Market Action

May 25, 2011

Fitch has opined that German banks should survive a Greek Tragedy:

German banks have “manageable” risks related to Greek sovereign debt and the Mediterranean country’s economy, according to Fitch Ratings, which said it doesn’t foresee any action on the lenders’ credit ratings.

“A hypothetical 50 percent haircut of Greek sovereign exposure would not result in such a depletion of banks’ capitalization that a rating action would automatically be triggered, even for the more exposed banks,” Fitch said. “These either have strong owners, sufficient profitability or capital able to absorb potential losses without a structural impact on their business model, funding or franchise.”

German banks cut their holdings in Greece to $34 billion in the last quarter of 2010 from more than $40 billion, while the French have reduced claims to about $57 billion from $63 billion, according to figures from the Basel, Switzerland-based Bank for International Settlements. Commerzbank AG (CBK), Germany’s second-biggest lender, said earlier this month that it would be able to absorb any “stress” related to its sovereign-debt holdings, such as a debt restructuring.

With all this stuff about Greece. it’s easy to forget Ireland. But bad things are happening there, too:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) has today downgraded the subordinated debt ratings, including the Dated Subordinated Debt rating of The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland (Bank of Ireland or the Group), to CCC from B (high). The ratings of all subordinated debt of the Bank of Ireland remain Under Review with Negative Implications, where they were placed on 3 December 2010. The rating action reflects the recent actions towards subordinated bondholders at two of Bank of Ireland’s domestic peers, and DBRS’s view that there is an increasing likelihood of similar actions towards the Group’s subordinated bondholders.

The rating action also considers the Minster for Finance’s comments that subordinated bondholders are expected to make noteworthy contributions to the incremental capital requirement under the PCAR results, which were acknowledged by the Bank of Ireland in its 1Q11 Interim Management Statement.

The bank’s Interim Management Statement doesn’t say anything beyond what’s noted by DBRS, but certainly had a strong effect on the market:

Credit-default swaps insuring the subordinated debt of Bank of Ireland Plc surged on concern the government will impose losses on bondholders as it has done with Anglo Irish Bank Corp. and Allied Irish Banks Plc.

Allied Irish this week offered to buy back junior debt at discounts of 75 percent to 90 percent prompting Standard & Poor’s to downgrade the notes to the lowest D for default grade. The “distressed exchange” is similar to that offered to Anglo Irish bondholders last year as the government seeks to share the costs of bailing out its lenders.

“The coerciveness of the Irish government has spread from Anglo to Allied,” said Alexander Plenk, an analyst at UniCredit SpA in Munich. “The offer they made was pretty much the same, and the fear in the market is that they will do the same thing with Bank of Ireland.”

The Anglo-Irish swap was coercive:

ANGLO Irish Bank Corp offered to exchange €1.6 billion of subordinated debt at a discount, paying in new bonds at a rate of 20 cent on the euro as the nationalised lender seeks to generate capital.

Anglo Irish will offer bondholders that don’t take up the exchange 1 cent per €1,000 face amount to redeem their floating-rate notes due in 2014, 2016 and 2017, the lender said last night. The new securities will be due 2011 and guaranteed by the Government, according to the statement.

Allied Irish published their similar offer on May 13.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp, FixedResets basically flat and DeemedRetractibles up 11bp. Volatility – in the index-included issues! – was low and volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.55%, equivalent to 7.22% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield a little under 5.3% (!) so the pre-tax interest equivalent spread is now about 190bp, a sharp widening from the 180bp reported May 18, as yields have moved in opposite directions.

But the big news of the day was the yellow blood all over the carpet!

YLO Issues, 2011-5-25
Ticker Quote
5/24
Quote
5/25
Bid YTW
5/25
YTW
Scenario
5/25
Performance
5/25
(bid/bid)
YLO.PR.A 24.11-24 23.84-95 7.85% Soft Maturity
2012-12-30
-1.12%
YLO.PR.B 18.47-54 17.85-99 11.99% Soft Maturity
2017-06-29
-3.36%
YLO.PR.C 19.80-20 18.88-00 8.93% Limit Maturity -4.65%
YLO.PR.D 19.96-00 19.17-34 8.95% Limit Maturity -3.96%

Cool!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2100 % 2,464.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2100 % 3,706.7
Floater 2.44 % 2.24 % 44,844 21.64 4 0.2100 % 2,661.1
OpRet 4.87 % 3.49 % 62,211 0.42 9 0.0730 % 2,423.0
SplitShare 5.22 % -2.15 % 60,083 0.56 6 0.0245 % 2,514.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0730 % 2,215.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.73 % 4.78 % 132,934 0.83 9 0.1807 % 2,068.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.48 % 5.55 % 123,524 14.49 15 0.0700 % 2,166.7
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.26 % 193,574 2.86 57 -0.0028 % 2,308.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.13 % 4.89 % 327,069 8.09 53 0.1135 % 2,144.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
NA.PR.P FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.27
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.81
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.98
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 89,472 RBC crossed blocks of 19,000 and 30,700, both at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 77,173 Desjardins crossed 60,000 at 21.91.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 21.55
Evaluated at bid price : 21.87
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 45,748 Desjardins crossed 27,200 at 19.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 19.49
Evaluated at bid price : 19.49
Bid-YTW : 2.71 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 44,831 RBC crossed 38,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
RY.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 41,623 TD crossed 29,300 at 24.32.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 41,000 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 23.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.27
Bid-YTW : 2.24 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.49 – 23.87
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2710

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 23.49
Bid-YTW : 5.38 %

POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Quote: 25.05 – 25.31
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1771

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-25
Maturity Price : 24.80
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.60 – 25.98
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2995

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 4.63 %

RY.PR.G Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.29 – 24.47
Spot Rate : 0.1800
Average : 0.1264

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %

IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.47 – 25.63
Spot Rate : 0.1600
Average : 0.1107

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 27.05 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1508

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %

Market Action

May 24, 2011

More trouble in Europe:

Standard & Poor’s said Saturday that country was in danger of having its debt rating lowered if it could not reduce its public borrowing and improve economic growth.

