Miscellaneous News

Critchley: Is this the end for rate resets?

Barry Critchley wrote a column in the Financial Post on April 1 titled Is this the end for rate resets?

The trigger for his column was (besides the obligation to bang out another 750 words, I mean!) the BNS 3.85%+100 new issue. Mr. Critchley believes that such skimpy yields will have the effect of pushing income investors back into common shares.

He concludes with a quote from John Nagel:

So what’s the outlook? John Nagel, a vice-president and director at Desjardins Securities and one of the architects of rate-reset pref shares, said that despite the low yield, there is still a market for the security, in part because investors continue to demonstrate that they don’t want to purchase “straight perpetual pref shares,” or securities that offer no chance of a change of dividend.

“The straight pref share marker is doing nothing but going straight down because investors are very nervous about higher interest rates,” he said, noting that more than $15.5-billion of rate-reset pref shares have been issued over the past two years. Accordingly that sector of the market is larger than the straight pref share market.

Despite the low yields, Nagel says the regulatory authorities have given their approval for rate resets to continue to count as Tier 1 capital. But he said the authorities have not been as kind for continued issues of so-called innovative Tier 1 securities.

It’s my understanding that the BNS issue sold out just as fast as all the other ones, despite its extreme richness vs. BNS Straights.

What do I think? Well, first of all, I think that forecasting investor tastes in new issues has much the same chance of success as forecasting young women’s tastes in new outfits. Some shops, who spend a lot of money on market research and take an intelligent approach to interpreting the data, can be right just often enough to pay for the times their wrong and make a great deal of money – but they’re still left holding the bag every now and then.

Second, I think that FixedResets have been grossly overemphasized in the marketplace through the course of their existence. The banks have been driven to inflate their Tier 1 capital at a time when bank money is pretty expensive. The allure of FixedReset issuance hasn’t been so much the reset provision (although that’s the hook for retail) as the five year call; which fixed income investors in most other markets will simply not allow.

Third, I don’t think the acid test of FixedResets continued existence is low issue yield – which is surely more a sign of fashionability rather than otherwise. I can think of two critical tests:

  • The first wave of redemptions: It is not entirely clear that investors have really thought through the implications of the five-year call and will be most upset when such a call lands most secondary market buyers with a big capital loss and the need to reinvest in a (probably) lower yield environment.
  • The first few downgrades & defaults: Nortel & Quebecor World defaulted on their FixedFloaters; BCE and Bombardier were downgraded. All remaining issues are trading well below par. How will the FixedReset market react when it becomes apparent that interest rate risk is only one of the problems facing fixed income investors?

Straights will always be the little black dress of the preferred share world, but FixedResets have the advantage of allowing the issuer to assume the inflation risk, just like RRBs; there will always be a significant number of new issue investors eager to accept low yields for the chance of offloading that risk. FixedResets have the chance of becoming a permanent feature of the new issue shop.

Issue Comments

NXY.PR.U Particulars

With an eMail headed NXY.PR.U, I was asked:

Can you please comment on how to classify the subject preferred shares ? How would you rate the credit risk ?

NXY.PR.U is more formally referred to as Nexen 7.35% Subordinated Notes due 2043, which were issued pursant to a Prospectus Supplement dated October 28, 2003, which is available on SEDAR.

The prospectus states:

Our unsecured subordinated debentures due November 1, 2043 (the ‘‘Subordinated Notes’’) will bear interest, payable in U.S. dollars, at an annual rate of 7.35%, accruing from November 4, 2003 and payable quarterly in arrears on February 1, May 1, August 1 and November 1 of each year, commencing February 1, 2004.

The Subordinated Notes will be subordinated to all our present and future senior indebtedness and will be effectively subordinated to all liabilities of our subsidiaries, including partnerships.

