PrefLetter

October PrefLetter is in Preparation!

The markets have closed and the October edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share; the recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The October issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”!

Reader Initiated Comments

Reflections on a Bull

My bullish correspondent has been busy and gleefully siezed on my comment yesterday that:

There was good volume in the preferred share market today … and continued declines in the perpetual sector which, quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand.

rate, the steepening in the past three weeks is stupendous. This is really strange!

and says that he is interested in my comments on his view that:

this is due to  the Commercial paper/subprime scare ….

Well, for what it’s worth, Mr. Bull, I think you’re right. I think we are seeing the confluence of a lot of factors:

  • Retail is avoiding assets that they don’t understand – and retail, in general, doesn’t understand preferred shares very well.
  • Retail is avoiding volatile assets – and perpetuals have certainly been showing volatility in the past six months.
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes in which they have recently been burnt – there were a lot of new issues last spring, much of it probably sold to unsophisticated investors who watched the market prices tank before they’d even received their monthly statement
  • Retail is avoiding asset classes which have not performed well in recent memory – performance of preferreds in general and perpetuals in particular has not been stellar for the past year or so
  • Retail is attempting to time the market. They are waiting for the bottom, therefore they will wait until they’re sure that prices are going up, therefore, probably, they will miss most of any rally that happens.

But, Mr. Bull, I want you to pay particular attention to my caveat: For what it’s worth.

  • How can any of the above statements be proven? If I were to say that relatively high spreads recently were due to the Tri-Lateral Commission acting under the orders of the Illuminati, how would you prove me wrong?
  • What predictive value does any of those statements have? They explain everything, cannot be falsified, and predict nothing.

I think we can agree that spreads are relatively high. And given this view, I will agree that a rational investment allocation model – for instance, one that says that the proportion of preferreds in a portfolio will be within a certain range – should probably be on the over-allocation side while long corporate bonds should be on the under-allocation side.

But the world is chaotic. We can formulate a beautiful asset allocation strategy … and tomorrow little green men from Mars will arrive with the secret of unlimited safe energy, requiring only extract of squid’s brain to run, which will give rise to a bull market in seafood and bear markets almost everywhere else.

So I make a deliberate attempt to avoid calling the market. Not because I don’t think I’m smart enough, but because there are too many random factors, too many of Colin Powell’s Unknown Unknowns, to make such an exercise a useful expenditure of time. Instead, I concentrate on weighing small differences between the various preferred share issues … up, down, I don’t care what the market does, as long as I do a nickel better, I’m happy. I can compare apples to apples, and give you good advice as to which one will be better. I cannot compare apples to squid’s brains.

If anybody tells you differently … find out why. Chances are, they’ve got great explanations and poor results.

Update: As if by magic, Accrued Interest has posted on this theme today.

Sub-Prime!

Sub-Prime! The IIF Weighs In

My interest was attracted by an article in the National Post, Banking group slams asset-backed securities market; the print headline is “Banks ‘Asleep at Switch'”; neither headline appears to be reporting on the purported substance of the story, a letter from the IIF, addressed to the chairman of the International Monetary and Finance Committee, that has been released on their website.

OK – first question: Who is the IIF? It is the Institute of International Finance, Inc., which claims to be “the world’s only global association of financial institutions”. I can’t remember having heard of them before. According to their annual report, they have annual revenue of about $25-million; certainly enough to hire a few analysts and buy sandwiches for their meetings, but hardly heavyweight. By way of comparison, the CFA Institute, to which I belong and which is notable mainly for its lack of relevance to my life, has annual revenue of a little over $100-million.

Now to look at their recommendations (bolded) with my commentary (plain):

