Data Changes

HIMIPref™ Data Simplification : FIG.PR.A Dividends

As assiduous readers will remember, FIG.PR.A was the “target security” in a four way merger earlier this year.

In what was presumably an effort to ensure that each class of shareholder got their due, FIG.PR.A paid a partial dividend of 0.05308 on 2007-2-9 to holders of record 2007-1-31. They then paid the balance ($0.10317) of the regular quarterly amount on 2007-4-2 to holders of record 2007-3-22.

Unfortunately, this sort of thing gives HIMIPref™ stomach-ache. There are several layers of checks built into the system to ensure that quarterly dividends are recorded quarterly, by billy-dam, or at least approximately. The good old Argus preferreds, for instance, have been in default for … a while … but on every dividend date I dutifully put in a dividend of $0.0001, just so the programmatic editors will see the entry and tick off their lists. There’s a wobble allowed, so that issuers like ABK.PR.C with their idiosyncratic ideas regarding the definition of “regular” and “quarterly” don’t cause me too many problems.

However, things like special dividends throw me for a loop. I can handle it on redemptions, but not with a continuing security. Therefore:

1: The dividend of 0.05308 paid 2/9 has been deleted from HIMIPref™

2: The dividend of 0.10317 paid 4/2 has been entered on the system as $0.15625.

This approximation means that intra-period returns on FIG.PR.A will be miscalculated.

It also means that in simulations, returns on holdings of FCN.PR.A / FCF.PR.A & FCI.PR.A will be overstated. But it’s either that, or re-write my edit routines to be even more complicated (which I might do eventually, but hardly seems worthwhile right now) or scrap my editors (which, given the number of times they’ve saved my hide, seems to me to be the worst option).

Market Action

April 23, 2007

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.25% 4.24% 40,467 16.86 2 +0.9670% 1,017.4
Fixed-Floater 5.44% 4.47% 107,857 16.44 6 -1.7970% 941.3
Floater 4.56% -18.58% 56,159 0.13 4 +0.3363% 1,061.8
Op. Retract 4.73% 3.27% 83,839 2.20 17 -0.1183% 1,033.4
Split-Share 5.03% 3.99% 142,867 3.23 12 +0.0266% 1,046.8
Interest Bearing 6.51% 3.92% 61,511 1.91 5 +0.2016% 1,047.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.05% 4.22% 222,634 5.87 54 -0.1467% 1,056.2
Perpetual-Discount 4.55% 4.58% 797,257 16.26 11 -0.1873% 1,061.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -3.762% Exchange/Reset date is 2010-12-01; until then these pay 4.54% of par. Closed at 22.00-50, 50×100 … 50×100? Seems to me that a few institutional investors have had time for their meetings. Traded as low as 21.50 today, a new 52-week low.
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater -2.5541% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-05-01 (exchange to BCE.PR.H); until then, they pay 4.35% of par. The bid moved on zero volume and they closed at 22.51-00, 4×15. The BCE.PR.H closed at 24.25-50, 1×20.
BCE.PR.I FixedFloater -2.1324% Exchange/Resdet date is 2011-08-01 (counterpart is unissued series ‘AJ’); until then pay 4.65% of par. Closed at 22.03-19, 4×15; new low of 22.00 today.
POW.PR.D PerpetualPremium -1.6387% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.54% based on a bid of 25.81 and a call 2014-11-30 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -1.3842% Exchange/Reset date is 2007-12-1 (to BCE.PR.Y); until then they pay 5.319% of par. Closed at 23.51-79, 5×1; the Ys closed at 23.87-19.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.D PerpetualPremium 245,550 Desjardins crossed 240,000 at 26.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.69% based on a bid of 26.50 and a call 2008-5-30 at $26.00.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualPremium 43,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.82% based on a bid of 24.80 and a limitMaturity. These fell 0.44% today … almost certainly due to the very similar new issue announced today.
RY.PR.W PerpetualPremium 38,660 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.18% based on a bid of 26.00 and a call 2014-3-26 at 25.00
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 25,655 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.57% based on a bid of 24.50 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 24,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.55% based on a bid of 24.78 and a limitMaturity.

HIMIPref News

HIMIPref™ Valuation for BCE.PR.C Suspect but Trading Engine Recovers

I was asked in the comments for April 20 whether the valuation shown by HIMIPref™ for BCE.PR.C was OK or not … it was showing a massive, massive positive number.

Well, no, it wasn’t … it dropped out of the math as designed, but division by small numbers can cause problems and huge results. The trading engine knows that this sometimes happens, however, and annulled the result without recommending a trade.