This deep subordination means that the only thing they are senior to is equity – which will include preferred equity if Nexen ever issues some. However, they are on the right side of the bond/equity line, which means there are events of default. These events of default are specified on page 32 of the Shelf Prospectus, dated October 22, 2003, and are not over-ridden (as they might be) by the Prospectus Supplement for this particular series. This means that in the event of a missed interest payment, the holders of NXY.PR.U may declare the principal immediately due and payable, effectively placing the company in bankruptcy. This is significantly more protection than is available with preferred shares, although in practice holders of the sub-debt might wish to keep the company out of bankruptcy since they’ll be totally out-gunned and subordinated to the Senior Debt Holders in bankruptcy court.

However, if matters were to become sufficiently dire that the company could not meet its obligation to pay interest, they have the option to forestall such a move by redeeming the issue for common shares. This issue is currently redeemable at par:

We may redeem the Subordinated Notes, in whole or in part, at any time and from time to time on or after November 4, 2008 at a redemption price equal to 100% of the principal amount of the Subordinated Notes to be redeemed plus any accrued and unpaid interest to the date of such redemption.

We may satisfy our obligation to pay the applicable redemption price (excluding any accrued and unpaid interest) or principal amount of the Subordinated Notes by delivering to the Trustee (as defined herein) Common Shares (as defined herein), in which event the holders of the Subordinated Notes shall be entitled to receive cash payments equal to the applicable redemption price (excluding any accrued and unpaid interest) or principal amount from the proceeds of the sale of the requisite Common Shares by the Trustee.

The noteholders will not actually get the shares; they will be sold by the Trustee and the proceeds deposited in trust (see “Common Shares Payment Election” in the Prospectus Supplement). Another wrinkle is that there is no set number of Common Shares that must be delivered:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we will not be permitted to satisfy our obligations to pay the redemption price (excluding any accrued and unpaid interest) or principal amount of the Subordinated Notes through the delivery of Common Shares if, on the Common Shares Delivery Date, the Common Shares are not then listed on a significant stock exchange in Canada or the United States. Neither our making of the Common Shares Payment Election nor the consummation of sales of Common Shares on the Common Shares Delivery Date will:

) result in the holders of the Subordinated Notes not being entitled to receive cash in an aggregate amount equal to the redemption price or principal amount of the Subordinated Notes plus, in each case, accrued and unpaid interest and other amounts, if any, thereon on the Maturity Date; or

) entitle or oblige such holders to receive any Common Shares in satisfaction of our obligation to pay the redemption price or principal amount of the Subordinated Notes.

So the Common Share Payment Election is a death-spiral conversion. I suspect the company would, 99 times in a hundred, prefer to go bankrupt.

The income distributions (7.35%, remember) are payable quarterly and are taxed as interest.

As far as credit quality is concerned … well, there’s a limit to what I’m going to do for free! DBRS rates them BBB(low), which maps to about maybe Pfd-2(low) / Pfd-3(high), somewhere around there.

There was something of a craze for issues of this nature back in the old days, when men were men.

Preferred Securities
CAD denominated
Ticker Issue Date Redemption Date
AEC.PR.A / ECA.PR.A 1999-8-9 2004-8-10
BNN.PR.S / BAM.PR.S 2001-12-20 2007-1-2
BNN.PR.T / BAM.PR.T 2002-4-22 2007-7-3
ENB.PR.B 1999-7-8 2004-12-16
ENB.PR.C 1999-10-21 2004-12-16
ENB.PR.D 2002-2-15 2007-2-15
MG.PR.A 1999-9-21 2004-10-1
SU.PR.A 1999-3-15 2004-3-15
TA.PR.A 1999-4-13 2005-2-16
TA.PR.B 1999-12-22 2005-2-16
TA.PR.C 2001-11-30 2007-1-2

Given the preponderance of of utilities in the above list, I suspect that this was a mechanism whereby the companies could gain the advantages of preferred shares (better credit ratios on their senior debt) without running afoul of contemporary regulatory restrictions on the issue of preferreds. But I have no definitive information on that point.

It was a nice market, hopelessly inefficient. Then, unfortunately, they continued to trade at enormous premia even as the first redemption date approached, yields declined to derisory (and even negative) levels and when they were called poor old retail got left holding the bag. I discussed the asset class in an article titled Interest Bearing Preferreds.

