Archive for March, 2011

March 8, 2011

Wednesday, March 9th, 2011

Alarms are sounding about a possible Chinese bank crisis:

China faces a 60 percent risk of a banking crisis by mid-2013 in the aftermath of record lending and surging property prices, according to a Fitch Ratings gauge.

The assessment is from a macro-prudential monitor used by the ratings company, Richard Fox, a London-based senior director, said in a phone interview on March 4.

The indicator signaled crises in Iceland and Ireland and has been tested back to the 1980s, Fox said.

The indicator’s failures have included not sounding an alarm about the banking system in Spain, he added.

Banking systems in emerging markets are vulnerable to systemic stress when credit growth exceeds 15 percent annually over two years with real property prices rising more than 5 percent, according to Fitch. Credit growth in China averaged 18.6 percent annually over 2008 and 2009 as house prices jumped, according to the ratings company.

The fallout from China’s lending spree may be bad loans totaling $400 billion, according to Hong Kong-based advisory firm Asianomics Ltd.

Gloominess on Europe:

Some countries in the euro region may have their credit ratings cut further while a Greece debt default is a “possibility,” said Moritz Kraemer, managing director of European sovereign ratings at Standard & Poor’s.

Asked if the worst was over for the region’s sovereign credit-rating outlook, Kraemer said: “I wish I could say yes, but the answer is no.”

“We still have a number of countries with a negative outlook or CreditWatch negative, indicating their credit ratings may be going down further,” Kraemer said in an interview in London. “Trigger points for that could be slippage in fiscal consolidation and structural reforms, but also decisions that will be taken at the European level later this month.”

S&P said on March 1 it kept Portugal’s A-long-term, A2 short-term and Greece’s BB+ long-term ratings on CreditWatch with a negative outlook. It cited Portugal’s “high external financing need and limited funding sources.” Moody’s Investors Service downgraded Greece’s government bond ratings yesterday to B1 from Ba1 , and assigned a negative outlook to the rating.

And more gloom on US mortgages:

Bank of America Corp. (BAC), the biggest U.S. lender by assets, is segregating almost half its 13.9 million mortgages into a “bad” bank comprised of its riskiest and worst-performing “legacy” loans, said Terry Laughlin, who is running the new unit.

The legacy portfolio will hold 6.7 million of loans with outstanding principal balance of about $1 trillion, according to a presentation to investors today. The split leaves home loan President Barbara Desoer with about half her previous portfolio, as well as new lending going forward.

Laughlin’s portfolio will include loans that are currently 60 or more days delinquent as well as riskier types of loans the bank no longer originates, such as subprime, Alt-A, interest- only and option adjustable-rate mortgages, he said. He said the portfolios will be completely split by March 31 and that his will be liquidated over time. Of the 13.9 million loans Bank of America services, about 3.5 million are held by the company on its balance sheet. The rest are owned by other investors.

There’s a rather odd perspective on the Charlie Sheen spectacle:

Second, he’s the talent. A hedge fund wouldn’t fire the star trader if he was a drug user or an alcoholic. It would have to get rid of half the staff if it did.

Which is why hedge funds blow up with such amazing regularity. I think it’s just sad: we have a guy who has achieved enormous success and can’t handle it. After pondering whether he was lucky or smart, he’s not just chosen “smart”, but gone beyond, into “completely irreplacable and personally indestructible.” It happens all the time, not just in Hollywood and Wall Street, but everywhere, sometimes with a definitions of “enormouse success” that most of us would consider “a good start”, causing an immense amount of pain and waste of talent.

If any employee of mine were ever to be found doing coke, he’d be out on his ass instantly, lawsuits and employer accomodation of addictions be damned. It’s cheaper in the end, as the Bishop said to the choir-boy.

Here’s some sense:

A top jurist has condemned plea bargaining as a form of coercion that tempts an intolerable number of innocent people into pleading guilty to avoid a harsh sentence.

Mr. Justice Marc Rosenberg of the Ontario Court of Appeal urged a thorough review of plea bargaining – a system that has become so entrenched in the past three decades that 90 per cent of criminal cases result in a guilty plea.

We can get rid of negotiated settlements in the securities industry while we’re at it.

Hats off to the Proceeds of Crime Act! Another way to build up slush funds like Brampton’s:

The Peel Police Services Board has bought tens of thousands of dollars worth of tickets to private mayoral galas in Brampton and Mississauga, using “proceeds of crime” that in Ontario typically go to victim and crime prevention programs.

The tickets were purchased over the years while Brampton Mayor Susan Fennell and a fundraising organizer of Mississauga Mayor Hazel McCallion sat on the board — and with the approval of Peel Region chair Emil Kolb, who also heads the police board.

Minutes show, for example, that the board approved buying a $4,000 table at Fennell’s gala on Feb. 20 last year, on Fennell’s invitation. A month before the gala took place, then-board member Jim Murray put forward a motion to buy a second table. It was approved.

[Peel Region chair Emil] Kolb, who has chaired the police board since 1996, acknowledged that the board routinely approves such purchases, but points out that it’s not tax-generated dollars being spent.

“It’s funds that come from crime funds. Not one red cent is taxpayer dollars.”