The ratings agency lowered its outlook for Italy’s debt to negative from stable. That means there is a one-in-three chance that S&P would downgrade Italy’s debt rating in the next two years.

Fitch and Moody’s, the other two main ratings agencies, have said they see no reason to alter their outlook for Italy’s debt. The S&P warning was enough to rattle European markets and cause investors to worry that Italy could be next on the list of countries affected by widespread European debt after Greece, Portugal and Ireland.

The Greeks might even get serious!

Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou’s Cabinet is set to endorse additional deficit cuts and asset sales, fending off speculation that the country is headed to a restructuring.

The cost to insure Greek debt against default rose to a record and the yield on its 10-year bonds increased to a euro- era high after Standard & Poor’s said May 20 it may cut Italy’s credit rating. That warning came hours after Fitch Ratings cut Greece three grades.

Greek 10-year yields jumped 19 basis points to 16.76 percent as of 9:23 a.m. in London while yields on two-year notes climbed 12 basis points to 25.58 percent. Italian 10-year yields rose six basis points to 4.84 percent.

The cost of insuring government and corporate debt rose in Europe, according to traders of credit-default swaps. Contracts on Greece soared 29 basis points to a record 1,373, Ireland jumped 14 to 655 and Portugal rose 9 to 649, while Italy increased 14 to 174 and Spain climbed 13 to 275, prices from data provider CMA showed today.

In Athens, Papandreou is chairing a Cabinet meeting today to discuss his fifth austerity package since getting a 110 billion-euro rescue from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.

The government is looking for ways to speed up plans to sell 50 billion euros of assets, the equivalent of almost 25 percent of gross domestic product. The meeting comes as a team of IMF and EU inspectors prepare to return to Athens this week to complete their review of Greece’s progress in meeting the bailout terms.

As it happens, asset sales will speed up:

The Greek government endorsed an accelerated asset-sale plan and 6 billion euros ($8.4 billion) of budget cuts to win extra aid and stem a market slide that threatens to swamp the most debt-laden euro-area nations.

Belgium had the outlook on its AA+ investment-grade credit rating lowered to negative at Fitch Ratings yesterday as the cost to insure Greek debt against default rose to a record and the yield on its 10-year bonds increased to a euro-era high.

Greek 10-year yields jumped 46 basis points to a record 17 percent, while yields on two-year notes climbed 79 basis points to 26.25 percent. Contracts on Greek default insurance soared 29 basis points to a record 1,373.

“The bond market is the only language policy makers will listen to,” Axel Merk, chief investment officer for Merk Investments Llc said in an interview with Bloomberg Television’s Betty Liu. “Once the bond markets impose austerity on the country that’s when they follow through, when there is a backing off, when things are going better, that’s when they lapse.”

I’ll bid on the Elgin Marbles!

Whenever you deal with somebody who proudly sports a title containing the word “ethicist” or “advocate”, you know you’re going to hear a lot of arrogance and idiocy. For example, there was an article in Sunday’s Star titled DNA diviners: Valuable service or dangerous novelty?:

Knowledge of your carrier status is beneficial, says Kerry Bowman, a medical ethicist at the University of Toronto who specializes in genetic issues.

But Bowman sees ethical problems with the disease susceptibility information, fearing it will be misunderstood or cause unnecessary fear.

“It does raise ethical questions. . . if you’re giving people genetic information about things they cannot control,” he says.

“I mean an increased prostate cancer (risk) or something, what can you do with that except stew?”

His fear that genetic information will be misunderstood or cause unnecessary fear is simply arrogant. Get back to your book-burning, Mr. Bowman. As for what people can do with increased prostate cancer risk … well, one thing you can do is take out increased insurance that covers prostate cancer. The adverse selection implied by idiotic restrictions on the information that insurance companies can use will be the death of the industry.

Rolet of the LSE is dissing the banks’ bid for the TMX:

We look at this first and foremost as an opportunity for Canada and a growth based deal, not the reconstitution of a very strong monopolistic silo. I think the Maple team has highlighted their preferred model — the Hong Kong Stock Exchange or Deutsche Borse model — which is based on a hermetically sealed clearing silo and no competition.

There are issues today in terms of competition if you merge with your competitor, if you integrate the clearinghouse — of course that’s where the growth is going to come from because by merging with the clearinghouse you’ve prevented any future competition from entering the market. Who’s going to pay for this? Perhaps not the founding members, certainly everyone else will.

If [Alpha and CDS] are contributed as equity does the banks’ ownership go above 50% if you have to put in another couple of billion? The whole construct, which is based on pricing power resulting from the setting up of a monopoly, comes crashing down when you look at the issue of getting approval from the shareholders of Alpha and CDS and that has to be based on a pricing agreement that realizes substantial value for them.

We don’t know anything about what the competition authorities are going to think in terms of this reconstitution of a monopolistic silo.