NXY.PR.U has not been previously discussed on PrefBlog. It is not tracked by HIMIPref™ since it is USD denominated.

Market Action

April 1, 2010

DBRS has concluded that the Brookfield Asset Management / General Growth Properties deal, as confirmed, continues to be credit-neutral. The original PrefBlog post on this issue has been updated with the link.

Volume continued to be elevated and the Canadian preferred share market continued to get hit, with PerpetualDiscounts down 32bp on the day and FixedResets losing 7bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.56 % 2.61 % 58,083 20.98 1 0.0000 % 2,162.1
FixedFloater 4.93 % 3.05 % 49,418 20.10 1 0.0000 % 3,207.1
Floater 1.90 % 1.67 % 47,936 23.42 4 -0.5411 % 2,423.2
OpRet 4.87 % 1.96 % 109,523 0.16 10 -0.0741 % 2,309.0
SplitShare 6.38 % -1.25 % 137,805 0.08 2 0.0880 % 2,139.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0741 % 2,111.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.74 % 3.06 % 36,513 0.65 2 0.2591 % 1,863.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.12 % 6.19 % 177,444 13.66 76 -0.3214 % 1,736.2
FixedReset 5.39 % 3.57 % 392,427 3.66 43 -0.0692 % 2,195.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.M FixedReset -1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.18
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.59
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.38
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 19.26
Evaluated at bid price : 19.26
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.40 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 1.62 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 23.41
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.87
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 23.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
GWL.PR.O Perpetual-Premium 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2010-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.05
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 48,565 TD sold 10,000 to Nesbitt at 28.06 and 12,000 to anonymous at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 47,441 TD crossed 26,000 at 28.22.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.22
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 43,573 Nesbitt crossed 40,000 at 21.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-04-01
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.70
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 42,555 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.96
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 40,330 RBC sold 10,000 to anonymous at 28.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.10
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 35,927 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.08
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: March 2010

HIMI Index Changes, March 31, 2010
Issue From To Because
CM.PR.R OpRet Scraps Volume
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
IAG.PR.E PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
IGM.PR.B PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price

As a result of the migration from PerpetualPremium to PerpetualDiscount due to price declines, the PerpetualPremium index has only two remaining members: GWL.PR.O, a chimerical issue which can sometimes be a straight, sometimes a FixedFloater, depending on where Prime is, and NA.PR.M.

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during March 2010
Issue Action Index Because
GWO.PR.M Add Perpetual-Discount New Issue
BRF.PR.A Add Scraps New Issue
TRP.PR.B Add FixedReset New Issue
HPF.PR.A Delete Scraps Redeemed
HPF.PR.B Delete Scraps Redeemed
ACO.PR.A Delete OpRet Redeemed
Issue Comments

GWL.PR.O Particulars

This is very old news indeed, but should be recorded for easy access to the information.

There’s no prospectus for the issue, since it came into being via the

OFFER TO PURCHASE
all of the outstanding Non-Cumulative Preferred Shares, Series L
of
THE GREAT-WEST LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
not already held directly or indirectly by Great-West Lifeco Inc.
in exchange, at the option of the holder, for
$23.00 cash
or
One Non-Cumulative Preferred Share, Series O (a “Series O Share”) of
The Great-West Life Assurance Company (“GWL”)
for each Non-Cumulative Preferred Share, Series L (a “Series L Share”) of GWL

This document is available on SEDAR, as “The Great-West Life Assurance Company Dec 14 2000 Issuer bid circular – English
PDF 314K”

Series O Dividends

Until October 31, 2010 (the “Fixed Dividend Rate Period”), the holders of the Series O Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly non-cumulative cash dividends, as and when declared by the board of directors of GWL, payable on the last day of January, April, July and October in each year at a rate equal to $0.346875 per share to initially yield 5.55%. The first such dividend, if declared, will be payable on January 31, 2001 in an amount equal to $0.346875 per share.

From October 31, 2010 (the “Floating Dividend Rate Period”), the holders of the Series O Shares will be entitled to receive non-cumulative cash dividends, as and when declared by the board of directors of GWL, payable on the last day of January, April, July and October in each year at a floating rate in respect of each quarterly dividend period equal to one quarter of the greater of (a) 4.75% and (b) 80% of Prime.