  • Going forward, market participants, including those currently not regulated, need to take the lead to enhance due diligence and strengthen credit discipline. Senior management of financial firms has a critical role to play in this context. As supervisors and central banks are also reviewing some of their approaches, we encourage them to do so in a focused manner so as to avoid possible overreaction. Meaningless.
  • ratings agencies should, in cooperation with market participants, review their approaches, including possible changes in ratings to clarify what is being assessed. Even after taking this into account, investors will be well advised to keep in mind that external ratings are just one component of a sound internal risk management system, not a substitute for it. Meaningless.
  • A top priority of market participants should be to develop conventions to value these complex financial instruments [structured credit], to ensure that the benefits of financial innovation for the efficiency of markets are fully realized.. This is more than just a little bit wierd. After implying that part of the problem was over-reliance on external credit ratings, they want to encourage reliance on external pricing? Let’s just have a little bit more cheerful anarchy in the markets and a little bit less reliance on Bloomberg’s analysis, shall we?
  • central banks should provide greater clarity about the modalities of the exercise of their role as lenders of last resort in times of crisis; expand the range of acceptable collateral and clarify policies as to haircuts; and increase the availability of cross-border collateralization. Recent events also suggest that central banks might consider the scope for better coordination of the timing and the maturities of their liquidity injections, while taking account of differences in market circumstances. I don’t know about this one. It strikes me that a little bit of uncertainty is good for the markets … let’s keep moral hazard to a minimum. Expanding the range of acceptable collateral – on a permanent basis, not just the temporary relaxation of recent times – is something that is often discussed; has been for years; probably since the start of central banking! I am comfortable with the current system that the central banks will accept only the highest quality, most liquid securities as collateral, with discretion to relax these rules whenever they feel like it. Central banks cannot and should not have the slightest concern about few speculators, overloaded with wierd stuff, going bankrupt; the concern should be restricted to the functioning of the overall market as chiefly expressed in the operations of a core group of strongly capitalized banks.
  • To minimize such problems in the future, disclosure practices [regarding banks exposures to structured credit and their credit line committments to customers] need to be improved so as to allow investors and other market participants to properly assess and price risk, thus effectively exercising market discipline. I don’t know about this one. It’s difficult to argue against such a motherhood issue as disclosure, but too much is enough, already! Presumably, the central banks have authority to require disclosure when disbursing emergency funds; I think it would be quite sufficient to ensure that banks have the ability to provide such disclosure if, as and when they feel like it, without actually making such disclosure mandatory.
  • [The IMFC should] explicitly encourage prompt but deliberative efforts involving official and private financial institutions to evaluate pragmatic approaches that will continue to support financial innovation, while reducing the risk of a recurrence of the current problems. Well, what’s to say? This may be code, encouraging the current IMFC to boldly go where no IMFC has gone before, but it may just be motherhood. In any event, this recommendation seems rather devoid of substance.
  • In view of current conditions and expectations, the IMFC, in its discussions of the global outlook, should stress the importance of central banks striking a delicate balance now Sounds good to me!
  • to reinforce the commitment to the coordination process in the achievement of agreed goals. Recent events have clearly demonstrated how market-driven adjustments in the face of excesses and imbalances can impose large and unexpected systemic costs. This should be a matter of concern to both leading industrialized and emerging market countries. They should have more meetings? Possibly sponsored by the IIF?
  • We believe that the IMF and the World Bank could play valuable roles in this area [of developing regulations for Sovereign Wealth Funds]. This looks like more political code. No comment until I’ve heard more.
  • Therefore, the IMF should reaffirm the importance of policy vigilance on the part of emerging market authorities as well as work closely with them to help implement needed structural reforms and further develop local capital markets. The identification and possible mitigation of risks associated with external borrowing in local banking and corporate sectors is an area that deserves attention. Greater transparency and strong investor relations programs, as emphasized by the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in Emerging Markets, should also be encouraged. This appears to be a simple reiteration of motherhood statements.

All in all, rather a disappointing letter. My guess is that they felt they had to say something, but they had to say it without offending any of their members. I’m rather surprised that the National Post gave such prominence to it.

Update: Related to this story is news that the US Treasury is:

talking with Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and other banks about a plan to jump-start the asset-backed commercial paper market.

Policy makers are concerned that investors remain reluctant to purchase the paper even if the loans that back them are sound, said a U.S. government official, who declined to be identified.

The discussions over the past two weeks have focused on structured investment vehicles, the units set up by banks and hedge funds to finance purchases of assets including subprime mortgage securities, said the official and a banker with knowledge of the deliberations. One plan under consideration would involve setting up a consortium backed by several of the biggest financial companies, the banker said.

Market Action

October 11, 2007

Willem Buiter is outraged at some aspects of the Northern Rock bail-out – specifically, the extension of deposit insurance to new money:

Why should the unsecured wholesale creditors of Northern Rock get any protection at all? There is no social justice (widows and orphans) argument to support this intervention, nor an efficiency argument – the wholesale creditors to Northern Rock should be expected to be able to pay the cost of verifying its financial viability. No public purpose is served by subsidising, through ex-post insurance, the ‘rate whores’ that are likely to make up the bulk of the wholesale creditors of Northern Rock. Municipalities, charities and professional and institutional investors that were happy to pocket the slightly above-market interest rates offered by Northern Rock should not be able to dump the default risk (whose anticipation/perception was the reason for the higher rates) on the tax payer. 

Meanwhile, the situation at Countrywide isn’t looking very pretty:

Overdue loans as a percentage of unpaid principal increased to 5.85 percent in September from 4.04 percent a year earlier, the company said in a statement. Foreclosures climbed to 1.27 percent from 0.51 percent. Mortgages funded by the Calabasas, California-based company last month declined to $21 billion.

