Archive for February, 2012

DBRS Downgrades YLO to Pfd-5(low) Trend Negative

Tuesday, February 14th, 2012

DBRS has announced that it:

has today downgraded Yellow Media Inc.’s (Yellow Media or the Company) Issuer Rating to B (high) from BB; its Medium-Term Notes to B (high) from BB, with an RR4 recovery rating; its Exchangeable Subordinated Debentures to B (low) from B (high), with an RR6 recovery rating; and its Cumulative Preferred Shares to Pfd-5 (low) from Pfd-4 (low). The trend on all ratings remains Negative.

Today’s downgrade reflects recent actions taken by Yellow Media that may indicate that its business transformation may take longer than previously anticipated, while its debt maturities over the medium term remain significant. DBRS believes that this may greatly restrict the Company’s ability to handle its maturing debt by means of internally generated free cash flow and, potentially, by drawing on external sources.

DBRS also notes that drawing on its revolving credit facility precludes Yellow Media from repurchasing up to $125 million of its 2013 debt maturities in the open market, as would have been allowable under its September 2011 amended credit agreement.

The Negative trend reflects the possibility that Yellow Media’s ratings could be further downgraded should the Company undertake refinancing actions that would entail some form of compromise for its existing creditors. Additionally, DBRS remains concerned that the digital transition may continue to take longer than currently anticipated and could include (1) accelerated pressure on Yellow Media’s traditional print business while digital revenue continues to grow but fails to compensate for print revenue pressure; and (2) further pressure on liquidity and free cash flow, rendering it insufficient to handle the Company’s sizable upcoming debt maturities.

YLO was last mentioned on PrefBlog in the post YLO Suspends Dividends. YLO has four issues of preferreds outstanding: YLO.PR.A and YLO.PR.B (OperatingRetractible) and YLO.PR.C and YLO.PR.D (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™; all are relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

New Issue: PWF 5.50% Straight

Monday, February 13th, 2012

Power Financial Corporation has announced:

that it has agreed to issue 6,000,000 Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series R (the “Series R Shares”) on a bought deal basis, for gross proceeds of $150 million. The Series R Shares will be priced at $25.00 per share and will carry an annual dividend yield of 5.50%. Closing is expected on or about February 23, 2012. The issue will be underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters led by BMO Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank.

Power Financial has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series R Shares at the same offering price. Should the underwriters’ option be exercised fully, the total gross proceeds of the Series R Share offering will be $200 million.

Proceeds from the issue will be used to supplement the Corporation’s financial resources and for general corporate purposes.

Update: Have heard that this has been upsized to $250-million.

Update: Confirmed.

February PrefLetter Released!

Monday, February 13th, 2012

The February, 2012, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The February edition contains two appendices: the first discusses lessons to be learnt about relative valuation from price behaviour during the recent market run-up; the second updates the analysis of YLO preferreds to incorporate the company’s recent financial statements and announcements.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the February, 2012, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the March, 2012, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close March 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on March 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

BK.PR.A: 11H1 Semi-Annual Report

Sunday, February 12th, 2012

Canadian Banc Corp. released its Semi-Annual Report to May 31, 2011 some time ago when it was still named Canadian Banc Recovery Corp.

Figures of interest are:

MER: The MER per unit of the Fund, excluding the cost of leverage, was 1.39% as at May 31, 2011.

Average Net Assets: Net assets were 192.0-million on 2011-5-31 and 181.6-million on 2010-11-30; average is 186.8-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Total income of 3,259,530, times two (semi-annual) divided by average net assets of 186.8-million is 3.49%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 1,948,474 divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 2,042,484 is 95%.