Series O Redemption

The Series O Shares will not be redeemable prior to October 31, 2010. Subject to the provisions described under “Restrictions on Dividends and Retirement of Series O Shares” and “Regulatory Approvals”, GWL may redeem on October 31, 2010 and on the last day of every successive period of five years plus one day thereafter, all or any part of the then outstanding Series O Shares. Such redemption may be made upon payment in cash of the amount of $25.00 per share together with an amount equal to all declared and unpaid dividends thereon to but excluding the date on which such shares are redeemed. GWL will provide not less than 30 nor more than 60 calendar days’ notice of such redemption to each holder of Series O Shares to be redeemed.

On October 31, 2010 and every five years thereafter, Series O is exchangeable at the holder’s option (subject to the usual restrictions on shares left outstanding) to and from Series P.

Series P Dividends

The holders of the Series P Shares will be entitled to receive fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of GWL, in an amount per share per annum determined by the Board of Directors of GWL payable quarterly on the last day of January, April, July and October in each year. The first such dividend, if declared, will be payable on January 31, 2011.

The annual dividend rate determined by the Board of Directors of GWL in respect of a Dividend Period will not be less than 85% of the Government of Canada Yield prevailing at the time the dividend rate is set.

Series P Redemption

The Series P Shares will not be redeemable prior to November 1, 2015. Subject to the provisions described under “Restrictions on Dividends and Retirement of Series P Shares” and “Regulatory Approvals”, GWL may redeem on November 1, 2015 and on the last day of every successive period of five years plus one day thereafter, all or any part of, the outstanding Series P Shares. Such redemption may be made upon payment in cash in the amount of $25.00 for each Series P Share together with an amount equal to all declared and unpaid dividends thereon to but excluding the date on which such shares are redeemed.

GWL.PR.O is not currently listed on PrefInfo. When I get around to updating the information, it will be summarized as:

  • GWL.PR.O

  • Great-West Life Pr O
  • Great-West Life Assurance Co Pr Ser ‘O’ (The)
1.3875

  • Floating Rate Start Date : 2010-10-31
  • Floating Rate Index ID : Canada Prime
  • FR Formula : Greater of 80% of index and Flat Rate 4.75% (#80)
  • Redemption 2010-10-31 2010-10-31 25.000000
  • Redemption 2015-10-31 2015-10-31 25.000000
  • None
  • Payments are Dividends : Yes
  • Cumulative Dividends : No
  • SplitShare Corp : No
Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: March 2010

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

March 2010
Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “March 31”)
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -8.18% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.26% based on a bid of 20.51 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.56% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.25% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.52% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.01% based on a bid of 19.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Pfd-1(low) -5.51% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.36 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A Perpetual-Discount Pfd-2(high) -5.46% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 18.86 and a limitMaturity.
TRI.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.40%  
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.55% The second-best performer in February.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +4.84% The third-best performer in February, the best performer in January and the second-best performer in December.
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Pfd-2(low) +7.56% The fifth-best performer in February. Strong pair with BAM.PR.E
BAM.PR.E Ratchet Pfd-2(low) +8.85% The best performer in February. Strong Pair with BAM.PR.G

Momentum is still amazing, with the Floating Rate sector continuing to shine.

Market Action

March 31, 2010

Greek bonds are getting hammered:

Europe’s week-old rescue plan for Greece has so far failed to do what its leaders predicted: reduce borrowing costs for the region’s most indebted country.

The yield on 10-year Greek government bonds has increased 24 basis points to 6.522 percent since EU leaders agreed to the aid blueprint on March 25. That’s the highest in a month and more than double the rate paid by Germany. Seven-year bonds sold by Greece on March 29 fell for a second day today.

“What they were hoping for was to set up some sort of arrangement that never has to be used,” said Phyllis Reed, head of bond research in London at Kleinwort Benson, which manages about $32 billion. “The markets have sniffed that out and it seems like we’re heading back to square one.”