Kolb should be fired – not just for reckless misuse of funds, but for general stupidity. Once it’s in the coffers, pal, it’s taxpayer’s money. Every goddam penny, regardless of whether it’s taxes, fees, fines, gifts or proceeds of crime. It’s not yours to do political favours for your buddies. Asshole.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 10bp, FixedResets flat and DeemedRetractibles gaining 16bp. Volatility was subdued with only one entry in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was heavy.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1669 % 2,395.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1669 % 3,603.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.26 % 45,011 21.56 4 0.1669 % 2,586.6
OpRet 4.88 % 3.58 % 57,856 1.01 9 -0.0945 % 2,389.8
SplitShare 5.09 % 3.01 % 211,851 1.03 5 0.2862 % 2,484.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0945 % 2,185.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.55 % 128,593 6.16 10 0.0318 % 2,032.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.53 % 5.65 % 126,574 14.34 14 -0.1003 % 2,112.6
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.52 % 189,320 2.98 54 -0.0049 % 2,280.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.23 % 5.27 % 363,399 8.27 53 0.1565 % 2,078.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 7.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 125,321 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 23.20; Nesbitt crossed 18,200 at 23.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 66,330 RBC crossed 49,900 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 65,850 Desjardins crossed 36,000 at 27.42; TD crossed 23,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 53,825 TD crossed 25,000 at 26.25; then anouther 25,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 53,676 TD crossed 49,400 at 25.89.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 45,701 TD crossed 15,800 at 27.37.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 24.40 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3368

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.40 – 25.74
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2526

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 5.24 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.45 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2541

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.45 – 21.74
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2105

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-08
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %

ENB.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.00 – 25.19
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1305

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-08
Maturity Price : 24.68
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

CM.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 27.70 – 27.95
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1933

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %

BoE Deputy Governor Tucker Supports High Trigger for CoCos

Tuesday, March 8th, 2011

Mr Paul Tucker, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, made a speech at the Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics, Cambridge, 18 February 2011 titled Discussion of Lord Turner’s lecture, “Reforming finance – are we being radical enough?”:

But none of what I have said makes a case for placing all of our eggs in the resolution basket. Switching metaphors, we need belt and braces. Which is why the G20 agreed that the so-called Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) should carry greater loss absorbing capacity (or GLAC) than implied by Basel III.

First best would be equity. Indeed, Adair has argued this evening that ideally Basel 3 would have set a higher equity requirement. But that did not happen. In practice, we are going to have to be open-minded, but also principled, about quasi-equity instruments contributing to GLAC for SIFIs (sorry about the acronyms!). Currently, the leading candidate is so-called Contingent Capital bonds (CoCos), which convert from debt into equity in certain states of the world. It seems to me that to serve the purpose of GLAC for large and complex firms, such instruments would need to convert when a firm was still fundamentally sound, which is to say that they should have high capital triggers. For a large and complex firm, a low capital trigger would be dangerous, as funders and counterparties would be likely to flee before reaching the point at which the firm would be recapitalised through the CoCos’ conversion.

Moreover, high-trigger CoCos would presumably get converted not infrequently which, in terms of reducing myopia in capital markets, would have the merit of reminding holders and issuers about risks in banking.

Lord Turner’s speech discusses a particular hobby-horse of mine:

It is therefore crucial that our answers to the SIFI problem cover also the more difficult but more likely scenario of multiple bank systemic stress. And in such conditions, bail-inable bonds will only enable us to avoid the dilemma of Autumn 2008, if the following vital conditions are met:

  • • If regulators could be confident that those bonds are held outside the banking system; and
  • • in addition, confident that the bonds are held by investors who have so arranged their assets and liabilities that they could face the imposed losses without that in turn inducing systemic effects.

And it may be very difficult to be confident that those conditions we met.

There are two ways to gain that confidence – the first relies on empirical observation, the second on an assumption of fully informed investor rationality. Neither route may be entirely robust.

  • • The first way to seek such confidence, would be for regulators to understand, or to regulate, which investors hold bank medium-term debt. Our information on this today is imperfect. We believe a significant proportion is initially held by other banks, and a larger proportion still by a broadly defined group of ‘fund managers’. (Slide 7). But ownership after secondary market trading could be significantly different. And some of these ‘fund managers’ may be in turn financed by banks (e.g. hedge funds by prime brokers), or linked to the banking system by complex repo and derivative relationship so that losses suffered by one bank, could indirectly impose losses or confidence shocks on others. And our ability to track these complex inter-connections, and as a result to predict the knock-on consequences of initial losses in conditions of systemic fragility is imperfect today and likely to remain so. We need to improve our understanding of the complex interconnections of our financial system: but it is unclear that understanding will ever be good enough for us confidently to impose large losses simultaneously on the senior debt of multiple large banks (or indeed multiple small banks), in conditions of macro-systemic stress.
  • • The other route to confidence, would be based on faith in market and investor rationality, assuming axiomatically that investors who buy bail-inable bonds will only do so on the basis of rational assessments of their ability to absorb risks in all possible future states of the world, including those of macroeconomic stress. As Section 3 will discuss, this axiomatic assumption was at the core of the pre-crisis conventional wisdom, the reason why public authorities thought they could sleep easy in the face of an explosive growth in financial scale, complexity and interconnectedness. But it relies on an assumption of fully informed rationality, which may be simply untrue, and indeed impossible. For as Andrei Shleifer et al (2010) have argued in an extremely perceptive recent paper, it may be inherent to human nature that in the good times investors systematically fail to take rational account of the tail of low probability adverse events.

