Archive for July, 2009

C-EBS Releases Counter-Cyclical Capital Buffer Position Paper

Friday, July 17th, 2009

The Committee of European Banking Supervisors has released a position paper on counter-cyclical capital buffers, favouring discretionary supervision (Pillar 2) over Capital Rules (Pillar 1):

While the mechanisms identified might be alternatively employed in Pillar 1, its use under the Pillar 2 umbrella is still considered the most sensible option at this stage. Pillar 2 allows for flexibility in testing new prudential tools; moreover, an application in Pillar 1 would require further work and refinements.

With regard to this last point a meeting with rating agencies was organized. They stated very clearly that transparency on capital adequacy is a key issue and it is a precondition for market acceptance of time-varying capital buffers. Rating agencies seem to prefer Pillar 1 solutions, considered more transparent [and] less prone to national discretions; however, they seem also aware that Pillar 2 would allow quicker responses and may be used for testing tools to be subsequently improved and, possibly, implemented under Pillar 1.

I suggest it’s not a matter of awareness: it’s a matter of trust. In Canada, of course, we have OSFI with its demonstrated willingness to short-circuit Pillar 1 on the basis of a panicky ‘phone call, as well as contemptuous opacity towards the concerns of investors (Pillar 3).

Essentially, the position paper aims at a different methodology for calculating Expected Losses (EL) – see Expected Losses and the Assets to Capital Multiple. EL is calculated by the formula

EL = PD * EAD * LGD

where PD = Probability of Default
EAD = Exposure at Default
LGD = Loss Given Default (a percentage)

What C-EBS is aiming at is:

the use of mechanisms that rescale probabilities of default (PDs) estimated by banks, in order to incorporate recessionary conditions.

Currently:

The input to the IRB formula is the annual PD expected to be incurred in that grade (computed as the long-run average of one-year default rates).

As for the LGD, banks are requested to use LGD estimates that are as much as possible estimated for an economic downturn (where these are more conservative than the long-run average).

One problem I see with the approach is there does not appear to be an allowance for the term of the exposure. Would a bank dealing exclusively in mortgages with a 5-year term be expected to use the same recessionary PD as a bank with a portfolio of exclusively 30-year mortgages?

July 16, 2009

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

The amount of US Commercial Paper outstanding is shrinking dramatically. Bloomberg reports:

For now, companies are willing to pay higher rates to ensure access to capital after watching credit dry up almost overnight as the subprime mortgage contagion spread in 2007 and 2008 and Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed in September.

More than 60 companies sold bonds this year to repay commercial paper, including Con Edison, Verizon Communications Inc. in New York and Kellogg, the 103-year-old maker of Keebler cookies and Rice Krispies cereal, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Non-financial companies have sold $306 billion of investment-grade bonds this year, a record pace.

“Treasurers aren’t sleeping at night because they don’t know if they can roll over commercial paper,” said Anthony J. Carfang, a partner at Treasury Strategies Inc, a Chicago consulting firm. “They’d rather lock in money for five years and pay a little more.”

Maybe it’s not so much a bad thing. With all the new emphasis on liquidity management and the example of CIT impossible to ignore, maybe these treasurers are wondering ‘What if we’re completely locked out of the capital markets for a year?’

Speaking of CIT …. bondholders are reportedly discussing a debt-for-equity swap:

Pacific Investment Management Co., CIT’s largest bondholder based on regulatory filings, was to host a call, and debt owners are considering hiring financial and legal advisers, said the person, who declined to be identified because the discussions are private. The company hasn’t proposed an exchange offer.

“CIT indicated that it needs at least $2 billion of rescue financing in the next 24 hours or it would likely file,” CreditSights analysts Adam Steer, David Hendler and Pri De Silva wrote in a report. “We believe the figure is in the range of $4 to $6 billion plus, making outside capital sources shy away.”

This would presumably wipe-out the participants in December’s $2.4-billion swap. The company, rather predictably, has issued a press release stating:

that its Board of Directors and management, in consultation with their advisors, are continuing to evaluate alternatives to improve the Company’s liquidity. CIT is in discussions with potential lenders to secure financing.

The Company is continuing to serve customers. CIT appreciates the strong support it has received from many of its 1 million small business and middle market customers, industry associations and dedicated employees.