I think this goes against — not just in France or Brussels or Germany or the U.K. or the U.S. — this goes against the general trend that regulators… do not want banks to own infrastructure, because infrastructure has to remain neutral.

It’s definitely not the sense we get history is moving, both in the United States and in Europe. You need at the end a separation, you need neutrality, because it’s not just about banks. Big wholesale banks are very important customers, but so are small and mid-sized broker dealers. If you get price increases linked to the integration of a clearinghouse [like CDS Inc.] who is going to pay for those increases? Who is going to pay for the fee increases resulting from lessened competition at the trading level? Is it going to be the founding members of that particular Maple consortium, or is it going to be everybody else? It’s the small corporate issuers, the small broker dealers. If a platform is not neutral, it cannot function as a exchange should.

But there are problems with the LSE bid:

The value of the bourse’s offer to buy TMX Group Inc. (X) with equity fell 4.9 percent below the price of the Toronto stock exchange operator’s shares yesterday, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. The gap is the widest of any all-stock deal over $1 billion, indicating to arbitragers that LSE’s equity alone won’t be enough to fend off a higher bid from a group of Canadian banks and funds trying to keep TMX in local hands.

Fox News has enough about the DSK thing to make you sick.

DBRS has downgraded Portugal to BBB+ [Trend Negative] and published a commentary titled The Effect of Sovereign Risk on Securitisations in the Euro Area.

Chinese equities got hit today:

Jim Chanos, the hedge-fund manager known for predicting Enron Corp.’s 2001 collapse, says he’d short sell Chinese companies listed in the U.S. if it were feasible to borrow shares to open the bearish positions.

The Bloomberg Chinese Reverse Mergers Index has plunged 41 percent since Nov. 8 amid speculation financial statements from companies such as China MediaExpress Holdings Inc. (CCME) can’t be trusted. The concern intensified this week after Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd. (LFT), whose initial public offering was underwritten by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank AG, said its auditor quit because of false records.

S&P upgraded Saskatchewan:

The province joined an elite club of provinces on Tuesday when Standard & Poor’s upgraded its debt rating to triple-A. The only provinces to share the triple-A honour are western neighbours Alberta and British Columbia.

Rather than quickly spending its newly-earned wealth, the provincial government has put its tax revenue toward paying the bills. S&P gave special credit to Saskatchewan for its “low-and-declining debt burden.” As of March 31, the province’s fiscal year-end, Saskatchewan’s debt totalled $4.6-billion, representing 38 per cent of this year’s projected operating revenues and only 8 per cent of its gross domestic product. Canada’s federal debt-to-GDP ratio sits at around 35 per cent.

Knowing how to actually do something useful can be lucrative:

College students’ choice of major can mean the difference between median earnings of $120,000 for petroleum engineering and $29,000 for counseling psychology, a study by Georgetown University showed.

Of the top 10 undergraduate majors with the highest median salaries, eight were in engineering, including aerospace, chemical and mechanical, according to the study released today by Georgetown’s Center on Education and the Workforce.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 5bp, FixedResets losing 10bp and DeemedRetractibles up 9bp. Not much volatility, but volume was above average. TMX block trading data from the Financial Post is not available at time of writing.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0233 % 2,459.4
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0233 % 3,699.0
Floater 2.45 % 2.24 % 44,857 21.65 4 -0.0233 % 2,655.5
OpRet 4.87 % 3.55 % 61,890 0.42 9 -0.0900 % 2,421.2
SplitShare 5.22 % -2.13 % 57,176 0.56 6 -0.0441 % 2,513.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0900 % 2,214.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 4.84 % 134,817 0.83 9 0.0397 % 2,064.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.53 % 124,634 14.52 15 0.0532 % 2,165.2
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.23 % 196,523 2.86 57 -0.1038 % 2,308.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.13 % 4.90 % 331,045 8.09 53 0.0874 % 2,142.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-24
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-24
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 228,820 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 114,342 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.81 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 79,995 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.10 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 48,080 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 36,115 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.37
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset 30,730 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 3.57 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 24.92 – 25.24
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2001

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.29 – 25.66
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2535

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %

BAM.PR.J OpRet Quote: 26.66 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2281

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.66
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %

BAM.PR.R FixedReset Quote: 25.81 – 26.12
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.2211

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-24
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.81
Bid-YTW : 4.62 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.55 – 23.81
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1814

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-24
Maturity Price : 23.33
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 23.26 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1650

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

Interesting External Papers

Exchange Traded Bonds?

Bruno Biais and Richard C. Green, The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th Century:

Bonds are traded in over-the-counter markets, where opacity and fragmentation imply large transaction costs for retail investors. Is there something special about bonds, in contrast to stocks, precluding transparent limit-order markets? Historical experience suggests this is not the case. Before WWII, there was an active market in corporate and municipal bonds on the NYSE. Activity dropped dramatically, in the late 1920s for municipals and in the mid 1940s for corporate, as trading migrated to the over-the-counter market. The erosion of liquidity on the exchange occurred simultaneously with increases in the relative importance of institutional investors, who fare better in OTC market. Based on current and historical high frequency data, we find that average trading costs in municipal bonds on the NYSE were half as large in 1926-1927 as they are today over the counter. Trading costs in corporate bonds for small investors in the 1940s were as low or lower in the 1940s than they are now. The difference in transactions costs are likely to reflect the differences in market structures, since the underlying technological changes have likely reduced costs of matching buyers and sellers.

