Market Action

February 5, 2008

The roar erupts from the angry crowds: when is PrefBlog going to get any work done? Again today, general commentary will be greatly foreshortened. In my defence, I can only say that I was able to post about Seniority of BAs, ruin Kaspu‘s day with a comment on CCS.PR.C, report on performance of Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund (my little fund did well! So why is it a little fund?), Best & Worst January Performers and finally January Index Performance.

So, apart from time constraints, my fingers are tired.

Econbrowser‘s Menzie Chinn commented on the Bush Budget and highlights the Reuters report by David Lawder :

“I think the main deceptions in the budget are the same ones we’ve seen for five years. The costs for Iraq and Afghanistan has consistently been $200 billion a year, but they’ve only put aside $70 billion,” said Chris Edwards, economist at the libertarian Cato Institute. “The war will cost $100 (billion) to $150 billion a year until 2012 or so.”

Coupled with unrealistic growth forecasts, the additional war costs mean the fiscal 2008 deficit will likely top $500 billion, he said.

Even Captain’s Quarters, a political blog which can usually be counted on to toe the Republican party line, has thrown in the towel on any hopes for fiscal conservatism. I continue to think that American fiscal profligacy will continue until conditions are in a lot worse shape than they are now – and, as in Canada, it will be the non-(so-called)-conservative party that does it, because they’re the ones who can’t be attacked for preaching hard times and shooting the hippo.

Fun and frolic for CDOs continued, with Fitch revamping its model and taking a gloomier view on the underlying securities chance of default. But nobody trades those things anymore, do they?:

Buying and selling of collateralized debt obligations based on mortgage bonds, high-yield loans or preferred shares has ground to a near-halt, traders said at the securitization industry’s largest conference.

“We’re definitely in a period of very low liquidity at the moment, which has actually been dropping precipitously in the last few weeks,” Ross Heller, an executive director at JPMorgan Securities Inc., said yesterday during a panel discussion at the American Securitization Forum’s annual conference in Las Vegas. “It’s a challenging time.”

I should note that the story is referring to American preferred shares, not Canadian ones. While some American issues are eligible for preferential tax treatment, this is a major bone of political contention, as I noted on January 10 (and continued after the charts, in the “Update” section). Without tax advantages, prefs are simply deeply subordinated debt.

This model revision is also having knock-on effects on … wait for it … the monolines:

MBIA Inc.’s AAA bond insurance ranking was placed back under review for a downgrade by Fitch Ratings less than a month after being affirmed with a stable outlook.

Fitch, which also put CIFG Financial Guaranty back under review, is updating its assumptions for higher losses on U.S. subprime-mortgage securities, the New York-based ratings company said today in a statement. If loss projections rise materially, the AAA ratings on bond insurers may no longer be appropriate regardless of how much capital they hold, the company said.

And it’s not as if the monolines don’t recognize their problems:

XL Capital Ltd., the Bermuda-based business insurer, said it lost $1.06 billion in the fourth quarter as it wrote down the value of investments including a stake in bond insurer Security Capital Assurance Ltd.

XL lost $6.01 a share, compared with a net profit of $481.1 million, or $2.62 a year earlier, the company said today in a statement. Excluding investment losses, XL earned 66 cents a share, lagging the $1.45 average estimate of 14 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg.

It seems, however, that business conditions aside, some portion of the monoline damage is self-inflicted … hedges aren’t perfect (hat tip: MarketRant).

Speaking of hedges … there is much concern and consternation about the BCE deal and the seemingly different probabilities assigned by the stock and bond markets (hat tip: Financial Webring Forum):

When it comes to the chances of the $35-billion BCE Inc. buyout falling through, the bond market isn’t buying what the equity market is selling.

Many stock market investors clearly believe the deal is likely to fail. The stock finished Friday at $36 on the Toronto Stock Exchange, well below the $42.75 that Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan and its partners agreed to pay last June before global markets went haywire.

Those in the bond market, on the other hand, are much more convinced the transaction will close later this year.