Which appears to be a nationwide phenomenon:

U.S. home foreclosures doubled in September from a year earlier as subprime borrowers struggled to make payments on adjustable-rate mortgages, RealtyTrac Inc. said.

In related news, Moody’s downgraded a big batch of sub-prime today. From their press release:

Moody’s Investors Service today announced that it has downgraded $33.4 billion of securities issued in 2006 backed by subprime first lien mortgages, representing 7.8% of the original dollar volume of such securities rated by Moody’s. Of the $33.4 billion downgraded securities, $3.8 billion remain on review for further downgrade. Moody’s also affirmed the ratings on $258.6 billion of Aaa-rated securities and $21.3 billion of Aa-rated securities, representing 74.7% and 52.0% of the original dollar volume of such securities rated in 2006, respectively. In addition, another $23.8 billion of first-lien RMBS were placed on review for downgrade, representing 5.6% of the dollar volume of subprime first-lien securities rated in 2006, including 48 Aaa-rated and 529 Aa-rated securities.

The analysis driving today’s rating actions takes into account several key factors. First, Moody’s assumes that the severity of loss associated with loans that are now seriously delinquent will be 40%-50% on average. Second, based on its recent survey of subprime loan servicers, Moody’s analysis assumes that significant loan modifications that might mitigate future losses are not likely to occur in the near term.

There was continued decline in outstanding ABCP in the States; on a probably-not-entirely-unrelated note, bond issuance is massive this week.

There was good volume in the preferred share market today … and continued declines in the perpetual sector which, quite frankly, I am at a loss to understand.

I have uploaded a graph comparing the yield curves as of the June 12 trough in the PerpetualDiscount index; the September 19 peak, and today. Note that the graph shown plots AFTER-TAX SPOT YIELDS:

  • After Tax: The after tax yield received by an investor for an investment
  • Spot Yields: Every cash flow is discounted with its own yield. For a “30-year” perpetual (I make the approximation of “30 Years = Forever” in the analysis), there will be
    • 120 dividend payments
    • 30 tax payments
    • 1 return of principal

    making a total 151 cash flows, each of which gets its own yield in accordance with the yield curve. In traditional bond mathematics, a flat yield curve is assumed and all cash flows are discounted with the same yield

At any rate, the steepening in the past three weeks is stupendous. This is really strange!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.70% 4.64% 709,805 15.97 1 0.0000% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.87% 4.74% 105,214 15.87 7 +0.1586% 1,041.6
Floater 4.51% 4.20% 76,396 10.74 3 +0.5121% 1,041.1
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.85% 76,714 3.16 15 +0.1117% 1,028.8
Split-Share 5.15% 4.81% 85,547 4.27 15 -0.0982% 1,045.2
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.41% 56,867 3.64 4 +0.0772% 1,051.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.66% 5.45% 95,701 8.26 17 -0.2561% 1,014.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.41% 5.44% 267,770 14.77 46 -0.3840% 931.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.8087% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.63 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.6386% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 20.41 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.3921% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.3889% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 23.43 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.3699% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 21.60 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -1.1628% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount -1.1299% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 22.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.0738% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.11 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.0040% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 24.65 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0328% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 157,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 109,520 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
CIU.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 108,500 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 21.25 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat 75,100 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 24.86; DS crossed 50,000 at 24.95.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 62,833 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity.

There were twenty-four other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices: October, 2001

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2001-10-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,531.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,880.0 12 2.0 4.63% 15.4 192M 5.62%
Floater 1,443.8 4 1.76 4.14% 16.0 57M 4.45%
OpRet 1,507.4 35 1.22 3.94% 1.7 67M 6.02%
SplitShare 1,525.1 8 1.87 5.60% 5.3 78M 6.14%
Interest-Bearing 1,791.3 7 2.00 4.87% 2.5 134M 7.60%
Perpetual-Premium 1,166.8 7 1.43 4.94% 5.6 117M 5.84%
Perpetual-Discount 1,355.1 7 1.57 5.64% 14.5 188M 5.59%

Index Constitution, 2001-10-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2001-10-31, Post-rebalancing

Reader Initiated Comments

One Bull Checks In

As mentioned yesterday, I received some interesting correspondence recently:

Love your blog !

I have been buying preferred shares for the last 10 years and discovered your site last month…

My porfolio of pref ( middle six figures ) consist only of bank shares and Power Corp /Power Financial, all perpetual discount.

Sometime I  try to balance my portfolio with the ups and down of the market but I buy for the long term. 

But these days I do not understand the pref market : today I  bought PWF.PR.G 5,90 perpetual at par ( $25,06) ( in Qc X 1.35 : 7,965 % ), last week NA.PR.K 5,85 at par ( $25)(QC X 1,35 : : 7,90%) .

