MAPF

MAPF Performance: June, 2008

The fund experienced disappointing returns in June, as the market didn’t just collapse, it collapsed without retaining a normal degree of internal consistency.

Returns to June 30, 2008
Period MAPF Index
One Month -6.37% -3.43%
Three Months -4.38% -2.09%
One Year -4.38% -4.35%
Two Years (annualized) +0.32% -2.34%
Three Years (annualized) +1.71% -0.67%
Four Years (annualized) +3.68% +1.08%
Five Years (annualized) +6.82% +1.70%
Six Years (annualized) +6.87% +2.72%
Seven Years (annualized) +8.05% +2.79%
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
June, 2008 8.3419 6.034% 0.952 6.338% $0.5287
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held; this assumes that the cash is invested in (or raised from) all securities held, in proportion to their holdings.

So, despite the poor price performance in June, we must remember that we are fixed-income investors. The expected annual income per unit (these are shown gross of fees and expenses) continues to show an upward path … and it is the income that makes the asset class worthwhile.

I should emphasize, however, that the fund does not explicitly seek to maximize this number. Yield on the portfolio will be given up when it is possible to exchange it for something else that is attractive: credit quality, say, or retractibility. Over the very long term, however, it is the prime objective of fixed income management to maximize the income received from a given amount of capital.

When we look at the MAPF Portfolio Composition for May, 2008, we see that the fund was invested almost entirely in PerpetualDiscounts; this overall analysis is unchanged in the portfolio composition for June. Given the sharp decline in the market in June, it should therefore come as no surprise that the the fund underperformed, but even so … PerpetualDiscounts declined 5.31% in June, so there is a further source.

I have made some data available with this post:

When we look at the June performance of the PerpetualDiscount Index as of May 30, the first thing we notice is that the non-financials did relatively well:

PerpetualDiscount
June Performance
by Industry
Industry Mean Return
(Equal Weight)
[BAM=Financial]
Mean Return
(Equal Weight)
[BAM=Non-Financial]
Financial -6.20% -6.16%
Non-Financial -0.35% -1.88%

BAM is perceived as a financial, but is classified as an “Industrial” by the TSX. Whichever way you slice it, financials did extremely poorly relative to non-financials, and this factor alone is enough to explain the underperformance of MAPF relative to the PerpetualDiscount index – the fund has a position in BAM.PR.N, but the other elements of its PerpetualDiscount exposure is unequivocally financial.

The remainder of the analysis will examine only the financials.

I have previously noted that the more deeply discounted perpetuals underperformed in the period 5/30 to 6/13. The following chart shows that this effect persisted through monthend:

A regression of the May 30 Price against June return for the issues rated Pfd-1 shows that the effect is significant: 28% of the variation is explained by the equation:

Return = -19.77% + 0.65*Price %

Thus, the expected return for a Pfd-1 financial issue in June with a May 30 price of $20 would be -6.77%, while an initial price of $25 would predict a June return of -3.52%. Surprisingly, this effect only hits the Pfd-1 issues … a similar regression for the Pfd-1(low) issues produced no result, while there are not enough data to examine in the Pfd-2(high) and Pfd-2(low) grades.

The price/return relationship for Pfd-1 issues is not just unexpected, it is ludicrous – as I have been harping on since mid-month. I will stress again that my expectations are not based on mere observations of historical relationships – these expectations are at the heart of fixed-income theory.

When selecting a fixed income portfolio, one always bears three scenarios (at least!) in mind – rates generally rise, rates generally fall, rates are essentially flat. More sophisticated analysis is, in many ways, simply an elaboration of these basic assumptions about the future. So, when we compare a low-coupon, low-price PerpetualDiscount to a high-coupon high-price PerpetualDiscount, we come up with the following implications of each scenario (for more information, see my article Perpetual Hockey Sticks):

  • If rates go up, the price of each instrument will decline by approximately the same percentage.
  • If rates go down, we expect the low-coupon, low-price issue to increase in price more, since it has more room to increase before the holder has to worry about his capital gains being called away.
  • If rates remain the same, the higher yielding issue will have a better return. Since the two issues are equal in first scenario, and the low-coupon issue wins in the second, we expect the high-coupon, high-price issue to have the better return in this scenario

Or, to put it another way, investors should demand a higher yield on the high-coupon issues, in order to compensate for the possibility that they might lose out on capital gains if rates decline and the issuer calls the issue for redemption.