According to the credit-default swaps (CDS) market, an influential backroom of the financial system where big bond investors place bets, there’s at least a 70-per-cent chance that the deal succeeds.

To me, this sounds normal. Each market is taking a gloomy view. Didn’t the lawsuit over Hemlo take a billion dollars off the combined market cap of the adversaries, when logically it should have been a wash? Seems to me that if I were a hedge fund, I’d be devoting enormous resources to calculating what proportion of equity and bonds I should have in a basket that … maybe, possibly, subject to fearsome market punishment … would have an expected positive return irrespective of the outcome.

A relatively quiet day in the preferred market. I’ll admit, I view the precipituous decline in the number of issues on the “Price Mover” list with mixed feelings … on the one hand, it means I have a whole lot less typing to do (I still haven’t caught up with HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices, so I still have to do it all manually); on the other hand, huge price movements are often a source of wonderful trades. Oh well, we’ll just see how it goes.

WFS.PR.A is behaving strangely … the huge volume today is unusual, but not strange; what’s strange is the day’s high price: $10.75. Holy smokes, at that level you’re amortizing the premium by over $0.20 annually against dividends of $0.525 to wind up with a Yield-to-Maturity of about 3.1%, according to Mr. Calculator. Geez, and there I am, thinking it’s overpriced at $10.37, yielding 4.26%! 

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.55% 5.58% 51,398 14.50 2 -0.2658% 1,070.4
Fixed-Floater 5.18% 5.68% 86,336 14.67 7 -0.3814% 1,016.4
Floater 4.93% 4.98% 77,696 15.52 3 +0.3947% 856.6
Op. Retract 4.83% 1.76% 81,067 2.71 15 -0.2348% 1,042.7
Split-Share 5.31% 5.52% 100,092 4.11 15 -0.0522% 1,036.3
Interest Bearing 6.28% 6.42% 62,105 3.36 4 -0.5243% 1,074.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.75% 5.49% 404,764 6.06 16 +0.1252% 1,025.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.44% 5.47% 302,020 14.71 52 +0.0718% 944.4
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat -2.1142%  
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.7690% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of February 1, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.23% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.44 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.6841% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.0549% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 23.95 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.4554% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 21.61 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 345,600 Scotia crossed 15,000 at 25.25. New issue settled 1/31. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.51% based on a bid of 25.24 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 369,127 Asset coverage of just under 1.9:1 as of January 31, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.26% based on a bid of 10.37 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 128,000 Scotia crossed 75,000 at 23.01; Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 22.91 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 56,205 Nesbitt crossed 47,100 at 21.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.21 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium 52,700 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 25.43. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 25.33 and a call 2012-1-9 at 25.00.

There were seventeen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Interesting External Papers

Seniority of Bankers' Acceptances

This is a question that has bothered me for a long time – and I’ve never been able to get a satisfactory answer.

What is the seniority of Bankers’ Acceptances?

Finally, through the magic of the Internet, I’m a bit further forward with this inquiry and think – think! – I have a good answer with respect to US Law.

According to DRAFT COPY: PRINCIPLES AND CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE CREATION OF A LATIN AMERICAN BANKERS ACCEPTANCES MARKET, creditted to Matilde Carrau, Constantino Flores and Manuel Renato Martínez Quezada of the University of Arizona College of Law:

To recuperate the funds invested by the bank in the discount of the acceptance, the bank generally rediscounts the facility in the New York bankers acceptance market. To be able to participate in this market the acceptances have to meet the eligibility requirements established by 12 USC § 372 and § 373. The result of compliance with eligibility requirements also causes that the acceptances not to be considered a deposit subject to reserve requirements or FDIC assessment(155) under regulation D. Hence if the bankers acceptance is eligible for discount and purchase the bank will offer a better rate for this facility as compared to what it would offer in a traditional lending since these “savings” will partially be passed on to the customer.(156)

[155] Under FDIC regulation, banks are required to pay a premium over deposits; hence, if the bankers acceptance complies with eligibility requirements and is therefore not considered a deposit, no prime will be paid for said transaction and the operation will be cheaper.