Meanwhile you are lucky if you get 5% on a 10 years municipal bond and 5,5% on a 20 years bonds ( ex: Greater Toronto Airport .) and the bank are signing 5 years morgage for 5,69%.

I understand the risks and the nature of the Pref , but   I wonder if I am missing something ( market disruption /Subprime /long term inflation )or if this is the buying opportunity of the decade ?
   
Thank you for your blog

Well, this is obviously a very sensible, wise and discerning correspondent – that’s obvious, because he likes the blog.

But let’s just take a VERY quick look at his question regarding “buying opportunity of the decade”. We’ll compare current yields with those of October 31, 2000, with help from the Bank of Canada’s yield look-up service, CanadianBondIndices, the HIMIPref™ Indices for October 31, 2000 and yesterday’s values:

Yield Comparisons
  2000-10-31 2007-10-10
Long Canada Yield 5.61% 4.80%
Long Corporate Yield 7.14% 5.90%
PerpetualDiscount Yield 6.03% 5.42%
Equivalency Factor 1.31 1.40
PerpetualDiscount Interest Equivalent 7.90% 7.59%
Canada Bond / Perpetual Discount
Spread
229bp 279bp
Corporate Bond / PerpetualDiscount
Spread
76bp 169bp

So … I have to agree with my correspondent that spreads look pretty attractive now!

Note that all this is very approximate. At some indeterminate time in the future, HIMIPref™ 2006 2007 2008 will be ready for testing. This new version of the programme will extend the analytics to bonds; enormous quantities of data will be purchased at ruinous expense; the analysis will allow for swaps between investment universes (although this feature might have to wait until HIMIPref™ 2009 is ready) and at that time, with lots of testing and data and controls to ensure that, for instance, there’s nothing fishy going on with the credit quality of the sampled universes, I will be much happier about saying whether spreads are wide.

But it does look pretty good, doesn’t it?

Market Action

October 10, 2007

On September 18 I mentioned the investment firm Calyon and its sudden discovery that it had a big position in credit derivatives it didn’t want. Today, the plot thickened:

The Calyon trader fired last month for alleged unauthorized trading that led to 250 million euros ($353 million) of losses said his bosses knew what he was doing and considered him a “golden child” of the New York office.”There was nothing deceptive or rogue,” Richard “Chip” Bierbaum, 26, said in an interview. “My positions were reported on a daily basis. It did not blow up. I expect there were some losses but nowhere near the amounts they are discussing. I was the golden child of credit trading in New York.”

It will be most interesting to see how this unfolds; but when things go wrong, all bureaucrats go into ass-covering mode, integrity be hanged. A trading loss of $353-million is a mere bagatelle anyway.

James Hamilton of Econbrowser writes about the return of backwardation to oil futures. A friend of mine claims that the recent contango in oil futures showed that there was no real North American oil shortage; contango implies that you can buy spot, sell futures, pay storage and make a profit. Therefore, the huge amount of contango in the recent past simply proved that there was so much oil around that the market had run out of places to store it for a few months … therefore no shortage. The current backwardation implies that the market is returning to normal, at any rate – as long as one considers a spot price of USD 80+ normal!

We will probably be hearing a lot about free trade in the next year, as the American presidential cycle ticks over. There are some polls that show the average North American supports free trade; other polls that show the opposite. The Republican front-runners are largely in favour; the Cato Institute considers Hillary Clinton to be an “interventionist” in its classification:

On the basis of their voting records, members of the 107th Congress can be classified in four categories: free traders, who oppose both trade barriers and subsidies; internationalists, who oppose barriers and support subsidies; isolationists, who support barriers and oppose subsidies; and interventionists, who support barriers and subsidies.

Her website does not discuss free trade as an issue. Anyway, in the grand tradition of American politics, we’re going to hear a lot of disingenuous statements, unfounded assertions and outright lies over the next year. Jagdish Bhagwati has written a short essay on current economic thought.

Eric Rosengren of the Boston Fed has spoken in favour of the concept of sub-prime mortgages and noted that important regional benefits resulted from their existence. His speech, published on the Boston Fed’s website, conveys some fascinating detail:

A  first finding is that recent foreclosures have been disproportionately related to multi-family dwellings.  In Middlesex County, Massachusetts, multi-family properties accounted for approximately 10 percent of all homes, but 27 percent of foreclosures in 2007.  This highlights a potentially serious problem for tenants, who may not have known that the owner might be in a precarious financial position.

Second, the Bank’s research shows that the duration of a subprime mortgages is on average quite short – for a sample of subprime mortgages used to purchase a home between 1999 and 2004,  two-thirds have prepaid within two years and almost 90 percent have prepaid within three years.  Prepayment will occur if the home is refinanced or if it is sold.  While some of those sales may have been under difficult circumstances, it is plausible that many borrowers who purchased homes with subprime products did benefit from the appreciation of home prices in New England that occurred over the last decade.