As is always the case in preferred share analysis, there is never enough data to show many perfect illustrations of various points – there are just too many cross currents, in terms of credit quality, issuer, coupon, redemption terms … the list is endless. However, there are two issuers of Pfd-1 quality with PerpetualDiscount issues outstanding that cover a broad enough range of coupons to be interesting: CM and RY. The following charts show the May 30 and June 30 yields, plotted against their coupon. It should be noted that if there was no convexity effect (which I would consider the limiting case) the plots should always be flat; a normal convexity effect should show that yield increases as the coupon gets larger, as compensation for the decreased room for capital gains before the holder has to worry about a call.

Clearly, the curve change from “normal” at the end of May to “abnormal” at the end of June. Please note that I have deliberately not referred to the June relationship as “inverted” … while normal yield curves can invert (when short rates are higher than long rates), this is an economically reasonable relationship under the correct economic conditions. There are no conditions in which high-coupon perpetual discounts should yield less than low-coupon perpetual discounts, in the absence of special, issue-specific factors, as I noted on June 27:

  • A big difference in term to call
  • A big difference in liquidity
  • A big difference in other terms of the issue (e.g., voting rights, restrictive covenants, etc.)

None of these features is applicable to the CM and RY issues.

Well … despite the fact that the changes in relationships are impossible, they happened anyway. Markets have a way of doing that, just to remind us that we don’t know everything! So why did all this happen?

I suspect that:

  • The overall decline in PerpetualDiscounts is due – at least in part – to the Bank of Canada June 10 decision to keep the overnight rate constant. There are many who imagine that there is only one interest rate … if the Government of Canada overnight rate is flat-to-increasing, they think, the same must apply to long term corporate rates. Therefore, they sell, in expectation of future price declines, which become (for a while, anyway, in a small enough market) a self-fulfilling prophecy
  • The huge difference in returns between financial and non-financial perpetualDiscounts implies that Fear of Banks is a major factor. It is my feeling that such fears are misplaced. While Canadian banks are certainly not unscathed by the credit crunch, they’re not exposed to the full force of leveraged positions in sub-prime paper either! I do not feel that the actual chance of default by any of Canada’s banks has increased in any kind of material way.
  • The abnormal coupon-yield relationship points to retail. Selling something because the price is down, rather than on an objective evaluation of risk/return, is never a winning strategy, but one can always count on retail to do the wrong thing.
  • The fact that this effect is most pronounced in the Pfd-1 issues (and barely visible in Pfd-1(low)) points to not just retail, but small-time retail at that. If one can only hold one or two preferreds (due to constraints of portfolio size), it only makes sense to hold tip-top quality – I’ve made that recommendation myself. If these small holders are eager to dump (a portion of) their preferreds, they don’t have a lot of choice as to which ones

What does it all mean? June was a bad month. The fund is overweighted in high quality, low-coupon, financial PerpetualDiscounts and this was precisely the wrong spot to be. HIMIPref™ is a statistically based system and will not work well every time. However, trading continues, based on expected incremental returns and I have every expectation that good results from this trading will become visible in terms of fund return as the market normalizes.

Market Action

July 7, 2008

VoxEU has put together a book comprised of selected columns about the sub-prime crisis.

The GSEs got whacked today, on reports that they may need to raise $75-billion:

Freddie Mac fell $2.59 to $11.91 after earlier dropping as low as $10.28. Fannie Mae declined $3.04 to $15.74 and earlier fell to $14.65.

The new FAS 140 rule that seeks to stop companies keeping assets in off-balance sheet entities may force Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to bring mortgages back onto their books, requiring them to put up capital, Lehman analysts led by Bruce Harting wrote in a note to clients today.

Fannie Mae would need to add $46 billion of capital and Freddie Mac would need about $29 billion, the Lehman analysts wrote.

The companies will probably get an exemption from the rule because it would be “very difficult” for them to raise that amount of capital, the analysts said.

“The provision discussed by Lehman could have an effect on our ability to serve the housing mission,” Freddie Mac spokeswoman Sharon McHale said. “We would hope FASB would take into account our mission” when it writes the final rule, McHale said.

Yields on agency mortgage securities relative to U.S. Treasuries rose to the highest since March 13 on concern that banks may need to sell off the debt.