[156] Professor Boris Kozolchyk comments that off balance sheet credit operations will always be preferred by bankers to get involved with. Bankers acceptances are regarded when backed by premium banks in the moneyness scale as one of the private instruments closest to the currency status; and for practical purposes, they may be regarded as money. Negotiable Instruments class, spring 1997 semester, University of Arizona College of Law, Master of Laws In International Trade Law Program (hereinafter NI Class comment).

Which seems to mean, according to these authors’ interpretation of US law (as of 1997!) that BAs are junior to DNs.

It is my (limited!) understanding that BAs in Canada are regulated by the Bills of Exchange Act … the fact that this is not the Bank Act leads me to believe that:

  • BAs are not considered deposits
  • BAs are not insured
  • BAs will be wiped out before insured deposits lose a dollar

But, I’m still trying to get something definitive from the CDIC and OSFI!

There’s more questions, too! Say the recipient of the proceeds of the BA (the issuer, whose note has been accepted by the bank) does, in fact, pay back his money while the bank is going down the drain. Will this repayment lose its identity in the bankruptcy, becoming part of the general assets of the bank and go towards paying its liabilities in order of seniority? Or does the payment retain its identity and be used to honour THE PARTICULAR BA that was issued against this payment?

Update, 2008-2-7: I have explicit confirmation from the CDIC that: “A Bankers’ Acceptance is not an insurable product with CDIC.”

Update, 2008-2-19: I asked the OSFI:

What is the status of Bankers’ Acceptances should the guaranteeing bank become bankrupt?

a) If the original issuer repays the debt, does this payment retain its identity (and become payable to the holder of those particular BAs), or do such repayments lose their identity and become undifferentiated assets of the bank?

b) If the original holder does not repay the loan, and the bank is not able to honour its guarantee, what is the seniority of the BA in the bankruptcy process? Are BAs junior to Deposit Notes, or parri passu?

c) Has the status of dishonoured BAs been tested in court?

and received the following answer:

OSFI does not have the authority over the day-to-day business operations of financial institutions, such as the issue you raise in your e-mail.

As you may know, a Bankers’ Acceptance note is a short-term promissory note issued by major corporations, backed by a Canadian Chartered Bank, and repayable on a specified date.   

Therefore, in order to determine the guarantee behind the note, you may wish to contact the financial institution from which the agreement originates.

Update, 2008-2-20: I have received the following answer from the Bank of Canada:

In response to your inquiry, I wish to inform you that the Bank of Canada, as the country’s Central Bank, does not provide banking services to the public, nor does it legislate the rules and regulations applicable to the activities of commercial banks and other financial institutions in Canada. This responsibility falls upon the jurisdiction of the Office of Superintendent of Financial Institutions, which can be reached at http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/osfi/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=18.

There’s still a few arrows in my quiver, but I’m starting to run out of options!

Update #2, 2008-2-20: I have talked to a money market trader at a major bank – who in turn talked to his liquidity desk (who runs the BA book) – and the answer from there is:

  • (a) Payments from the underlying borrower would go into a BA pool, and
  • (b) BAs are parri passu with deposit notes

He had nothing written down on this matter.

Update, 2008-2-21 I checked Moody’s Guidelines for Rating Bank Junior Securities:

For most unregulated non-financial organizations, it is generally assumed that the probability of default is constant across the various obligations within a typical capital structure.1 (In other words, if the company goes bankrupt, it will default on all of its obligations.) Notching guidelines for these entities are therefore governed solely by differences in the expected severity of loss given default. However, because they are regulated — and their regulators may refuse to support certain junior obligations (or more likely, selectively impose losses on them without placing the entire bank into liquidation) — differences in the probability of default also play a role in bank notching practices.

The interplay between systemic support and selective interference complicates the analysis of banks’ junior obligations.