A bail-inable bond will have a highly skewed probability distribution of pay-outs. (Slide 8 ) Over a long period of time, only the zero-loss segment of the distribution will be observed. A low probability of significant loss continues to exist, but Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishay argue that that low probability will be wholly discounted through a behavioural process which they label ‘local thinking’ – the reality, deeply rooted in human nature, that not all contingencies are represented in decision makers’ thought processes. After a period of good times, investors will assume that senior bank debt is effectively risk-free: as indeed they did, in the years before the crisis (Slide 9). Regulators cannot therefore rely on free-market discipline to ensure that the debt is only held by investors who can suffer loss without that causing knock-on systemic disruption.

If therefore we can neither perfectly and continuously monitor or regulate who owns bail-inable debt, nor rely on free-market discipline to ensure that it is always appropriately held, contractually bail-inable debt and technical resolvability will be valuable but still imperfect solutions to the ‘too big to fail’ problem. We can only be sure that losses can be smoothly absorbed if we are sure that the investors who provide funds do not suffer from ‘local thinking’ but remain perpetually aware of the full distribution of possible results. Subordinated debt which can convert to equity well before potential failure (‘early trigger CoCos’) may approach what is required since the price will presumably vary with probabilistic expectations of future conversion. But only with pure equity can we be fully confident that the dangers of ‘local thinking’ will not creep in over time, and that investors, facing day-by-day price movements up and down will remain continually aware that they hold a potentially loss absorbing instrument. The implication of Shleifer’s ‘local thinking’ theory is that if investors are to remain continuously aware of the full frequency distribution of objectively possible results the observed frequency distribution of returns needs to include negatives and well as positives. This is achieved by equity returns but not by low risk debt.

OSFI, in its infinite wisdom, is going in entirely the opposite direction: the lowest possible conversion triggers for CoCos, and seeking to include CoCos in the regular bond indices so that investors will be fooled into buying them.

March 7, 2011

Monday, March 7th, 2011

There are threats of inflation in Asia:

The Bank of Thailand and Bank of Korea will each raise key interest rates this week by a quarter percentage point, median estimates in Bloomberg News surveys of economists show. Malaysia may also be approaching the end of its pause in boosting borrowing costs, as four of 12 analysts polled see a March 11 move, the highest such share since the last increase, in July.
….
The region’s economies are strong enough to withstand the impact of faster inflation, the Asian Development Bank said last week.

“The region is particularly prone to food and oil price shocks as a greater percentage of household income is spent on food and transportation,” said Vishnu Varathan, an economist in Singapore at Capital Economics (Asia) Pte.

Diminished resistance to currency gains in China may have a knock-on effect throughout Asia as the continent’s biggest economy also seeks to contain price pressures. People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said last month in Paris that his nation may use means “including rates and currency” to curb increases in food and home prices.

WordPress.org was attacked by hackers in China recently. I wondered how one defends against this and found a paper by S S Nagamuthu Krishnan and Dr. V. Saravanan titled DDoS Defense Mechanism by applying stamps. Precious in places (‘Oh, do be a good netizen while munching your granola’) and, naturally enough, veering occasionally into jargon, but they do achieve one of their major objectives in the paper addressing a major problem:

This was a major event, covered in the major news media. They have done an excellent job in their coverage; as far as it has gone, their coverage has been accurate. The problem is, their coverage hasn’t been sufficiently detailed to explain why we cannot track down the people committing these attacks, and why we can’t defend against them. There’s a good reason for these omissions: the attack is subtle, and understanding how it works well enough to understand why we can’t cope today, and what will have to change before we can, requires a more detailed explanation of how the Internet is constructed than the mass media are prepared to deliver to their audiences.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts gained 6bp, FixedResets lost 8bp and DeemedRetractibles were down 11bp. Volume was average, but there were some nice blocks changing hands – all courtesy of Nesbitt, which shut out the rest of the street on the Volume Highlights table.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1666 % 2,391.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1666 % 3,597.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 45,299 21.54 4 -0.1666 % 2,582.3
OpRet 4.87 % 3.80 % 60,227 0.39 9 -0.0815 % 2,392.1
SplitShare 5.10 % 3.35 % 220,566 1.03 5 -0.2826 % 2,477.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0815 % 2,187.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.61 % 130,664 6.17 10 -0.0099 % 2,032.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.64 % 123,239 14.36 14 0.0608 % 2,114.7
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.48 % 191,942 2.98 54 -0.0752 % 2,280.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.24 % 5.27 % 366,176 8.27 53 -0.1125 % 2,075.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.67
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 185,833 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 100,000, both at 24.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 159,745 Nesbitt crossed three blocks of 50,000 each, all at 23.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 115,335 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 and 47,800, both at 23.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %
TD.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 110,994 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 106,700 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-07
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.74
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 106,673 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.18 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 103,684 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
There were 35 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.50 – 23.99
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2860

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

ELF.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 20.22 – 20.75
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3418

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %

FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.20 – 26.64
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3026

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.24
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2937

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.42 – 22.89
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3514

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %

RY.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 27.09 – 27.35
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1871

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.09
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

New Issue: MFC FixedReset 4.20%+141

Monday, March 7th, 2011

Manulife Financial has announced:

a Canadian public offering of Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 3 (“Series 3 Preferred Shares”). Manulife will issue eight million Series 3 Preferred Shares priced at $25 per share to raise gross proceeds of $200 million. The offering will be underwritten by a syndicate of investment dealers led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for Manulife. The expected closing date for the offering is March 11, 2011. Manulife intends to file a prospectus supplement to its September 3, 2010 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

Holders of the Series 3 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive a non-cumulative quarterly fixed dividend yielding 4.20% annually, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Manulife, for the initial period ending June 19, 2016. Thereafter, the dividend rate will be reset every five years at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.41%.