The Brookfield/General Growth affair is winding its way through court:

General Growth Properties Inc.’s proposal to exit bankruptcy with funding from Brookfield Asset Management Inc. has a clause that will give the company until the end of the year to complete a takeover deal with another party, according to two people with knowledge of the plan.

The provision would give Chicago-based General Growth time to explore a takeover bid from Simon Property Group Inc., whose $10 billion offer was turned down by its rival last month. Simon is preparing a new bid, according to a person with knowledge of that plan. Brookfield’s plan is subject to the approval of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Allan Gropper, who gave General Growth an Aug. 26 deadline to control its case.

Citigroup has spent a lot of money upgrading its algorithmic trading software:

Citigroup Inc. is overhauling its platform of trading strategies in an attempt to grow its share of U.S. equities from 14 percent, according to Young Kang, global head of algorithmic products at the firm.

A global group of 20 quantitative analysts and more than 50 developers, overseen by Kang, built the algorithms and the technology supporting the new platform, which has been used on Citigroup’s cash equities and program trading desks. The strategies have been tested in recent months by some hedge funds and institutional clients.

Citigroup is also making changes to ColorBook, the smart router from Lava Trading, a unit within the broker, to execute orders faster. Smart routers are used by brokers to craft an execution strategy for the smaller orders generated once an algorithm or trading desk has decided how to transact a stock.

ColorBook currently executes orders in 700 microseconds, or 0.0007 second, Swanson said. The firm is trying to reduce that to 200 microseconds.

There is as yet no word on the take-up of the WFS warrants, which expired today out of the money, or regarding the SBN warrants, likewise.

Volume was highly elevated again today as the Canadian preferred share market staggered into quarter end. PerpetualDiscounts were down 35bp while FixedResets lost 38bp to take the yield on the latter index back above 3.50%, to 3.55%. The only winner in the performance highlights is W.PR.H, which is merely a dead-cat bounce from yesterday.

The yield on PerpetualDiscounts is now 6.16%, equivalent to 8.62% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.8%, having achieved a total return of +88bp on the month and +5.02% on the year-to-date, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 285bp, a sharp increase from the 265bp reported March 24 and getting very close to their one-year high in the low 290s.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.56 % 2.61 % 57,956 20.98 1 0.2273 % 2,162.1
FixedFloater 4.93 % 3.05 % 49,216 20.11 1 0.2272 % 3,207.1
Floater 1.89 % 1.65 % 48,457 23.45 4 0.5562 % 2,436.5
OpRet 4.84 % 3.35 % 109,163 0.16 12 -0.0711 % 2,310.7
SplitShare 6.38 % 5.08 % 139,530 0.08 2 -0.2853 % 2,138.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0711 % 2,112.9
Perpetual-Premium 6.00 % 6.08 % 124,177 13.73 7 -0.1386 % 1,859.0
Perpetual-Discount 6.09 % 6.16 % 187,682 13.72 71 -0.3455 % 1,741.8
FixedReset 5.37 % 3.55 % 381,165 3.65 43 -0.3771 % 2,196.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.82
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.51
Evaluated at bid price : 20.51
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.91 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 5.03 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.60
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.07
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
GWO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.35
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.E FixedReset 160,848 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from anonymous at 28.22; RBC bought three blocks of 10,000 each from TD at 28.05. RBC crossed 40,200 at 28.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.42 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 119,398 RBC crossed 97,500 at 28.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.90
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 104,645 Nesbitt bought blocks of 20,000 and 16,400 from TD at 28.50, then crossed 50,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.45
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 103,633 Nesbitt bought 10,000 each from National and anonymous at 28.25, followed by 10,000 from CIBC at 28.10. Desjardins bought 14,800 from TD at 26.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.05
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 100,805 TD crossed 40,000 at 28.12, Nesbitt crossed 24,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.12
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 78,300 Nesbitt crossed 37,500 at 23.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.28
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
There were 64 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Miscellaneous News

Tranche Retention in the sub-prime CDO Market

Bloomberg has a fascinating story today titled How Lou Lucido Let AIG Lose $35 Billion With Goldman Sachs CDOs.

