Issue Comments

CCS.PR.C To Be Added to TSX Quantum

The TSX has announced:

Ten new symbols will be added to TSX Quantum on Friday March 7th 2008.

    <<     The symbols are from the following issuers:

    Cinram International Income Fund           CRW.UN
    Cooperators General Insurance Co.          CCS.PR.C
    Cygnal Technologies Corp.                  CYN
    Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd.            FFH
    HEARx Canada Inc.                          HUX
    Kinross Gold Corp.                         K, K.U, K.WT.B
    Nventa Biopharmaceuticals Corp.            NVN
    Technicoil Corp                            TEC
    >>

    These symbols join Telus Corporation (T and T.A) and TSX Group Inc. (X) that are already trading on TSX Quantum.
    Rik Parkhill, Interim CO-CEO, TSX Group Inc., said, “We are pleased with the robust performance and efficiency of TSX Quantum. As we continue to migrate symbols to the new trading platform, we are one step closer to realizing the goal of significant enhancement in performance and capacity across the entire market, which also offers a large benefit to our customers.”

The Quantum platform is the TSX’s new trading platform. I do not anticipate any market impact from this change.

CCS.PR.C was discussed recently on PrefBlog.

Miscellaneous News

US Fed & Negative Non-Borrowed Reserves

Frankly, I thought this was over since even Naked Capitalism no longer considers this an issue. But I see that there is a new post at Mish’s Global Economic Trend Analysis that is keeping the flame alive.

I was going to ignore it, when I saw that it has attracted no less than 124 comments, but I can’t bear discussing the matter any further in the daily commentary. So here it is, a post dedicated to this issue, which will be updated if, as and when necessary (hopefully never).

The story so far:

January 29, 2008:

Naked Capitalism is very concerned about a precipituous decline in non-borrowed reserves at the Fed, but I’m not convinced there’s a story here. In the current H3 release, it is disclosed that, of $41,475-million in reserves, only $199-million are non-borrowed. Usually, non-borrowed reserves will be roughly equal to total reserves – implying that net free reserves is about zero. The chart tells the story:

So … what are reserves? The Fed has the answer:

  • Reserve requirements, a tool of monetary policy, are computed as percentages of deposits that banks must hold as vault cash or on deposit at a Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Reserve requirements represent a cost to the banking system. Bank reserves, meanwhile, are used in the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve.
  • As of December 2006, the reserve requirement was 10% on transaction deposits, and there were zero reserves required for time deposits.

There are two things to note here: first, Canada does not have a fractional reserve requirement and second, banks get ZERO interest on their reserves:

The Fed has long advocated the payment of interest on the reserves that banks maintain at Federal Reserve Banks. Such a step would have to be approved by Congress, which traditionally has been opposed because of the revenue loss that would result to the U.S. Treasury. Each year the Treasury receives the Fed’s revenue that is in excess of its expenses. The payment of interest on reserves would, of course, be an additional expense to the Fed.

Thus, all banks will attempt to keep their reserves as close to their requirements as possible. If they have any excess in the system, they will either try to lend them on the Fed Funds market – at the infamous Fed Funds Rate – or withdraw them, to invest the money in … basically anything. Even a one-week T-bill, even now, pays more than ZERO.

Now, along comes the Term Auction Facility. Its value of $40,000-million is – surely not fortuitously! – roughly equal to the total US bank reserve requirement … and it’s available cheap – 3.123%, as pointed out by Naked Capitalism.

If these borrowed term funds were to be left at the Fed – on top of the reserve balances that had been held there previously – then the banks would be borrowing at 3.123% and lending at ZERO. It is my understanding that this sort of negative margin on loans is not considered the road to riches at banking school. But an American stockbroker heard about this, got all excited and appears to have stampeded Naked Capitalism into unnecessary worry.

February 8, 2008:

I discussed the effect of the TAF on bank reserves – and hysterical reactions thereof – on January 29. Naked Capitalism is now republishing a UBS research note that, frankly, I don’t understand at all:

What if the Fed’s rate cuts aren’t motivated by the desire to stave off recession, rather they’re to prevent a major banking crisis. Not one of escalating subprime losses or monoline downgrades, but actually a sheer lack of cash. The Fed’s not telling anyone what it’s up to because it doesn’t want to cause panic, but the evidence is actually there in its own data…

Ok, so things might not be quite as bad as that, but the situation isn’t far off. That’s because of the TAF. ….a savvy bank can put down lesser quality paper that it can’t generally do very much with (and certainly no one else really wants it), raise funds through the TAF, then use those funds to put down as reserves, and then conveniently gets paid a modest rate of interest against those reserves (which acts as a partial offset against the TAF). While there’s a small net cost to the banks, the real loser here is the Fed, what it gets stuck with is an ever growing pile of collateral.

Now consider this – that collateral is actually what’s backing the entire US banking system by way of its conversion to dollars and then the flow of those same dollars back to the Fed….

All this changes the complex of the US banking system somewhat. From the gold standard to the subprime standard perhaps?

