showdown began last week when trustee Josh Matlow, the outspoken rogue of the TDSB, accused the board of going on a “drunken spending binge.”

The TDSB’s new sheriff, chair Bruce Davis, promptly demanded an apology and attached a deadline, Monday at 4 p.m., leaving Mr. Matlow the weekend to contemplate his fate.

Bruce Davis should take a civics course – he doesn’t appear to understand that cabinet solidarity only applies if one is in cabinet. However, I’m sure his responsibilities in ensuring seven-year olds are properly punished if they should, for instance, throw a snowball against a wall preclude any useful or intelligent use of time.

Today’s Treasury auction didn’t go all that well:

Treasuries tumbled after the U.S. sold a record-tying $25 billion of 10-year securities, the second of three note and bond auctions this week totaling $81 billion, and as investors weighed the prospects of European aid for Greece.

The yield on the current 10-year note climbed six basis points, or 0.06 percentage point, to 3.71 percent at 1:30 p.m. in New York, according to BGCantor Market Data. It increased as much as nine basis points yesterday, the most this year. The 30- year bond yield rose six basis points to 4.65 percent.

A marginally good day for Canadian preferred shares today, in constrast to all the recent marginally bad ones. PerpetualDiscounts gained 6bp and FixedResets gained 11bp, taking the yield on the latter down to 3.58%. The market was well-behaved as volume moderated, with only four performance highlights – three of them BAM issues in the Floating Rate class. The best of these, BAM.PR.K, also made it to the volume highlights.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.87%, equivalent to 8.22% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates continue to yield about 5.8%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread has now widened to about 240bp, a slight widening from the 235bp reported February 3.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.02 % 3.65 % 29,768 20.23 1 1.4054 % 1,831.3
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 33,888 19.23 1 -0.3667 % 2,765.2
Floater 2.04 % 1.76 % 39,238 23.12 4 1.2615 % 2,249.3
OpRet 4.84 % -3.56 % 105,077 0.09 13 0.0236 % 2,323.1
SplitShare 6.32 % 6.00 % 141,377 0.08 2 -0.1959 % 2,124.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0236 % 2,124.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 4.50 % 88,217 0.78 7 0.2286 % 1,896.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.87 % 168,968 14.06 69 0.0632 % 1,808.4
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.58 % 318,190 3.78 42 0.1136 % 2,183.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-03-12
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.51 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 3.65 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-10
Maturity Price : 16.33
Evaluated at bid price : 16.33
Bid-YTW : 2.43 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 2.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-10
Maturity Price : 16.17
Evaluated at bid price : 16.17
Bid-YTW : 2.45 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 127,605 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.00; TD crossed 35,000 at the same price; then Nesbitt bought 11,000 from National at 27.94.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.94
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 102,730 TD crossed 100,000 at 21.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-10
Maturity Price : 21.69
Evaluated at bid price : 21.69
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 81,060 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 20,000, both at 15.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-10
Maturity Price : 16.17
Evaluated at bid price : 16.17
Bid-YTW : 2.45 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 79,133 RBC crossed 59,900 at 27.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.93
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
GWO.PR.E OpRet 77,842 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 25.67.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : -0.23 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 72,883 RBC crossed 60,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.80
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
There were 28 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Miscellaneous News

DBRS: Pipeline/Utility Regulatory Changes No Big Deal

Dominion Bond Rating Service has released a study titled Recent Regulatory Developments for Canadian Pipeline and Utility Companies:

“None of the decisions rendered in Q4 2009 are viewed by themselves as materially changing any one entity’s financial risk profile,” concludes [DBRS Managing Director] Mr. [Michael] Caranci. “Rather, the improvements are viewed as supportive of current ratings and would improve flexibility within the rating category.”

Market Action

February 9, 2010

Lucas van Praag, World’s Greatest Corporate Spokesman, writes a rebuttal to the New York Times’ assertions in the Huffington Post. The most intruiging dispute is:

NYT assertion: “In addition, according to two people with knowledge of the positions a portion of the $11 billion in taxpayer money that went to Societe Generale, a French bank that traded with A.I.G, was subsequently transferred to Goldman under a deal the two banks had struck.”
The facts: The assertion is false and misleading. Goldman Sachs provided financing to many counterparties, but in that role we would not have known whether a counterparty had obtained credit default protection, let alone from whom or in what amount.