First, many subprime borrowers have respectable credit histories.  LoanPerformance data from Middlesex County show that almost two-thirds (64 cent) of borrowers who received subprime loans had FICO scores greater than 620, and 18 percent had scores over 700.  They may have been in subprime products because they chose to make a highly leveraged home purchase, or they may have been steered to a more costly mortgage for which they might have otherwise qualified.  Either way, it is encouraging to note that these borrowers could be in a position to refinance to another product.

Third, many borrowers of so-called “teaser” 2/28 mortgages were actually paying a much higher rate than is found on prime loans.  The average “teaser” rate was 7.3 percent in 2005 and 8.35 percent in 2006 for loans located in Middlesex County in Massachusetts.  This suggests that if these borrowers could qualify for a prime product, they would likely see a significant reduction in their interest rate.

Second, many subprime borrowers have held their house long enough for it to appreciate, so they may now have sufficient equity in their house to facilitate refinancing into a prime product.

Sorry to include such a long quote – but seeing some actual data on subPrime, as opposed to reporters’ drivel, is very exciting!

He even included a rather puzzling note, that may be an elliptic reference to Canadian ABCP:

Much of the asset-backed commercial paper had liquidity and often credit enhancements provided by banks, to insure that investors would receive their money should they decide they no longer wanted to hold the commercial paper.  The success of the asset-backed commercial paper in financing assets has encouraged some organizations to choose structures that were less reliant on liquidity provisions by banks.

But … that’s it for me. I have better things to do this evening; I will be updating HIMIPref™ data later and may have time for some comments (and perhaps some snarky comments about the election) but no guarantees!

Update: So … the Ontario election results are in and it looks like John Tory will have to run for Prime Minister next time. It’s a bit of a shame, in many ways, because he ran an absolutely masterful campaign. The faith-based-school thing (which was only charter-school-lite, anyway) was a beautiful distraction from the completely ludicrous budgetary plan and he managed to escape with a reputation as an earnestly mistaken zealot, rather than a dangerous bozo.

What has happened to the (Progressive) Conservative party to which I used to belong in pre-Harper, pre-Eves days? It used to be the party of fiscal responsibility and competent management; it has become the party of moronic tax cuts and vindictive politics of resentment.

Ontario voters have also shown good sense in rejecting proportional representation; a number of supporters are showing all the intellectual honesty of unrepentent Stalinists: ‘It’s a great system! It just wasn’t done right!’. Still rejection of the changes as written provides Ontario with an opportunity to increase revenues at some point in the future … instead of presenting the party leaders with a batch of seats to sell, the province might in the future sell them directly, at so much per year. This makes a lot more fiscal sense in these troubled times.

It was another bad day for prefs, with the PerpetualDiscount index down just over a third of a percentage point. PerpetualPremiums were down marginally.

I received some more fascinating correspondence tonight and will post about it tomorrow.

Update 2007-10-11

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.69% 4.63% 739,258 15.99 1 -0.0408% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.87% 4.75% 104,097 15.84 7 +0.3158% 1,040.0
Floater 4.53% 4.52% 77,642 11.27 3 -0.7793% 1,035.8
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.95% 77,331 3.15 15 -0.1174% 1,027.6
Split-Share 5.14% 4.76% 85,311 4.04 15 -0.0748% 1,046.2
Interest Bearing 6.29% 6.40% 56,493 3.64 4 +0.5475% 1,051.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.65% 5.41% 94,826 8.89 17 -0.0422% 1,017.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.38% 5.42% 266,215 14.81 46 -0.3463% 935.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -2.5058% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.5385% Asset coverage of 2.5+:1 as of 2007-10-4, according to Brompton. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.81% based on a bid of 10.24 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.3790%  
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.1163% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.31% based on a bid of 21.26 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.4202% Asset coverage of 1.79:1 as of October 5, according to Brookfield. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.35% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.31 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 275,564 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.0469% on the day.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 413,039 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.26% based on a bid of 21.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7438% on the day.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 336,250 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.6993% on the day.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 307,740 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 21.75 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.2294% on the day.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 306,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 22.05 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.9434% on the day.
FAL.PR.A Scraps (Would be Floater, but there are credit concerns) 175,526 Down 0.3241% on the day.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 107,850 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 24.35 and a limitMaturity. Down 0.7338% on the day.

There were fourteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Reader Initiated Comments

What Affects Preferred Shares Prices?