In the first place, there is no interest paid on reserve balances. In the second place, the monetary effect of the TAF was neutralized by the Fed’s sale of T-Bills. I note Caroline Baum’s column and say: one may take a view on the advisability of the TAF, one may take a view on capital adequacy, and one may take a view on inter-bank lending; but any hullaballoo over “negative non-borrowed reserves” is hysterical nonsense:

The writer of the e-mail directs his readers to the most recent H.3 report, which shows total reserves ($41.6 billion) less TAF credit ($50 billion) less discount window borrowings ($390 million) equals non-borrowed reserves (minus $8.8 billion). The negative number is really an accounting quirk: If banks borrow more than they need, non-borrowed reserves are a negative number.

This gentleman is overlooking the fact that the Fed is “a monopoly provider of reserves,” said Jim Glassman, senior U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. “This is a non-starter. There is no such thing as a banking system short of reserves. The Fed has absolute control over the supply.”

[Update: See also Felix Salmon at Why Non-borrowed Reserves Don’t Matter]

As mentioned above, Mr. Shedlock has now posted another treatise under the title Borrowed Reserves and Tin-Foil Hats. In this post he makes a vast array of points regarding stress on the US banking system – none of them relevant to his previous thesis that the reported Negative Non-Borrowed Reserves was in and of itself an indicator of carnage to come in the sector – on which I will comment as best I can:

Banks participating in the Term Auction Facility (TAF) have to put up collateral for the amounts they borrow.

Clearly, the Fed does not hand out reserves willy-nilly. It lends them, but only if banks have sufficient collateral. Furthermore lending is not “printing”. Thus Glassman, the senior U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. really needs an education here.

It is indeed true that the Fed is not currently handing out under- or badly-collateralized reserves, but this is not always the case – I have previously highlighted a paper by Anna J. Schwartz, which argued that the discount window be eliminated due to fears that it might be used to prop up insolvent institutions. Additionally, Mish’s point that the current loans are well-collateralized seems to run counter to his purported thesis.

And, in fact, lending is printing – a colloquialism, to be sure, but the Fed does not have to print dollar bills to inflate the currency. All they have to do is say ‘Hey, presto! You’ve got $50-billion on deposit with us’ to achieve that goal. It is for this reason that when the TAF was implemented, it was simultaneously neutralized in monetary terms by their sale of bills … they deposited $50-billion in various accounts as TAF loans, they withdrew $50-billion from various accounts as payment for the bills. Monetary effect zero.

The Fed does not have “control” over supply of reserves because it does not have control over assets held and loans made by member banks. If Glassman’s thinking is representative of bank thinking in general, it’s no wonder banks balance sheets are so $#@%’d up.

“Assets held and loans made by member banks” represent the demand for reserves. The Fed controls the supply of reserves by virtue of their ability to loan anybody anything on any collateral.

A shortage of reserves comes into play when banks no longer have sufficient collateral to exchange for temporary reserves. Banks that do not have sufficient collateral, do not get loans from the discount window or the TAF. Period. End of Story. The Fed does NOT simply “print money” and hand it out to capital impaired banks. Bankruptcies result.

Fair enough, although as stated above the Fed does indeed have the ability to print money and hand it out to capital impaired banks to avert bankruptcy. Again, I fail to see the relevance to the “negative non-borrowed reserves” issue.

If Citigroup could have borrowed reserves from the Fed at 3-4% wouldn’t it had done so instead of raising $7.5 billion from Abu Dhabi at an interest rates of 11%? See Petrodollars Return Home and Abu Dhabi Deal Raises Questions About Citigroup’s Health for more on Abu Dhabi.

Citigroup went back to the well a second time under even more onerous terms as discussed in Cost of Capital “Ratchets Up” at Citigroup and Merrill.

Umm … the Citigroup / Abu Dhabi deal propped up Citigroup’s capital. They raised Tier One Capital through their deal with Abu Dhabi, not reserves. One would naturally expect a higher rate to be paid on Tier One Capital – to the extent that one can compare rates of expected return on equity vs. debt.

Read this again and again until it sinks in:

Over a third of the nation’s community banks have commercial real estate concentrations exceeding 300 percent of their capital, and almost 30 percent have construction and development loans exceeding 100 percent of capital.There will be more criticized assets; increases to loan loss reserves; and more problem banks. And yes, there will be an increase in bank failures.

No objections here! I can’t help but wonder, though, whether Mish is confounding loan loss reserves with fractional reserves … and wonder what relevance this has with the specific point regarding “negative non-borrowed reserves”.

Why Will Banks Fail?

  • Banks will fail because they do not have sufficient reserves.
  • Banks cannot borrow those reserves because they do not have sufficient collateral.
  • The Fed’s collateral requirements do not permit printing money and handing that money over to failing banks.
  • The Fed will not change those requirements and start printing money because of the “checkmate” scenario discussed below.

Well … let’s see:

  • Lack of reserves is indeed one trigger that could lead to bank failure
  • The banks certainly could borrow these reserves, if the Fed (or anybody else) felt like lending them the money on any collateral they wished. It should be noted that Overnight Fed Funds are explicitly uncollateralized … the problem is getting somebody to lend them to you on such a basis! See also a post on knzn.
  • The Fed’s current collateral requirements do not permit “printing money and handing that money over to failing banks”, but there is no reason why this cannot change
  • Whether or not they may change their collateral requirements in the future is a matter of conjecture and opinion
  • Not a single one of these points is relevant to the topic at hand of “negative non-borrowed reserves”!