Without having to ask AIG’s permission, firms such as TCW, hired to oversee funds called collateralized debt obligations, replaced maturing assets with junk that quickly went bad. Managers including Lucido said they didn’t realize how severe the mortgage crash would be and were called upon by CDO contracts to reinvest. At the same time, buying riskier assets could mean bigger paydays.

Lucido’s team, following criteria set by [under-writer] Goldman Sachs, changed almost one-third of the collateral in Davis Square III after the CDO’s creation in 2004, according to data compiled by Bloomberg from Moody’s Investors Service reports. The securities were mostly backed by the types of newer loans that are going bad at more than twice the rate of older ones. By November 2008, after U.S. taxpayers rescued AIG with a bailout that later swelled to $182.3 billion, even the highest-rated parts of Davis Square III had lost almost half their value.

When the Financial Products unit agreed to guarantee certain top-rated CDO pieces, it didn’t envision that assets added later could cause losses, according to a person with knowledge of AIG’s thinking who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to comment.

As long as managers adhered to investment criteria outlined in the prospectus, there was little AIG could do, according to Mark Herr, a spokesman for the insurer.

The tiniest slice, less than 1 percent in the case of Davis Square III, was made up of what’s called equity, which wasn’t rated by credit companies. Equity investors were paid only after everyone else. They received a higher return while the going was good because they took the most risk and were the first ones wiped out if borrowers quit paying their mortgages.

While Lucido said he didn’t own a stake in Davis Square III, he said he did have his own money riding on the equity pieces of some CDOs.

Goldman Sachs did own an equity stake in Davis Square III, according to Michael DuVally, a spokesman for the firm, who declined to say how much it was. Even so, the bank didn’t try to influence TCW’s investment decisions, DuVally said.

It didn’t have to. TCW was promised 20 percent of what was left over after equity investors got 10 percent returns, according to a Goldman Sachs sales pitch to potential equity investors dated September 2004. That was on top of its fee of 0.10 percent of the CDO’s assets, according to the prospectus.

[Andrey Krakovsky, chief investment officer at New York-based asset manager Tacticus Capital LLC,] said managers often owned equity pieces of CDOs and earned fees linked to their returns.

More than $16 billion of CDOs managed by TCW have defaulted, been liquidated or stopped paying some investors, according to RBS Securities Inc.

TCW now finds itself defending Gundlach’s team at the same time it’s suing him for having “no understanding or respect for the obligations of a fiduciary,” according to a complaint filed Jan. 7 in Los Angeles Superior Court.

It is unfortunate, but nowhere does the article discuss the track record records of the managers of these CDOs. Like so much other smiley-boy stuff, it prefers to talk about “experience”.

However, my point in highlighting this article has more to do with tranche-retention than investment management. Tranche retention has been both disparaged and and praised as a method for encouraging investment managers to think about what they’re doing; this article represents another small, but useful, point against the concept.

Market Action

March 30, 2010

RBC is expanding its US investment banking business:

RBC Capital Markets plans to be a top 10 investment bank in the U.S. by attracting business from American companies worth as much as $10 billion, five times larger than its traditional client base.

“Our goal over the next two to three years is to be top 10 in the U.S. market,” said Blair Fleming, who heads the U.S. investment-banking unit of Royal Bank of Canada in New York.

It’s an interesting strategy in light of the recent deprecation of earnings volatility.

Global corporates are doing well this quarter:

Corporate bonds are rallying for the fourth straight quarter, the longest streak since 2004, extending a record advance as 72 percent of companies beat analysts’ earnings expectations.

The securities returned 2.6 percent this quarter through March 30, following a 16.3 percent gain in 2009, according to a Bank of America Merrill Lynch index. The extra yield, or spread, investors demand to own corporate bonds fell 0.26 percentage point since year-end relative to benchmarks to 1.5 percentage points as of yesterday, the narrowest since November 2007.

Company debt rallied on signs the global economy is improving, with U.S. consumer confidence gaining in March and corporate defaults declining from record levels. Borrowing costs declined to the lowest since 2005, spurring $730 billion of bond issuance globally this quarter, a 25 percent increase from the final period of last year.