SLF Downgraded, Outlook Negative, by Moody's

Sunday, February 12th, 2012

On January 26, Moody’s announced:

Moody’s Investors Service has downgraded the insurance financial strength (IFS) rating of Sun life Assurance Company of Canada (U.S.) (Sun Life US) — a wholly owned subsidiary of Sun Life Financial, Inc. (SLF: TLS; SLF) – to A3 from Aa3. Other affiliated U.S. ratings were also downgraded (see complete ratings list, below). Moody’s also downgraded the preferred stock rating of SLF to Baa3 (hyb) from Baa2 (hyb), but affirmed the Aa3 IFS rating of SLF’s Canadian insurance subsidiary, Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (SLA), as well as the ratings of other Canadian affiliates. The outlook on all ratings of SLF and its Canadian and U.S. affiliates is negative. The action concludes a review for possible downgrade of Sun Life US and its affiliates, initiated on October 18, 2011.

Commenting on the downgrade of the SLF preferred rating to Baa3 (hyb) from Baa2 (hyb), Moody’s said that it reflects a widening of the typical 3-notch differential that previously existed between SLF’s implied senior debt rating and the Aa3 IFS rating of SLA, because of: 1) the weakening of the stand-alone credit profile of Sun Life US; and 2) the credit profiles of SLF’s other key operating subsidiaries (i.e., MFS; UK insurance, and Asia insurance — not rated by Moody’s), which are relatively weaker than the Aa3 IFS rating on SLA. In addition, SLF’s financial flexibility has diminished due to the significant accounting charges taken during 2011 — mostly associated with the problematic Sun Life US business — which have reduced SLF’s capital, increased its financial leverage, and decreased its debt service coverage ratios.

Commenting on the negative outlook for the entire SLF group, the rating agency noted its concerns related to the execution risks of the runoff strategy for the U.S. businesses and that any further charges arising from Sun Life US’ and the U.S. branch’s closed blocks would remain a drag on SLF’s consolidated earnings, and possibly SLA’s earnings. The negative outlook on SLA also reflects the potential of additional capital support being needed at Sun Life US. Furthermore, there is uncertainty about the timing for SLF to lower its currently elevated financial leverage, as well as future capital releases from Sun Life US to SLF and the profitability of the remaining employee benefits and voluntary product businesses at the U.S. branch, now that its life insurance business and the U.S. subsidiary’s operations are in run-off.

Moody’s stated that SLF expects run rate expenses for the U.S. subsidiary to be reduced by $160 -$180 million annually, and capital to be released over time. “This strategy is not without execution risk, however, and waiting to see at least a few quarters of experience before addressing the outlook for the organization as a whole is appropriate at this time”, Beattie added.

SLF has a lot of preferreds outstanding: SLF.PR.A, SLF.PR.B, SLF.PR.C, SLF.PR.D and SLF.PR.E (DeemedRetractible) as well as SLF.PR.F, SLF.PR.G, SLF.PR.H and SLF.PR.I (FixedReset). All are tracked by HIMIPref™ and all are assigned to the indices noted.

February PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

Friday, February 10th, 2012

The markets have closed and the February edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The February edition will contain two appendices: one reviewing lessons to be learned from the recent dramatic run-up in the prices of insurance company issued DeemedRetractibles, and of the simultaneous rise in Straight Perpetuals; the second will review the recent decision of YLO to suspend its preferred share dividend.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The February issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the February issue.

February 10, 2012

Friday, February 10th, 2012

Astonishing! There is a continued Greek crisis:

In Athens, unions struck for the second time this week and police used tear gas to counter protesters. George Karatzaferis, who heads one of the three parties supporting interim Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, said he wouldn’t support austerity measures worked out for a rescue. He spoke hours after German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble told lawmakers in Berlin that Greece was missing deficit targets.

“What has particularly bothered me is the humiliation of the country,” Karatzaferis, whose Laos party has 16 members in the 300-seat parliament, said in televised comments. “Clearly Greece can’t and shouldn’t do without the European Union but it could do without the German boot.”

“The Greek offer is not sufficient and they have to go away to come up with a revised plan,” Bertrand Benoit, a spokesman for the German Finance Ministry, said by telephone.