Bank of America Corp., the second-largest U.S. bank, may sell mortgage assets after buying Countrywide Financial Corp., Kenneth Hackel, the managing director of fixed-income strategy at RBS Greenwich Capital Markets in Greenwich, Connecticut, said in a note to clients.

The difference between yields on the Bloomberg index for Fannie Mae’s current-coupon, 30-year fixed-rate mortgage bonds and 10-year government notes widened 7 basis points, to 204 basis points. The spread has climbed 18 basis points since June 18.

Note that Accrued Interest comments that he does not believe that the sell-off and Lehman’s analysis are related.

Remember my table of CM issues on June 26? Well, here’s a table of PWF issues, just to make sure you’re thoroughly confused.

PWF Perpetuals
Issue Dividend Quote Pre-Tax
Bid-YTW
PWF.PR.K 1.2375 19.70-99 6.42%
PWF.PR.L 1.275 20.30-44 6.42%
PWF.PR.F 1.3125 20.91-24 6.41%
PWF.PR.E 1.375 21.12-50 6.66%
PWF.PR.H 1.4375 23.06-99 6.36%
PWF.PR.G 1.475 24.45-70 6.15%
PWF.PR.I 1.50 25.00-09 6.15%

Negative Convexity? Negative Schmonvexity! It just doesn’t make any sense!

Update: Assiduous Reader prefhound points out in the comments that PWF goes ex-dividend tomorrow … so be careful when comparing! … end update

The market got thumped again, on average volume with a notable paucity of block-trades. What can I say? It looks retail-driven … but it’s pretty depressing anyway. But with long corporates still hanging around 6.10% and PerpetualDiscounts now yielding 6.23% … tax-advantage? We don’t need no stinking tax advantage! But for those who do, AND who have an interest-equivalency factor of 1.4x, that’s +262bp. Wow.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.26% -2.84% 48,438 0.08 1 +0.5507% 1,124.6
Fixed-Floater 4.65% 4.37% 69,099 16.38 6 -0.0744% 1,090.7
Floater 4.01% 4.03% 51,798 17.37 3 +0.1129% 917.8
Op. Retract 4.95% 3.23% 171,246 2.57 17 -0.1189% 1,048.0
Split-Share 5.33% 6.16% 64,470 4.14 14 -0.1482% 1,036.2
Interest Bearing 6.14% 4.61% 45,395 1.99 3 -0.4336% 1,122.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.96% 5.90% 65,155 10.97 4 -0.0497% 1,006.4
Perpetual-Discount 6.17% 6.23% 247,246 13.58 67 -0.7016% 854.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -4.48% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.66% based on a bid of 21.12 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -4.2025% Asset coverage of 3.2+:1 as of June 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.89% based on a bid of 18.92 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.16% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (8.46% to 2016-3-25).
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -3.7611% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.35% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.9397% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.96% based on a bid of 19.15 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -2.3233% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 20.18 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.0159% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.48% based on a bid of 16.04 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -1.8295% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.7614% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.91% based on a bid of 17.29 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.7094% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.50% based on a bid of 20.70 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.5797% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 20.56 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.5102% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.4799% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.23% based on a bid of 18.64 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.4563% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 20.30 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.2531% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 19.70 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.2524% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.73% based on a bid of 20.50 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.2520% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 24.45 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2042% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 18.05 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.1949% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.1573% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.36% based on a bid of 23.06 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.1572% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.61% based on a bid of 20.50 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.1038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.0638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.76% based on a bid of 23.25 and a optionCertainty 2013-6-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.22% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.56% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.J (6.52% to 2018-3-30).
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0147% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 19.51 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +2.3541% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of June 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 32,004 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualDiscount 22,961 CIBC crossed 12,300 at 24.38. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 24.17 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 22,905 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.07% based on a bid of 18.60 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 21,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 18.45 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 20,120 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 24.51 and a limitMaturity.

There were nineteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Interesting External Papers

Central Banks and the Eligibility Premium

For reasons that will become clear to Assiduous Readers in the near future, I’m doing a little reading on the “Eligibility Premium”.

This was defined, in ECB Occasional Paper #49, BindSeil & Papadia, August 2006 as:

the interest rate differential between eligible [as collateral for central bank loans] and ineligible assets, dubbed the “eligibility premium”.