Holders of Series 3 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their shares into Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 4 (“Series 4 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on June 19, 2016 and on June 19 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series 4 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive non-cumulative quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Manulife, at a rate equal to the three-month Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield plus 1.41%.

The net proceeds from the offering will be utilized for general corporate purposes, which may include investments in subsidiaries.

In setting up this issue on HIMIPref™ I have assumed that it will not have a non-viability contingent capital clause, and therefore will be subject to the declining cap on non-qualifying Tier 1 Capital that I anticipate will be applied to Insurance Holding Companies and that therefore it should have a hardMaturity in its call schedule for 2022-1-31.

I hate this. The most important thing in preferred share analysis nowadays is … guessing what OSFI’s going to do. So much for Pillar 3.

MAPF Performance: February 2011

Sunday, March 6th, 2011

The fund continued its good start to the year by outperforming its benchmark in February.

The fund’s Net Asset Value per Unit as of the close January 31 was $11.2375.

Returns to February 28, 2011
Period MAPF Index CPD
according to
Claymore
One Month +1.21% +0.82% +0.96%
Three Months +4.01% +2.41% +1.81%
One Year +20.51% +11.69% +9.00%
Two Years (annualized) +36.17% +19.40% N/A
Three Years (annualized) +22.75% +5.96% +3.56%
Four Years (annualized) +17.64% +3.33%  
Five Years (annualized) +15.36% +3.56%  
Six Years (annualized) +13.68% +3.63%  
Seven Years (annualized) +13.03% +3.63%  
Eight Years (annualized) +15.07% +4.39%  
Nine Years (annualized) +13.42% +4.14%  
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”
MAPF returns assume reinvestment of distributions, and are shown after expenses but before fees.
CPD Returns are for the NAV and are after all fees and expenses.
* CPD does not directly report its two-year returns.
Figures for Omega Preferred Equity (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.76%, +2.20% and +10.04%, respectively, according to Morningstar after all fees & expenses. Three year performance is +4.95%.
Figures for Jov Leon Frazer Preferred Equity Fund Class I Units (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.22%, +0.22% & +5.53% respectively, according to Morningstar
Figures for Manulife Preferred Income Fund (formerly AIC Preferred Income Fund) (which are after all fees and expenses) for 1-, 3- and 12-months are +0.81%, +1.62% & +6.76%, respectively
Figures for Horizons AlphaPro Preferred Share ETF are not yet available (inception date 2010-11-23)

MAPF returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page. The fund is available either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited.

Sometimes everything works … sometimes the trading works, but sectoral shifts overwhelm the increment … sometimes nothing works. The fund seeks to earn incremental return by selling liquidity (that is, taking the other side of trades that other market participants are strongly motivated to execute), which can also be referred to as ‘trading noise’. There were a lot of strongly motivated market participants during the Panic of 2007, generating a lot of noise! Unfortunately, the conditions of the Panic may never be repeated in my lifetime … but the fund will simply attempt to make trades when swaps seem profitable, whether that implies monthly turnover of 10% or 100%.

There’s plenty of room for new money left in the fund. I have shown in recent issues of PrefLetter that market pricing for FixedResets is demonstrably stupid and I have lots of confidence – backed up by my bond portfolio management experience in the markets for Canadas and Treasuries, and equity trading on the NYSE & TSX – that there is enough demand for liquidity in any market to make the effort of providing it worthwhile (although the definition of “worthwhile” in terms of basis points of outperformance changes considerably from market to market!) I will continue to exert utmost efforts to outperform but it should be borne in mind that there will almost inevitably be periods of underperformance in the future.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Capital
Gains
Multiplier
Sustainable
Income
per
current
Unit
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 1.2857 0.3628
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 1.2857 0.3885
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 1.2857 0.4112
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 1.2857 0.4672
June 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% 1.2857 $0.4112
September 8.1886 7.108% 0.969 7.335% 1.2857 $0.4672
December, 2008 8.0464 9.24% 1.008 9.166% 1.2857 $0.5737
March 2009 $8.8317 8.60% 0.995 8.802% 1.2857 $0.6046
June 10.9846 7.05% 0.999 7.057% 1.2857 $0.6029
September 12.3462 6.03% 0.998 6.042% 1.2857 $0.5802
December 2009 10.5662 5.74% 0.981 5.851% 1.0819 $0.5714
March 2010 10.2497 6.03% 0.992 6.079% 1.0819 $0.5759
June 10.5770 5.96% 0.996 5.984% 1.0819 $0.5850
September 11.3901 5.43% 0.980 5.540% 1.0819 $0.5832
December 2010 10.7659 5.37% 0.993 5.408% 1.0000 $0.5822
February, 2011 11.2375 5.66% 1.014 5.739% 1.0000 $0.6449
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions of dividend income and annual distribution of capital gains.
Portfolio YTW includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
The Leverage Divisor indicates the level of cash in the account: if the portfolio is 1% in cash, the Leverage Divisor will be 0.99
Securities YTW divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.
The Capital Gains Multiplier adjusts for the effects of Capital Gains Dividends. On 2009-12-31, there was a capital gains distribution of $1.989262 which is assumed for this purpose to have been reinvested at the final price of $10.5662. Thus, a holder of one unit pre-distribution would have held 1.1883 units post-distribution; the CG Multiplier reflects this to make the time-series comparable. Note that Dividend Distributions are not assumed to be reinvested.
Sustainable Income is the resultant estimate of the fund’s dividend income per current unit, before fees and expenses. Note that a “current unit” includes reinvestment of prior capital gains; a unitholder would have had the calculated sustainable income with only, say, 0.9 units in the past which, with reinvestment of capital gains, would become 1.0 current units.
Analysis of yields changed in February 2011 to include the concept of DeemedRetractible issues. DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis. This deemed maturity has a significant effect on calculated yields.

