Market Action

February 8, 2010

Alessandro Beber and Marco Pagano have summarized their recent paper on short-selling bans in a VoxEU article Short-selling bans in the crisis: A misguided policy:

The evidence suggests that the knee-jerk reaction of most stock exchange regulators around the globe to the financial crisis – imposing bans or regulatory constraints on short-selling – was at best neutral in its effects on stock prices. The impact on market liquidity was clearly detrimental, especially for small-cap and high-risk stocks. Moreover, it slowed down price discovery.

Perhaps the main social payoff of this worldwide policy experiment has been that of generating a large amount of evidence about the effects of short-selling bans. The conclusion suggested by this evidence is best summarised by the words of the former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox on 31 December 2008: “Knowing what we know now, [we] would not do it again. The costs appear to outweigh the benefits”. We hope that this lesson will be remembered when security markets face the next crisis.

Also on VoxEU, Hans Gersbach makes an interesting proposal in Double targeting for Central Banks with two instruments: Interest rates and aggregate bank equity:

The central bank would have two instruments at its disposal:

(a) the short-term interest rate and

(b) the aggregate equity ratio of the banking sector defined as the ratio of total end-borrower lending (credit for non-financial firms, households, and governments) plus other non-bank assets to total equity in the banking sector. The aggregate equity ratio is the measure of the capital cushion of the banking sector.

As a consequence, there are two policy rules for the central bank: an interest rate rule and an aggregate equity ratio rule. The former is a traditional interest rate rule (see for example Gali (2008, Chapter 3)) that may include an additional variable capturing the current state of money and credit, as discussed below. The latter relates the required equity ratio of the banking system in the next period to the current aggregate equity ratio and to the state of money and credit.

The current proposal aims at separating the responsibilities and instruments regarding capital requirements and bank supervision. The proposal places a substantial burden on the shoulders of central banks with regard to inflation and financial stability. Together with current events, the function of central banks as a lender of last resort indicates that this burden cannot be avoided. Accordingly, it makes good sense to equip the central bank with two instruments (short-term interest rates and aggregate equity ratios of the banking system) to help them bear this burden, while leaving detailed bank regulation and supervision activities to separate authorities.

In other words, counter-cyclical capital requirements would be set by empirical judgement, rather than with any of the various formula-based currently being discussed.

Citigroup is developing a new derivative:

the CLX is constructed as a sum of the Sharpe ratio – deviations from the mean divided by volatility – of various market factors, such as equity volatilities, Treasury rates, swap spreads, corporate bond swaption-implied volatilities, and structured credit spreads. Citi will make the CLX tradable by using fixed historical values for the mean and volatility parameters, eliminating the need for costly recomputation from lengthy time series.

“The great thing about the index is that it hedges your funding costs while being very simple to trade. I believe it will reduce the systemic risk in the industry, akin to how the advent of swaps means people don’t worry about interest-rate exposures any more – they just pay a fee to hedge it,” [Terry Benzschawel, a managing director of quantitative credit trading strategy at Citi in New York and head of the team researching the product] says.

Chris Rogers, chair of statistical science at Cambridge University, said the only participants able to sell CLX-based products would probably be those who are too big to fail.

I have to wonder about the statement that funding costs can be hedged by the index … the only sure way of doing that is by borrowing longer in the first place and in a crisis funding costs are going to be highly company specific. And I must admit that I am deeply suspicious of an index based partly on “structured credit spreads” – not just idiosyncratic by instrument but also by whoever’s providing the quote and how much they want to quote firm.

Another day of relatively light trading; PerpetualDiscounts lost 4bp while FixedResets gained 3bp in a reasonably well-behaved market.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.05 % 3.71 % 28,541 20.16 1 1.5890 % 1,809.8
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 34,429 19.23 1 0.0000 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.08 % 1.77 % 40,065 23.11 4 0.3451 % 2,207.0
OpRet 4.84 % -2.94 % 106,236 0.09 13 0.2248 % 2,321.5
SplitShare 6.31 % 2.23 % 147,264 0.08 2 0.3711 % 2,130.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2248 % 2,122.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.77 % 5.54 % 81,622 2.01 7 -0.1245 % 1,891.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.86 % 170,982 14.08 69 -0.0377 % 1,808.6
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.61 % 316,029 3.79 42 0.0306 % 2,180.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 22.13
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.54
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.06
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 19.91
Evaluated at bid price : 19.91
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 264,550 Nesbitt crossed 250,000 at 24.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 24.49
Evaluated at bid price : 24.83
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 57,110 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
TD.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 42,072 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 24.45
Evaluated at bid price : 24.67
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
TD.PR.N OpRet 31,300 RBC crossed 30,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-03-10
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.18
Bid-YTW : -2.94 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 30,462 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.92
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 27,759 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-08
Maturity Price : 20.62
Evaluated at bid price : 20.62
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
MAPF

MAPF Transaction Costs (TER)

A potential investor in MAPF writes in and says:

I wonder if you could answer a few questions for me.