There have been some questions about this issue recently, both on FWF:

My limited understanding of prefs is that they are a lot less volatile than commons and trade in a “short” range. TD is on its way up. They just bought Commerce Bancorp at a time when our loonie is worth huge. If they do well, even their prefs are going to appreciate somewhat. Even if they don’t do so well, the US. $ will eventually find it’s way back and they’re going to make it on the exchange.

and in my eMail:

The one thing I don’t understand about preferreds is how their shared price is affected.  I assume like bonds they trend inverse to the prime rate and I get that part of the discount. Over the past several years I have held preferreds and noticed very little fluctuation in the share price but lately they are falling and I don’t fundamentally understand why as interest rates appear stable (or am I wrong here?).  Further, some hold their value better than others (e.g., MFC.PR.A versus PWF.PR.F – I’d consider ManuLife and Power Financial equally sound companies for the long term yet one share price is falling while the other is not).  How concerned does one need to be about share price and if they do go down what are the factors that will bring them back to book value (e.g., something is making ManuLife more stable than Power and I don’t understand what that is).  Sorry, if the question comes across as naive but I find it hard to get my head around all the factors affecting these preferreds.  Thanks in advance.

Well, let’s begin with the first statement: the thing to remember about preferred shares is that they are fixed income investments. A $25.00 par-value preferred share paying $1.3125 annually to yield 5.25% will never change its dividend just because the company is doing well. Whether the issue is priced at $30 (to yield 4.375% of market price) or at $20 (to yield 6.5625% of market price) is another matter entirely.

‘They never change their dividends?’, you ask, ‘What, never?’ Well … hardly ever. Every now and then a company will seek to change the terms of a preferred share issue (extending the maturity date of a split-share preferred is a recent example) and sweeten the dividend to make the change more palatable. Such examples are notable mainly for their rarity.

Another exception is “fixed-reset” issues, in which the company resets the fixed-rate every five years and gives the holder the option to convert to floating rate. BCE.PR.A / BCE.PR.B is an example of such a pair. The company’s motives in setting the rate, however, will be to minimize their expense, not to ‘share the wealth’ if they do well.

The price of preferreds will be affected by the fortunes of the company only to the extent that the company’s ability to pay the agreed dividends and principal changes. In the case of TD Bank, an improvement in their financial position will have an extremely limited effect, because both the markets and the credit rating agencies agree that the probability of them being able to meet their committments is pretty close to 100% right now; therefore, any possible increase in this probability is extremely small and therefore will have a very limited effect on market price.

On the other hand, a deterioration in the company’s ability to pay can have a very marked effect on market price. Recently, for instance, Weston has run into difficulties – not as exciting as the fears of imminent bankruptcy that plagued Nortel a few years back, or the silliness that affected Bombardier preferreds, but difficulties nevertheless, and their ability to pay the agreed dividends is not considered to be as secure as it once was.

WN.PR.E is very similar in its terms to SLF.PR.A, and therefore it should respond similarly to general financial market pressures – any differences will be almost entirely due to company-specific factors. I have graphed the flatBidPrice of these issues … you can see that the detioration in Weston’s credit quality has had a huge effect. Credit, credit, credit! You always have to pay attention to credit!

As far as Weston is concerned, an investor might well look at what they’re doing and take the view that they’re going to do so well that market perceptions of their ability to pay will become much rosier; in such a case, we’d expect the spread between SLF.PR.A and WN.PR.E to narrow; and hence, WN.PR.E would (if the analysis is correct!) outperform. This type of analysis is called Credit Anticipation and represents a blurring of the lines between fixed income and equity analysis. As far as TD is concerned though, they’re recognized as such a strong company already that “ability to pay” simply doesn’t have much room to improve.

OK – on to the second question!

My correspondent is quite correct in his understanding about the inverse relationship between interest rates and preferred share prices, but I have to quibble over the use of the “Prime” interest rate.

“Prime” is for very short term loans and is related to the Bank of Canada’s overnight target rate. Preferreds, particularly perpetual preferreds, will be related to the long rate – and the corporate long rate at that.

The two are not necessarily directly related. Long term bonds – those maturing in 20-30 years – are sensitive to perceptions of inflation, while short term bonds – those maturing in less than 5 years – are sensitive to monetary policy as executed via the overnight rate. The Bank of Canada might, for instance, cut overnight rates to 1% … not very likely, perhaps, but possible! In such a case, short rates would decline (trading at a relatively constant spread to overnight), but long rates would almost certainly skyrocket, as investors decided that such easy money would fuel inflation.

Additionally, I will stress that it is Corporate long rates that we are concerned with when analyzing perpetual prefs. According to CanadianBondIndices.com, corporate long bonds have returned -3.82% in the year to October 9 and the yield is about 5.9%, compared to about 5.2% at the beginning of the year. Government long bonds, on the other hand, have returned -1.25% … a fair loss, but the fact that this is so much less than the loss on corporates indicates that spreads have increased. In other words, the perceived risk of holding corporates has increased and investors want more money in compensation.