Significant positions were held in DeemedRetractible and FixedReset issues on February 28; all of the former and most of the latter currently have their yields calculated with the presumption that they will be called by the issuers at par prior to 2022-1-31. This presents another complication in the calculation of sustainable yield. The fund also holds a position in a SplitShare (BNA.PR.C) which also has its yield calculated with the expectation of a maturity.

However, if the entire portfolio except for the PerpetualDiscounts were to be sold and reinvested in these issues, the yield of the portfolio would be the 5.67% shown in the MAPF Portfolio Composition: February 2011 analysis (which is in excess of the 5.62% index yield on February 28). Given such reinvestment, the sustainable yield would be $11.2375 * 0.0567 = $0.6371, a significant increase from the $11.1030 * 0.0546 = $0.6062 reported last month.

Note that there will be a drag on the calculation in up-markets due to presence of shorter-term issues (or, at least, presumed shorter term issues!); the question is whether the positive effect of these issues in down markets will outweight their negative effect in up-markets – all I can say is … that’s what I keep working towards!

Different assumptions lead to different results from the calculation, but the overall positive trend is apparent. I’m very pleased with the results! It will be noted that if there was no trading in the portfolio, one would expect the sustainable yield to be constant (before fees and expenses). The success of the fund’s trading is showing up in

  • the very good performance against the index
  • the long term increases in sustainable income per unit

As has been noted, the fund has maintained a credit quality equal to or better than the index; outperformance is due to constant exploitation of trading anomalies.

Again, there are no predictions for the future! The fund will continue to trade between issues in an attempt to exploit market gaps in liquidity, in an effort to outperform the index and keep the sustainable income per unit – however calculated! – growing.

MAPF Portfolio Composition: February 2011

Sunday, March 6th, 2011

Turnover picked up again in February, to about 70%

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may be thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2011-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 1.8% (-0.2) 6.11% 6.53
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.0% (-25.5) N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 11.2% (-37.1) 5.67% 14.34
Fixed-Reset 10.4% (-9.4) 3.50% 2.94
Deemed-Retractible 65.3% (+65.3) 5.98% 8.21
Scraps (Various) 9.8% (+5.0) 6.59% 9.85
Cash +1.4% (+1.8) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.66% 8.36
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
DeemedRetractibles are comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See OSFI Does Not Grandfather Extant Tier 1 Capital and the January & February, 2011, editions of PrefLetter for the rationale behind this analysis.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2011-2-28
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 0 (0)
Pfd-1(low) 39.7% (-18.7)
Pfd-2(high) 26.2% (+8.2)
Pfd-2 0 (0)
Pfd-2(low) 22.8% (+3.5)
Pfd-3(high) 4.8% (+1.5)
Pfd-3 3.3% (+1.8)
Pfd-3(low) 1.6% (+1.6)
Cash 1.4% (+1.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.
A position held in ELF preferreds has been assigned to Pfd-2(low)

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2011-2-28
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.6% (+1.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 23.5% (+12.4)
$100,000 – $200,000 24.0% (+10.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 +13.3% (-33.1)
>$300,000 36.1% (+6.3)
Cash 1.4% (+1.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased either directly from Hymas Investment Management or through a brokerage account at Odlum Brown Limited. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) or those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on the Claymore Preferred Share ETF (symbol CPD) as of August 31, 2010, and published in the September, 2010, PrefLetter. When comparing CPD and MAPF:

  • MAPF credit quality is better
  • MAPF liquidity is a higher
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • Weightings in
    • MAPF is much more exposed to Straight Perpetuals
    • MAPF is much less exposed to Operating Retractibles
    • MAPF is slightly more exposed to SplitShares
    • MAPF is less exposed to FixFloat / Floater / Ratchet
    • MAPF weighting in FixedResets is much lower

MUH.PR.A to Liquidate, Default

Friday, March 4th, 2011

Mulvihill Asset Management’s MCM Split Share Corp. has announced:

that it will voluntarily dissolve and distribute to shareholders the proceeds to be received from the liquidation of the assets, less all liabilities and all expenses to be incurred in connection with the dissolution and winding up of the Fund. This dissolution is in advance of the scheduled termination date of February 1, 2013. The Fund expects that proceeds from the liquidation will be payable to holders of the Priority Equity Shares on or about March 31, 2011.