The riskRewardAnalysisBox showed numbers that all looked fairly normal, with the exception of portYieldReversion: this showed an exceptionally – ridiculously – high value of 135.443.

Therefore, one looks at the riskRewardAnalyticalValuesBox to find that this value depends upon some reasonable reversion factors and a pseudoModifiedDurationPort of -244.2194 … rather a large value, and with a funny sign, to boot!

The calculation of this variable may be examined via the pseudoPortfolioReportBox, which reports that a 2% change in price results in an absolute yield (and we are talking about portYield, remember!) change of -0.0082% and the large value of pseudoModifiedDurationPort.

Bringing up the details for the three yield calculations implicit in this value, we find that the high priced yield is 4.1622% with a price of 23.937 and the base priced yield is 4.1702% with a price of 23.70 while the low priced yield is 4.1540% with a price of 23.463.

Essentially, what is happening is that the probability of a near-term call at a price higher than market is goes up with price at a rate that nearly exactly matches the decline in yield of the far more likely limitMaturity, so that price changes, at this particular price level, have a negligible effect on this particular measure of yield.

*sigh* It happens.

Fortunately, though, an occasional blow-up like this is accounted for in the trading engine – even at the ridiculously high valuation, there are very few trades generated into this security.

When we look at the trade evalation report, into BCE.PR.C out of a randomly chosen security, we see that the bidToOfferPickup is negative. Negative? How can it possibly be negative when the valuation on the buy side is so high?

To answer that, we look at the pickup calculation box for this trade and find that, while the buyValuationAsk is much greater than the sellValuationBid, there is a large negative contribution to the total pickup from the parameter excessRewardDifferenceValuation, a parameter invented for just such occasions.

In the standard parameterization supplied with HIMIPref™, the parameter excessValuationCap is set to 1.00, while the excessValuationReduction is set to 2.00. This adjustment – one might almost call it a sanity check in the calculations – prevents the trade from being shown as desirable, both in live reports and in future simulations that will analyze this date as part of the continuing efforts to refine the parameterization.

OK, so it’s maybe a little complex. So?

Publications

Research : Perpetual Hockey Sticks

A new edition of Canadian Moneysaver has been issued, so I can re-publish my article from the penultimate publication!

Many readers will be familiar with the “hockey stick” pattern of option returns – if not, don’t worry, I explain it in the article. This paradigm is pretty practical for those people (and practitioners) perplexed by the price pattern of perpetual preferreds.

Look for the research link!

As a bonus, I have also made available the spreadsheet I used when writing the article.

Issue Comments

DBRS Downgrades Loblaws … What about Weston?

DBRS has downgraded Loblaw Companies debt from “A” to “A(low)”:

DBRS had placed Loblaw’s long-term ratings Under Review with Negative Implications on February 8, 2007, following the release of 2006 results, which were indicative of a more challenging situation at the Company than previously understood. Sharply lower operating income, net earnings from recurring operations and cash flow for the second year in a row, combined with a significant writedown to goodwill, led to substantially weaker credit metrics (i.e., lease-adjusted cash flow/debt of approximately 20% for 2006) that are not consistent with an “A” rating from DBRS.

The downgrade follows a detailed review, from which DBRS has concluded that Loblaw’s credit risk profile has been affected by the evolving operating and competitive challenges. DBRS believes intensifying competition has been exacerbated by internal problems relating primarily to supply chain management and general merchandise program. These factors have contributed to declining sales growth and operating margins that will not be easily stabilized and reversed.

 

Preferred share investors will recall that Weston, Loblaw’s parent, is on Credit Watch Negative and DBRS goes on to say:

DBRS ratings for George Weston Limited remain under review with negative implications (where they were placed on February 8, 2007). The review will be completed over the near term.

Weston’s debt is currently rated A(low) … nobody can speak for DBRS except a DBRS spokesman, but I think it’s fair to say that holding companies are more often than not rated at least one notch below their owned operating companies. For example, we can look at the DBRS press release for Weston dated 2006-08-14, after Loblaw was downgraded from A(high):

As such, the one notch differential between Weston and Loblaw is considered sufficient to reflect the structural differences between the parent company (Weston) and the primary operating company (Loblaw).

Should there be further change in the opinion on or ratings of Loblaw, DBRS will assess the impact on Weston at that point in time.

Should Weston’s DEBT be downgraded to BBB, there are not necessarily any implications for the PREFERREDS … but the chance that the prefs will get downgraded have just increased. At least, according to me. We shall see!