The authors point out the central question:

Perhaps corporate and municipal bonds have low liquidity and high trading costs because they are traded in opaque and decentralized dealer markets. Alternatively, perhaps they trade over the counter because the infrequent need for trade, and sophistication of the traders involved, renders the continuous maintenance of a widely disseminated, centralized limit-order book wasteful and costly.

What is often ignored is the fact that exchange trading of bonds has been tried before:

Until 1946, there was an active market in corporate bonds on the NYSE. In the 1930s, on the Exchange, the trading volume in bonds was between one fifth and one third of the trading volume in stocks. In earlier periods, there was also an active market for municipal bonds and government bonds…Municipal bond trading largely migrated from the exchange in the late 1920s, and volume in corporate bonds dropped dramatically in the late 1940s.(footnote) Since this collapse, bond trading on the Exchange has been limited.

Footnote: The historical evolution of trading volume in municipal and corporate bonds is documented in the present paper. The Treasury and Federal Study of the Government Securities Market, published in July 1959, mentions (Part I, page 95) that trading volume in Treasury securities migrated from the NYSE to the OTC market during the first half of the 1920s.

Two possible explanations for the collapse of the exchange market are dismissed:

First, we ask whether decreases in liquidity could have been associated with changes in the role of bond financing generally. Based on data assembled from different sources (Federal Reserve, NBER and Guthman (1950)) we show that bond financing actually grew during the periods when trading volume collapsed on the Exchange.

Second, we ask whether the drop in liquidity could have resulted from SEC regulations increasing the cost of listing on the Exchange. We show that the decline in liquidity was not correlated with a decline in listings. Furthermore, while Exchange trading disappeared in securities that were exempt from the 1933 and 1934 acts (such as municipal bonds), it remained active in securities which were subject to this regulation (most notably stocks).

The third possibility is due to the interaction of groups with differing objectives in a heterogeneous market:

Different equilibria will vary in terms of their attractiveness for different categories of market participants. Intermediaries benefit when liquidity concentrates in venues where they earn rents, such as opaque and fragmented markets. For reasons we will show were quite evident to observers at the time, large institutional investors fare better than retail investors in a dealership market. This was especially t ue on the NYSE until 1975, because commissions were regulated by the Constitution of the Exchange, while intermediary compensation was fully negotiable on the OTC market. We find that liquidity migrated from the exchange to the OTC market at times when institutional investors and dealers became more important relative to retail investors. As institutions and dealers became more prevalent in bond trading, they tipped the balance in favor of the over-the-counter markets.

TRACE, of course, has had an impact:

In their studies of the corporate bond market, Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) and Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2007) show that the lack of transparency in the corporate bond market led to large transactions costs, while the recent improvement in post-trade transparency associated with the implementation of the TRACE system lowered these costs for the bonds included in the TRACE system.

A later paper by Bessembinder & Maxwell has been reviewed on PrefBlog, in the post TRACE and Corporate Bond Market Transparency. The referenced paper, by Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman, is titled Market Transparency, Liquidity Externalities, And Institutional Trading Costs in Corporate Bonds:

We develop a simple model of the effect of transaction reporting on trade execution costs and test it using a sample of institutional trades in corporate bonds, before and after the initiation of public transaction reporting through the TRACE system. The results indicate a reduction of approximately 50% in trade execution costs for bonds eligible for TRACE transaction reporting, and consistent with the model’s implications, also indicate the presence of a “liquidity externality” that results in a 20% reduction in execution costs for bonds not eligible for TRACE reporting. The key results are robust to allowances for changes in variables, such as interest rate volatility and trading activity, which might also affect execution costs. We also document decreased market shares for large dealers and a smaller cost advantage to large dealers post-TRACE, suggesting that the corporate bond market has become more competitive after TRACE implementation. These results reinforce that market design can have first-order effects, even for sophisticated institutional customers.

The paper by AMY K. EDWARDS, LAWRENCE E. HARRIS, MICHAEL S. PIWOWAR is titled Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and Transparency:

Using a complete record of U.S. OTC secondary trades in corporate bonds, we estimate average transaction costs as a function of trade size for each bond that traded more than nine times between January 2003 and January 2005. We find that transaction costs decrease significantly with trade size. Highly rated bonds, recently issued bonds, and bonds close to maturity have lower transaction costs than do other bonds. Costs are lower for bonds with transparent trade prices, and they drop when the TRACE system starts to publicly disseminate their prices. The results suggest that public traders benefit significantly from price transparency.

The paper by Michael A. Goldstein, Edith S. Hotchkiss and Erik R. Sirri is titled Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate Bonds:

This article reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of lastsale trade reporting on the liquidity of BBB corporate bonds. Overall, adding transparency has either a neutral or a positive effect on liquidity. Increased transparency is not associated with greater trading volume. Except for very large trades, spreads on newly transparent bonds decline relative to bonds that experience no transparency change. However, we find no effect on spreads for very infrequently traded bonds. The observed decrease in transaction costs is consistent with investors’ ability to negotiate better terms of trade once they have access to broader bond-pricing data.

The Biais and Green paper makes a hiliarious point about trading frequency:

Table 6 shows the number of trades and average trade size on the NYSE by year for the six corporate issues in our sample. In 1943 and 1944, trading activity was relatively high. There were around 800 trades per bond issue each year, which is over two transactions per trading day. The trading frequency observed in the modern OTC corporate bond market has been documented in modern studies. Using TRACE data Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) observe on average 1.1 trade per day, and Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) around 2.0 trades per day.