… with the conclusion …

The three estimates above consistently indicate that the eligibility premium deriving from being eligible as collateral for Eurosystem operations is, as a maximum, in the order of magnitude of a few basis points only. However, again, the following caveats to these estimates should be highlighted: In times of financial tensions, the eligibility premium will be much higher. One may view ample collateral availability as an insurance against the consequences of financial instability.

  • In times of financial tensions, the eligibility premium will be much higher. One may view ample collateral availability as an insurance against the consequences of financial instability.
  • For lower-rated banks (e.g. banks with a BBB rating), the value of the eligibility feature is likely to be systematically higher.
  • The low eligibility premium in the euro area is also the result of the ample availability of collateral. If availability were to decrease or demand increase, the premium would increase as well.

As remarked by Michael Reuther of Commerzbank in June 2008:

In a liquidity stress situation only central bank eligible collateral can be seen as really liquid.

It was to capture a suddenly much larger eligibility premium that Congress pressured the Fed to add Student Loans to the eligibility list – and the Fed responded on May 2. It’s hard to say how much the eligibility premium was in this case, but 35bp is a possibility:

The Lincoln, Nebraska-based student-loan provider issued three-year bonds rated AAA that priced to yield 70 basis points more than the three-month London interbank offered rate, said a person familiar with today’s sale, who declined to be identified because the terms aren’t public. That’s a narrower spread than the 105 basis points Nelnet was charged last month, and the 100 basis points the company offered on March 31.

I seem to remember – but cannot find – a Bloomberg story specifically mentioning that spreads between eligible and non-eligible assets had skyrocketted at the height of the crisis.

All this is related to the matter of the Real Bills Doctrine.

Issue Comments

AO.PR.A & AO.PR.B to be Delisted

The TSX has announced that it:

has determined to delist the Common Shares of Algo Group Inc. (Symbol: AO), as well as the Convertible Redeemable Retractable Third Preferred Shares Series I (Symbol: AO.PR.A) and 6% Cumulative Redeemable Convertible Second Preferred Shares Series I (Symbol: AO.PR.B) at the close of market on August 6, 2008 for failure to meet the continued listing requirements of TSX. The Securities of the Company are currently halted due to the imposition of a Cease Trade Order. In addition, the Securities have been suspended from trading by TSX effective immediately. The Company will now be subject to the requirements of Section 501 of The TSX Company Manual.

The review was previously reported on PrefBlog. Neither issue is tracked by HIMIPref™.

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance: June 2008

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for June, 2008, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
June 2008
Three Months
to
June 30, 2008
Ratchet +0.38% +2.68%
FixFloat -0.41% -1.02%
Floater -3.09% +6.39%
OpRet -0.32% +0.53%
SplitShare -2.02% +1.31%
Interest +0.91% +2.72%
PerpetualPremium -1.38% -0.57%
PerpetualDiscount -5.31% -3.90%
Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD -4.26% -2.90%
DPS.UN -3.53% -2.20%
Index
BMO-CM 50 -3.43% -2.09%

Claymore has published NAV data for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to June, 2008
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
March 31, 2008 17.60      
April 30 17.60     0.00%
May 30 17.85 0.00   +1.42%
June 25 17.01 0.2097 -3.53% -4.26%
June 30, 2008 16.88   -0.76%
Quarterly Return -2.90%

The DPS.UN NAV for June 25 has been published so we may calculate the June returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund:

DPS.UN NAV Return, June-ish 2008
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
May 28 $20.89   +0.87%
May 30 N/A   +0.11%
June 25 $20.33   -2.79%
June 30 N/A   -0.76%
Estimated June Return -3.53%
CPD had a NAV of $17.83 on May 28 and $17.85 on May 30. The estimated May end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.11%, which is applied to DPS.UN as described above.
CPD had a NAV of $17.01 on June 25 and $16.88 on June 30. The estimated June end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.76%, which is applied to DPS.UN as described above.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for April and May:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-June-ish, 2008
April-ish +0.39%
May-ish +0.98%
June-ish -3.53%
Three-months-ish -2.20%
New Issues

New Issue: TD Fixed-Reset, 5.10%+168

TD Bank has announced:

that it has entered into an agreement with a group of underwriters led by TD Securities Inc. for an issue of 10 million non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series Y (the “Series Y Shares”), carrying a face value of $25.00 per share, to raise gross proceeds of $250 million. TD intends to file in Canada a prospectus supplement to its January 11, 2007 base shelf prospectus in respect of this issue.