Assiduous Readers will be accustomed to my occasional rants about bond market structure and auction design – these are usually triggered by ignorant whining about exchange trading of bonds, but now the Fed has become involved:

The Federal Reserve secretly selected a handful of banks to bid for debt securities acquired by taxpayers in the U.S. bailout of American International Group Inc., and the rest of Wall Street is wondering what happened to the transparency the central bank said it was committed to upholding.

“The exclusivity by which the process has shut out smaller dealers is a little un-American,” said David Castillo, head of sales and trading at broker Further Lane Securities LP in San Francisco, who said he would have liked to participate. “It seems odd that if you want to get the best possible price that it wouldn’t be open to anyone who wants to put in the most competitive bid.”

After inviting more than 40 broker-dealers to take part in a series of auctions last year, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asked only Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS), Credit Suisse Group AG (CSGN) and Barclays Plc (BARC) to bid on the full $13.2 billion of bonds offered in two sales over the past month. The central bank switched to a less open process after traders blamed the regular, more public disposals for damaging prices in 2011. This week, Goldman Sachs bought $6.2 billion of bonds in an auction.

“The purpose should be to get the best price for the taxpayer,” said Robert Eisenbeis, a former research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta who’s now chief monetary economist for Sarasota, Florida-based Cumberland Advisors. “Anybody knows the more bidders the better, so it’s a little hard to understand why they would essentially pick potential winners and losers. That smacks of crony capitalism.”

The New York Fed was criticized for damaging credit markets with the regular sales, and halted them in June after disposing of about $10 billion in face value of the assets.

It resumed the sales on Jan. 19, when it unloaded about $7 billion of assets in one block to Credit Suisse, after receiving an unsolicited bid for the securities from Goldman Sachs. Only Barclays and Bank of America were invited to also participate in that auction. Goldman Sachs won the auction for $6.2 billion of bonds this week after Credit Suisse placed an unsolicited bid for the assets. Barclays, Morgan Stanley (MS) and RBS Securities Inc. were also included in that sale. Barclays presented the second- highest offer in both auctions this year, according to a person familiar with the process.

The New York Fed didn’t announce either auction until after they closed, and said the broker-dealers it included were chosen based on the strength of previous bids. The Wall Street firms, and their clients who wished to bid on the assets, were required to sign non-disclosure agreements forbidding them from discussing the offerings. At least one investor opted not to participate for that reason.

Now, I’m not going to state that the Fed did things in the best possible way. I’m not even going to state that the auction method they chose is better than a fully public process! But I will state that calling the process “un-American” or stating that “Anybody knows the more bidders the better” is just plain pig-ignorant.

The Canadian preferred share market took a thumping today, as the very attractive GWO 5.40% Straight issue announced – and later upsized – today sucked all the money out of the market. PerpetualPremiums were down 34bp, FixedResets off 10bp and DeemedRetractibles lost 59bp. There is a very lengthy list of losers – and no winners – in the Performance Highlights table, overwhelmingly comprised of insurance DeemedRetractibles. Volume was a little on the light side.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.7057 % 2,445.4
FixedFloater 4.55 % 3.91 % 39,241 17.48 1 0.7229 % 3,430.6
Floater 2.73 % 2.97 % 63,110 19.77 3 -0.7057 % 2,640.4
OpRet 4.84 % -0.06 % 63,024 1.26 6 -0.3279 % 2,514.6
SplitShare 5.28 % -0.41 % 80,622 0.83 4 -0.0597 % 2,650.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3279 % 2,299.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.33 % -0.48 % 117,923 0.12 26 -0.3430 % 2,223.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.03 % 4.88 % 196,096 15.66 4 -0.2157 % 2,457.3
FixedReset 5.02 % 2.62 % 217,705 2.30 65 -0.1002 % 2,395.5
Deemed-Retractible 4.89 % 3.45 % 225,376 1.64 45 -0.5940 % 2,314.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Premium -2.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 4.92 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -2.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible -2.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.64
Bid-YTW : 5.14 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.97 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 17.39
Evaluated at bid price : 17.39
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.82 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 5.46 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Premium -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
GWO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 5.06 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.22
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 4.96 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 27.61
Bid-YTW : -0.06 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 80,188 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 24.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.99 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 55,401 TD crossed 50,000 at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : -7.57 %
BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 53,027 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.64 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 39,861 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 39,722 RBC crossed 20,200 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-01-29
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.72
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 39,202 RBC crossed 36,400 at 27.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNS.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.13 – 27.48
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2316