Moody’s does not notch senior debt issued by banks; they are rated at the same level as deposits. This is because deposits and senior debt have the same probability of default and generally rank pari passu in liquidation.

Here’s what Fitch has to say in its Bank Rating Methodology:

Support ratings are the product of Fitch’s assessment of a potential supporter’s (either a sovereign state’s or an institutional owner’s) propensity to support a bank and of its ability to support it. Its propensity to support is a judgement made by Fitch….

It is assumed that typically the following obligations will be supported: senior debt (secured and unsecured), including insured and uninsured deposits (retail, wholesale and interbank); obligations arising from derivatives transactions and from legally enforceable guarantees and indemnities, letters of credit, acceptances and avals; trade receivables and obligations arising from court judgements.

Update, 2008-2-22: OK, we’re starting to get somewhere! Here’s what a Bank of Canada spokesman had to say on the matter:

I would recommend seeking answers from issuers of these instruments or regulators thereof (securities commissions) or perhaps OSFI.

As for the Bank of Canada: BAs carry the credit risk of the accepting bank and are valued accordingly. If the Bank of Canada were holding (either outright or as collateral) a BA issued or accepted by a bank that becomes insolvent, the market value of the BA would obviously be reduced.

In this situation, the Bank of Canada would demand that the BA it is holding as collateral or in a repo be replaced by other collateral. If the institution that pledged or sold the BA to the Bank of Canada were to default at the same time as the bank that issued or accepted the BA were to become insolvent(a highly unlikely scenario), the Bank would be holding an unsecured claim against the bank, that would rank parri passu with the claims of depositors and other general creditors.

Update, 2008-2-27: Many thanks to the wonderful OSFI, who referred me to Section 369 of the Bank Act:

Insolvency 

369. (1) In the case of the insolvency of a bank, 

(a) the payment of any amount due to Her Majesty in right of Canada, in trust or otherwise, except indebtedness evidenced by subordinated indebtedness, shall be a first charge on the assets of the bank;

(b) the payment of any amount due to Her Majesty in right of a province, in trust or otherwise, except indebtedness evidenced by subordinated indebtedness, shall be a second charge on the assets of the bank;

(c) the payment of the deposit liabilities of the bank and all other liabilities of the bank, except the liabilities referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e), shall be a third charge on the assets of the bank;

(d) subordinated indebtedness of the bank and all other liabilities that by their terms rank equally with or subordinate to such subordinated indebtedness shall be a fourth charge on the assets of the bank; and

(e) the payment of any fines and penalties for which the bank is liable shall be a last charge on the assets of the bank.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prejudices or affects the priority of any holder of any security interest in any property of a bank.

(3) Priorities within each of paragraphs (1)(a) to (e) shall be determined in accordance with the laws governing priorities and, where applicable, by the terms of the indebtedness and liabilities referred to therein.

This helps a little … but Paragraph (3) kind of muddles the game, doesn’t it?

Update 2008-3-19: No response at all – not even an acknowledgement – from the thoroughly useless Canadian Bankers Association. I am now contacting the IR departments of the Big 6 Banks individually:

Sirs,

It is my understanding that under Section 369(1)(c) of the Bank Act, your Bankers Acceptances would be considered a third charge on the assets of the bank in the event of insolvency.

Section 369(3) of the Act notes that liabilities within this charge may be further ranked in accordance with terms of the indebtedness and liabilities referred to therein.

I would appreciate receiving information regarding Bankers Acceptances that have been accepted by your firm, regarding their seniority within the third charge.

Sincerely,
HYMAS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INC.

James Hymas
President

Update, 2008-03-24: TD is parri passu, according to their IR department:

In the event of the insolvency of The Toronto-Dominion Bank, the obligations of the Bank under any Banker’s Acceptance issued by it would rank against the unencumbered assets of the Bank on a parity with all deposit liabilities of the Bank, other than amounts due to the government of Canada or to a province thereof which shall be a first and second charge on the assets of the Bank. Under the laws of Canada, the obligations of the Bank under any Banker’s Acceptances issued by the Bank are direct liabilities of the Bank and rank at least pari passu with all unsecured, unsubordinated indebtedness of the Bank.