In late 2007, the Fund adopted a strategy (the “Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan”) to assist the Fund with payment of the original issue price of the priority equity shares (the “Priority Equity Shares”) on the redemption date originally scheduled for February 1, 2013. Given the steep market sell-off in November 2008, the Fund was required to implement the Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan and raised its cash levels to ensure compliance with the plan. Since that time, the Fund has been invested in cash and cash equivalents with no equity exposure. For the year ended January 31, 2011, the Fund’s total return was negative 1.3%. Distributions amounting to $0.83 per Priority Equity Share were paid during the year ended January 31, 2011, contributing to an overall decline in the net asset value (“NAV”) of the Fund from $14.24 per Unit (each notional Unit consisting of one Priority Equity Share and one Class A Share) as at January 31, 2010 to $13.23 as at January 31, 2011. The Fund believes that holders of the Priority Equity Shares may be better off reinvesting the proceeds from the voluntary dissolution than by remaining invested in the Fund as a result of the returns available on the Fund’s existing investments.

Given that the Priority Equity Shares rank ahead of the Class A Shares, the Fund expects that holders of the Priority Equity Shares will receive the entire amount of the liquidation proceeds to be paid to shareholders because they are entitled to the first $15.00 of NAV of the Fund per share in priority to other shareholders. As the amount of such liquidation proceeds will be less than $15.00 per Priority Equity Share, the Fund does not expect to be in a position to make any payment to holders of Class A Shares upon dissolution.

The NAV was $13.23 on February 28, according to Mulvihill. There are just over 1.1-million shares outstanding, according to TMXMoney. The fund had been scheduled to wind up on 2013-2-1 but had problems:

The Fund adopted a strategy (the “Priority Equity Portfolio Protection Plan”) to protect holders of the Priority Equity Shares by assisting the Fund with the payment of the original issue price of $15.00 per share on termination date. With the steep market sell off in November 2008 we had to raise our cash levels to ensure compliance with the above feature. The Fund is now in cash and cash equivalents with no equity exposure. During the fiscal year ended January 31, 2010, the annual total rate of return of the Fund was negative 1.42 percent. Distributions amounting to $0.83 per share to Priority Equity shareholders and $0.01 per share to Class A shareholders were paid during the year, contributing to the overall decline in the net asset value from $15.29 per Unit as at January 31, 2009 to $14.24 per Unit as at January 31, 2010.

This portfolio insurance strategy didn’t work out too well for XCM.PR.A or XMF.PR.A, either … at least as far as the sponsors were concerned.

MUH.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when they announced they were contemplating a reorg. MUH.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

March 4, 2011

Friday, March 4th, 2011

The IMF has released the March 2011 edition of Finance and Development. There’s an article by André Meier titled Up or Down:

Some have predicted postcrisis deflation in advanced economies, others high inflation. Worries about either are probably exaggerated.

Historical episodes of persistent large output gaps in advanced economies show a clear pattern of disinflation, supported by weak labor markets and low wage growth. However, declines in inflation appear to become more modest when the initial rate of inflation is already quite low, suggesting some combination of better-anchored inflation expectations and downward nominal rigidities, such as resistance to outright wage cuts. Moreover, fluctuations in oil prices and exchange rates can introduce significant shortterm volatility in inflation outturns.

Developments since the beginning of the global financial crisis are consistent with this pattern. Despite large swings in headline rates, underlying inflation in advanced economies has generally declined, with many core measures reaching the very low rates at which disinflation typically petered out during past [persistent large output gap] episodes. Thus, while upside inflation risks should be limited in countries facing continued economic slack, a slide into outright deflation does not seem very likely either.

There’s also a very hopeful article titled Healing Health Care Finances by Benedict Clements, David Coady, Baoping Shang, and Justin Tyson. Hey, here in Canada, no problem! You see, what we’re going to do is keep standards high but costs low through the use of a well-respected technique that has just been approved by an expert group of 23-year-old B.Comms with clipboards: Doing a shitty job. Whenever something goes wrong and this becomes public knowledge, just fire whoever was standing nearest. Works every time. How many voters really have any insights into the public health system, anyway?

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 21bp, FixedResets gaining 17bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 16bp. For all that, the market was relatively well behaved, with only one entry on the Performance Highlights table. Volume remained high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0238 % 2,395.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0238 % 3,603.0
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 45,102 21.55 4 -0.0238 % 2,586.6
OpRet 4.87 % 3.34 % 59,836 0.40 9 0.0644 % 2,394.0
SplitShare 5.09 % 2.93 % 228,998 1.04 5 -0.0529 % 2,484.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0644 % 2,189.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.65 % 124,741 1.27 10 -0.0556 % 2,032.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.52 % 5.63 % 125,140 14.38 14 -0.2094 % 2,113.4
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.46 % 199,740 2.99 54 0.1696 % 2,281.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.23 % 5.26 % 369,455 8.28 53 -0.1600 % 2,077.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.H OpRet 99,471 CIBC sold 28,900 to Desjardins and 34,700 to TD, both at 25.60. Desjardins crossed 30,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-04-03
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 0.82 %
TD.PR.Q Deemed-Retractible 63,917 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 59,777 Anonymous crossed (?) blocks of 10,000 and 15,000 at 26.60. RBC crossed 16,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 52,785 RBC bought blocks of 10,000 and 19,100 from Nesbitt, both at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 42,822 TD sold 14,500 to anonymous at 27.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 42,393 Desjardins crossed 12,900 aat 27.80; Nesbitt sold 15,000 to anonymous at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.76
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
RY.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.10 – 27.44
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2217

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %

BAM.PR.H OpRet Quote: 25.60 – 25.97
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2520

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-04-03
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 0.82 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.15 – 25.54
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2804

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.02 – 26.45
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3206

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.02
Bid-YTW : 4.75 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 27.46 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1558

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

TDS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 10.41 – 10.77
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2846

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.41
Bid-YTW : -0.18 %

March 3, 2011

Friday, March 4th, 2011

The migration of traders continues:

Guggenheim Partners LLC, the closely held investment bank and asset manager, plans to hire as many as 150 staff being pushed out of banks’ proprietary-trading units because of U.S. financial rules enacted last year.