Bank reserves are net borrowed. This comes at a time when commercial real estate is about to plunge and bank balance sheets are loaded to the gills with them.

This also comes at a time when social attitudes towards debt are going to impair Bernanke’s ability to inflate. For more on social attitudes, please see 60 Minutes Legitimizes Walking Away, Changing Social Attitudes About Debt, and a Crash Course For Bernanke.

Finally, banks will not be going deeper to the “TAF well” as long as the rules state “All advances must be fully collateralized.” Once collateral runs out, it’s the end of the line.

If the Fed is not concerned about this situation, they soon will be.

Of course there are those who believe the Fed will break the rules and eliminate all collateral requirements. So far anyway, they have not done so. Let’s assume however, when push comes to shove, the Fed acting under duress does just what Glassman says, and provides permanent capital for free.

Finally … a mention of Bank Reserves and “net borrowed” in the same sentence! Unfortunately for Mish, this is criticism of the TAF, not criticism of Negative Non-Borrowed Reserves, which are simply a mathematical result of the TAF.

I will note that Glassman said nothing whatsoever about the Fed providing permanent capital (by which I mean Tier 1 Capital …. I’m not sure what Mish means!) for free. Glassman was not asked about permanent capital – he was asked about reserves.

***************************************************

All in all, Mish’s post reveals more ignorance than analysis. But he certainly seems to have struck a chord with his readers – many of whom are, presumably, clients.

Update: The story has been picked up by the WSJ:

A number of people on Wall Street have noticed a recent plunge in non-borrowed reserves in the banking system and wondered it is a sign of distress in the banking system or of unusually stringent monetary policy. They dropped from $42 billion last November to negative $2 billion at the end of January.

It’s probably a false alarm, though. The drop is purely technical, a function of how the Fed has chosen to classify the money lent through its new Term Auction Facility.

As it happens, in the last week of January
TAF credit reached $50 billion. The amount of bank reserves the same week was only $48 billion. So, by definition, nonborrowed reserves, the difference, fell to negative $2 billion.


Update, 2008-4-29: The Fed has seen fit to comment:

The H.3 statistical release indicates that nonborrowed reserves of depository institutions have declined substantially since mid-December to a level that is now negative. This development reflects the provision of a large volume of reserves through the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and has no adverse implications for the availability of reserves to the banking system.

By definition, nonborrowed reserves are equal to total reserves minus borrowed reserves. Borrowed reserves are equal to credit extended through the Federal Reserve’s regular discount window programs as well as credit extended through the TAF. To maintain a level of total reserves consistent with the Federal Open Market Committee’s target federal funds rate, increases in borrowed reserves must generally be met by a commensurate decrease in nonborrowed reserves, which is accomplished through a reduction in the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities and other assets. The negative level of nonborrowed reserves is an arithmetic result of the fact that TAF borrowings are larger than total reserves.

Remember … you read it first on PrefBlog!

PrefLetter

February, 2008, Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The February, 2008, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the February, 2008, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the March, 2008, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close March 14 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on March 17.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Market Action

February 8, 2008

Bill Gross of PIMCO (whose forecast of FedFunds at 3.50% was mentioned here on October 29) has called for rough justice for the monolines:

As long as the illusion lasted, however, it is clear that monoline guarantees fostered an expansion of our modern shadow banking system and therefore an extension of US and even global economic prosperity.

…authorities through both official and backdoor channels now endorse a rescue effort. What is good for Ambac, they reason, is good for the country – and by extension the world.

As stock markets rise on optimistic workout developments, it is clear that it is – in the short run. But like General Motors a half century back, the sense of stability imparted to an oligopolistic industry with visible flaws is not likely to last, nor may the hope for a return to economic growth of recent years. The modern US financed-based economy has a striking resemblance to Barney Fife, guaranteeing global prosperity without the productive industrial-based firepower to back it up. Neither ultra-low interest rates or tax rebates, nor investor-led and authority-based monoline bailouts are likely to change that significantly during the next few years.

I’m inclined to agree with him … as far as I can tell – without specializing in such matters – the monolines are better characterized as hedge funds than anything else. Let them fail!

Treasury trading is showing increasing nervousness:

Traders drove two-year note yields to 172 basis points below 10-year rates, the widest gap since September 2004. The spread signals increasing demand for shorter-maturity debt in anticipation that interest rates will fall. Longer-dated securities are more vulnerable to speculation that rate cuts will revive the economy, spurring inflation and eroding the bonds’ fixed payments.

Two-year notes are poised for the longest stretch of weekly gains since October 1998, while 10-year notes are headed for their biggest weekly loss in almost two months. Thirty-year yields have risen this week by the most in nine weeks.