I have heard of things like this taking place. For instance, say Goldman wanted to do a deal with AIG but could not do so directly because of their risk management procedures. What they would do is call up their good friends at another bank – let’s call it the Clearly Idiotic Bunch of Clowns, or “Clowns” for short – and tell them the story. Goldman would do its deal with the Clowns and the Clowns would then lay off their exposure to AIG. The Clowns would take a spread of 15-25 bp on the transaction, record their profit, pad their bonus, shake hands and move on.

What the clowns didn’t consider important when doing the deal, however, was the fact that their deal with Goldman was collaterallized but their deal with AIG wasn’t. So as the value of the underlying instruments declined, they were getting margin calls from Goldman without being able to offset them with collateral from AIG … and, of course, as AIG itself went south, their exposure to AIG started looking more and more like a loss.

Fortunately for the Clowns, the Fed Fairy waved its magic wand and their contract with AIG was honoured. They honoured their contract with Goldman – but they would have done so anyway. The Fed Fairy’s action simply meant they could do so without taking the loss themselves.

Goldman did nothing wrong or even underhanded in this story, which is probably the explanation of the SocGen story that van Praag discusses. SocGen, of course, is renowned for it’s meticulous risk management procedures, as discussed by Jerome Kerviel.

Shed no tears for the Clowns, however! Nobody ever gets fired, or anything Dickensian like that. Only evil banks, such as Goldman, would ever dream of firing somebody for incompetence. They’ll get some extra coaching on risk management, between the “Respect in the Workplace” seminar and the workshop on throwing cream pies, and live happily ever after.

John Varley of Barclay’s testified to the UK’s Treasury Select Committee today. One of his startling revelations was that nice things cost money:

Barack Obama’s plans to stop banks engaging in risky trading activities will not stop another banking crisis, John Varley, chief executive of Barclays, said today.

Speaking before the Treasury select committee, Varley also tried to calm concerns that the crack down on proprietary trading, known as the Volcker rule, would knock Barclays’ profits.

“This initiative [Volcker] on its own will not lead to a safer system,” Varley said. “It is inconsequential. It is completely irrelevant [to Barclays].”

As he made a staunch defence of big banks like Barclays not being broken up by regulators, Varley warned MPs on the committee that the implication of demands that banks hold more capital and more liquid assets such as government bonds was that they would increase interest rates charged to customers.

“The cost of credit is going in one direction only – it’s going higher,” said Varley.

Bombardier is considering a new medium term note, but the terms are not yet final:

DBRS has today assigned a BB rating, with a Stable trend, to the proposed issuance of up to $1 billion in Senior Unsecured Notes (Notes) by Bombardier Inc. (BBD or the Company). The Notes are expected to be due before 2020. Proceeds from the issuance are likely to be used largely toward debt repayment, with no material change in the Company’s financial profile. Bombardier announced today that it has commenced a cash tender offer to purchase up to $550 million aggregate principal amount of its 6.75% Notes due 2012, 6.30% Notes due 2014 and Floating Rate Senior Notes due 2013. DBRS notes that the Company has the option to increase the tender offer to $1.25 billion.

Notes:
All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted

The tender offer was announced yesterday. Regulators insist that this be kept secret from Italians so remember: if you’re Italian, you didn’t learn about the tender from me, OK?

Trading volumes picked up substantially today, but PerpetualDiscounts continued their slow descent, losing 8bp, while FixedResets were able to pick up 3bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.06 % 3.72 % 28,274 20.15 1 -0.2158 % 1,805.9
FixedFloater 5.70 % 3.77 % 34,177 19.26 1 0.4737 % 2,775.3
Floater 2.07 % 1.77 % 39,542 23.11 4 0.6481 % 2,221.3
OpRet 4.84 % -3.71 % 103,573 0.09 13 0.0472 % 2,322.6
SplitShare 6.31 % 1.53 % 141,644 0.08 2 -0.0870 % 2,128.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0472 % 2,123.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.58 % 86,005 2.00 7 0.0510 % 1,892.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.84 % 5.87 % 170,829 14.05 69 -0.0750 % 1,807.2
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.61 % 321,937 3.79 42 0.0341 % 2,180.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -2.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 20.81
Evaluated at bid price : 20.81
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.84
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.27
Evaluated at bid price : 21.27
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.06
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 1.72 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.56
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.67
Evaluated at bid price : 22.91
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 50,915 RBC crossed 49,900 at 28.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.27
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 49,452 National crossed 30,000 at 27.95. A swap against TD.PR.I?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.92
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 44,497 RBC crossed 21,500 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 43,747 National crossed 30,000 at 27.85. Did somebody swap against TD.PR.G?
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.85
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet 35,517 Desjardins crossed 35,000 at 26.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : -29.19 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 34,150 RBC crossed 26,300 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Administration