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-04-26
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 1.84 %

TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.03 – 26.36
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2185

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : -6.94 %

POW.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.40 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2185

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -8.72 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.15 – 26.38
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1500

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 2.88 %

PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.51 – 25.75
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1614

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-11
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : -4.72 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.39 – 17.70
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2356

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-10
Maturity Price : 17.39
Evaluated at bid price : 17.39
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %

New Issue: GWO 5.40% Straight!

Friday, February 10th, 2012

Great-West Lifeco has announced:

Great-West Lifeco Inc. (“Lifeco” or the “Company”) has today entered into an agreement with a syndicate of underwriters co-led by BMO Capital Markets, RBC Capital Markets and Scotiabank under which the underwriters have agreed to buy, on a bought deal basis, 6,000,000 Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series P (the “Series P Shares”) from Lifeco for sale to the public at a price of $25.00 per Series P Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $150 million.

Lifeco has granted the underwriters an underwriters’ option to purchase an additional 2,000,000 Series P Shares at the same offering price. Should the underwriters’ option be fully exercised, the total gross proceeds of the Series P Shares offering will be $200 million.

The Series P Shares will yield 5.40% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Company. The Series P Shares will not be redeemable prior to March 31, 2017. On or after March 31, 2017, the Company may, on not less than 30 nor more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the Series P Shares in whole or in part, at the Company’s option, by the payment in cash of $26.00 per Series P Share if redeemed prior to March 31, 2018, of $25.75 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2018 but prior to March 31, 2019, of $25.50 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2019 but prior to March 31, 2020, of $25.25 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2020 but prior to March 31, 2021 and of $25.00 per Series P Share if redeemed on or after March 31, 2021, in each case together with all declared and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.

The Series P Shares offering is expected to close on February 22, 2012. The net proceeds will be used for general corporate purposes and to augment Lifeco’s current liquidity position.

It has been almost two years since the last Straight offering, which was GWO.PR.M, listed on 2010-3-4. Mind you, the market doesn’t seem too thrilled – comparable issues have dropped substantially since the announcement earlier this morning.

Update: Upsized to $250-million, no greenshoe.

February 9, 2012

Thursday, February 9th, 2012

Greece claims to have reached agreement:

“Discussions between the Greek government and the troika were successfully completed this morning,” Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos’s office said in an e-mailed statement today in Athens. “Political leaders have agreed with the result of those negotiations. Therefore there is a general agreement in the context of the new program ahead of tonight’s euro group meeting.” The statement didn’t include any details.

But PIMCO notes potential resistance of Greeks:

“It is very unlikely to lead to growth, jobs, financial stability and new investments,” El-Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer of the world’s biggest manager of bond funds, said in a radio interview today on “Bloomberg Surveillance” with Tom Keene and Ken Prewitt. “This agreement will be very difficult to sell when the principals, those who have agreed, have to go to their constituents.”

The question on my mind is still: will Greek politicians sell the deal to Greek voters? I supported the idea of a referendum when the idea was floated – very briefly! – last fall. We continue to live in interesting times.

Meanwhile, the guys with the money say “Show me!”:

European finance chiefs are set to defer ratifying a 130 billion-euro ($173 billion) rescue for Greece, pressing the government in Athens to put a newly struck austerity plan into action.