Loren M. Katzovitz and Patrick Hughes, 49-year-old managing partners who have worked together since 1993, are launching Guggenheim Global Trading LLC in Purchase, New York, with an initial investment of $500 million as soon as June 1, they said yesterday in an interview. The firm plans to hire 100 to 150 traders and manage as much as $2 billion, they said.

Much the same thing is happening in Canada:

The cultural gulf between Canada’s independent securities firms – with their eat-what-you-kill pay structures – and the more staid bank-owned investment dealers is steadily widening. Some of the people who recruit bankers and traders say that the result of a move to more deferred pay and smaller cash bonuses at bank-owned firms means they are attracting a more risk-averse type of person, which is what regulators were seeking.

The pay system at independent firms like GMP Securities remains simple. Bankers and traders get paid for the business they bring in. Base salaries are rare, but bonus payments are regular and in cash. Bonuses are big when business is good, and they can dry up in fallow times.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out. I can tell you that the quality of institutional bond desk personnel has declined over the past 15 years. There’s still lots of the old guys around, but as they retire and move on, they’re being replaced by order-takers.

General Growth, the object of Brookfield’s affections, is taking advantage of better tone in the CMBS market:

General Growth Properties Inc. (GGP), the U.S. mall owner planning to refinance $5 billion of mortgage debt, tapped UBS AG and Morgan Stanley (MS) to fund loans as banks rebuild inventory to back bonds tied to commercial real estate.

UBS agreed to provide a $375 million loan on the 977,000- square-foot Providence Place Mall in Rhode Island, according to a person with direct knowledge of the deal who declined to be identified because the talks are private. Morgan Stanley will lend about $150 million for a Humble, Texas property, according to a person familiar with those negotiations. The banks plan to package the loans for sale as securities, the people said.

General Growth, which emerged from the largest real estate bankruptcy in U.S. history in November after piling up $27 billion in debt, plans to refinance $5 billion in mortgages in 2011, Chief Executive Officer Sandeep Mathrani said during a March 1 conference call with analysts. Property owners nationwide are benefiting as the Federal Reserve keeps its benchmark interest rates near-zero to stimulate economic growth.

General Growth buckled under its debt load when the market for commercial-mortgage backed bonds shut down in 2008 and the company was unable to refinance properties. The real estate investment trust has $18.2 billion in outstanding mortgage debt, Mathrani said.

A mixed, relatively quiet day on the Canadian preferred share market, as PerpetualDiscounts lost 5bp, FixedResets were down 7bp, and DeemedRetractibles gained 4bp. There are only two entries on the Performance Highlights table – and neither would have made had their closing bids been a penny lower. Volume remained at elevated levels.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2625 % 2,396.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2625 % 3,603.8
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 44,561 21.55 4 0.2625 % 2,587.2
OpRet 4.87 % 3.33 % 59,910 0.40 9 0.0086 % 2,392.5
SplitShare 5.09 % 3.19 % 232,068 1.05 5 0.1416 % 2,485.6
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0086 % 2,187.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.55 % 125,081 1.27 10 0.0079 % 2,033.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.51 % 5.61 % 125,531 14.40 14 -0.0455 % 2,117.9
FixedReset 5.21 % 3.51 % 197,858 2.99 54 -0.0697 % 2,278.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.23 % 5.24 % 374,462 8.29 53 0.0429 % 2,081.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
BNA.PR.E SplitShare 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 176,634 Desjardins crossed 11,000 at 27.22 and 50,000 at 27.25. RBC crossed blocks of 49,200 and 33,900 at 27.25, then bought 22,800 from Nesbitt at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.18
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 141,482 Desjardns crossed 50,000 at 27.50, then 70,000 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 112,710 Desjardins crossed 110,000 at 26.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 96,137 RBC crossed three blocks: 41,000 shares, 23,800 and 25,000, all at 24.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-03
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 75,416 Desjardins crossed blocks of 25,600 and 45,000, both at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet 62,329 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.70 and 11,100 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
There were 45 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.23 – 22.69
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3282

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.23
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %

TDS.PR.C SplitShare Quote: 10.46 – 10.78
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2019

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.46
Bid-YTW : -0.80 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.50 – 27.84
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2389

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.45 – 26.75
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2000

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.45
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.40
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2007

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %

PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Premium Quote: 24.92 – 25.19
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1781

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-03-03
Maturity Price : 24.64
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %

SplitShare Capital Unit Debate

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

Assiduous Readers will remember that I was quoted in a recent article by John Heinzl expressing a strong opinion on the Capital Units issues by SplitShare corporations:

For those reasons, Mr. Hymas says the capital shares are only appropriate for “suckers.”

This statement has attracted a certain amount of commentary and I have received some material criticizing my views. All further quotes in this post have been taken, in order, from an eMailed commentary – it has been interspersed with my commentary, but is quoted verbatim and in its entirety.