Update, 2008-7-18: Other references

Update, 2008-8-12: Daryl Merrett, Bank of Canada Review, 1981: The Evolution of Bankers’ Acceptances in Canada

Issue Comments

CCS.PR.C : An Attractive Speculation?

Assiduous Readers Kaspu and madequota have been watching CCS.PR.C very carefully recently – see the comments to February 1, the comments to the January Index Rebalancing and the comments to February 4.

My contribution will be mainly the note that a reasonable comparator to CCS.PR.C is FTS.PR.F:

CCS.PR.C / FTS.PR.F
Comparison
Issue CCS.PR.C FTS.PR.F
Dividend  1.25 1.225 
Redemption
Period
Begins
 2012-6-30 2011-12-1
Initial
Redemption
Price
 $26.00  $26.00
DBRS
Rating
Pfd-3   Pfd-3(high)
S&P
Rating
P-2(low)   P-2

I will also note that Co-Operators’ financial statements are available at SEDAR (remember the hyphen when searching!) 

And a graph of a graph of their YTWs since CCS.PR.C’s first day of trading and the differences thereof. Fortis was upgraded a notch by S&P during the period.

The comparison may not be GREAT, but I think it’s PRETTY GOOD. And the graphs are amazing.

 

MAPF

MAPF Performance : January, 2008

Well, that’s a relief!

After a month’s superb performance – up 4.50% in December –  there is often a pullback. Perhaps some issues were expensive at month-end, for instance, not by enough to trade (or they would have been traded), but by enough so that all holdings were at the top of their range and all had a downward bias for the next time.

Not this month! I’m very pleased to say that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for January, 2008, month-end; the unit value is $9.1224. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to January 31, 2008
One Month +1.28%
Three Months +5.66%
One Year +0.61%
Two Years (annualized) +3.06%
Three Years (annualized) +3.95%
Four Years (annualized) +5.82%
Five Years (annualized) +9.79%
Six Years (annualized) +8.59%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The competition was outpaced: the fund outperformed the closed-end fund (DPS.UN), which returned an estimated -0.97% on the month and an estimated -0.21% on the quarter, as well as the exchange-traded fund (CPD) which returned 0.00% and -0.28% on the month and quarter. Calculation details for these two performances have been posted separately.

 The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 0.5288
January, 2008 9.1224 5.92% 1.00 0.5400
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.

It should be noted that I do not have this calculation audited in any way, so once the audited financials are available you will not be able to see an explicit confirmation of these figures, although you will be able to derive the year end figure for yourselves. Readers should also note that the fund is indifferent to whether investment returns are in the form of capital gains or dividends – portfolio management seeks to maximize total return after tax for a notional high-marginal-rate investor based in Ontario. It should also be noted that this sustainable income figure is not targetted in any manner; it may well go down if, for instance, it is decided that quality is cheap and trades are executed to increase credit quality at the expense of yield.

For all that, though, there is a point to the calculation – it shows that in the recent past, and subject to the usual warning that historical performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns:

  • Income expectations are a lot more stable than market prices, and
  • the overall trend is upwards

It was another interesting month, in terms of trends. Readers will remember that strength in early December evaporated in the face of tax-loss selling, exacerbated by sudden concerns regarding the credit quality of CIBC. In January, early strength was blown away by the new BNS perpetual issue, which raised fears that the market would reprice itself to reflect the concessionary 5.6% coupon. These fears proved to be unfounded … but not before the market came very close to dipping below its November 30 value – which, for now, remains the month-end marking the market’s low point.

The fund did considerable trading during the month, but most of this trading was simply opportunistic switching between issues with similar characteristics. One trend that was noticable was the build-up of a large position in Royal Bank perpetuals, which seemed very cheap even though a dividend was earned with an ex-dividend date of January 22. This position was largely unwound – profitably! – by the end of the month.

