PrefBlog

Well … there won’t be much today!

All my non-preferred-trading-and-carnage-watching time today was spent puzzling over Capital Tax … some bond investments are subject to capital tax and some other bond investments are not subject to capital tax. The difference is, ostensibly, to avoid double taxation; I suspect that the real goal is to

• raise money in a manner that will be invisible to Joe Lunchbucket
• provide employment for retired politicians

Friend Flaherty is, of course, too busy grandstanding with ATM fees, National Securities Regulators and the price of eggs & milk in Buffalo … no, scratch that, the price of eggs and milk in Buffalo SHOULD be cheaper than in Toronto, because otherwise farmers with quota might have to work for a living … the price of Harry Potter books in Buffalo to be worried about doing something useful. Like eliminating busy-work taxes that have economically negative effects.

Some readers might surmise that I’m not in the best of tempers. Some readers might win a kewpie doll if they can do it three times running.

So … just time for one snippet of interesting financial news … there’s an ABCP lawsuit announced:

A potential flood of lawsuits over asset-backed commercial paper could hit courts in the coming weeks after Aastra Technologies Ltd. (TSX: AAH.TO) became the first to launch a legal action against adviser HSBC Securities for exposing the IT company to the troubled investment vehicle.

Aastra’s press release states:

Finally, as previously announced during the quarter, the Company currently holds $13.7 million of non-bank owned asset-backed commercial papers for which, currently, there is no active market. Of these investments, $8.5 million is invested in Structured Investment Trust III and was not repaid to the Company when it became due on October 10th while $5.2 million invested in Lafayette Structured Credit Trust is not yet due until October 30th of this year.

As a result of the developments above, Aastra commenced legal proceedings today against its investment advisor, HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. and one of its employees, in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice seeking damages relating to investment advice provided with respect to Aastra’s purchase of the Structured Investment Trust III asset-backed commercial paper.

On August 23, they stated:

As of August 23, 2007, Aastra had $13.7 million, or approximately 11% of its cash and short-term investment balances, invested in asset-backed commercial paper.

So … a couple of observations … most of which are really queries:

• HSBC Securities? So it’s a stockbroker they’re blaming? What was his Money-Market track record? I wonder how much due diligence they did before hiring him.
• Frankly, 11% of a money market portfolio in ABCP doesn’t sound all that actionable to me. It’s aggressive, sure, but it doesn’t sound all that reckless.
• Every time the market goes down a nickel, the OSC gets bagfulls of complaints. The favourite story I’ve heard is of a guy who got angry with his advisor during the Tech Boom (not the Wreck … the Boom). He had a portfolio and received a total of sixteen (if memory serves) recommendations. Fifteen of them made money. One of them lost a little bit. His portfolio did quite well. The client went completely berserk over the one unfortunate recommendation and made life miserable for everybody, for literally years, with complaints.
• Is Aastra serious about the lawsuit, or just grandstanding for their shareholders? If they’re serious, they’ll post all the court documents on their website; if they’re grandstanding, they’ll just send out the occasional press release.

Prefhound commented on yesterday’s post regarding current market conditions and – to my gratification – did not cast aspersions on my observation that perpetual/retractible spreads were starting to look awfully juicy! I had hoped to comment further on these spreads today, but as it is, I will set some homework for the blog’s readers (BOTH of them! That means you, too, Dad!).

In my article How Long is Forever?, I compared a perpetual with a retractible by:

• Calculating the total return of the retractible to the Retraction Date
• Determining what price the perpetual would be on that date to provide the same total return
• Determining what yield would give rise to that price
• Laughing

Recent events have increased yields of the retractibles to the point where they’re not completely stupid any more … and increased the term to their presumed retraction/redemption date to the point where meaningful comparisons can be made (if the YTW is just six months off, you’re basically comparing the perp to cash, which is silly). There’s even enough that we can choose pairs for which credit quality will cancel – or, at least, cancel as much as one can for a perp.

So, here’s your homework: What will be the perps’ yield on the retractibles’ end-date in order for the two total returns to the end-date to be equal?