I should start by saying that I am far from being an accountant. I would have my accountant offer an opinion if I decide to proceed, but in the meantime I apologize if any my questions are simplistic. Clearly being an accredited investor does not make one an investment professional.

On p. 2 of your 2008 statements (Statement of Operations) you show net investment income for the year as 58 989 as well as transaction costs of 45 617 and net realized losses of 58 725.

On p.3 (Changes in Net Assets) you show distiributions to unitholders of 58 989, i.e. all of the net investment income.

On p. 7 of the statement under “Unitholder’s Equity” you show “distributions in excess of income” of 104 342, which is the sum of transaction costs and net realized losses on p. 2.

Am I therefore correct that the net investment income from your fund exceeded the transactions costs by 13 372? Although unitholders would have received a larger distribution, the NAV of the fund would have decreased to reflect the transaction costs. (The NAV would have also decreased to reflect the capital losses, of course, but that is to be expected whether realized or not.) If I am correct, then a significant proportion (77% in this year) of the net investment income from your fund is “consumed” by transaction costs and 79% of the dividends are “consumed” by costs (after the costs you absorb). An investor would be largely relying on capital appreciation (i.e. increased NAV) to realize a return. Am I correct in understanding your investment strategy?

I also notice that transaction costs do not appear until 2007 on your financial statements. Why is this?

Finally, for the returns posted on your website, are those returns before or after transaction costs and other expenses (eg. audit)? I understand that they do not include management fees.

The question refers to Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund (MAPF); further information regarding the fund can be found on the fund’s main page. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

You are entirely correct in your analysis that transaction costs were large in 2008 compared to investment income, but there is no direct relationship between the two figures.

If, for instance, the fund was being run as a passive index fund, transaction costs would have been negligible but, to a first approximation, investment income would have been unaffected. However, the fund is run in accordance with the principles discussed in my statement of Investment Philosophy.

Markets can move around significantly in the absence of a “real” change in the valuation of a security, as incoming orders are filled. To achieve superior long term gains on an investment portfolio, the key is to sell when others are buying and to buy when others are selling. To this end, Hymas Investment Management focuses its research efforts on the analysis of a market price into it’s “fair” and “liquidity” components, to achieve superior investment returns by “selling” liquidity to the market, taking advantage of mispricing while at all times keeping the client’s tax and commission considerations in view.

In a year like 2008, when there were repeated waves of panic selling and euphoric buying (more of the former than the latter!) there were many opportunities to swap very similar instruments at very dissimilar prices. The statement of transactions for 2008 shows a huge number of trades which, alas, achieved a cumulative loss of just over $104,000 (including transaction costs).

However, this trading was highly profitable, although it was not enough to outweigh the effect of a rotten year in the market.

You will observe from the statement of annualized returns that the fund returned -3.85% (after expenses but before fees) compared to an index return of -16.42%.

If the fund had been run as an index fund, it is fair to assume – as an approximation for illustrative purposes – that its return for the year would be about -16.85% (the index return less an allowance of 43bp for fees), but in fact it lost much less.

We may conclude that the fund’s trading had a positive impact on the fund’s return of +13.00% (actual return of -3.85% less the notional return of -16.85%) and that this positive impact is net of the costs of performing the transactions.

If we take a simple average of the fund’s beginning and ending NAV, then we find that this 15% net impact of trading was worth, in dollar figures, about $117,000. Transaction costs, as you note, were about $46,000 so the following arithmetic is reasonably valid:

MAPF
2008 Approximate Trading Impact
Gross transaction profit
Relative to Benchmark
$163,000
Cost of transactions (46,000)
Net transaction profit $117,000

The words “Relative to Benchmark” should be carefully noted when examining the above table! The benchmark was so horribly negative that all the trading was able to accomplish was a reduction of the realized and unrealized capital loss that would otherwise have been experienced.