Response to “Ups and Downs of Doing The Splits” – John Heinzl, Globe and Mail, March 2, 2011

I have had a lot of involvement in split shares over the last two years, and I have to differ markedly from the assessment of Mr. Hymas, who prefers the preferreds to the capital units. I believe the exact opposite to be the case.

The split-share preferreds have limited upside, yet unlimited downside. They are essentially equity investments with a ‘preferred share’ wrapper. Most have downside protection to some degree, but rest assured, they can fall pretty well as much as the equity market can.

Asymmetry of returns is a feature of all fixed income, not simply SplitShare preferreds. Naturally, they can default, and one must take account of the chance of default: but firstly most will have Asset Coverage of at least 2:1 at issue time – meaning that the underlying portfolio can drop by half before the preferred shareholders take any loss at all – and secondly the Capital Unitholders will be wiped out before the preferred shareholders lose a penny.

No, there are no guarantees – there never are. But the preferreds have at issue time a significant amount of first-loss protection provided by the Capital Units.

The capital units are a whole other story. In my view they offer the BEST deal out there.

Imagine if you had a $100,000 portfolio of Canadian equities. You are totally exposed to the performance of the underlying assets, so a market fall of 50% takes an equivalent bite out of your assets. Now suppose instead you invest in a capital share with the following characteristics: leverage factor is 3.75 times. Discount to NAV is 20%. Maturity is 3 years. (These numbers are most assuredly achievable).

These numbers can be illustrated by the following:
Preferred Par Value: $10.00
Whole Unit NAV: $13.64
Price of Capital Units: $2.91

However, the capital units are issued at a premium to NAV (since they absorb all the issue expenses) of 5-10%. Thus, by choosing this example, you are to a degree saying that the Capital Units are only worth buying once they have lost about 25% of their value relative to NAV and have lost most of their NAV as well. I claim that this shows that the guys who paid full price for them are suckers.

While discounts of market price to intrinsic value are not unknown, they are by no means automatic. I gave a seminar on SplitShares in March, 2009 – the very height of the crisis! – and used the following chart to illustrate the fact that, even (or particularly!) when distressed, these things will generally trade at a premium to intrinsic value:


Click for Big

The seminar was videotaped and is available for viewing (and downloading in Apple QuickTime format for personal use) for a small fee.

You could invest $26,667 in the capital units, and put the remainder in cash or investment grade bonds yielding , say, 3.5%. By doing so you get the same upside as the underlying assets.

Actually, it will be a bit better, because at maturity the discount will be made up, so you get an extra kicker of 6% per year. But in the event of a 50% fall in the market, although you would probably lose all of the value of the capital units, your cash would remain at $73,333, plus interest. You have dramatically outperformed on the downside, losing about 27% vs. 50%.

Yes, certainly, but you are not looking at the situation at issue time. You are looking for a distressed situation, in which somebody (the sucker) has already taken an enormous loss, not just on the NAV but also on the market price relative to NAV. Your illustration relies on the same presumption as the attractiveness of the preferred shares: the willingness of the sucker to take the first loss.

Not all split share capital units are attractive: some trade at premiums, and offer little leverage. Remember, these things are effectively long-dated options or warrants, although – even better – they can receive dividends. Any option or warrant calculator will tell you that if the capital units are priced correctly they should trade at a premium, not a discount, especially when leverage increases.

I discussed the valuation of Capital Units as options in my Seminar on SplitShares and provided the following charts. The first shows the theoretical value – given reasonable assumptions regarding volatility – of the capital units as the Whole Unit NAV changes. I will also note that this computation of theoretical value ignores all of the cash effects in the portfolio – dividends in, dividends out, fees and expenses out and portfolio changes to offset these effects – that will, in general, reduce the attractiveness of the Capital Units.


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The second shows the premium of expected market price over intrinsic value as the NAV changes:


Click for Big

Instead, over the last few years I have seen cases where capital units offered leverage of up to 20 times, and yet still traded at a discount to NAV. That remarkable set of circumstances enabled investors to replace all-equity portfolios with a capital shares and cash combination portfolio which limited their equity exposure, and hence risk, to a fraction of what would otherwise be the case. Yet without losing any upside.

The remarkable paradox about capital units is that the higher the leverage, and hence the risk, in these things, the more one can reduce portfolio risk.

Scott Swallow, Financial Advisor
Manulife Securities Incorporated

Scott, I suggest that the critical element of your argument is the phrase “remarkable set of circumstances” and that, in the absence of such remarkable circumstances, our views are probably not very different.

Perhaps, as printed, my “sucker” epithet was too general – I certainly did not mean to suggest that all capital units were always bad all the time at all prices. If somebody offers to sell me capital units with an intrinsic value of $10 for a penny each, I’ll back up the truck! As I like to say, at the right price, even a bag of shit can be attractive: I buy fifteen of them every spring for my garden! So, perhaps I can be faulted for not qualifying my statement enough – but the reporter and I were talking about the issuance of these securities and he only had 1,000 words or so to work with – a full investigation of Split Shares takes considerably more space than that.

But your argument, as stated earlier, rests on the assumption that somebody else has taken a double loss – first on NAV, then on market price relative to NAV. I claim, that given the risk-reward profile of capital units at issue time in general, the IPO buyers (and most of those in the secondary market) are suckers.