TD has also granted the underwriters an option to purchase, on the same terms, up to an additional 2 million Series Y Shares. This option is exercisable in whole or in part by the underwriters at any time up to two business days prior to closing. The maximum gross proceeds raised under the offering will be $300 million should this option be exercised in full.

The Series Y Shares will yield 5.10% annually, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, for the initial period ending October 31, 2013. Thereafter, the dividend rate will reset every five years at a level of 168 basis points over the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield.

Holders of the Series Y Shares will have the right to convert their shares into non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Preferred Shares, Series Z (the “Series Z Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on October 31, 2013, and on October 31 every five years thereafter. Holders of the Series Z Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, equal to the three-month Government of Canada
Treasury Bill yield plus 168 basis points.

The issue is anticipated to qualify as Tier 1 capital for TD and the expected closing date is July 16, 2008.

So … now there are seven of these Fixed-Reset Thingies. This joins the previous TD deal with this structure, which was 5.00%+160, now trading as TD.PR.S

Issue: The Toronto-Dominion Bank Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Class A Preferred Shares, Series Y

Size: 10-million shares @ $25 (= $250-million), greenshoe of 2-million shares (=$50-million) exercisable up to two business days before closing.

Ratings: DBRS, Pfd-1; S&P: P-1(low); Moody’s: Aa2

Exchange Dates: October 31, 2013 and every five years thereafter.

Dividend: 5.10% until first exchange date, then 5-Year Canadas +168bp

Exchangeable: On every exchange date to series Z, which pay 90-day T-bills +168bp, calculated quarterly

Redemption: Every Exchange Date at 25.00. Series Z are redeemable every exchange date at $25.00 and at $25.50 at all other times.

Closing: July 16, 2008

Boy … these things sure seem popular, eh? And I will admit, so far my disdain has been thrown back in my face. But I still don’t like ’em.

Update, 2013-9-26: Trades as TD.PR.Y

Regulatory Capital

S&P Recognizes Implicit MMF Guarantees When Assessing Banks

I hadn’t been aware of this when I wrote my opinion piece A Collateral Proposal

The Federal Reserve discloses a “memo to file” on a meeting June 8, 2004, with S&P about Basel II:

Standard & Poor’s proprietary capital model is the primary driver for assessing capital, but regulatory capital is also taken into consideration. Standard & Poor’s already incorporates an operational risk capital charge into its capital assessment of trust and custody banks by deducting a certain basis point amount from capital for the amount of assets under custody (AUC) and assets under management (AUM).

With regard to assets under management, Standard & Poor’s methodology requires banks to hold more capital for money market funds than for equities and fixed income pooled funds, as it is the investor who takes the market risk for the latter two asset classes. The bank, on the other hand, provides an implicit guarantee with money market funds. This is because a bank will step in and support its sponsored money market funds if they are in danger of “breaking the buck”.

Assiduous readers will remember that the proposal to incorporate the implicit credit guarantee banks give to their branded Money Market Funds has been supported in principal by Ian de Verteuil of BMO-CM – although his proposal differs somewhat in specifics.

Market Action

July 4, 2008

Maple bonds aren’t selling well this year:

Four banks outside Canada raised just C$500 million ($492 million) selling Maple bonds, or foreign debt denominated in Canadian dollars, according to Bloomberg data. That compares with C$20.6 billion from 55 issues in the first half of 2007.

“Investors are having a preference for well-known, well- understood companies, and they have a home-market bias,” said Chris Seip, head of Canadian debt capital markets at RBC Capital Markets in Toronto.

By contrast, bond sales by Canadian governments rose 19 percent in the first half of the year, to C$40.5 billion. Corporate bond sales rose 1.4 percent to C$45.3 billion, according to Bloomberg data.

Speaking of “home market bias”, I suspect that FTU.PR.A (US Financial 15 Split) is ripe for another downgrade … it was downgraded to Pfd-3 when asset coverage was 1.4+:1 … asset coverage is just under 1.1:1 as of June 30.

My notes from yesterday attracted some comment on Financial Webring Forum:

To quote Preferred Share High Priest Hymas from his Prefblog of yesterday:

Let’s see: 250bp over long corporates, 10-year high and short-lived…

Need I say more?