Weston issues in the HIMIPref™ universe are: WN.PR.A / WN.PR.B / WN.PR.C / WN.PR.D / WN.PR.E (putting the ticker symbols in posts is my way of tagging them!)

New Issues

New Issue : Brookfield Asset Management 4.75% Perp

Brookfield has announced a new Cumulative Perpetual Preferred issue, Series 18.

Size : $200-million ( = 8-million shares @ $25.00) prior to over-allotment)

Closing : May 9, 2007

Dividends : 4.75%, first dividend payable July 31 (short first coupon)

Redemption Schedule :

BAM 4.75 Perp Redemption Schedule
From To Price
2012-07-31 2013-07-30 $26.00
2013-07-31 2014-07-30 25.75
2014-07-31 2015-07-30 25.50
2015-07-31 2016-07-30 25.25
2016-07-31 INFINITE DATE 25.00

Brookfield Asset Management is rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS and P-2 (stable) by S&P.

More Later

Market Action

April 20, 2007

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.28% 4.29% 40,513 16.81 2 -1.1694% 1,007.6
Fixed-Floater 5.34% 4.37% 105,800 16.60 6 -0.2705% 958.6
Floater 4.56% -18.22% 56,292 0.13 4 +0.1090% 1,058.2
Op. Retract 4.72% 3.16% 84,054 2.10 17 +0.0865% 1,034.6
Split-Share 5.03% 3.97% 147,239 3.38 12 -0.0712% 1,046.5
Interest Bearing 6.52% 4.02% 61,776 1.91 5 -0.0602% 1,045.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.04% 4.09% 224,917 5.54 54 -0.0619% 1,057.7
Perpetual-Discount 4.54% 4.57% 815,195 16.27 11 +0.0079% 1,063.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.Y Scraps (would be ratchetRate, but there are volume concerns) -2.1829% Exchange/Reset date is 2007-12-1 (to BCE.PR.Z). Closed at 23.75-18, 21×9 on volume of 1,400 shares.
TOC.PR.B Scraps (would be Floater, but there are volume concerns) -2.1434% Contagion from the BCE issues? This was on volume of 200 shares. Closed at 25.11-75, 6×35.
BCE.PR.I FixedFloater -1.4880% Exchange/Resdet date is 2011-08-01 (counterpart is unissued series ‘AJ’); until then pay 4.65% of par. New low today of 22.50; closed at 22.51-87, 5×10
BCE.PR.S Ratchet -1.3344% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-11-01 (to BCE.PR.T). Did this on volume of 700 shares; closed at 24.40-89, 3×1
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -1.0390% Exchange/Reset date is 2010-12-01; until then these pay 4.54% of par. Closed at 22.86-15, 2×10. Traded as low as 22.85 today, a new 52-week low.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PWF.PR.I PerpetualPremium 129,350 Desjardins crossed 124,100 at 26.75. Now with a skimpy pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.86% based on a bid of 26.75 and a call 2008-05-30 at 26.00. The buyer seems to be hoping that they last longer!
WN.PR.D PerpetualPremium 104,985 Scotia crossed 92,400 at 25.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 25.73 and a call 2014-10-31 at 25.00. Weston is still under Credit Watch Negative.
RY.PR.D PerpetualPremium 81,758 RBC crossed 65,000 at 25.35. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.54% based on either a call 2016-3-25 at 25.00, or a limitMaturity, take your pick.
CM.PR.I PerpetualPremium 63,350 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.59% based on a bid of 25.23 and a call 2016-3-1 at 25.00
WN.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 58,337 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 24.86 and a limitMaturity.

Issue Comments

LCS.PR.A : Continuation of Analysis

In the first part of this analysis, we got as far as estimating the two fundamental credit quality ratios as:

  • Asset Coverage Ratio : 2.3:1
  • Income Coverage Ratio: 0.5:1

As noted, the Income Coverage Ratio is a little scary (as the company will, in the absence of other income, have to dip into capital to make the preferred dividend payments), but on the other hand consider that there is a lot of capital to dip into! The shortfall is approximately $0.25 annually; the term of the investment is seven years (since the prospectus notes that the preferred shares will be redeemed at $10.00 on April 30, 2014); and therefore that the shortfall amounts to about $1.75 over the term of the investment.

If we deduct this amount from the capital available (which we previously calculated as approximately $23.55), we are left with $21.80 to cover our $10.00 investment. So, even after setting aside some capital to meet the income requirements, we still have a fair amount of danger space.