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performers: January 2008

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “January 31”)
BCE.PR.B Ratchet Pfd-2(low) -7.11% This issue is most notable for the horrible market making lately, noted on February 4, January 31, January 22, January 17 and January 7. Naturally, one of the days that Little Boy Blue visits the haystack has to be month-end and it closed at 22.77-24.24. A rational quote would have kept it off this list.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 -3.86%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.69% based on a bid of 22.65 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 -3.67%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 23.90 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -3.20%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 21.45 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 -3.06%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 22.84 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) +4.73%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.81% based on a bid of 23.68 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) +4.78%  Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 23.90 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.K Floater Pfd-2(low) +5.30%  A dead cat bounce from the horrible performance in December.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare Pfd-2 +5.68%  Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of January 31, according to the company. The US financials on which this is based managed to bounce back in the latter half of January, but another good sharp downdraft could make my speculation regarding a downgrade look prescient. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.98% based on a bid of 9.71 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.B Floater Pfd-2(low) +6.11%  Another dead cat bounce from December.

It’s worth noting that HSB.PR.D was actually only the 27th-worst issue in the HIMIPref™ Universe, but only those issues included in the HIMIPref™ indices are examined for possible inclusion in this table. A lot of lower-volume and worse-credit issues were passed over.

Index Construction / Reporting

Index Performance, January 2008

Performance of the HIMIPref™ Indices for January, 2008, was:

Total Return
Index Performance
January 2008
Three Months
to
January 31, 2008
Ratchet -0.28%  +0.67%
FixFloat -1.57%  -2.97%
Floater +3.17%  -17.64%
OpRet +0.47%  +1.75%
SplitShare +0.31%  -1.01%
Interest +1.37%  +1.04%
PerpetualPremium +0.19%  +1.36%
PerpetualDiscount +0.40%  +2.98%
Funds (see below for calculations)
CPD +0.00%  -0.08%
DPS.UN -0.97%  -0.21%

The FloatingRate index bounced back (just a little bit!) from its disastrous performance in December. The tepid returns for the two perpetual sub-indices mask a great deal of excitement – at its peak on January 16 the PerpetualDiscount index was up 1.85% on the month, while at its trough on January 21 it was down 1.23%. The downdraft was caused by a new issue: BNS.PR.O, announced January 17. There was extreme fear that this could presage another hit to the market as happened in September, but by the time TD.PR.Q was announced January 22 the worst was over.

Claymore has published NAV data for its exchange traded fund (CPD) and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to January 31
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
October 31, 2007 18.19      
November 30 17.97   -1.21% -1.21%
December 24 17.75 0.2219 +0.01% +1.14%
December 31, 2007 17.95   +1.13%
January 31, 2008 17.95   0.00% 0.00%
Quarterly Return -0.08%

The DPS.UN NAV for January 30 has been published so we may calculate the January returns (approximately!) for this closed end fund:

DPS.UN NAV Return, January-ish 2008
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
December 27, 2007 $21.07    
January 30, 2008 $21.02 $0.00 -0.24%
Adjustment for December stub-period -0.67%
Adjustment for January stub-period -0.06%
Estimated January Return -0.97%
CPD had a NAV of $17.83 on December 27 and $17.95 on December 31. The estimated December end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore +0.67%, which is subtracted from the DPS.UN total return when estimating the return for January.
CPD had a NAV of $17.96 on January 30 and $17.95 on January 31. The estimated January end-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.06%, which is added to the DPS.UN total return when estimating the return for January.

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for December:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-January-ish, 2008
November-ish -1.14%
December-ish +1.93%
January-ish -0.97%
Three-months-ish -0.21%

Market Action

February 4, 2008

There ain’t too much commentary today, folks! No great loss, since nothing much happened, but there was one item of great pith and moment: Moody’s is considering a separate rating scale for structured products:

Moody’s Investors Service is considering a new ratings system based on numbers for structured- finance securities that would abandon the letter grades created by founder John Moody about a century ago.