Additionally, there will be a spread between Corporate Long Bonds and Perpetual Preferreds due simply to the fact that there is a different pool of investors. Pension funds, for instance, will not normally hold preferreds; since pension funds are not taxable, there are no tax advantages to be gained by receiving dividend income rather than interest. And retail panics a lot, besides; since there is no institutional hot money (or less of it, at any rate) cruising around looking for a cheap buy in the preferred mariket place, price swings can be more pronounced.

With respect to the two specific issues mentioned in the eMail: MFC.PR.A is a retractible issue; in December 2015, holders are entitled to get their $25 capital back from the company. There are some details to be understood about this – holders might actually get $26.00 worth of common stock, which they would then have to sell – but basically, an investment in MFC.PR.A is roughly comparable to an eight-year bond. I wrote an article comparing perpetuals to retractibles a while ago; and a more recent one comparing retractibles to bonds. PWF.PR.F is a perpetual; a fair number of perpetuals have been issued in the past year; and the recent credit crunch has scared off a few investors who are more concerned with price fluctuations than with income.

There are many investors who want only retractibles; they will not look at perpetuals regardless of price. Which is why retractibles of operating companies are usually so expensive and not worth buying!

Information regarding the attributes of preferred share issues is almost always available on SEDAR (as long as the prospectus was issued within the last 10-odd years); mostly available on my summary website PrefInfo.com (I track almost all of the liquid issues … the tiny little guys are a bit more hit-and-miss); and often available on the company website, as either a summary or a full prospectus – sometimes both! To find a company website, get a quote for the issue from the TSX, then click “Company Information”.

Market Action

October 9, 2007

Worry over the fate of the USD continues to be a theme in the markets, and Menzie Chinn of Econbrowser has posted a review of the issues. I will admit, this post is notable mainly for its links to definitions and prior reviews of the issue, but these are good links. The 2005 post includes a link to a paper showing the futility of forecasting: it’s always gratifying to get some agreement with one’s prejudices! The examination of the interest-rate parity predictions are interesting, if only because I have seen it claimed – by a sophisticated retail investor – that carry trades are intrinsically unsound because interest-rate parity is guaranteed. Well … not in this world!

Accrued Interest reviewed the jobs numbers on the weekend, with a view to discussing the investment difference between “lawyers” and “detectives” – the former seeking evidence to support a particular view; the latter (greatly favoured) seeking to examine evidence to form a view.

What’s a good name for those, such as myself, who feel that the process is pointless because natural chaos will destroy any prediction as soon as it’s made? Weatherman, perhaps? I’m not going to predict a hurricane, but I will say that if there is a hurricane, you should have a good solid house; but if it’s sunny and pleasant, you’ll want nice windows; so build your house with the objective of surviving hurricanes with not too much damage while being able to enjoy the sunny times.

Perhaps this is stretching a metaphor too far! The markets can be outperformed, but you have to get your hands dirty and examine a wide variety of scenarios. And – assuming you are a rational investor and avoid the One Big Bet school of thought – you’re not going to double your money while everyone else goes broke, either! Ideally, you’ll outperform by a constant, small-but-worthwhile amount, irregardless of economic conditions.

The Northern Rock Saga continues:

Northern Rock, based in Newcastle, England, said in a statement today that money deposited after Sept. 19 will now be covered by the Bank of England, the U.K. Treasury and Financial Services Authority. The authorities previously only protected deposits made before then.

“This may make Northern Rock easier to sell,” said Philip Shaw, chief European economist at Investec Bank in London.

The case has been “damaging” for the reputation of the U.K., Financial Services Authority Chairman Callum McCarthy told the Treasury Select Committee of lawmakers today. Still, it was “impossible” to predict closure of the markets both for securitization and for short-term repurchase agreements, he said.

“We didn’t identify the probability of that happening,” McCarthy said. “No regulator anywhere around the world succeeded in predicting that.”

Sion Simon, a Labour Party member of the committee, said he had heard that relations between the FSA and the Bank of England were “poisonous” and compared McCarthy to a boxer.

“You are the Sugar Ray Leonard of the financial-services sector. You are a world-class ducker and diver.” Simon told McCarthy. “There was a run on the bank, the nation was a global laughing stock, and you say the provisions worked?”

Instead of saying ‘We didn’t predict it and neither did anybody else’, McCarthy should have blamed the credit rating agencies. That technique is working beautifully in North America!