We can also take comfort from one of the committments in the prospectus:

No distributions will be paid on the Class A Shares if (i) the distributions payable on the Preferred Shares are in arrears, or (ii) in respect of a cash distribution, after payment of the distribution by the Company, the NAV per Unit would be less than $15.00. In addition, it is intended that the Company will not pay special distributions, meaning distributions in excess of the targeted $0.075 per month in distributions, on the Class A Shares if after payment of the distribution the NAV per Unit would be less than $25.00 unless the Company would need to make such distributions so as to fully recover refundable taxes.

So, if the Asset Coverage Ratio falls below 1.5:1, then at least distributions to the capital unitholders will not be a drain on corporate resources, which is a comfort. The “intention” regarding special distributions is appreciated, but as hard-nosed fixed income investor, we don’t really care a lot about their precious “intentions”. It’s their committments that matter.

In sum, I have no problems with the rating of this issue as Pfd-2(low) by DBRS.

OK, so the issue looks like it’s investment grade. It’s only just investment grade; carnage in their underlying portfolio of life insurance companies could add to our worries; but it’s a reasonable investment and worth looking at further.

The issue is currently quoted on the TSX at $10.55-65. What’s the yield if purchased at $10.65?

Using Keith Betty’s Yield Calculator (remember, we can’t use a generic bond calculator, since bonds trade with accrued interest and preferreds don’t), we plug in the following values:

Parameterization of Yield Calculation
Current Price 10.65
Call Price 10.00
Settlement Date 2007-04-25
Call Date 2014-04-30
Quarterly Dividend 0.13125
Cycle 2
Pay Date 10
Include First Dividend 1
First Dividend Value If Different 0.01917

Some of the above values require explanation … this is a simple generic calculator, not one designed for six decimal places of precision.

I have told the calculator that it will receive payments on the 10th day of February, May, August & November, as promised in the prospectus. This is indeed the date of receipt but the date of accrual is actually the last business day of January, April, July, October. Thus, the final payment has been marked down a bit; the calculator pro-rates the final dividend to what it thinks it will have accrued and not paid to April 30, which underestimates the final payment by ten-day’s-worth of accrual.

In the “Include First Dividend” field, I have indicated to the calculator that I expect to receive a payment on May 10. I won’t, but it’s the best way to indicate to the calculator that the first payment, in August, will be larger than usual ($0.15042, rather than $0.13125).

I have double checked the calculated cash-flows (in the blue highlighted area, cells G2:H31), to ensure that it reflects reality – or, at least, the best approximation of reality achievable with a generic spreadsheet. They look OK to me.

And finally, after looking at the answer (4.2%), I have performed an independent sanity check: it’s a seven year investment. Since I’m buying at 10.65 and being called at 10.00, that’s a total loss of $0.65, or $0.093 annually. I’m getting paid $0.525 annually, so after deducting my projected capital loss, I have a net income of $0.432 from an investment of $10.65 that will decline to an investment of $10.00 over time, which is an average investment of 10.33. Therefore, I can make a very (very!) rough approximation of the total yield as $0.432/$10.33 = 4.18%. OK. I’m happy that the calculator is working properly, especially after looking at the two-digit calculation in cell U105, which is simply copied to the one-digit answer in cell B21.

I can compare this value with bonds by multiplying by my Interest Equivalency Factor of 1.4 … to get the same after-tax income from interest payments, I’d need a yield of about 5.9%. And I can compare this with other comparable preferred shares, such as, for instance, whatever has been recently recommended in PrefLetter.

However, I have to remember the issue size. This issue might be liquid enough now that I can invest everything I want at a price of $10.65. And I might have every intention of simply holding the issue until it’s redeemed. But there’s many a slip twixt the crouch and the leap … if I have a lot of shares, and need to sell them in 2010, will I be able to do it? If I only have a few shares, will the lack of liquidity mean that potential buyers will discount what they would otherwise pay to account for their liquidity problems? These worries must be accounted for at all times, and particularly when the issue capitalization is only $30-million.

All in all, this isn’t a bad issue at the current price. You could do worse.

Update: And never forget credit quality! This is on the very edge of investment grade; while it’s good enough for a conservative investment portfolio, it’s not good enough to be a huge chunk of an investment portfolio.

And, of course, this does not constitute specific investment advice, one way or the other. I am a financial advisor – but I am not necessarily YOUR financial advisor.