Moody’s in a letter today asked investors for comments on five options it is reviewing to improve ratings including a numerical scale and a designation of “.sf” to differentiate a structured finance ranking from a corporate credit grade.

The use of a different scale has been proposed before – it was mentioned by the Bank of Canada and has been advocated elsewhere – like, f’rinstance, by Richard Portes on VoxEU as discussed on November 15. Frankly, I have difficulty understanding why it’s considered worthy of discussion.

And I would like to mention that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been priced for monthend … and achieved a return of 1.28% for the month, vs. an estimated ZERO for the index. I’ll try to post properly about this tomorrow … but those who speculate that I’m rather pleased about this (especially after the superb performance in December) may very well win a kewpie doll.

Another good strong day in the preferred share market – the perpetualDiscount index is now within a hair of the 945.3 January peak, which it hit on January 16, the day before the announcement of the BNS new issue knocked it for a loop. Volume wasn’t particularly exciting … on the low side of normal, but not by much.

I should hire Assiduous Reader madequota as colour commentator … his daily comments are much better than mine!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.53% 5.56% 52,857 14.61 2 -0.5942% 1,073.3
Fixed-Floater 5.16% 5.64% 87,818 14.70 7 +0.0565% 1,020.3
Floater 4.95% 5.00% 79,433 15.49 3 -0.2585% 853.3
Op. Retract 4.83% 1.99% 82,057 2.72 15 +0.1190% 1,045.1
Split-Share 5.30% 5.48% 99,705 4.11 15 +0.0723% 1,036.8
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.33% 61,602 3.39 4 +0.0304% 1,080.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.75% 5.51% 399,131 6.06 16 +0.1734% 1,023.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.44% 5.47% 304,901 14.70 52 +0.4470% 943.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.B Ratchet -2.1053% Closed at 23.25-24.25, 2×3. Fine market-making, marvellous! It reminds me of the good old days, when I could (on occasion) put in both a bid and an ask, fifty cents apart, and get filled on both sides thank you very much! Unfortunately, the fund is not long BCE.PR.B to try this play, but those who do have a position to which they’re indifferent can probably improve on this spread.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing -1.2333% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of February 1, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.90% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.61 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.1018%  
BCE.PR.S FixFloat +1.0593%  
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.0620% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.11% based on a bid of 25.57 and a call 2012-3-31 at 25.00.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.1933% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.20 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.2129% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.3519% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 23.24 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.4774% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 24.04 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.6796% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 23.61 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.7279% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 23.55 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.2336% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 21.97 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 99,060 New issue settled 1/31. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 25.18 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 39,775 New issue settled 1/31. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 25.28 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 28,399 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 20.90 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 26,430 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 26,400 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 24.26 and a limitMaturity.

There were seventeen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing : January 2008

HIMI Index Changes, January 31, 2008
Issue From To Because
BCE.PR.T FixFloat Scraps Volume
FAL.PR.B FixFloat Scraps Volume
CM.PR.D PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
NA.PR.K PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during January 2008
Issue Action Index Because
MIC.PR.A Deleted Scraps Redemption
BNS.PR.O Added PerpetualPremium New Issue
TD.PR.Q Added PerpetualPremium New Issue

Market Action

February 1, 2008

There ain’t gonna be much today! Month end duties call, with a shrill, unpleasant voice.

However, remember Springfield, MA’s complaint against Merrill Lynch, discussed here on January 4. They’ve settled … and a certain amount of vital information – previously ignored by the media – has finally been reported:

Merrill and two of its brokers sold “unsuitable” securities to Springfield last year after the firm was hired to help manage the city’s short-term investments, Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin said in a complaint filed today.

“Merrill was supposed to invest in only safe money-market like investments,” Galvin said in the lawsuit.