Let’s hope people don’t come to their senses too fast

Well, I like flattery as much as anybody else … but remember my feelings about market timing! I may think that this episode is overblown, I may be able to show it’s a ten-year high, I may think that in the past spikes such as the current episode have been short-lived … but I don’t know anything. Markets teach you to be humble and not to get too greedy! So … well, if you’ve been looking for an entry point, now seems to be a good time! But don’t over-allocate (my rule of thumb is a maximum of 50% of the fixed income portion of your portfolio can go into prefs), don’t get greedy and don’t mortgage the house.

And FWF participant has a very good idea:

I’ve also been trying to swap ‘weak pairs’ of perpetuals that I already owned before the slide to book those losses. I may as well make a positive out of a negative.

This is smart thinking. ‘Weak Pairs’ were discussed in an article I published last year. They can even be extremely weak pairs … that is, it’s also reasonable to do this with PerpetualDiscounts from the same issuer as long as the coupon isn’t all that much different … maybe I’m being too fussy, but the more similar the elements of a swap, the better it is for a retail investor who doesn’t trade very much and doesn’t want to spend a lot of time on analysis.

Look …. say you own one of the RY low coupon issues and you’re sitting on a capital loss. Swapping it into another RY low coupon issue and crystallizing that loss for tax purposes is good business, as long as you don’t give up yield after paying commission. In this market, you might even be able to pick up a few basis points, if you show some discipline and watch the market.

As long as the coupons aren’t too different, and the issuer is the same, overall investment characteristics of the issues will be almost identical and (when following this particular example and swapping RY issues) then you can take advantage of the fact that the ex-dates are identical and trade off current yield rather than YTM. Just make absolutely sure when you do this that ex-Dates are identical! Some issuers have different dates for different issues.

Anyway … the markets. I’ve got some good news, some bad news and then some good news.

The good news BCE issues rocketted today on the BCE announcement that financing has been arranged.

The bad news is that PerpetualDiscounts got hammered again.

The good news is that the markets will be closed for the weekend.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.28% 2.86% 44,832 0.08 1 -0.1179% 1,118.4
Fixed-Floater 4.65% 4.36% 68,098 16.40 6 +7.7461% 1,091.5
Floater 4.02% 4.03% 52,442 17.37 3 +2.5946% 916.8
Op. Retract 4.94% 3.01% 176,996 2.64 17 -0.1576% 1,049.2
Split-Share 5.32% 6.09% 65,072 4.16 14 -0.2670% 1,037.8
Interest Bearing 6.11% 0.30% 45,157 1.99 3 +0.3381% 1,126.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.96% 5.89% 64,718 10.98 4 -0.1284% 1,006.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.12% 6.18% 249,371 13.65 67 -0.6236% 860.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -4.3005% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.47 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -3.4868% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.64% based on a bid of 20.76 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -3.4673% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 19.21 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -3.0263% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -2.4038% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.33% based on a bid of 20.30 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -2.3976% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of June 30, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 9.77 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 a t 10.00.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -2.3849% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.28% based on a bid of 23.33 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.J OpRet -2.2689% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.42% based on a bid of 23.26 and a softMaturity 2018-3-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.20% to 2012-3-30), BAM.PR.I (5.55% to 2013-12-30) and BAM.PR.O (6.50% to 2013-6-30).
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.1067% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 20.91 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.8667% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.17% based on a bid of 18.40 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.8639% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.39% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.7176% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.32% based on a bid of 20.60 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.6894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.29% based on a bid of 18.04 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.4674% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.64% based on a bid of 18.13 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.3895% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.60% based on a bid of 21.29 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.3041% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.13% based on a bid of 18.92 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.2973% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.19% based on a bid of 18.26 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.1260% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.20% based on a bid of 18.44 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1200% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 18.54 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.0726% Asset coverage of just under 3.6:1 as of May 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.44% based on a bid of 20.29 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.03% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.C (7.33% to 2019-1-10).
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.0661% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 23.20 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat +6.6228%  
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +7.1741%  
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +7.1741%  
BCE.PR.I FixFloat +7.6923%  
BAM.PR.K Floater +8.0497%  
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +8.5650%  
BCE.PR.R FixFloat +9.2444%  
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount 103,839 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 48.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 48.20 and a limitMaturity.
FAL.PR.B Scraps (Would be FixFloat, but there are volume concerns) 150,037 Desjardins crossed 150,000 in two tranches at 24.80.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 80,011 RBC crossed 71,100 at 18.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 18.47 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 77,711 RBC crossed 71,100 at 19.20. Gee, I wonder if this trade is somehow related to the cross of MFC.PR.C? Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.11% based on a bid of 19.21 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 51,695 Anonymous – maybe not the same anonymous – bought three tranches of 10,000 shares each from RBC, at 17.90, 17.90 & 17.92. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.57% based on a bid of 17.95 and a limitMaturity.