Orthography

I am sometimes taken to task for my spelling of the word “retractible”. Today, a newly Assiduous Reader writes in and says:

I note that you use the term “Retractible” in your work. I believe the correct spelling is “Retractable”. See http://en.wiktionary.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ASearch&search=retractible&go=Go

Well, I don’t think it’s as cut and dried as all that, and even if it’s not I won’t get too fussed. The great strength of English is that not only will we steal words from anybody, running amok like thugs, but there are so many English speakers nowadays that the very concept of the Queen’s English is obsolete (The Queen’s English? Anybody knows that!).

Indian English, for example, has something of a reputation for being “cute” (among other English speakers). I can’t remember any particular examples off-hand, but I’ll update this post if I do. There are similar views whenever languages diverge slightly – Swedes think Norwegian is cute. On the other hand, Frenchmen think Quebecois is hillbilly.

And, of course, language is always changing … I once totally impressed a linguistics grad by being familiar with the Great Vowel Shift … not as familiar as she was, of course, but let’s just say … it was a great date!

Anyway, after due consideration, I have decided that for now, my spelling of retractible is non-retractible. What’s more, it’s not just me being stubborn – I can back it up!

According to Random House:

Origin:
1535–45; < L retractāre to reconsider, withdraw, equiv. to re- re- + tractāre to drag, pull, take in hand (freq. of trahere to pull) Related forms: re⋅tract⋅a⋅ble, re⋅tract⋅i⋅ble, adjective re⋅tract⋅a⋅bil⋅i⋅ty, re⋅tract⋅i⋅bil⋅i⋅ty, noun re⋅trac⋅ta⋅tion

Pay attention to the derivation, it’s important!

According to the American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language

Latin retractāre, to revoke, frequentative of retrahere, to draw back : re-, re- + trahere, to draw. V., tr., senses 2 and 3, and v., intr., sense 2, Middle English retracten, from Old French retracter, from Latin retractus, past participle of retrahere.]
re·tract’a·bil’i·ty, re·tract’i·bil’i·ty n., re·tract’a·ble, re·tract’i·ble adj., re’trac·ta’tion

“Retractation” sounds like a good word! I think I’ll start using it!

Now, remember the derivation? From Latin? According to The English Club (I have no idea whether this should be considered an Authoritative Source or not, but I’m not sure if ANYBODY is an Authoritative Source):

-ible or -able
Many words end in -ible and -able. Sometimes it is difficult to remember which spelling to use.

The -ible ending is for words of Latin origin. There are about 180 words ending in -ible. No new words are being created with -ible endings.

They don’t list “retractible” amongst their examples, but the key part is the “Latin Origin” – and “retract” is from Latin.

On the other hand, there’s a bit on the Ohio Literary Resource Center website (note that I have spelt the word “Centre” incorrectly, in accordance with their spelling) stating:

Adding the letters able or ible to a word or word part makes it an adjective. An adjective is used to describe a noun. In the sentence Macy had an adorable cat, able is added to adore in order to describe what kind of cat Macy had. Below is one basic rule for adding the able/ible endings. Study the rule and then complete the practice exercise.

Rule : add able to roots that can stand alone and ible to roots that cannot stand alone
return + able = returnable terr + ible = terrible

So take your choice! I have!

Update: I remembered my favourite example of Indian English! It was an ad for some service or other that claimed that having the company provide this service would reduce your botheration. Perfectly understandable, but I was taken aback by seeing the word in a formal ad. I once told a Russian girl I had been taken aback by something, which she was surprised at because some Americans she knew had told her quite emphatically that nobody was “taken aback” any more.

Market Action

February 8, 2010

Alessandro Beber and Marco Pagano have summarized their recent paper on short-selling bans in a VoxEU article Short-selling bans in the crisis: A misguided policy:

The evidence suggests that the knee-jerk reaction of most stock exchange regulators around the globe to the financial crisis – imposing bans or regulatory constraints on short-selling – was at best neutral in its effects on stock prices. The impact on market liquidity was clearly detrimental, especially for small-cap and high-risk stocks. Moreover, it slowed down price discovery.