The Canadian DEX Universe All Corporate Bond Index is up 2.06% year-to-date.

Volume soared today in the Canadian preferred share market in a rush for the exits … quarter-end window dressing? PerpetualDiscounts were clobbered, losing 67bp, while FixedResets were not immune to the downdraft, losing 28bp. A lengthy performance highlights list is comprised entirely of losers

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.56 % 2.62 % 57,533 20.97 1 0.8249 % 2,157.2
FixedFloater 4.94 % 3.06 % 51,108 20.09 1 0.0000 % 3,199.9
Floater 1.90 % 1.67 % 49,981 23.41 4 0.3153 % 2,423.0
OpRet 4.84 % 3.28 % 108,864 0.33 12 -0.0646 % 2,312.4
SplitShare 6.37 % 4.84 % 137,973 0.08 2 -0.0877 % 2,144.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0646 % 2,114.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.99 % 6.05 % 123,990 13.76 7 -0.3578 % 1,861.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.07 % 6.14 % 183,434 13.74 71 -0.6720 % 1,747.8
FixedReset 5.35 % 3.40 % 369,864 3.66 43 -0.2786 % 2,205.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -4.98 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.01
Evaluated at bid price : 21.01
Bid-YTW : 6.58 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -4.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.55
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -2.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.23
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
BMO.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -2.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 23.89
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.86
Evaluated at bid price : 19.86
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Premium -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
GWO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.23
Evaluated at bid price : 19.23
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.57
Evaluated at bid price : 21.86
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 21.22
Evaluated at bid price : 21.22
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 18.83
Evaluated at bid price : 18.83
Bid-YTW : 6.23 %
SLF.PR.F FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.67
Bid-YTW : 3.37 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 19.41
Evaluated at bid price : 19.41
Bid-YTW : 5.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater 153,500 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 23.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-03-30
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 23.93
Bid-YTW : 1.61 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 127,322 CIBC bought 27,000 from National at 28.25; RBC bought 10,000 from GMP at 28.20. RBC then crossed 50,000 at 28.28.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.22
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 86,776 Nesbitt bought 50,000 from National at 28.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.11
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 86,655 RBC crossed 10,000 at 28.30; Nesbitt bought two blocks of 11,000 each from anonymous at 28.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.10
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 61,439 RBC bought 10,000 from Scotia at 28.23.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.24
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 55,703 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.70
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
There were 71 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Regulation

Irish Bank Capital Requirements Skyrocket

The Irish Financial Regulator has announced new capital requirements after its Prudential Capital Assessment Review:

A target level of 8% core tier 1 capital should be attained after taking account of the realisation of future expected losses and other financial developments under a base case scenario. This test is designed to ensure the credit institutions are capitalised to a level which reflects prudential requirements and current market expectations, after taking account of forecast loan losses through to 2012. As a further prudent requirement, the capital used to meet the base case target must be principally in the form of equity, the highest quality form of capital, with 7% equity as the target level. In calculating the requirements, individually specified amounts have been added to the institutions’ estimates of expected losses to take account of the uncertainty of loss forecasts for particular portfolios.

A target level of 4% core tier 1 capital that should be maintained to meet a stress scenario or a portfolio level sensitivity analysis. This capital test, which is similar to that employed by US and UK supervisory authorities, is designed to ensure the credit institutions have a sufficient capital buffer to withstand losses under an adverse scenario significantly worse than currently anticipated.

This, together with worse than expected valuations of their loan books, has resulted in enormous capital requirement numbers:

Ireland’s banks may need at least 31.8 billion euros ($42.7 billion) in new capital after a real- estate slump left them crippled by mounting bad loans.

The fund-raising requirement was announced after the National Asset Management Agency, the country’s so-called bad bank, said it will apply an average discount of 47 percent on the first block of loans it is buying from lenders, and the financial regulator set new capital targets. The discount compares with the government’s initial 30 percent estimate.

Irish banks were last discussed on PrefBlog in the post Why weren’t Irish Banks Resilient?