There were sixteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: June, 2008

Trading started off slowly in June, but two bursts of activity from June 10-13 (when spreads started widening) and June 27-30 brought portfolio turnover up to about 65%.

Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-6-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0.9% (0) 5.02% 4.48
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.3% (0) 5.54% 2.38
PerpetualDiscount 94.4% (-4.4) 6.35% 13.43
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash 4.8% (+4.4) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.03% 12.67
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-6-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 36.6% (-40.2)
Pfd-1(low) 40.2% (+29.0)
Pfd-2(high) 7.9% (+7.0)
Pfd-2 0.4% (0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.3% (-0.2)
Cash 4.8% (+4.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

The slight decline in credit quality is the result of a move from banks to insurers; in overall terms that do not reflect specific trades, a May month-end position of 7% BMO and 32% RY issues became 8% POW (Pfd-2(high)), 11% GWO (Pfd-1(low)) and 18% PWF (Pfd-1(low)).

The first trade I will examine comprises the largest single piece of the series of trades – unfortunately, it would have been better to delay:

Post Mortem: sale RY.PR.C, purchase GWO.PR.G
Date RY.PR.C GWO.PR.G
May 30
(bid)
$20.52
(yield: 5.65%)
$23.28
(yield: 5.58%)
Trade, 6/18
Price
Including
Commission
$19.33 $21.31
June 30
(bid)
$19.60
(yield: 5.95%)
$21.13
(yield: 6.20%)

Unfortunately, sometimes you’re just going to be too soon – particularly when you are trading on random noise … sometimes the random noise gets louder than usual, sometimes (in the worst case scenario) the so-called noise turns out to be a trend. HIMIPref™ simply plays the odds: with enough trades, actual results will reflect the statistics. At time of writing, RY.PR.C is bid at $19.05, while GWO.PR.G is bid at $20.84, so the trade results have improved since month-end – although it’s still underwater.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-6-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.5% (-0.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 0.7% (-10.8)
$100,000 – $200,000 47.2% (+19.1)
$200,000 – $300,000 29.0% (+5.9)
>$300,000 18.0% (-18.3)
Cash 4.4% (+4.4)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from May month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

A similar portfolio composition analysis has been performed on CPD as of May month end. It is interesting to note:

  • MAPF credit quality is superior
  • MAPF liquidity is superior
  • MAPF Yield is higher
  • But … MAPF is more exposed to PerpetualDiscounts

This last factor hurt performance in June and will be discussed when the performance is posted.

Issue Comments

BCE / Teachers' : A Giant Step Closer

BCE has announced:

BCE today announced the company has entered into a final agreement with a company formed by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Providence Equity Partners Inc., Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC, and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity.

As a result of the execution of the final agreement, amending the definitive agreement dated June 29, 2007:

  • The purchase price will remain $42.75 per common share;
  • The Purchaser and the Lenders have delivered fully negotiated and executed credit documents for the purpose of funding the transaction, including an executed credit agreement and other key financing documents;
  • The reverse break fee payable by the Purchaser in the circumstances contemplated by the definitive agreement has been increased to $1.2 billion;
  • Closing will occur on or before December 11, 2008; and
  • Prior to closing, the company will not pay dividends on its common shares but will continue to pay dividends on its preferred shares.

Well, the deal hasn’t closed until the money’s in the bank … but at this point I have to say that a successful closing looks pretty likely. It’s interesting that the break fee increased; presumably, that’s the concession won by BCE in exchange for cancelling the common dividend.

BCE has the following preferred shares outstanding: BCE.PR.A, BCE.PR.C, BCE.PR.D, BCE.PR.E, BCE.PR.F, BCE.PR.G, BCE.PR.H, BCE.PR.I, BCE.PR.R, BCE.PR.S, BCE.PR.T, BCE.PR.Y & BCE.PR.Z

The last dedicated PrefBlog entry in this saga was BCE / Teachers’ Deal : Chattering Classes Humiliated