More Biais & Green:

Furthermore, the professionalized management and relatively frequent presence in the market of institutions makes transparency less important to them than to less sophisticated small investors who trade infrequently. The repeated interaction that dealers and institutions have with each other renders them less vulnerable to the opportunities which a lack of transparency affords other participants to profit at their expense on a one-time basis. Smaller institutions and individuals, for the opposite reasons, will tend to fare better in an exchange-based trading regime. Indeed, the theoretical model of Bernhardt et al (2005) shows that, in a dealer market, large institutions will trade more frequently and in larger amounts than retail investors, and incur lower transactions costs.(footnote)

Footnote: Bernhardt et al (2005) also offer an interesting empirical illustration of these effects in the case of the London Stock Exchange.

The paper by Dan Bernhardt, Vladimir Dvoracek, Eric Hughson & Ingrid M. Werner is titled Why Do Larger Orders Receive Discounts on the London Stock Exchange?:

We argue that competition between dealers in a classic dealer market is intertemporal: A trader identifies a particular dealer and negotiates a final price with only the intertemporal threat to switch dealers imposing pricing discipline on the dealer. In this kind of market structure, we show that dealers will offer greater price improvement to more regular customers, and, in turn, these customers optimally choose to submit larger orders. Hence price improvement and trade size should be negatively correlated in a dealer market. We confirm our model’s predictions using unique data from the London Stock Exchange during 1991.

Biais & Green also make the point:

Over-the-counter and exchange-based bond trading coexisted for decades in the 20th century with viable levels of activity in each setting. What upset this balance? Was the migration to the OTC market triggered by changes in the structure of the population of bond investors? Combining Guthman (1950) and data from the Fed, we present in Figure 5 the evolution of bond ownership between 1920 and 2004.13 As can be seen in Panel A, there was a dramatic increase in institutional ownership in corporate bonds between 1940 and 1960. In the 1940s the weight and importance of institutional investors in the bond market grew tremendously. These investors came to amount for the majority of the trading activity in the bond market. Naturally, they chose to direct their trades to the OTC market, where they could effectively exploit their bargaining power, without being hindered by reporting and price priority constraints, and where they could avoid the regulated commissions which prevailed on the Exchange. Thus, the liquidity of the corporate bond market migrated to the dealer market.

Biais & Green also make an important point, which may be relevant to the debate on High Frequency Trading:

An obvious question is why exchange trading remained predominant in the stock market, in such a stark contrast with the bond market. One important difference between bond and stock trading on the Exchange is that, while the bond market has always been purely order driven, specialists have traditionally supplied liquidity in the stock market. It is possible that the presence of the specialist anchored the liquidity on the exchange. Because it was common knowledge that the specialist would be there to supply liquidity, small and medium sized trades could continue to be directed to the exchange. Because liquidity attracts liquidity, the larger traders also found it attractive to trade there, in line with the logic of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988).

Market Action

May 20, 2011

Another bad day for Greek bonds:

The yield on the Greek 10-year bond added 56 basis points, driving the difference with German bunds to a record 1,349 basis points.

Stocks and the euro extended losses as the Associated Press reported Norway froze a 235 million kroner ($42.3 million) grant to Greece because it hasn’t lived up to conditions linked to the grant, while Fitch Ratings said any potential extension of Greek bond maturities would be considered a default as it downgraded the debt.

The yield on Greek 10-year bonds surged 1.11 percentage points to 16.55 percent this week. The Portuguese 10-year yield increased 27 basis points to 9.38 percent, sending the spread with benchmark German bunds 33 basis points wider. Irish 10-year bond yields rose six basis points, with similar-maturity Spanish yields nine basis points higher.

The IMF has lent some money to Portugal:

The International Monetary Fund approved a 26 billion-euro ($36.8 billion) loan to Portugal as part of a joint bailout with the European Union in the latest effort to stem the region’s sovereign debt crisis.

The Washington-based institution will make 6.1 billion euros available immediately, the fund said in an e-mailed statement today. The IMF followed European officials, who on May 16 endorsed the 78-billion ($110 billion) joint package.

Sadly, the article does not address the question of whether the cheque was delivered by women in skimply little maid outfits.

The FRB-Boston has released a public policy brief by Jeffrey C. Fuhrer and Giovanni P. Olivei titled The Estimated Macroeconomic Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Treasury Purchase Program:

This brief examines an issue of current importance to the conduct of U.S. economic policy: how has the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) plan to purchase up to $600 billion of Treasury securities by June 30, 2011 affected the movement of inflation, GDP, and employment to more desirable medium-term and long-term levels? Following the FOMC’s announcement of the plan on November 3, 2010, other events that potentially influence Treasury yields have been at play. To estimate the effects that the FOMC Treasury purchases may have on the goal of achieving more desirable levels of inflation and employment, the authors make use of different models to gauge the likely effect upon interest rates, the interest rate effects on real spending (GDP), and how changes in GDP may be affecting the employment rate.

The FRB-Cleveland has published the May, 2011, edition of Economic Trends.

OSFI has released the Spring, 2011, edition of the OSFI Pillar with articles (well, notes, really):

  • OSFI Plan and Priorities for 2011-2014
  • Draft revised MCT guideline for P&C insurers
  • Speech by Assistant Superintendent Ted Price
  • Speech by Superintendent Julie Dickson
  • External peer review panel on 25th CPP Actuarial Report
  • Draft Stress Testing Guideline for Defined Benefit Pension Plans

There was good inflation news:

The consumer price index increased 0.3 percent in April after a 1.1 percent gain in the previous month, Statistics Canada reported today. The median forecast of 27 economists in a Bloomberg News survey was for a 0.5 percent advance.