Thus – and again making an approximation – about one-quarter of the gross transaction profit was eaten up by commission. Or to put it another way, I saw repeated opportunities through the year to buy a dollar for twenty-five cents.

Note, however, that it isn’t quite as straightforward as that! Some of those twenty-five cent trades made two dollars, not just one … others lost money on top of transaction charges! All I can do is identify anomalies that “should” make some money and leave the rest up to statistics. The success of the fund will depend on my ability to identify potentially profitable trades accurately – and the results since inception show that I have been quite successful identifying these anomalies in the past.

The draft financials for 2009 – the auditor has not yet signed off on the statements – have a much nicer look to them, since in 2009 I was not trying to swim up a waterfall:

MAPF
Extract from Unaudited
Statement of Operations
Net realized gains, 2009 479,095
Net change in unrealized gains, 2009 75,229
Transaction costs (17,862)

The decline in transaction costs is largely due to a change in brokers that took place in late 2008.

So, your first major question, a significant proportion (77% in this year) of the net investment income from your fund is “consumed” by transaction costs and 79% of the dividends are “consumed” by costs (after the costs you absorb). An investor would be largely relying on capital appreciation (i.e. increased NAV) to realize a return. Am I correct in understanding your investment strategy? implicitly assumes that transaction costs should be applied against dividends. I consider it much more reasonable for analytical purposes to apply them against (hopefully excess) capital gains.

In answer to your second question: transaction costs do not appear on the pre-2007 financials because they were not required by the accounting rules of the time. Rules have changed and they are now required to be broken out instead of “buried” in the statement of capital gains and losses. If you want to see the transaction costs, I report them in the Transaction Statements for each half- and full-year, which are available on the fund’s main page.

With respect to your third question: all the returns reported are after everything except fees.

Update: My interlocuter responds, in part:

I understand your argument and it makes sense. At the end of the day, there is only really a total return which consists of distributions plus capital appreciation of the units. What you are saying is that the transaction costs (and audit and management costs, for that matter) should be judged by the extent to which they increase (or mitigate a decrease) in the value of the portfolio compared to a passive alternative, and on that score your fund was successful even after management fees.

It still seems to me, though, that the trading costs are a significant percentage of the dividend component of the return. That implies that your trading costs must be offset by either (1) an increase in the NAV of the fund compared to a passive index or (2) a richer long-term dividend stream compared to not making a trade if the market “fails to realize” the mispricing of the preferreds that you have bought. In a nutshell, the return of the fund is highly dependent on your continued success as a
trader. If your trading is simply neutral with regard to these factors, then the costs (trading, audit and management) will consume a significant element of the return compared to a passive alternative. Clearly, you have had some success in this regard, but it implies to me a high degree of model risk. If your model were to fail then the dividends would not bail an investor out as an alternative source of returns. I contrast this to either a passive model or an active model where the trading costs are a lower percentage of the dividend stream; or even the segregated accounts you offer.

None of this is intended as criticism. I’m just trying to understand the nature of the fund, its risks and its strategy. Do you think these are fair comments?

These are indeed fair comments.

Clearly, you have had some success in this regard, but it implies to me a high degree of model risk. Yes, this is correct. All I can say is that the model is constantly being evaluated and is based on the fundamentals of fixed income investing. I cannot conceive of any circumstance in which liquidity ceases to have any value in any marketplace – there are liqudity premia on US Treasuries, the most liquid market in the world – so it’s just a matter of finding it.

While liquidity premia can rise and fall relative to other components of price and markets can change, all I can say is that throughout my career I have been able to deliver returns to clients that have been significantly above benchmark – even when running $1.7-billion in Canadian goverment bonds – and continue to work at understanding the changing markets so that I may continue to do so.

I contrast this to either a passive model or an active model where the trading costs are a lower percentage of the dividend stream;

You must realize that passive models are not immune to liquidity costs. For example, moronic trading in POW.PR.C triggered by index rebalancing, was a large factor in CPD’s large tracking error in January 2010. Commissions are only one part of trading costs!

I will also note that you are still comparing trading costs to the dividend stream. It should be noted that these are not constant costs – if I don’t see opportunities, I don’t trade. For example, portfolio turnover in January 2010 was a mere 40%, compared to nearly 170% in November 2008 when the market collapsed.