I am fearful of US inflation, but it takes two to make a market! Janet Yellen, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, takes the other view:

I expect core inflation to moderate over the next few years, edging down to around 1¾ percent under appropriate monetary policy. Such an outcome is broadly consistent with my interpretation of the Fed’s price stability mandate. Moreover, I believe the risks on the upside and downside are roughly balanced. First, it appears that core inflation has been pushed up somewhat by the pass-through of higher energy and food prices and by the drop in the dollar. However, recently, energy prices have turned down in response to concerns that a slowdown in the U.S. will weaken economic growth around the world, and thereby lower the demand for energy.… Another factor that could restrain inflationary pressures is the slowdown in the U.S. economy. This can be expected to create more slack in labor and goods markets, a development that typically has been associated with reduced inflation in the past.

We shall see! 

I’ve added another blog to the blogroll … Across the Curve. As with Accrued Interest, I don’t know the guy (John Jansen) and haven’t verified any of his claimed credentials … but I’ve read his posts and yes, he’s been a player.

I discussed the effect of the TAF on bank reserves – and hysterical reactions thereof – on January 29. Naked Capitalism is now republishing a UBS research note that, frankly, I don’t understand at all:

What if the Fed’s rate cuts aren’t motivated by the desire to stave off recession, rather they’re to prevent a major banking crisis. Not one of escalating subprime losses or monoline downgrades, but actually a sheer lack of cash. The Fed’s not telling anyone what it’s up to because it doesn’t want to cause panic, but the evidence is actually there in its own data…

Ok, so things might not be quite as bad as that, but the situation isn’t far off. That’s because of the TAF. ….a savvy bank can put down lesser quality paper that it can’t generally do very much with (and certainly no one else really wants it), raise funds through the TAF, then use those funds to put down as reserves, and then conveniently gets paid a modest rate of interest against those reserves (which acts as a partial offset against the TAF). While there’s a small net cost to the banks, the real loser here is the Fed, what it gets stuck with is an ever growing pile of collateral.

Now consider this – that collateral is actually what’s backing the entire US banking system by way of its conversion to dollars and then the flow of those same dollars back to the Fed….

All this changes the complex of the US banking system somewhat. From the gold standard to the subprime standard perhaps?

In the first place, there is no interest paid on reserve balances. In the second place, the monetary effect of the TAF was neutralized by the Fed’s sale of T-Bills. I note Caroline Baum’s column and say: one may take a view on the advisability of the TAF, one may take a view on capital adequacy, and one may take a view on inter-bank lending; but any hullaballoo over “negative non-borrowed reserves” is hysterical nonsense:

The writer of the e-mail directs his readers to the most recent H.3 report, which shows total reserves ($41.6 billion) less TAF credit ($50 billion) less discount window borrowings ($390 million) equals non-borrowed reserves (minus $8.8 billion). The negative number is really an accounting quirk: If banks borrow more than they need, non-borrowed reserves are a negative number.

This gentleman is overlooking the fact that the Fed is “a monopoly provider of reserves,” said Jim Glassman, senior U.S. economist at JPMorgan Chase & Co. “This is a non-starter. There is no such thing as a banking system short of reserves. The Fed has absolute control over the supply.”

[Update: See also Felix Salmon at Why Non-borrowed Reserves Don’t Matter] 

On the Better-Living-Through-More-Rules front, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox made a speech today:

Among the proposals that the Commission may consider in the spring are rules that would require credit rating agencies to make disclosures surrounding past ratings in a format that would improve the comparability of track records and promote competitive assessments of the accuracy of past ratings. In addition, the Division may propose rules aimed at enhancing investor understanding of important differences between ratings for municipal and corporate debt and for structured debt instruments.

I have also asked the Division to present proposed rules to the Commission that begin to address the significant shortcomings that we’ve identified in the municipal market. The recent financial stress on monoline insurers has heightened the importance of timely and rigorous disclosure that investors can understand. We have had ample illustration already of what happens when investors fail to look past an AAA rating to do independent analysis themselves — a problem that was exacerbated when important information was not supplied to the market in real time.

Well, I don’t have any problems with the transition analyses that the agencies currently publish, but I suppose if a standard format for these is defined it’s not horrible. I fail to see the point of the other stuff, though: “may propose rules aimed at enhancing investor understanding”; “what happens when investors fail to look past an AAA rating to do independent analysis themselves”. Seems to me these are due diligence issues, to be addressed at the SEC/Advisor level; with performance issues to be Client/Advisor.

I love the way that Mr. Cox assumes that advisors at fault in the sub-prime debacle will actually read additional information if it is available. All the rules in the world won’t make a genius out of a bad advisor.