Consumer prices rose 3.3 percent from a year earlier, matching the annual rate of advance in March.

The TMX will resist bank hegemony. Go, guys, go!

Bubble, bubble, toil and trouble:

Housing costs for the average two-storey home in Vancouver today eat up the equivalent of 80 per cent of a typical family’s annual pretax income, according to new research, putting ownership out of reach for most.

Across the country, homeowners are putting a larger portion of their earnings toward their homes, and interest-rate increases are likely to put further pressure on homeowners in the coming months, the Royal Bank of Canada said in its quarterly affordability index.

The problem is especially pronounced in Vancouver, where the bank estimated families must now dedicate 72 per cent of their household income to pay the mortgage, property taxes and utilities on a bungalow. In Toronto, it would take 47.5 per cent.

It was another fine day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts inching ahead by 1bp, FixedResets up 11bp and DeemedRetractibes rocketting 28bp. The last group were led by SLF issues, which went ex-Dividend today. Volume was mediocre.

See you after the Rapture!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1753 % 2,460.0
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1753 % 3,699.8
Floater 2.45 % 2.25 % 41,507 21.63 4 0.1753 % 2,656.2
OpRet 4.87 % 3.51 % 62,267 0.44 9 0.0129 % 2,423.4
SplitShare 5.21 % -1.59 % 56,280 0.57 6 0.3934 % 2,514.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0129 % 2,216.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.29 % 135,095 0.84 9 -0.0859 % 2,064.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.53 % 120,357 14.53 15 0.0112 % 2,164.1
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.22 % 195,420 2.87 57 0.1056 % 2,311.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.91 % 328,831 8.10 53 0.2761 % 2,140.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.84
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
BMO.PR.L Deemed-Retractible 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.51
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.44
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.32
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 2.60 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-06-19
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : -27.48 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.28
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 1.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 304,677 TD crossed five blocks; 100,000 shares, then 60,000 and 35,000, followed by two of 50,000 each, all at 27.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.43
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 76,960 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 23.90; RBC crossed 29,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-20
Maturity Price : 23.67
Evaluated at bid price : 23.94
Bid-YTW : 5.65 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 54,883 Nesbitt crossed 37,200 at 25.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 44,488 RBC crossed 38,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.18
Bid-YTW : 3.19 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 37,193 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 26.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.15
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 35,640 RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.39.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.39
Bid-YTW : 3.25 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.E OpRet Quote: 26.75 – 27.18
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2753

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %

ELF.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.84 – 23.40
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.4187

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.84
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.93 – 23.29
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2248

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.93
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %

TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Premium Quote: 50.11 – 50.39
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1915

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-20
Maturity Price : 46.84
Evaluated at bid price : 50.11
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.70 – 24.99
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2035

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-20
Maturity Price : 23.53
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.40 – 24.94
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.4585

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-20
Maturity Price : 24.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 5.70 %

Interesting External Papers

BoC Releases Spring, 2011, Review

The Bank of Canada has released the Bank of Canada Review, Spring 2011, a Special Issue devoted to Lessons from the Financial Crisis with articles:

  • Understanding and Measuring Liquidity Risk: A Selection of Recent Research
  • Unconventional Monetary Policy: The International Experience with Central Bank Asset Purchases
  • Lessons from the Use of Extraordinary Central Bank Liquidity Facilities
  • Central Bank Collateral Policy: Insights from Recent Experience

Sadly, despite the promising focus of the special issue, I found nothing of particular interest in the material.

Market Action

May 19, 2011

The lifecos continue to whine about new capital requirements:

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) set to take effect 2014 “will severely inhibit” the core business of Canadian lifecos, Donald Stewart, chief executive of Sun Life Financial Inc., told the company’s meeting Wednesday.

One of the main problems with IFRS is that it changes the way companies value products such as life insurance policies, potentially forcing companies to hike prices beyond the reach of many Canadians. Mr. Stewart warned this wouldn’t benefit either the industry or the country.

Meanwhile, insurers are also bracing for the impact of new capital rules that are “significantly more onerous” than existing regulations, he said.

The industry is working with the Office of the Superintendent of Financial institutions, the regulator, to try to ensure that the new capital rules are not excessively stringent.

The comments echo recent statements made by Don Guloien, chief executive of Manulife Financial Corp. Mr. Guloien told his company’s annual meeting May 5 that new accounting and capital rules constitute one of the single biggest risks that Manulife currently faces.

The industry is particularly concerned that the new IFRS accounting rules will make earnings more volatile. That could have a negative impact on capital and on key capital ratios used by the regulator to determine a company’s financial health.

DSK has quit the IMF to pursue other interests.

Here’s a straw in the wind:

Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN) now sells 105 books for its Kindle electronic-readers for every 100 printed books.

Sales of the e-books for the Kindle, introduced in 2007, surpassed hardcover titles in July 2010, and overtook paperbacks six months later, the Seattle-based company said today in a statement.