Additionally, if you compare the 1H09 Transaction Report (particularly towards the end of the period) to the 2008 Transaction Report, you will see that unit trading costs have declined dramatically. This is also apparent in the extract from the unaudited 2009 Financial Statements, above, which shows commission costs for the whole of 2009 declining to $17,862 from approximately $46,000 in 2008.

I contrast this to either a passive model or an active model where the trading costs are a lower percentage of the dividend stream; or even the segregated accounts you offer.

I wouldn’t take a segregated account mandate that included a directive to minimize trading costs; I would be unable to add much – if any! – value net of very, very tiny fees. My product for ‘long-term buy-and-hold investors’ is PrefLetter; after setting up a portfolio, such investors can compare what they hold with the monthly recommendations and decide for themselves whether the investment characteristics of what’s available are sufficiently superior to what they hold to justify a trade. This approach could be combined with periodic consultations.

Market Action

February 5, 2010

BofA / Merrill Lynch Plot Thickens!

When Bank of America Corp.’s board met to approve the acquisition of an investment bank on Sept. 15, 2008, members thought they were going to buy Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., not Merrill Lynch & Co., according to New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo.

However, the story has some support for my thesis that large corporations are riskier than smaller ones, on the grounds that you get ahead by telling your boss what he wants to hear:

[Company eMails and notes] also show Merrill kept [BofA ex-Chief Financial Officer Joe] Price informed of the losses as they grew, yet he resisted pressure from his lawyers to disclose them to shareholders.

When Price asked for a review of whether the [October 2008] losses — then $5 billion after taxes — should be disclosed to shareholders, his general counsel Timothy Mayopoulos said they should.

Mayopoulos was later fired by Price and replaced by Brian Moynihan, who later became CEO, Cuomo said.

This is just a hair off-topic, but I’ve often wondered what the big deal is about atmospheric CO2 levels. I mean, assuming they’re causing problems, why not just fix it? Genetically engineer some yeast cells, or other bug, so that they eat CO2 and excrete sugar, put them in a tank and Bob’s your uncle! If you want to get fancy, put some other bugs in the tank that eat sugar and excrete polysaccharides; if you want to make some money, sell the kits in one-liter sizes so that Mr. & Mrs. Precious can reduce their carbon footprint. Why can’t this be done? Converting CO2 to sugar is no big deal – plants do it all day long and have time left over for sex with bees.

So it was a great relief to read Neil Reynolds column today, Profit motive is the solution to CO2 emissions:

A Santa Barbara, Calif., company called Carbon Sciences Inc. provides a convenient prototype. The company announced last week that it has developed a “breakthrough technology” that converts atmospheric carbon dioxide into commercial-grade gasoline, diesel fuel and jet fuel. Founded in 2006, Carbon Sciences had previously converted CO-2 into low-grade methanol using an enzyme-based technology. Now, it said, it has combined chemical and biological engineering in a bio-catalytic process that transforms carbon emissions into “a cost-efficient” energy resource.

Is the process really commercially viable, or at least on the way there? Is Carbon Sciences (OTCBB: CABN) a decent investment? I don’t know and I’d need to hire some expertise before I ventured an opinion. But I’m just glad I’m not the only person in the world who’s thought of this.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to slide today, losing 27bp on a day with sharply reduced volume. FixedResets were able to squeak out a gain of 2bp. There were only three entries for the Performance Highlights table!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.10 % 3.79 % 27,647 20.08 1 -0.7613 % 1,781.5
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 34,880 19.23 1 0.0000 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.09 % 1.76 % 41,381 23.12 4 0.2128 % 2,199.4
OpRet 4.86 % -3.26 % 109,178 0.09 13 0.0770 % 2,316.3
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.30 % 152,629 3.73 2 0.0655 % 2,122.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0770 % 2,118.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.45 % 80,742 2.02 7 0.0000 % 1,893.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.83 % 5.87 % 171,328 14.08 69 -0.2659 % 1,809.3
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.61 % 318,475 3.80 42 0.0157 % 2,179.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -2.93 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 19.52
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 21.02
Evaluated at bid price : 21.02
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CIU.PR.B FixedReset 100,016 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 shares, 35,000 and 20,800, all at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.13
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 78,516 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 35,000, both at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.02
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 61,100 RBC crossed blocks of 40,000 and 21,000, both at 27.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 48,048 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 19.94
Evaluated at bid price : 19.94
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset 45,400 RBC crossed 38,100 at 27.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 45,010 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-05
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

February 4, 2010

Deutsche Bank is using the compensation hysteria to put golden handcuffs on the peons:

A significant proportion of compensation will, where applicable, be deferred. Deferred compensation will be a combination of restricted equity awards (75%) and restricted incentive awards (25%).