I’ll try to get to this … but maybe somebody else will get there first! Just for fun, I’ll do a really quick back-of-the-envelope calculation for the PWF.PR.J / PWF.PR.L pair:

• L gets about 1.4% more yield annually than J
• For six years
• Total 8.4% more return
• Therefore can withstand 8.4% capital loss and still break even
• Current bid price of L is 21.67
• Less 8.4% is 19.94
• Dividend is $1.275
• Therefore, yield on 2013-7-30 can be 1.275 / 19.94 = 6.39% and still break even

Now, I’m not going to suggest that this calculation automatically shows that PWF.PR.L is a screaming buy for everybody. Hell, they were down 4.58% today! But I do wonder how many people have actually performed the calculation and decided they want the safety of the retractible anyway!

Total carnage for preferreds today – I can only imagine that people saw the Merrill Lynch downgrade and decided that

• All financials were at risk
• The preferreds as much as the common

The PerpetualDiscount index hit a new 18-month low and now has a total return of about negative nine percent for the 15-odd months since 2006-6-30. And, for the first time, the PerpetualPremium index has gone below the 1,000.00 starting figure. I should have stood in bed.

There were twenty-seven other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

More details are emerging regarding the SIV situation: FT-Alphaville has republished a Fitch graph showing the NAV of the SIVs it rates:

In this case, “NAV” is a measure of the asset coverage provided to the equity noteholders; therefore, when it’s below 100%, they’ve lost money. These numbers have no independent implications for the asset coverage ratios for the senior noteholders; that will depend on the original capital structure of the SIV.

Naked Capitalism discusses this and other tidbits from the SIV front. An anonymous Fed tipster is putting out the word that the Fed’s silence should not be misconstrued. The WSJ has published an extract from an interview with the head of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – he’s not impressed by the Super-Conduit idea. One question-and-answer brought tears of gratitude to my eyes:

Might Basel II’s reliance on rating agencies, for instance, come under consideration?

There are problems to be solved with rating agencies. … but you remain responsible at the end of the day, yourself, and you have to make your own assessments.

Fitch Ratings has published an initial review, dated September 20, and an update, dated October 12, of the SIVs it rates (the chart above is taken from the update). Credit Sights, an independent credit rating agency (that is, one paid by its subscribers rather than – gasp! – the issuers) that delights in being gloomier than the the issuer-paid credit rating agencies, has released a report (to paying clients) that claims:

Many structured-investment vehicles may be forced to close in the next few months as defaults by SIVs run by European hedge funds make it harder for others to avoid selling off their assets

So if Super-Conduit ever gets off the ground, there is every indication that it will have plenty of assets to choose from!

I mentioned the issue of bank purchases of ABCP held in their money-market funds on August 20 in the context of managerial independence, but there are other problems with the idea. Mainly, is a MMF a stand-alone investment vehicle, or is it a bank deposit? There are some US banks purchasing SIV paper from their MMFs; this is not a right and proper thing to do. I hope that the OSFI in Canada and the Fed in the US will nail these banks to the wall on their next audit; unless unitholders are taking ALL the risk of the investment, EVERY SINGLE PENNY, then the MMF is not a stand-alone vehicle.

Given all the excitement regarding the issuance of covered bonds, it would seem that if bank-run MMFs are really “covered bank deposits” then the banks’ balance sheets should be grossed up by the size of their funds and capital adequacy determined from these figures. The National Bank, for example, has total assets of about $117-billion and a total of about $1.7-billion in various MMF vehicles: Money Market Fund, Treasury Bill Plus, US MMF, Corporate Cash Management, Treasury Management and Strategic Yield. Grossing up the balance sheet would not be the biggest charge in the world, but if the banks are going to give implicit support to their funds, it is a charge that should be taken in order to protect depositors.

Business Week has a fascinating story on the implosion of the two Bear Stearns hedge funds that triggered the whole crisis. I have updated my post on stress-testing of Australian mortgages with a report from Bloomberg that one of the largest mortgage insurers is being downgraded.