It was a strong day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 20bp, FixedResets up 5bp and DeemedRetractibles leaping ahead 38bp. The Performance Highlights table told a tale, with nine entries, all DeemedRetractible and mostly insurers – which was also the tilt on the volume table, although not to as large an extent. Volume was comfortably above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0350 % 2,455.7
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0350 % 3,693.3
Floater 2.45 % 2.25 % 41,884 21.64 4 -0.0350 % 2,651.5
OpRet 4.87 % 3.51 % 61,098 1.15 9 0.1804 % 2,423.1
SplitShare 5.24 % -1.75 % 56,727 0.57 6 -0.0505 % 2,504.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1804 % 2,215.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 4.88 % 126,595 0.84 9 0.0551 % 2,065.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.49 % 5.51 % 120,608 14.56 15 0.2021 % 2,163.8
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.29 % 195,962 2.88 57 0.0509 % 2,308.7
Deemed-Retractible 5.14 % 4.90 % 322,437 8.11 53 0.3755 % 2,134.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.30
Bid-YTW : 5.72 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.85
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.93
Bid-YTW : 5.76 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.18
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.66
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.09
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %
GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.67
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 123,976 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 23.34.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet 101,512 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.79 %
SLF.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 86,594 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 22.10; RBC crossed 27,200 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 67,453 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 22.44, then another 40,000 at 22.62.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 65,904 TD crossed 25,000 at 27.90; Desjardins crossed 31,900 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 2.90 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 59,013 Scotia crossed two blocks of 25,000 each at 25.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-02-29
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.80 %
There were 41 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.41 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.3692

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-05-19
Maturity Price : 24.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.41
Bid-YTW : 5.69 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 27.41 – 27.75
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2392

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.41
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.20 – 25.49
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2050

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.65 – 22.98
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2633

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %

MFC.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.01 – 22.24
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1647

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %

SLF.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.20 – 22.45
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1896

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %

Issue Comments

RBS.PR.A: Partial Redemption Call

R Split III Corp. has announced:

that it has called 138,250 Preferred Shares for cash redemption on May 31, 2011 (in accordance with the Company’s Articles) representing approximately 8.9583729% of the outstanding Preferred Shares as a result of the annual retraction of 276,500 Capital Shares by the holders thereof. The Preferred Shares shall be redeemed on a pro rata basis, so that each holder of Preferred Shares of record on May 30, 2011 will have approximately 8.9583729% of their Preferred Shares redeemed. The redemption price for the Preferred Shares will be $29.22 per share.

In addition, holders of a further 150,000 Capital Shares and 75,000 Preferred Shares have deposited such shares concurrently for retraction on May 31, 2011. As a result, a total of 426,500 Capital Shares and 213,250 Preferred Shares, or approximately 13.1778% of both classes of shares currently outstanding, will be redeemed.

Holders of Preferred Shares that are on record for dividends but have been called for redemption will be entitled to receive dividends thereon which have been declared but remain unpaid up to but not including May 31, 2011.

Payment of the amount due to holders of Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on May 31, 2011. From and after May 31, 2011 the holders of Preferred Shares that have been called for redemption will not be entitled to dividends or to exercise any rights in respect of such shares except to receive the amount due on redemption.

R Split III Corp. is a mutual fund corporation created to hold a portfolio of common shares of Royal Bank of Canada. Capital Shares and Preferred Shares of R Split III Corp. are listed for trading on The Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols RBS and RBS.PR.A respectively.

RBS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when there was a partial call for redemption in May, 2010. RBS.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Publications

Opinion: OSFI and the Bond Indices

OSFI wants to include contingent capital in the bond indices … even though Contingent Capital issues are not bonds!

Look for the opinion link!

Also available is the draft version with footnotes

The article has also been published on-line by Advisors’ Edge Report with the title OSFI Targets Bond Investors.

Update, 2011-6-21: Investors with an interest in the subject are urged to read Rowland Fleming’s explanation of how Bre-X became an index constituent.

Update, 2015-4-26: In the article, I attempt to differentiate between “good indices” and “bad indices”; the proliferation of ETFs has caused a corresponding proliferation of indices, which concerns a few US-based heavyweight lobbies:

ETFs – Since the Commission first permitted the creation of exchange-traded funds through an exemption from the Investment Advisers Act, well over a trillion dollars have been invested in these funds. ETFs, which were originally conceived as plain vanilla, index-tracking investments, can offer significant benefits to retail investors. In recent years, however, the Commission staff has approved through ad-hoc exemptive orders new and exotic versions of ETFs, many of which pose significant risks that are likely to be poorly understood by unsophisticated retail investors. For example, Commission staff has permitted ETF providers to: create their own indices just so they can create an ETF to track those indices, create inverse and leveraged ETFs, and even create actively managed ETFs.

Press Clippings

Financial Post: Opt for dividend half of split-share companies

Eric Lam of the Financial Post has published a piece titled Opt for dividend half of split-share companies in which I am quoted:

James Hymas, an expert on preferred shares and president of Hymas Investment Management, recommends preferred shares over capital shares. “The preferred shares are very often a good investment for a fixed income retail investor looking for a short-term investment. Capital shares are almost always a poor investment.”

While the investments carry a paper expense ratio generally between 1% and 1.5%, the fees are borne almost entirely by capital shareholders.

For example, if the underlying portfolio is worth $15 and preferred shareholders are guaranteed $10 on maturity, then capital shareholders only really have a claim on $5, but are paying fees on much more than that, he said.

Another factor to consider is that split preferred shares often receive very low credit ratings from credit agencies due to the multiplying risks involved in holding a basket of companies. However, Mr. Hymas argues that investors holding split preferred shares are still better off as investors in common or preferred shares in an operating company generally get nothing in the event of a default.