* The restricted equity award will vest in nine equal instalments over 3¾ years, while the restricted incentive award will vest in three equal instalments over three years.

* All restricted equity and restricted incentive awards will continue to be subject to claw-back in the case of policy/regulatory breach.

And, of course, if they don’t feel like living up to their side of the bargain, inventing a policy/regulatory breach is easy enough. The best job of the brave new world? Employment contract litigator.

Some players are reducing their risk:

Two Citigroup Inc. executives running a proprietary-trading unit quit to join hedge fund Moore Capital Management LP, amid concern the government might order U.S. banks to exit trading businesses that don’t cater to customers, people briefed on the matter said.

Matthew Carpenter, a 15-year Citigroup veteran who had assembled the unit over the past three years, is leaving the bank along with his deputy, Matthew Newton, Citigroup spokesman Alex Samuelson said. The group trades U.S. stocks in several industries, Samuelson said.

In yet another instance of regulatory extortion, the SEC has admitted that State Street did nothing wrong but is paying $300-million anyway. Nobody’s been fired, nobody’s lost their license, back to business as usual. The trend towards bureaucratic ursurpation of the role of the courts, in all aspects of life, continues.

PerpetualDiscounts continued to slide today, losing 17bp, while FixedResets were down slightly less than 1bp. Volume continued to be on the heavy side.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.08 % 3.75 % 28,727 20.12 1 1.8837 % 1,795.1
FixedFloater 5.72 % 3.79 % 35,338 19.24 1 3.2048 % 2,762.3
Floater 2.09 % 1.76 % 41,224 23.12 4 0.4408 % 2,194.7
OpRet 4.86 % -3.97 % 110,416 0.09 13 -0.1360 % 2,314.5
SplitShare 6.33 % 6.29 % 154,966 3.74 2 1.7559 % 2,120.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1360 % 2,116.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.76 % 5.46 % 81,605 2.02 7 0.1114 % 1,893.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.81 % 5.84 % 172,907 14.10 69 -0.1741 % 1,814.1
FixedReset 5.43 % 3.61 % 318,933 3.80 42 -0.0071 % 2,179.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.80 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.31
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 20.08
Evaluated at bid price : 20.08
Bid-YTW : 5.62 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 21.21
Evaluated at bid price : 21.21
Bid-YTW : 5.71 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.78
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.52
Bid-YTW : 7.99 %
BAM.PR.E Ratchet 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.39
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 3.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount 95,345 RBC crossed 84,700 at 24.92.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 24.58
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 5.68 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 63,500 CIBC sold 25,000 to National at 27.80, then another 19,400 to Desjardins at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 50,760 Desjardins crossed 48,000 at 27.71.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.70
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 41,870 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 27.27.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.10
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 33,907 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 29,565 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 19.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-04
Maturity Price : 19.12
Evaluated at bid price : 19.12
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Market Action

February 3, 2010

In yet another example of PrefBlog’s trendsetting nature, Citigroup has started a blog.

The market responded to my deprecating remarks about FixedResets by selling off PerpetualDiscounts, which lost 28bp on the day and buying FixedResets, which gained 5bp, on fairly heavy volume.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.83%, equivalent to 8.16% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long corporates continue to yield about 5.8%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 235bp, which is where it was at month-end.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 3.14 % 3.85 % 29,741 20.01 1 -0.2762 % 1,762.0
FixedFloater 5.91 % 3.96 % 35,743 19.02 1 -4.9070 % 2,676.5
Floater 2.10 % 1.78 % 38,620 23.08 4 -0.1867 % 2,185.1
OpRet 4.85 % -4.11 % 107,957 0.09 13 -0.1887 % 2,317.6
SplitShare 6.45 % 6.81 % 149,412 3.73 2 -1.7042 % 2,084.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1887 % 2,119.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.75 % 5.57 % 80,086 2.21 7 -0.0338 % 1,891.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.80 % 5.83 % 172,105 14.13 69 -0.2837 % 1,817.3
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.61 % 318,524 3.80 42 0.0525 % 2,179.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -4.91 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare -2.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.76
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.16
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.38
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 15.50
Evaluated at bid price : 15.50
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 105,335 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 28.09; RBC crossed 20,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.07
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 85,645 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.78; RBC crossed 10,000 at 27.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.78
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 50,475 RBC crossed 45,600 at 24.81.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-02-03
Maturity Price : 24.37
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 45,700 Dundee sold 10,000 to anonymous at 27.72; Desjardins crossed blocks of 10,100 and 10,000, both at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.75
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 44,406 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 43,799 Nesbitt crossed 11,600 at 27.88 and 23,000 at 27.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.87
Bid-YTW : 3.44 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