The decline in perpetual preferreds actually accellerated today; to me, the yields have gone beyond “wow!” and into “outlandish” territory … but those who are selling evidently disagree with me!

There are some proxy-variables in the yield curve analysis that lead me to suspect that there is a definite bias towards selling the newer issues – by which I mainly mean everything issued in the last year; this is a change from the situation last spring. I had mentioned at that point that liquidity appeared to be at a premium – and so it was, according to the analysis. I am beginning to suspect, however, that the yield curve needs some kind of – yech! – momentum indicator, because I am now hypothesizing that the liquidity premium was actually a proxy for a “recent issue premium”. Currently, I am analyzing a premium being paid for “cumulative dividends”; this might be a proxy for “recent issue discount”.

There’s always something new, something to be tested, that becomes apparent only in times of extreme stress. ‘Nature reveals her secrets best under torture’, and all that. If Bacon didn’t say it, then I will.

I should note – for those who might be alarmed at the idea that I don’t know everything already – that yield curve analysis is the least of my analytical worries right now. Fits to the curve are excellent; it’s diversification that has me concerned. The yield pick-up of Perpetuals over Retractibles is now so extreme it’s becoming harder and harder to justify any holdings of the latter at all!

There were twenty-eight other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Sometimes I wish that this blog would get more comments. At other times, I’m glad that I don’t have to make the decision ten times per day on whether a particular comment is so ad hominem that I have to zap it. Today is one of those other days!

Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser posted a graph for which the general outlines have been known for a long time by those who are following the subprime debacle:

…and it triggered a lot of nastiness in the comments when a (purported – I haven’t checked!) market professional asked, essentially, ‘What’s the big deal?’.

It continually surprises me to see just how much bitterness there is out there against investment managers. But – that’s the Internet! As far as graphs go, I like the one from Moody’s showing mortgage delinquency rates:

Bear Stearns has agreed to a deal with CITIC whereby CITIC will take equity in Bear Stearns and Bear Stearns will, essentially, provide vendor financing. This should calm some fears about the future independence and financial viability of Bear Stearns going forward, and a joint-venture deal in Hong Kong with CITIC might even be profitable!

whereby CITIC will take equity in Bear Stearns and Bear Stearns will, essentially, provide vendor financing. This should calm some fears about the future independence and financial viability of Bear Stearns going forward, and a joint-venture deal in Hong Kong with CITIC might even be profitable!whereby CITIC will take equity in Bear Stearns and Bear Stearns will, essentially, provide vendor financing. This should calm some fears about the future independence and financial viability of Bear Stearns going forward, and a joint-venture deal in Hong Kong with CITIC might even be profitable!Naked Capitalism has again done a good job of collecting media references to the Super-Conduit … and it looks like my speculation regarding the operation of this vehicle as a Vulture Fund is both right and wrong. Wrong because that’s not what the primary sponsors have in mind. Right because if it ain’t, there won’t be any secondary sponsors:

One key concern is over the process by which it is proposed that the fund will decide on prices to offer SIVs for their securities. The lead banks are proposing that prices should be determined according to quotes provided by dealers for small volumes of the particular security rather than large trades. Critics say this means prices will be artificially high. “Banks are being asked to finance a vehicle full of overvalued assets which is not very attractive,” said one banker. Critics believe it would be better to work with true market prices – however painful.

I will now speculate that buying good assets from distressed SIVs is exactly how the RBS / Cheyne deal will unfold … but we will see! Accrued Interest has clearly been puzzling over the sponsors’ motivations as much as I have … he has introduced the rather Machievellian possibility that it is actually a rescue of the bank Money Market Funds.

The fair value estimate for the TD 5.25% Perpetual New Issue has been updated to $24.05 as of the close today.

Perpetuals continued to decline today. Holders of the Royal Bank issues should note – before they have a heart attack at 9:31 tomorrow – that today, 10/22 was the last day of cum-dividend trading; tomorrow, 10/23, will be the first day of ex-dividend trading for the current dividend.

There were fifteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.