“It’s up to the Greek government by concrete actions — through legislation, other actions — to convince its European partners that the second program can be made to work,” European Union Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn said today as he arrived for an emergency meeting of euro-area finance ministers in Brussels.

And how many stories like this are we going to see?

Greek doctors are fighting a new invisible foe every day at their hospitals: a pneumonia-causing superbug that most existing antibiotics can’t kill.

The culprit is spreading through health centers already weighed down by a shortage of nurses. The hospital-acquired germ killed as many as half of people with blood cancers infected at Laiko General Hospital, a 500-bed facility in central Athens.

The drug-resistant K. pneumoniae bacteria have a genetic mutation that allows them to evade such powerful drugs as AstraZeneca Plc (AZN)’s Merrem and Johnson & Johnson’s Doribax. A 2010 survey found 49 percent of K. pneumoniae samples in Greece aren’t killed by the antibiotics of last resort, known as carbapenems, according to the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network. Many doctors have even tried colistin, a 50-year-old drug so potent that it can damage kidneys.

“We’re not used to seeing people die of an untreatable infection,” said John Rex, vice president for clinical infection at London-based AstraZeneca, which is developing a new generation of antibiotics. “That’s like something in a novel of 200 years ago.”

The Bank of Canada has provided another nail in the coffin of Efficient Market Theory:

This paper develops and estimates a model to explain the behaviour of house prices in the United States. The main finding is that over 70% of the increase in house prices relative to trend during the increase of house prices in the United States from 1995 to 2006 can be explained by a pricing mechanism where market participants are ‘Fooled by Search.’ Trading frictions, also known as search frictions, have been argued to affect asset prices, so that asset markets are constrained efficient, with shocks to liquidity causing prices to temporarily deviate from long run fundamentals. In this paper a model is proposed and estimated that combines search frictions with a behavioural assumption where market participants incorrectly believe that the efficient market theory holds. In other words, households are ‘Fooled by Search.’ Such a model is potentially fruitful because it can replicate the observation that real price growth and turnover are highly correlated at an annual frequency in the United States housing market. A linearized version of the model is estimated using standard OLS and annual data. In addition to explaining over 70% of the housing bubble in the United States, the model also predicts and estimation confirms that in regions with a low elasticity of supply, price growth should be more sensitive to turnover. Using the lens of turnover, a supply shock is identified and estimated that has been responsible for over 80% of the fall in real house prices from the peak in 2006 to 2010.

Search costs are important!

This paper examines the impact of bank consolidation on mortgage rates in order to evaluate the extent to which mortgage markets are competitive. Mortgage markets are decentralized and so rates are determined through a search and negotiation process. The primary effect of a merger therefore is to reduce the number of partners available with whom to negotiate, although it can also change the characteristics of the product, and impact the search effort of consumers. Using a Canadian merger as a case study, we find that, overall, consolidation had little effect on rates suggesting that, on average, the mortgage market is fairly competitive. However, a decomposition of the aggregate treatment effect reveals important heterogeneity in the impact of the merger. We find that consumers gathering multiple quotes are affected by the merger, while those who do not search are not. These results suggest that market power originates in large part from the presence of asymmetric search costs.

Woo-Hoo, we’re saved! The CSA is bringing in new Money Market Fund regulations:

Canadian securities regulators have slapped new rules on money market funds in a move that could push already puny yields on these investments even lower.

Under the new regulations, these funds, which typically pay investors around 1 per cent a year, will need to hold at least five per cent of their assets in cash or in securities that can easily be converted into cash within a day. In addition, they must hold at least another 15 per cent of their assets in securities that can be converted within a week.

As I have pointed out until I’m sick to bloody death of saying it, the problem is not liquidity (although that can become a factor in an extreme case, just like any other extreme case) the problem is credit quality – and these rules do absolutely nothing to improve credit quality, which requires mandatory support from the sponsor. But why would a regulator worry about what might actually work?