XCM.PR.A Approves Reorganization

Commerce Split Corp. has announced:

that a proposed capital reorganization plan for the Company was approved at the special meeting of Shareholders held earlier today. The Company believes this reorganization has the potential to significantly increase the value attributed to all shareholders.

The reorganization will provide all shareholders with the ability to elect to:

  • 1. Maintain the current investment characteristics of their existing shares (a status quo option), through the Original Commerce Split Fund, or
  • 2. Have their existing Priority Equity and/or Class A shares reorganized into a new series of shares (the New Commerce Split Fund) that would potentially provide greater distribution and capital growth potential, especially if the common shares of CIBC increase over the remaining 5 year term of the Fund.

Under the New Commerce Split Fund, holders of the existing Priority Equity Shares that elect to transfer into the New Commerce Split Fund will receive the following securities for each Priority Equity share held at the close of business on the record date (to be determined):

One $5.00 Class I Preferred Share – paying fixed cumulative preferential monthly dividends to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price and having a repayment objective on December 1, 2014 or such other date as the Company may be terminated (the “Termination Date”) of $5.00;

One $5.00 Class II Preferred Share – paying distributions to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price if and when the net asset value per Unit exceeds $12.50 and having a repayment objective on the Termination Date of $5.00;

One-half 2011 Warrant – each full 2011 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $10.00 at specified times until February 28, 2011; and

One 2012 Warrant – each 2012 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $12.50 at specified times until February 28, 2012.

Holders of the existing Class A Shares would receive a Capital share for each share held and would continue to participate in any net asset value growth over $10.00 per Unit.

It is expected that Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares, Capital Shares, 2011 Warrants and 2012 Warrants will be issued sometime in March 2010 and will commence trading on the TSX at the opening of trading on such date.

The Company will issue shortly a further press release including all key dates related to the election process and capital reorganization.

I had previously recommended against the plan but nobody ever listens to me. Undeterred, I will now recommend that holders of XMF.PR.A elect to receive holdings in the “Original” group. I challenge all comers to show me a scenario of prices of CIBC common (“CM”) which show that the “New” plan is superior to assigning extant holdings to the “bond” part of their portfolios and buying a few CM shares directly.

XCM.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Issue Comments

XMF.PR.A Approves Reorganization

M-Split Corp. has announced:

that a proposed capital reorganization plan for the Company was approved at the special meeting of Shareholders held earlier today. The Company believes this reorganization has the potential to significantly increase the value attributed to all shareholders.

Holders of the existing Priority Equity Shares will receive the following securities for each Priority Equity share held at the close of business on the record date (to be determined):

One $5.00 Class I Preferred Share – paying fixed cumulative preferential monthly dividends to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price and having a repayment objective on December 1, 2014 or such other date as the Company may be terminated (the “Termination Date”) of $5.00;

One $5.00 Class II Preferred Share – paying distributions to yield 7.50% per annum on the $5.00 notional issue price if and when the net asset value per Unit exceeds $12.50 and having a repayment objective on the Termination Date of $5.00;

One 2011 Warrant – each 2011 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $10.00 at specified times until February 28, 2011; and

One 2012 Warrant – each 2012 Warrant can be exercised to purchase one Unit for an exercise price of $12.50 at specified times until February 28, 2012.

Holders of the existing Class A Shares would receive a Capital share for each share held and would continue to participate in any net asset value growth over $10.00 per Unit.

It is expected that Class I Preferred Shares, Class II Preferred Shares, Capital Shares, 2011 Warrants and 2012 Warrants will be issued sometime in March 2010 and will commence trading on the TSX at the opening of trading on such date.

The Company will issue shortly a further press release including all key dates related to the capital reorganization.

I had previously recommended against the reorganization, but does anybody every listen to me? I believe the preferred shareholders have given up a perfectly good, well secured fixed income investment for more speculative securities; they would have been better off reallocating their holdings to the “bond” part of their portfolio and buying better preferreds … but that isn’t what happened.