It was a very quiet day for prefs. PerpetualDiscounts had their first down day since January 28 – they have gained 3.1% since then.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.49% 5.51% 47,010 14.6 2 +1.7995% 1,083.7
Fixed-Floater 5.17% 5.68% 86,613 14.65 7 +0.0383% 1,018.6
Floater 4.95% 5.00% 75,805 15.48 3 -0.9509% 853.6
Op. Retract 4.82% 2.23% 80,900 2.43 15 +0.0040% 1,044.3
Split-Share 5.31% 5.54% 100,826 4.22 15 -0.0912% 1,036.4
Interest Bearing 6.25% 6.42% 60,526 3.37 4 -0.1726% 1,079.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.74% 5.08% 402,477 5.22 16 -0.0486% 1,025.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.40% 5.43% 298,669 14.76 52 -0.0018% 951.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
TOC.PR.B Floater -1.7021%  
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.2913%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.2333% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of February 1, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.92% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.61 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
POW.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.2086% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 25.34 and a call 2012-1-5 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.2494% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 21.88 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.B Ratchet +3.6056% Reversal of yesterday’s nonsense … with no trades, the market-maker was able to keep up. Closed at 23.85-25, 10×3.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 141,250 Recent new issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 25.27 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
CM.PR.A OpRet 105,500 Nesbitt was a big seller today, on the sell side for the last ten trades of the day (from 2pm-4pm) totalling 55,500 shares, all at 25.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.83% based on a bid of 25.86 and a call 2008-3-9 at 25.75.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 102,695 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 20.76 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat 102,100 Scotia bought 98,700 from RBC at 23.97. 
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 78,700 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 25.39 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.

PrefLetter

February PrefLetter Now In Preparation!

The markets have closed and the February edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The February issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

Issue Comments

BCE.PR.C Dividend Rate Reset Announced

As previously discussed, BCE.PR.C is a fixed floater with a reset scheduled to take effect March 1, 2008. It is convertable (for a very limited time, so call your broker!) into BCE.PR.D, a “Ratchet Rate” Preferred.

The fixed rate payable on BCE.PR.C for the five years commencing March 1, 2008, will be 4.60% of par, or $1.15 p.a.

As implied by the previous discussion, I recommend conversion to BCE.PR.D, based on a balance of risks.

The announcement has been posted by BCE:

BCE Inc. will, on March 1, 2008, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AC (“Series AC Preferred Shares”) outstanding if holders of at least 2.5 million of its Series AC Preferred Shares elect not to convert such shares into Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AD (“Series AD Preferred Shares”) by February 20, 2008. In such a case, as of March 1, 2008, the Series AC Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend of $0.2875 based on an annual dividend rate of 4.60% for the five-year period beginning on March 1, 2008.

Under and subject to the terms and conditions of the Definitive Agreement entered into by BCE Inc. in connection with its acquisition by an investor group led by Teachers’ Private Capital, the private investment arm of the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, Providence Equity Partners Inc., Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC and Merrill Lynch Global Partners, Inc., the purchaser has agreed to purchase all outstanding Series AC Preferred Shares for a price of $25.76 per share, together with accrued but unpaid dividends to the Effective Date (as such term is defined in the Definitive Agreement). The purchaser has also agreed, on and subject to the terms and conditions of the Definitive Agreement, to purchase any Series AD Preferred Shares that might be issued by BCE Inc. on the conversion of the Series AC Preferred Shares for a price of $25.50 per share, together with accrued but unpaid dividends to the Effective Date. The Board of BCE Inc. has received opinions as to the fairness, from a financial point of view, of the consideration to be paid for the preferred shares from BCE Inc.’s financial advisors.

Market Action

February 7, 2007

In the continuing saga of the credit rating agencies, S&P has announced the creation of an ombudsman position, together with other reforms:

Among the changes set to be announced today, S&P will rotate lead rating analysts after five years of following the same company, government bond issuer, or structured-finance arranger. The new practice, which will be phased in, should prevent professional or personal relationships from affecting ratings, company officials said.

Analysts who leave S&P to work at a bond issuer will have some deals they previously rated reviewed to make sure their objectivity wasn’t compromised by the prospect of the new job.

Hey! That makes all kinds of sense, doesn’t it? Perhaps, now that I’ve been offering advice on preferred shares for over five years, the regulators should insist that I be rotated to, say, junior oil equity. Naked Capitalism isn’t much impressed:

The real problem that the agencies are paid by the very organizations they rate, and as long as this conflict remains, all other measures are mere window-dressing. The creation of an ombudsman role is an inadequate, unrealistic remedy for a problematic payment structure.

Well, last I heard, this was still a reasonably free country. Anybody who doesn’t want to take S&P’s advice is (as far as I know) welcome to listen to somebody else. But nothing, particularly not logic, will dampen expectations for certainty and a risk-free investment environment … portfolio managers should, if anything, welcome the provision of bad advice (if we may make the assumption, for the moment, that S&P’s advice is bad), since this will lead to market mispricing that may be exploited.

Andrew Cuomo, well known for his uncanny expertise at fixed income credit analysis, isn’t much impressed either:

New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo said “supposed reforms” by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s Investors Service, which gave high ratings to subprime debt that later plummeted, are “too little, too late.”

“Both S&P and Moody’s are attempting to make piece-meal changes that seem more like public relations window dressing than systemic reform,” Cuomo said in the statement.

In more interesting news, it appears that Credit Default Swaps may have increased the corellation in the mononlines sector:

Separately, the Financial Times reports on yet another largely unrecognized hole in the bond insurers’ balance sheets. Wall Street was apparently fond of a so-called negative basis trades. If they bought a bond, hedged it with credit default swaps, then hedged the risk of the guarantor defaulting (generally a monoline) with a different guarantor (generally a different monoline), they could accelerate the expected profits over the life of the deal into the current period. The result is that the bond insurers have an unknown (to the outside world) but potentially significant number of guarantees written on each other.