Speaking of credit rating agencies, I see in the Globe today that State Street (among other Money-Market-Fund sponsors) is seeing a big uptick in business:

Executives at many small to mid-sized companies across Canada woke up in mid-August to find a portion of their supposedly liquid cash holdings were frozen, as a $30-billion segment of the asset-backed commercial paper market (ABCP) collapsed. Airline Transat A.T. Inc., for example, has $154-million of its $340-million in cash reserves stuck in a holding pattern.

“Corporate treasurers suddenly became aware that they face risks in their cash holdings, and they’re rushing to deal with these risks,” said Gregory Chrispin, president of State Street’s Canadian arm and former treasurer of Export Development Canada.

It is nice to see that some companies are taking my advice to stick to what they’re good at and pay for portfolio management. Whether or not there will be a surge of CFO replacements to accompany the sudden discovery that treasury departments have been speculating with shareholder assets remains to be seen! 

Treasuries drifted downwards, attributed to a ‘no-recession’ indication by the Fed, though today’s retail sales number provided no indication of a huge economic boom. Canadas fell, as a strong housing number decreased chances for a rate cut. US equities rose (no recession!) while Canadian equities were pretty quiet.

The news in the preferred share market today was that the TD New Issue and the closing of the BMO new issue combined to drive the PerpetualDiscount index to a new low. The prior low (since the temporary index was started, as of 2006-6-30, that is) was set on June 12, 2007. The four main indices since then have returned:

Total Return
2007-6-12 to 2007-10-9
Index Return
OpRet +0.82%
SplitShare +1.56%
PerpetualPremium +1.05%
Perpetual Discount -0.48%

If we look at returns for CPD …

CPD Returns for period of interest
After all fees and Expenses
Date NAV Distribution Period Return
June 12, 2007 $18.97 N/A N/A
June 26 18.97 $0.1998 +1.05%
Sept 25 18.76 $0.2185 +0.04%
October 9, 2007 $18.49 $0.00 -1.44%
Total (after fees & expenses) -0.37%

So, speculating on price movements in prefs has not been a jolly time for the past four months! Fortunately, the investments are paying the same income as they have done in the past, so income – which is the entire reason for investing in prefs, right? – is unaffected. Market timers may wish to kick themselves for getting it wrong, but an honest market timer is always kicking himself anyway, so there’s not much difference there.

It was nice to see some good volume in the pref market today, with a few good-sized crosses courtesy of Scotia.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.68% 4.62% 769,935 16.01 1 +0.0408% 1,044.1
Fixed-Floater 4.89% 4.77% 104,381 15.82 7 -0.1098% 1,036.7
Floater 4.50% 3.01% 76,099 10.71 3 -0.1365% 1,043.9
Op. Retract 4.86% 3.98% 78,046 3.27 15 +0.0216% 1,028.9
Split-Share 5.13% 4.80% 85,029 4.05 15 -0.0962% 1,047.0
Interest Bearing 6.33% 6.48% 56,152 3.62 4 -0.1268% 1,045.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.64% 5.40% 94,703 8.28 17 -0.2043% 1,018.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.36% 5.40% 264,377 14.84 46 -0.6242% 938.8
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -2.8558% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.0478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 22.96 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount -1.9624% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.17% based on a bid of 23.48 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.8893% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 22.33 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.6529% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.6355% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 21.05 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -1.5894% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.37% based on a bid of 22.29 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.P PerpetualPremium -1.4168% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 25.05 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.4061% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 23.84 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount -1.2159% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 49.56 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1404% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.28% based on a bid of 22.54 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1106% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.27% based on a bid of 22.26 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.1034% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.30% based on a bid of 24.20 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.0334% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 24.90 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.0223% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 21.30 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.1379% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.36% based on a bid of 23.11 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.1759% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.5208% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 24.70 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
NTL.PR.F Scraps (would be ratchet, but there are credit concerns) 153,926 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 15.50.
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 84,620 New issue closed today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 24.50 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 83,925 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 21.47 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 63,200 Scotia crossed 49,000 at 21.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 21.40 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 59,776 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 58,600 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 21.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.32% based on a bid of 21.45 and a limitMaturity.

There were sixteen other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Data Changes

BMO.PR.K Slithers onto Market

This new issue, announced on September 27 initially looked pretty good … but market yields kept increasing and it looked less and less like a good thing as time went on.

The new issue announcement by TD today probably didn’t help a lot either.

Opening day wasn’t very good, but was at least better than the EPP.PR.A, BAM.PR.N and CCS.PR.A opening days of late last spring. 84,620 shares traded in a range of 24.50-70, closing at 24.50-55, 10×32.

As of the close, HIMIPref™ estimates the fair value of this issue to be 24.67. The issue has been entered into the HIMIPref™ database with a securityCode of A40007. A reorgDataEntry has been created to reflect the change from the preIssue code of P25008.

Update: This issue has been added to the PerpetualDiscount Index.