XMF.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Miscellaneous News

January 2010 Top Publication Downloads

It’s interesting:

1. Preferred Shares and GICs (1)

2. Perpetual and Retractible Preferred Shares (2)

3. Why Invest in Preferred Shares? (5)

4. A Brief Introduction to Preferred Shares (6)

5. Corporate Bonds … or Preferred Shares? (3)

6. Trading Preferreds (8)

7. Interest Bearing Preferreds (4)

8. Modified Duration (9)

9. Break-Even Rate Shock (-)

10. The Bond Portfolio Jigsaw Puzzle (-)

The bracketted numbers give the positions on the December Top 10 List – there’s not much change!

Interesting External Papers

Boston Fed Examines Fair Value Accounting and Asset Fire Sales

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a working paper by Sanders Shaffer titled Fair Value Accounting: Villain or Innocent Victim: Exploring the Links between Fair Value Accounting, Bank Regulatory Capital and the Recent Financial Crisis:

There is a popular belief that the confluence of bank capital rules and fair value accounting helped trigger the recent financial crisis. The claim is that questionable valuations of long term investments based on prices obtained from illiquid markets created a pro-cyclical effect whereby mark to market adjustments reduced regulatory capital forcing banks to sell off investments which further depressed prices. This ultimately led to bank instability and the credit effects that reached a peak late in 2008. This paper analyzes a sample of large banks to attempt to measure the strength of the link between fair value accounting, regulatory capital rules, pro-cyclicality and financial contagion. The focus is on large banks because they value a significant portion of their balance sheets using fair value. They also hold investment portfolios that contain illiquid assets in large enough volumes to possibly affect the market in a pro-cyclical fashion. The analysis is based on a review of recent historical financial data. The analysis does not reveal a clear link for most banks in the sample, but rather suggests that there may have been other more significant factors putting stress on bank regulatory capital.

After a discussion of Fair Value Accounting and the criticism that has been leveled against it, the author points out:

Fair value is applied to investment securities depending on how they are classified. Investment securities classified as available for sale are measured at fair value each reporting period. The resulting adjustments are termed unrealized gains or losses. These adjustments are recorded in an equity account called Accumulated Other Comprehensive Income. An important point here is that fair value adjustments related to debt securities and unrealized gains on equity securities are excluded when computing Tier 1 regulatory capital.

The author hypothesizes:

This analysis does not address whether raising capital through the sale of investments in a distressed market would be a first choice or last resort. However, one may be able to infer that if banks were actually being forced into distressed sales, they would first try to reduce more discretionary items. Dividends on common stock are discretionary and can be reduced or suspended as a method to maintain capital ratios.

Further, it does not appear that losses were realized in practice:

To summarize, this analysis looked at the largest financial institutions. It then isolated the impacts that critics have linked to capital destruction, namely the application of fair value to banks’ investment portfolios. The analysis shows that the impact on regulatory capital was quite small and does not appear to be large enough to be considered the driver of the pro-cyclical dynamic whereby declining asset prices lead to lower capital, then on to sales of assets to replenish capital, creating further pressure on prices and so on. In addition, there was no evidence found in reported financial data which would be indicative of distressed selling activity during the crisis period of 2008.

So if mark-to-market wasn’t the villain, what was?:

Based on further analysis of 2008 financial results, it was noted that loan loss provision had a significant impact on regulatory capital for most institutions in the sample.

An example is supplied:

At the height of the crisis, State Street stock fell 59 percent in one day when it was announced that unrealized losses had doubled, and analysts noted that TCE was approaching zero based on pro-forma calculations that added in the impact of consolidating certain off-balance sheet investment conduit programs.

The Simple TCE Ratio is calculated as STCE/tangible assets. Tangible assets = total assets – goodwill – intangible assets (excluding Mortgage Servicing Rights). It is not known how much emphasis was placed on TCE versus other significant factors that were also affecting bank stocks at the same time. That being said, State Street and BNYM are two possible examples in this analysis where fair value accounting may have contributed to bank instability based on the significant affect on TCE. It should be noted though that State Street and BNYM did not sell investment assets in response to capital depletion or market stress. They were able to rely on debt and equity issuances as well as participation in government capital programs. So although fair value may have contributed to some instability, the link between fair value and pro-cyclicality did not necessarily come to fruition here, at least partially due to government intervention.