There is at least one player trying to whip up the panic:

Deutsche Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann said rating downgrades for bond insurers pose risks that could match the U.S. subprime market collapse.

“It could be a tsunami-like event comparable to subprime,” Ackermann said in a Bloomberg Television interview in Frankfurt today. Deutsche Bank, Germany’s biggest bank, is “well positioned” on its risk from bond insurers, he said

But there is another player – one not trying to sell a specific product – who has an opinion. Bernanke is concerned that monoline problems could cause banks’s balance sheets to gross-up. And Moody’s has downgraded SCA:

Security Capital Assurance Ltd.’s bond insurance units, hobbled by a decline in subprime mortgage securities, lost their Aaa credit rating at Moody’s Investors Service.

XL Capital Assurance Inc. and XL Financial Assurance Ltd. were cut six levels to A3, New York-based Moody’s said today in a statement. The outlook for both is negative, Moody’s said.

And MBIA, desperate to avoid such a fate, has embarrassed itself even more than it did yesterday by selling even more equity at an even lower price:

MBIA Inc., the world’s biggest bond insurer, raised $1 billion by selling shares at $12.15 each in an effort to protect its AAA insurance rating.

The 82.3 million shares were sold at a 14 percent discount to Armonk, New York-based MBIA’s $14.20 closing price today, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

MBIA increased the sale from a planned $750 million, though accepted a lower price than it had anticipated. The sale matches the price private-equity firm Warburg Pincus LLC had agreed to pay to backstop the transaction in case no buyers could be found.

Speaking of downgrades, Loblaws was downgraded today, which has implications for Weston. I’ve updated the post about Weston’s credit

The Cleveland Fed has updated its estimate of inflation expectations from TIPS … very interesting indeed. The breakeven rate is increasing slightly, but the analytical rate – which attempts to incorporate adjustments for the inflation-risk-premium and liquidity-premium – is skyrocketting. This epsiode will be very useful in determining the validity of these adjustments!

I have opined many times in the past that the Fed’s easing may well rebound in an unfavourable manner vis-a-vis inflation – scarcely the most original of views, but I do what I can. In this context, it was interesting to read the following report on the Treasury Bond auction:

U.S. 30-year Treasuries fell the most since June as demand was weaker than expected at the government’s $9 billion auction of the securities.

Ten- and 30-year securities declined a second straight day as investors balked at buying at this week’s auctions, with yields at record lows. Investors are also betting that the Federal Reserve’s five interest-rate cuts since September will revive economic growth and cause inflation to accelerate, reducing the value of Treasuries’ fixed payments.

“The auction went as poorly as one could imagine,” said Andrew Brenner, co-head of structured products in New York at MF Global Ltd., the world’s largest broker of exchange-traded futures and options contracts. “There isn’t a lot of demand for bonds at these levels.”

These fears are finding support at high levels:

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher, who voted against cutting interest rates last week, warned that aggressive reductions in response to a weak economy may “juice up” inflation.

“Given that I had yet to see a mitigation in inflation and inflationary expectations from their current high levels, and that I believed the steps we had already taken would be helpful in mitigating the downside risk to growth once they took full effect, I simply did not feel it was the proper time” for more rate cuts, Fisher said.

Another good day! PerpetualDiscounts continued to improve and volume remained above the recent average.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.59% 5.62% 48,751 14.5 2 -0.9369% 1,064.6
Fixed-Floater 5.19% 5.69% 85,475 14.64 7 -0.1134% 1,015.2
Floater 4.90% 4.95% 75,926 15.57 3 +0.2596% 861.8
Op. Retract 4.82% 1.70% 80,829 2.42 15 -0.0280% 1,044.2
Split-Share 5.30% 5.53% 102,352 4.22 15 +0.1058% 1,037.3
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.44% 61,301 3.60 4 +0.0254% 1,081.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.74% 4.76% 401,624 5.21 16 +0.1564% 1,026.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.40% 5.43% 301,916 14.76 52 +0.1671% 951.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.B Ratchet -2.0426% Closed at 23.02-24.25, 3×2. Just another appalling spread from a hopeless market-maker.
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.5789%  
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.4224% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 22.87 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.1869% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 23.31 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.0009% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 21.76 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.1287% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.09% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.2306% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of -6.15% (annualized) based on a bid of 25.50 and a call 2008-3-8 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat +1.2911%  
TOC.PR.B Floater +1.2931%  
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium +1.3033% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 25.65 and a call 2012-1-5 at 25.00.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount +1.5041% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 23.62 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.9776% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 23.72 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.3341% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 22.36 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 274,825 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.36% based on a bid of 18.95 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.G PerpetualPremium 190,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 25.30 and a call 2011-8-16 at 25.00.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 143,055 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 25.38 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 122,050 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.48 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 81,225 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 23.21 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-six other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Market Action

February 6, 2008

Willem Buiter was last mentioned in PrefBlog on January 25 in connection with inflation concerns. He’s back again today, preaching not just the likelihood, but the necessity of a US recession:

Therefore, to restore a sustainable external balance and to accumulate the financial assets that will support a greying US population in the style it would like to and hopes and expects to be accustomed to, the US private and public sectors must save more. To get to a higher saving and wealth trajectory, the US economy will first have to pass through the valley of the shadow of deficient effective demand, rising excess capacity and growing unemployment. Postponing the necessary adjustment will just make the pain of the eventual unavoidable correction that much greater.