It was a weak day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualPremiums down 8bp, FixedResets off 12bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 20bp. Volatility was average, skewed to the downside. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.0259 % 2,462.8
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.94 % 39,741 17.43 1 -1.1905 % 3,405.9
Floater 2.71 % 2.96 % 63,663 19.80 3 1.0259 % 2,659.1
OpRet 4.82 % -1.13 % 65,615 1.27 6 -0.3331 % 2,522.9
SplitShare 5.28 % -0.40 % 80,670 0.83 4 0.2945 % 2,651.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3331 % 2,307.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.31 % -3.74 % 109,618 0.09 26 -0.0766 % 2,230.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.02 % 4.84 % 196,708 15.69 4 0.0205 % 2,462.6
FixedReset 5.01 % 2.60 % 217,262 2.30 65 -0.1234 % 2,397.9
Deemed-Retractible 4.87 % 2.28 % 224,056 1.19 45 -0.1979 % 2,328.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.85 %
BNS.PR.J Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.38
Bid-YTW : 2.06 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 24.56
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 5.39 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 85,884 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset 70,251 Nesbitt crossed 60,000 at 25.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.52
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 2.91 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 66,301 Nesbitt crossed 65,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.61
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Premium 65,196 RBC crossed a block of 39,700 and two of 10,300 each, all at 25.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : -12.30 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 56,140 Anonymous bought two blocks of 10,000 each from RBC at 25.17 and one block of 10,600 from Nesbitt at 25.19.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.15
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 43,661 RBC crossed 39,400 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.32
Bid-YTW : 2.57 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 26.10 – 26.47
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2555

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2042-02-09
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 26.10
Bid-YTW : 2.72 %

FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 26.00 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1898

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -5.85 %

RY.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 27.16 – 27.45
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1973

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-24
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.16
Bid-YTW : 1.74 %

CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.22 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2700
Average : 0.1999

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %

BNA.PR.D SplitShare Quote: 26.65 – 26.91
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1930

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-10
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.65
Bid-YTW : -8.18 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.55 – 25.84
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2270

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %

BAM: S&P Revises Outlook to Negative

Thursday, February 9th, 2012

S&P has announced:

  • We are revising our outlook on Brookfield Asset Management Inc. to negative from stable.
  • At the same time, we are affirming our ratings on the company, including our ‘A-‘ long-term corporate credit and ‘A-2’ short-term ratings.
  • We base the outlook revision on our view that Brookfield’s corporate adjusted debt and remitted operating cash flows (OCF) in 2012 will result in credit measures that would be either below or very tight to our target levels for the rating.
  • Our base case projection for Brookfield’s 2012 OCF is high single-digit growth, driven by steady performance in its core sectors and modest growth in the opportunities sectors.
  • We believe that the debt levels will increase in 2012 by about 3% from September 2011 levels.


The negative outlook reflects our view that the key credit measures, operating cash flows (OCF) to debt and OCF coverage of debt service, will be under pressure for the rating and that there is little capacity at the current rating for further cash flow deterioration or higher adjusted debt, which would include preference shares at 50%. We could lower the rating if remitted OCF interest coverage and debt coverage remain below 5x and 30%, respectively, in the next 12 months or if we believe Brookfield is becoming more aggressive with its use of project-level or subsidiary leverage, such as increases in its use of recourse debt, guarantees to its subsidiaries, or other measures that would materially commit the parent resources. It is unlikely that we would raise the rating in the near term.

BAM has a plethora of preferred share issues outstanding: BAM.PR.B (Floater), BAM.PR.E (RatchetRate), BAM.PR.G (FixedFloater), BAM.PR.H, BAM.PR.I & BAM.PR.J (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.K (Floater), BAM.PR.M & BAM.PR.N (PerpetualDiscount), BAM.PR.O (OperatingRetractible), BAM.PR.P, BAM.PR.R, BAM.PR.T, BAM.PR.X & BAM.PR.Z (FixedReset).