The author concludes:

Based on this simple analysis it would appear that fair value accounting had a minimal impact on the capital of most banks in the sample during the crisis period through the end of 2008. Capital destruction was due to deterioration in loan portfolios and was further depleted by items such as proprietary trading losses and common stock dividends. These are a result of lending practices and the actions of bank management, not accounting rules. Furthermore, the data suggests that banks were not raising significant capital through distressed asset sales; rather they were relying on government programs as well as debt and equity markets.

This paper is of particular interest given the recent BoC Paper on Systemic Capital Requirements and its concern regarding the contagion effect of Asset Fire Sales.

Press Clippings

James Hymas Interviewed by Globe & Mail

A very nice piece by John Heinzl in today’s Globe: An Investor with a Preference for Preferreds.

Update: Finally got a heckler in the Globe’s comments section! An individual who was too ashamed to sign his name wrote:

There is a problem with the authors comment about firs loss protection. Pref Shares are equity from a balance sheet stand point, and the financial regulators treat them as such.

Pref Shares are equity investments with stated yield that must be paid before the common share dividend. THIS IS THE ONLY protection. It is not a bond, meaning the issuer does not have to make good on it to stay in business, nor do pref shareholders have any stake in the event of an insolvent company.

For reference, Please read p. 58 of Benjamin Graham’s book The Outstanding Investor. Or have a read at this study of preferred shares. http://www.pallas-athena.ca/Income_Investing_Preferred_Shares.html

Firstly, I don’t understand the author’s problem with my statement regarding first-loss protection. I was not referring to the balance sheet treatment specified by accountants or the regulatory treatment specified by Basel II – I was referring to the investment characteristic of first-loss protection.

  • 1 – How much money did CIBC lose in 2008-2009?
  • 2 – How much of this loss was borne by common shareholders?
  • 3 – How much of this loss was borne by preferred shareholders?
  • 4 – What conclusions may be drawn regarding first loss protection?

I am not aware of any book authored by Benjamin Graham titled The Outstanding Investor and neither is Wikipedia. The commentator may possibly be referring to The Intelligent Investor; I commented on an extract from this book dealing with preferred shares in my early 2009 post, Benjamin Graham et al. on Preferred Stocks. Briefly, Mr. Graham was writing in another time, under a very different tax regime; I agree that under the conditions described, it would be highly unusual for an individual investor to find an attractively priced preferred share – but those conditions no longer apply.

The essay published on the Pallas Athena Investment Counsel website, titled Preferred Shares: A Tutorial again references page 58 of the mysterious book The Outstanding Investor and quotes an extract from it that appears to be a verbatim copy of part of the passage from The Intelligent Investor discussed briefly above.

To be brutally frank, I do not consider the Pallas Athena analysis to be worthy of much detailed comment. Their first example assumes:

the dividend increases by only 27% over the next 4 years to $2.54.

Therefore, $2.54 / 4% = $63.50. This is the price that the common shares should be worth at a 4% yield if the Royal Bank dividend on common shares will be $2.54 in 2013. A 27% dividend increase over the next four years is a very likely scenario; especially when we look at the past.

Given these assumptions, why would one ever invest in anything but Royal Bank common?

PA’s second example differs only in the starting price for the common.

This assumption is repeated in the third example. The preferred share used in the example is RY.PR.W at its lowest price, but the authors display their lack of familiarity with the preferred share market with the statement:

We will assume that we the shares are held until the end 2013, a few months prior to the scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014. For this reason, we’ll assume that the value of the Series W shares will be $25.00 at the end of 2013.

There is no “scheduled $25.00 redemption in February 2014”. That is when the shares become callable at par, which implies only a ceiling to the potential price, not a floor. This is, of course, favourable to the preferred share, but is inexcusable anyway. Naturally, the authors make the same assumptions about the future common as they do in the other examples (only the purchase price is different), leaving one to wonder yet again: why would anybody ever invest in anything but RY common if these assumptions are to be regarded as solid?

The authors conclude, in part:

The reality is that preferred shares are a tool for companies to increase their profits which is to the benefit of common shareholders or it is a tool for companies to solidify their balance sheet which is to the benefit of the lenders and bond holders.

Certainly, that’s as good a one-sentence explanation of the existence of preferred shares as any, but the authors neglect to inqure as to what price the company is prepared to pay for these benefits.

Preferred shares form a region on the continuum between debt and equity that will be attractive to many. That’s about the only general statement I can make!

I was not able to find composite performance numbers for Pallas-Athena Investment Counsel; if anybody has more luck, please let me know!