For those interested, Mr. Hymas recommends investors look for annual yields of at least 4.5% or more. Deciding on credit volatility means taking a good hard look at the underlying portfolio.

Mr. Hymas is keeping an eye on two different preferred shares from BAM Split Corp. that carry shares in Brookfield Asset Management Inc. and must be redeemed by 2016 and 2019 respectively. Another is the preferred shares of Dividend 15 Split Corp. II, which holds 15 companies including the big five banks and telecoms such as Telus Corp. and BCE Inc. It matures in 2014.

Market Action

May 18, 2011

There’s a scuffle about a Greek default:

European Central Bank officials ruled out a Greek debt restructuring, clashing with political leaders over a solution to the sovereign financial crisis.

“A Greek debt restructuring is not the appropriate way forward — it would create a catastrophe” because it would damage the banking system, ECB Executive Board member Juergen Stark said today in Lagonissi, Greece. Fellow board member Lorenzo Bini Smaghi said in Milan that “a solution for reducing debt but not paying for it will not work.”

Now, I will not claim that I’m the world’s greatest scholar on the debt crisis, but that seems to me to be the first official admission that the purpose of the various bail-outs is to save the banks. Anybody have anything both earlier and more explicit?

More gloomy punditry on US housing:

More than half U.S. homeowners and renters say housing won’t recover until at least 2014, reflecting a deepening pessimism about the real estate market, according to a survey by Trulia Inc. and RealtyTrac Inc.

The survey, taken in April, found that 54 percent of respondents don’t expect a recovery for at least three years, up from 34 percent in November, the two real estate data companies said today. Those who see a turnaround by the end of next year fell to 15 percent from 27 percent.

The housing market is weakening as near record-low interest rates and falling prices fail to boost demand after the expiration of a federal tax credit for homebuyers last year. Values will come under more pressure as 1.8 million properties that are delinquent or in foreclosure are added to the inventory of unsold homes, according to a March estimate by CoreLogic Inc., a real estate information firm in Santa Ana, California.

The iPad has been extraordinarily disruptive:

The iPad is wreaking havoc on the personal-computer market.

Hewlett-Packard Co. (HPQ)’s consumer PC sales plunged 23 percent last quarter, and the company lopped $1 billion off its annual sales forecast. And while rival Dell Inc. (DELL) beat analysts’ estimates because of corporate demand, its sales to consumers slumped 7.5 percent. More than 70 million tablets like the Apple Inc. (AAPL) iPad will be sold in 2011, a total that will balloon to 246 million in three years, Jefferies & Co. said yesterday.

You don’t need a full-blown computer to use eMail or look at dirty pictures on the internet!

There’s sales parties, sure. And then there’s REALLY GOOD sales parties!

A Munich Re unit hosted about 20 prostitutes at a Budapest party to reward the insurer’s high- performing agents, a spokesman said.

Ergo hosted the party for about 100 guests at the historic Gellert spa, Handelsblatt reported in a preview of an article to be published today. Women wore color-coded armbands, the newspaper said, citing unidentified guests, with red for hostesses, yellow for those available for sexual favors and white for women reserved for executives and top agents. After each trip to beds set up near the thermal baths, a woman would receive a stamp on her forearm, the paper reported.

And, just to get even further off topic, The Periodic Table of Videos is a great website!

It was a sharply mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 20bp, FixedResets losing 17bp, and DeemedRetractibles ahead 11bp. The Performance Highlights table is more interesting than usual, but still nothing like the glory days of late 4Q08 / 1Q09, which will be treasured in my memory for as long as I still have one.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.51%, equivalent to 7.16% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield a little under 5.4% (maybe I should say, a little over 5.35%), so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 180bp, about the same as reported on May 11.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1638 % 2,456.6
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1638 % 3,694.6
Floater 2.45 % 2.25 % 41,160 21.63 4 0.1638 % 2,652.4
OpRet 4.88 % 3.60 % 61,442 1.15 9 -0.0301 % 2,418.7
SplitShare 5.23 % -1.74 % 56,975 0.58 6 -0.0765 % 2,506.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0301 % 2,211.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 5.51 % 127,951 0.85 9 0.0110 % 2,064.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.50 % 5.51 % 120,382 14.56 15 0.1969 % 2,159.5
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.28 % 198,675 2.88 57 -0.1704 % 2,307.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.16 % 4.95 % 309,083 8.09 53 0.1104 % 2,126.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BMO.PR.J Deemed-Retractible -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 4.85 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.78
Bid-YTW : 5.43 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.69
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 71,328 TD crossed 45,200 at 24.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 64,427 TD crossed 58,900 at 24.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %
SLF.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 49,067 TD crossed 20,200 at 21.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.93
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
FTS.PR.E OpRet 47,400 Nesbitt crossed 45,600 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.75
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
BNS.PR.M Deemed-Retractible 44,623 TD crossed 24,800 at 24.40.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.37
Bid-YTW : 4.86 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 41,400 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
There were 32 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.35 – 24.80
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2828

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

ALB.PR.B SplitShare Quote: 22.31 – 22.59
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1782

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-03-29
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 1.34 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 24.62 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1388

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.62
Bid-YTW : 3.95 %

PWF.PR.M FixedReset Quote: 26.70 – 27.00
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2170

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %

BAM.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 27.52 – 27.81
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2132

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.52
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.26 – 22.52
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1901

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 6.04 %