Update: On April 30, the issuer announced:

that it has completed the issuance of an additional 150,000 preferred shares at $10 per share and 150,000 Class A shares at $15 per share representing total gross proceeds of $3,750,000. This issuance was pursuant to the exercise of the over-allotment option granted to the agents in connection with the Company’s recently completed initial public offering. With the exercise of the over-allotment option, the total amount raised by the Company was $76,750,000.

Documentation

Connection Test for HIMIPref™

There are periodic problems with accessing HIMIPref™ over a network – problems that appear to flummox networking specialists. I know I’m flummoxed!

The problem arises from the length of time it takes to perform the calculations: in the full institutional version of HIMIPref™ all calculations are performed from scratch. It’s done this way because I want to provide massive amounts of intermediate data to clients for verification and explanatory purposes and it’s easier to produce all this stuff de novo than to write it to files then read it and transmit it separately.

Anyway, when logging in to HIMIPref™, you see notifications of fundamental data coming in (dividends, options …) then a wait screen while the calculations are performed. In some systems, particularly with proxy-servers, the system will hang as the client programme waits for data from the server that just ain’t coming. I never see this problem with direct connections.

Rather than endure any more speculation from network technicians that I just plain can’t write code, I have developed a Connection Test. It uses the same technology as HIMIPref™ but just sleeps for input number of seconds and returns an integer vector of the input length (in case anybody suspects that the volume of data is a contributory factor).

Full source code is available to HIMIPref™ clients.

Update: A note regarding the availability of this test has been added to the HIMIPref™ documentation, “System Requirements“.

Market Action

April 19, 2007

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.23% 4.22% 41,772 16.92 2 -0.3265% 1,019.5
Fixed-Floater 5.33% 4.35% 104,168 16.63 6 -1.3177% 961.2
Floater 4.57% -16.72% 56,123 0.13 4 +0.0993% 1,057.1
Op. Retract 4.73% 3.20% 84,517 2.16 17 +0.0425% 1,033.8
Split-Share 5.02% 3.98% 147,534 3.38 12 -0.1060% 1,047.3
Interest Bearing 6.51% 5.23% 62,026 2.27 5 +0.0040% 1,045.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.03% 4.03% 225,592 5.58 54 -0.0264% 1,058.4
Perpetual-Discount 4.54% 4.57% 829,295 16.27 11 -0.0144% 1,063.1
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater -4.1494% Exchange/Reset date is 2010-12-01; until then these pay 4.54% of par. Closed at 23.10-34, 6×1. Traded as low as 23.10 today, a new 52-week low. Each one of those three prices is exactly $1.00 below yesterday’s number, amusing if you don’t own it.
BCE.PR.T Scraps (would be FixedFloater, but there are volume concerns) -2.4230% Exchange/Reset date is 2011-11-01 (to BCE.PR.S); until then, pays 4.502% p.a. Closed at 23.76-00, 8×4. New 52-week low of 24.00
BCE.PR.Z FixedFloater -2.2774% Exchange/Reset date is 2007-12-1 (to BCE.PR.Y); until then they pay 5.319% of par. Afterwards … I bet it’s less! Closed at 23.60-17, 20×1. New 52-week low of 23.51.
BCE.PR.C FixedFloater -1.7034% Exchange/Reset date is 2008-03-01 (to series AD, not issued); until then they pay 5.54% of par. Closed at 23.66-02, 12×4. Traded as low as 23.50 today, a new 52-week low.
CGI.PR.C SplitShare -1.5625% It did this on zero volume. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.86% based on a bid of 25.20 and a softMaturity 2016-6-14 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.Y Scraps (would be ratchetRate, but there are volume concerns) -1.3810% Exchange/Reset date is 2007-12-1 (to BCE.PR.Z). Closed at 24.28-98, 10×10, on zero volume.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.I OpRet 103,825 RBC crossed 47,700 at 25.20, then another 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.59% based on a bid of 25.20 and a call 2007-12-25 (er … give or take a few days!) at 25.00
TD.PR.N OpRet 67,500 TD crossed 32,800 at 26.99, then another 17,200 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 2.82% based on a bid of 26.82 and a call 2009-5-30 at 26.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualPremium 57,789 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.59% based on a bid of 25.22 and a call 2016-3-1 at 25.00
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 49,000 RBC crossed 40,000 at 24.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.55% based on a bid of 24.85 and a limitMaturity
POW.PR.D PerpetualPremium 26.23 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.27% based on a bid of 26.23 and a call 2014-11-30 at 25.00.

There were fourteen other “$25 p.v. equivalent” index-included issues with over 10,000 shares traded today.