The trouble with such a prescription is that it runs headlong into the American “can do” attitude. This attitude is admirable and has served them well … but sometimes it comes a cropper. “Reduce taxes and the deficit while increasing services? Can do!” “Bring Western Democracy to regions where even those who understand it don’t want it? Can do!”.

The failure of a few auctions for American Auction Rate Municipals has attracted some notice lately. Accrued Interest explains the situation … it all comes down to the monolines!

The bank was only willing to provide liquidity if there was some additional credit support. No problem, thought the municipal bond bankers! We’ll bring in a monoline insurer! The bank would therefore agree to provide liquidity so long as the bond insurer was rated at some minimal credit rating level. What that level is depends on the deal. Might be AA, might be A. I haven’t seen any that were actually AAA but they could be out there.

But what happens if the unthinkable happens? A monoline insurer gets downgraded? Well, the bank’s liquidity agreement becomes null and void. Where does that leave bond holders? It leaves them with no credit support at all. Only the issuer itself would remain.

Auction rate securities are a recurring niche in the markets – I remember (a long, long time ago) there were some Hees (remember Hees?) MAPS – Monthly Auction Preferred Shares. It’s really just another mechanism whereby issuers can finance long at short rates and investors can pretend they’re money-market superstars by outperforming the 3-month benchmark with 100-year paper … for a while.

And the mention of monolines reminds me of a funny story … remember MBIA’s line in the sand, discussed on January 31? Well, the tide’s come in:

MBIA Inc., the world’s biggest bond insurer, plans to raise an additional $750 million by selling about 50.3 million common shares, bolstering capital in an attempt to retain its AAA credit rating.

Investment firm Warburg Pincus will backstop the offering by purchasing as much as $750 million of convertible participating preferred stock, the Armonk, New York-based company said in a statement today. MBIA, which has already raised at least $1.5 billion since November, said it would contribute most of the proceeds to its MBIA Insurance Corp. unit.

Another article highlighted by Naked Capitalism delivers a rather vague exhortation for increased bank regulation while one particular example purporting to show the need concerns some recent problems with Wachovia:

AmeriNet was a “payment processor,” a company that creates unsigned checks on behalf of telemarketers to withdraw funds automatically from customer accounts. Such checks, once widely used by businesses collecting monthly fees, are legal if customers approve the transactions.

In 2006, an executive at Citizens Bank wrote via e-mail that thieves were routing unauthorized checks through Wachovia that stole from Citizens account holders.

“We have spoken to many of our customers who have been victimized by this scam,” wrote the Citizens executive, according to court documents. “We would appreciate it if you would shut down accounts of any customers of yours that may be engaging in improper activity.”

But Wachovia kept that account open until it was frozen by a federal court a few weeks later, as part of a government lawsuit against the client.

This is just more nonsense from the “Everything will be better with just a few more rules” camp. It is very tempting to believe that a few more rules will bring the new millennium, but those who argue in favour of this have never seen what happens in real life. Rules such as this – shutting down accounts due to suspicions of fraud – are not investigated by dispassionate keen-eyed investigators who have the evidence weighed by judicious descendents of Solomon. It is, in fact, a virtually random process in which facts become secondary to ass-covering.

In the quoted text above, the Citizens Bank executive should not have been contacting Wachovia – if they became involved at all, I suggest that police are generally considered the proper authorities for investigation of impropriety.

A bank clerk is not a cop I trust. A branch manager is not a judge I trust. And wishing won’t make it so.

But, that’s what happens when stuff hits the headlines – everybody’s an expert:

Regulators may restrict Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s from advising banks on structured debt securities after criticism the firms failed to downgrade subprime-related debt as investor losses mounted.

Ratings firms may face a new code of conduct that limits their business and requires “reasonable steps” to ensure “a credible rating,” the International Organization of Securities Commissions in Madrid said in a statement today. IOSCO is the main forum for regulators, covering more than 100 countries from the U.S. to Japan.

I sure wish there was a code of conduct for regulators forcing them to take reasonable steps to ensure credible regulation!

An IMF research group has summarized a paper on VoxEU arguing that the subprime crisis is not unusual:

The subprime experience demonstrates that even highly-developed financial markets are not immune to problems associated with credit booms.

What can be done to curb bad credit booms? Historically, the effectiveness of macroeconomic polices in reducing credit growth has varied (see, for example, Enoch and Ötker-Robe, 2007). While monetary tightening can reduce both the demand and supply of bank loans, its effectiveness is often limited by capital account openness. This is especially the case in small open economies and in countries with more advanced financial sectors, where banks have easy access to foreign credit, including from parent institutions. Monetary tightening may also lead to significant substitution between domestic and foreign-denominated credit, especially in countries with (perceived) rigid exchange rate regimes. Fiscal tightening may also help reduce the expansionary pressures associated with credit booms, though this is often not politically feasible.