Merrill, the world’s largest brokerage, bought CDOs for Springfield between April and June last year after it was hired to help manage the city’s cash. It didn’t give the city a detailed description of the investment until November, when it sent officials a private placement memorandum on Centre Square CDO, one of the series of securities it bought.

Why it has not previously been reported that Merrill was acting as Portfolio Manager for the city and therefore had a fiduciary obligation (which would not have been the case if they had simply sold it on a principal to principal basis) is something that I don’t understand.

Given my usual month-end woes, there will be no report on the indices today, which is too bad. It was a really strong day! Volume picked up a little, but not to any spectacular extent.

Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.0230% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 23.22 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.0883% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 24.15 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1450% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.20 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1483% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 21.14 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.1973% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.13 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.2073% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 24.31 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.2935% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 22.71 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.3687% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 23.70 and a limitMaturity.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare +1.4237% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 14.96 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +1.4418% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of January 15, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 9.85 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.4599% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 20.85 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.6770% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 21.22 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.7175% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 23.69 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.7716% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.83 and a limitMaturity.
WFS.PR.A SplitShare +1.8519% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.00% based on a bid of 10.45 and a hardMaturity 2011-6-30 at 10.00.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +2.1583% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.18% based on a bid of 22.72 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.2075% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +2.2118%  
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +2.2456% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.40 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.3134% Asset Coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of January 31, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.67% based on a bid of 9.73 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.4402% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.41 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +2.8302% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.12% based on a bid of 21.80 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +2.9282% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 24.10 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +4.1237%  
BCE.PR.B Ratchet +4.3039% Reversal of yesterday’s nonsense. It didn’t trade a single share today, so the poor wickle market maker was able to keep up.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BNS.PR.O PerpetualPremium 125,385 Recent new issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 25.13 and a call 2017-5-26 at 25.00.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 82,028 Recent new issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 25.25 and a call 2017-3-2 at 25.00.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 63,986 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 21.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.06 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 59,615 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 21.20. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 21.14 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 59,110 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 20.85 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

FIG.PR.A : Partial Redemption

Woo-hoo! You know what I like? I like redemptions at prices that exceed the market, that’s what I like! Redemptions are not always unfavourable!

FIG.PR.A closed today at 9.81-85, 4×9, after trading 20,437 shares in a range of 9.80-90. The sponsor, Faircourt Asset Management, has just announced:

that $30,000,000 of aggregate principal amount of preferred securities will be redeemed.
    Given the challenges facing global equity markets and resulting volatility, the Manager believes that to maintain appropriate balance in the fund between the Trust Units and Preferred Securities, redemptions are necessary. Therefore, the Manager announces that $30,000,000 in aggregate principal amount of the Trust’s 6.25% outstanding Preferred Securities (the “Preferred Securities”) will be redeemed on March 2, 2008 (the “Redemption
Date”). The scheduled Redemption Date of March 2, 2008 falls on a Sunday and payment will therefore be made in full on the next business day, March 3, 2008.
    Proceeds from the Preferred Securities redemption will amount to $10.1062 for each $10.00 principal amount of Securities, being equal to the aggregate of (i) $10.00 (the “Redemption Price”), and (ii) all accrued and unpaid interest hereon to but excluding the Redemption Date (collectively, the “Total Redemption Price”). The notice date of the Preferred Securities redemption is February 1, 2008. The Total Redemption Price for all Preferred Securities being redeemed is $30,318,600
    The Preferred Securities are being redeemed pursuant to the terms of the Trust Indenture governing the Preferred Securities, which permit a partial redemption at such time as the principal amount of the Preferred Securities exceeds 40% of the Total Assets of the Trust.

Assiduous Readers with extremely good memories will recall that there was also a redemption last August. The TSX states that 17,464,308 shares are outstanding, therefore the redemption proportion is a bit more than one-sixth.

Asset coverage on January 31 was 2.0+:1 according to the company. This redemption should bring coverage up to 2.4+:1.

FIG.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is part of the Interest Bearing subindex. The issue has recently been removed from the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index.