Perhaps the main social payoff of this worldwide policy experiment has been that of generating a large amount of evidence about the effects of short-selling bans. The conclusion suggested by this evidence is best summarised by the words of the former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on 31 December 2008: “Knowing what we know now, [we] would not do it again. The costs appear to outweigh the benefits”. We hope that this lesson will be remembered when security markets face the next crisis.

Also on VoxEU, Hans Gersbach makes an interesting proposal in Double targeting for Central Banks with two instruments: Interest rates and aggregate bank equity:

The central bank would have two instruments at its disposal:

(a) the short-term interest rate and

(b) the aggregate equity ratio of the banking sector defined as the ratio of total end-borrower lending (credit for non-financial firms, households, and governments) plus other non-bank assets to total equity in the banking sector. The aggregate equity ratio is the measure of the capital cushion of the banking sector.

As a consequence, there are two policy rules for the central bank: an interest rate rule and an aggregate equity ratio rule. The former is a traditional interest rate rule (see for example Gali (2008, Chapter 3)) that may include an additional variable capturing the current state of money and credit, as discussed below. The latter relates the required equity ratio of the banking system in the next period to the current aggregate equity ratio and to the state of money and credit.

The current proposal aims at separating the responsibilities and instruments regarding capital requirements and bank supervision. The proposal places a substantial burden on the shoulders of central banks with regard to inflation and financial stability. Together with current events, the function of central banks as a lender of last resort indicates that this burden cannot be avoided. Accordingly, it makes good sense to equip the central bank with two instruments (short-term interest rates and aggregate equity ratios of the banking system) to help them bear this burden, while leaving detailed bank regulation and supervision activities to separate authorities.

In other words, counter-cyclical capital requirements would be set by empirical judgement, rather than with any of the various formula-based currently being discussed.

Citigroup is developing a new derivative:

the CLX is constructed as a sum of the Sharpe ratio – deviations from the mean divided by volatility – of various market factors, such as equity volatilities, Treasury rates, swap spreads, corporate bond swaption-implied volatilities, and structured credit spreads. Citi will make the CLX tradable by using fixed historical values for the mean and volatility parameters, eliminating the need for costly recomputation from lengthy time series.

“The great thing about the index is that it hedges your funding costs while being very simple to trade. I believe it will reduce the systemic risk in the industry, akin to how the advent of swaps means people don’t worry about interest-rate exposures any more – they just pay a fee to hedge it,” [Terry Benzschawel, a managing director of quantitative credit trading strategy at Citi in New York and head of the team researching the product] says.

Chris Rogers, chair of statistical science at Cambridge University, said the only participants able to sell CLX-based products would probably be those who are too big to fail.

I have to wonder about the statement that funding costs can be hedged by the index … the only sure way of doing that is by borrowing longer in the first place and in a crisis funding costs are going to be highly company specific. And I must admit that I am deeply suspicious of an index based partly on “structured credit spreads” – not just idiosyncratic by instrument but also by whoever’s providing the quote and how much they want to quote firm.

Another day of relatively light trading; PerpetualDiscounts lost 4bp while FixedResets gained 3bp in a reasonably well-behaved market.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.05 % 3.71 % 28,541 20.16 1 1.5890 % 1,809.8
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 34,429 19.23 1 0.0000 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.08 % 1.77 % 40,065 23.11 4 0.3451 % 2,207.0
OpRet 4.84 % -2.94 % 106,236 0.09 13 0.2248 % 2,321.5
SplitShare 6.31 % 2.23 % 147,264 0.08 2 0.3711 % 2,130.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2248 % 2,122.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.54 % 81,622 2.01 7 -0.1245 % 1,891.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.86 % 170,982 14.08 69 -0.0377 % 1,808.6
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.61 % 316,029 3.79 42 0.0306 % 2,180.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 22.13
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.54
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 19.91
Evaluated at bid price : 19.91
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 264,550 Nesbitt crossed 250,000 at 24.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 57,110 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 42,072 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 24.45
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 31,300 RBC crossed 30,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-03-10
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.18
Bid-YTW : -2.94 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 30,462 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.92
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 27,759 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 20.62
Evaluated at bid price : 20.62
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.