Fiscal tightening didn’t have much chance under a Republican administration! When in doubt, assume the best, right? It is very interesting to speculate as to what might have happened under Prof. Taylor’s counterfactual scenario of Fed tightening during the boom. We are certainly seeing that sub-prime sucked in a lot of money from Europe even with the relatively loose Fed policy during that time.

A very good day for the preferred share market, although I don’t see how the S&P/TSX Index was able to improve by 0.55% … half that, sure, two-thirds, maybe, but I suspect that this is an artefact of calculation caused either by low closes yesterday or high closes today.

Be that as it may, it was a strong day, with volume picking up and good strength throughout the entire PerpetualDiscount index. This index now has an interest-equivalent yield of 7.62% (at a conversion factor of 1.4), which is Canadas +350bp, Long Corporates +180bp. This latter (and probably more meaningful) figure has narrowed in about 30bp since last reviewed October 30, but still has a long way to go before reaching last spring’s levels of Long Corporates + ~110bp.

Hmmmm …. 70bp x 14years duration = … I’ll take it!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.53% 5.55% 50,060 14.6 2 +0.3949% 1,074.6
Fixed-Floater 5.19% 5.69% 85,475 14.64 7 -0.1134% 1,015.2
Floater 4.96% 4.96% 76,713 15.55 3 +0.3437% 859.6
Op. Retract 4.82% 1.10% 80,875 2.49 15 +0.1808% 1,044.6
Split-Share 5.31% 5.54% 101,648 4.11 15 -0.0045% 1,036.2
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.42% 61,338 3.60 4 +0.5748% 1,080.8
Perpetual-Premium 5.75% 5.50% 402,200 5.93 16 -0.0311% 1,024.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.41% 5.44% 301,279 14.75 52 +0.5889% 949.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
WFS.PR.A SplitShare -1.6393% Asset coverage of just under 1.9:1 as of January 31, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 10.20 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30. Still a pretty crummy yield, if you ask me, but better than yesterday!
FTU.PR.A SplitShare -1.2295% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of January 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.18% based on a bid of 9.64 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
BCE.PR.I FixFloat -1.2190%  
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.0035% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0323% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 22.51 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.0352% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 24.40 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.0476% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +1.0799%  
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0813% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.50 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1574% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 21.85 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1682% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.24% based on a bid of 21.65 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.2582% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 21.73 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.5748% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 24.51 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.7544% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.20 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.7916% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.15% based on a bid of 21.59 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +2.4670% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 23.26 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.8602% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of February 1, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.73% based on a bid of 9.71 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
PIC.PR.A SplitShare 293,875 Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of January 31, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.83% based on a bid of 15.00 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 142,550 RBC crossed 100,000 at 22.35; then another 40,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 22.45 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 66,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 25.38 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 47,695 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.40% based on a bid of 18.85 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount 36,948 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-six other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

EPP.PR.A and WN.PR.E : Coupled? Decoupled?

Assiduous Reader madequota asked about EPP.PR.A in the comments to February 5 … since he is an Assiduous Writer as well … let’s indulge him, shall we? It has been a long time since I last looked at this issue.

EPP.PR.A was issued last spring and received an extremely hostile reception from the market, as by the time it commenced trading the market was way down. It is my understanding that the underwriters had a really hard time selling it and took a bath. Problems with such issues can persist for a long, long time, especially in the preferred market: many preferred share investors buy an issue when issued and never look at it again. Those issues that have trouble finding such a “real money” home at issue time find themselves perpetually in the hands of hot money.

Anyway … this is another split-rated issue, as is the CCS.PR.C examined yesterday; it’s rated Pfd-3(high) by DBRS and P-2(low) by S&P.

I’m not going to say much one way or the other. Issues with this kind of credit carry a larger proportion than usual of specific risk – and my firm avoids this for the most part. I don’t want to analyze companies! I analyze the yield curve! This means I concentrate on high quality instruments in which specific risk is minimized.

However, I’ve prepared some graphs that may provide some context for those who want to analyze the company’s financials and, at least to some extent, take a view on the credit:

Readers will note the precipituous decline in averageTradingValue for EPP.PR.A after its issue … recall that it starts with a pre-set $2.5-million presumed value and declines exponentially to a long-term average of actual trading volumes.

Also note that the Quality Spread graphed is between Pfd-2 and Pfd-3: no allowance is made in this graph for “high” and “low” modifiers.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : January 31, 2008

There was a good level of trading in January, most of it intra-sector.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 25.8% (-3.2) 7.03% 5.37
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 12.8% (+12.8) 5.61% 14.20
PerpetualDiscount 61.4% (-2.6) 5.50% 14.69
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -0.1% (-5.9) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.92% 12.23
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.
Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-1-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 61.2% (+16.7)
Pfd-1(low) 0.3% (-12.7)
Pfd-2(high) 13.4% (+5.6)
Pfd-2 12.6% (-1.1)
Pfd-2(low) 12.6% (-2.5)
Cash -0.1% (-5.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-1-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.6% (-0.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 13.7% (+13.2)
$100,000 – $200,000 27.8% (+20.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 17.0% (-11.3)
>$300,000 41.0% (-15.6)
Cash -0.1% (-5.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

The fund’s performance in January and the performance of the indices has already been discussed.