Another day of strong performance for preferred shares, on continued good volume. I don’t know what happened to the MFC PerpetualDiscounts – their decline was unmatched by the MFC FixedResets and common. Just another one of those pref thingies, I guess…

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3617 % 1,154.8
FixedFloater 7.25 % 5.46 % 35,501 16.68 1 0.0000 % 2,118.3
Floater 3.30 % 3.89 % 80,930 17.68 3 -0.3617 % 1,442.7
OpRet 4.98 % -2.98 % 130,922 0.09 15 0.0261 % 2,218.5
SplitShare 6.08 % 4.12 % 96,579 4.15 4 0.3799 % 1,927.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0261 % 2,028.6
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2136 % 1,776.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.24 % 6.26 % 159,835 13.53 71 0.2136 % 1,636.3
FixedReset 5.55 % 4.29 % 569,360 4.28 40 0.2268 % 2,072.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -3.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 18.11
Evaluated at bid price : 18.11
Bid-YTW : 6.51 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.95 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.14
Evaluated at bid price : 20.14
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.91
Bid-YTW : 6.37 %
RY.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 19.02
Evaluated at bid price : 19.02
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.41
Evaluated at bid price : 20.41
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 18.28
Evaluated at bid price : 18.28
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-08-15
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.00
Bid-YTW : -9.27 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 21.31
Evaluated at bid price : 21.31
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 15.82
Evaluated at bid price : 15.82
Bid-YTW : 7.60 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.72
Bid-YTW : 4.60 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 24.18
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 6.00 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.93 % Pro forma asset coverage of 2.6+:1 as of July 8, according to DBRS.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.36
Bid-YTW : 10.27 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater 102,100 RBC crossed 98,600 at 10.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 10.10
Evaluated at bid price : 10.10
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 73,995 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 73,975 Scotia crossed 24,500 at 17.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 17.43
Evaluated at bid price : 17.43
Bid-YTW : 6.54 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 58,450 RBC crossed 49,800 at 17.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 17.07
Evaluated at bid price : 17.07
Bid-YTW : 6.59 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 48,637 Scotia sold 22,600 to anonymous at 25.56.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-16
Maturity Price : 25.58
Evaluated at bid price : 25.63
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 46,175 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.19
Bid-YTW : 4.74 %
There were 59 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

Cleveland Fed Releases July "Economic Trends"

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

The Cleveland Fed has released the July edition of Economic Trends with articles on:

  • May Price Statistics
  • The Yield Curve, June 2009
  • A Global Fiscal Crisis?
  • The Employment Situation, June 2009
  • Real GDP: First-Quarter 2009 Final Estimate
  • Gross Domestic Product Growth across States
  • Fourth District Employment Conditions
  • Consumer Credit Markets

Excluding food and energy prices (core CPI), the index rose just 1.7 percent in May, compared to 2.3 percent over the past three months and 1.8 percent over the past year. Alternative measures of underlying inflation trends—the median CPI and the 16 percent trimmed-mean CPI—increased 0.6 percent and 1.1 percent, respectively in May. The sluggish gain in the median CPI was the smallest increase in the measure since April 2003. The longer-term (12-month) trends in the underlying inflation measures all ticked down in May and are now ranging between 1.8 percent and 2.4 percent.

Indications so far suggest that the TALF is having a positive impact on consumer credit markets. In September 2008, the market for consumer ABS eff ectively shut down. This was particularly true for student loan ABS and credit card ABS. After the introduction of the TALF, the market began to revert to levels seen before the market’s collapse. For instance, total consumer ABS issuance in November was merely $0.5 billion, while six months later it had risen to $14.4 billion. This increase was not due entirely to Federal Reserve actions—the total increase in ABS issuance was larger than the amount lent under TALF. This would imply that banks are becoming less risk averse as they once again engage in securitization.

BMT.PR.A to be Redeemed on Schedule

Thursday, July 16th, 2009

BMONT Split Corp. has announced:

The Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be redeemed by the Company on August 5, 2009 (the “Redemption Date”) in accordance with the redemption provisions as detailed in the prospectus dated July 29, 2004. Pursuant to these provisions, the Preferred Shares will be redeemed at a price per share equal to the lesser of $27.45 and the net asset value per unit. The Capital Shares will be redeemed at a price for every two shares equal to the amount by which the net asset value per unit exceeds $27.45.

A further press release will be issued by the Company in connection with the redemption prices on July 31, 2009. Payment of the amounts due to holders of Capital Shares and Preferred Shares will be made by the Company on August 5, 2009.

Given that the NAV is currently $47.30, redemption at par seems like a pretty good bet.

BMT.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog in February, when it was downgraded to Pfd-4 by DBRS. At the time, the NAV was $30.77 … what a difference!

BMT.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the “Scraps” sub-index on both volume and credit concerns.

July 15, 2009

Wednesday, July 15th, 2009

Apparently there has been a “credit line run” on CIT:

Regulators tried to craft a rescue package late yesterday as CIT customers, prompted by reports of possible bankruptcy, drained $750 million from credit lines on Monday and Tuesday, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

The U.S. may let CIT transfer assets to its bank in Utah, and the Federal Reserve would let CIT pledge some assets at its discount window while the company tries to refinance debt, the newspaper said.

This type of run was discussed in the post A Question of Liquidity: The Great Banking Run of 2008

At the company’s request, the NYSE halted trading, “pending news”. Reuters had no news, but plenty of speculation:

U.S. officials are considering giving CIT Group Inc (CIT.N) a temporary loan as part of an aid package to help the lender avoid collapse, a source familiar with regulators’ thinking said on Tuesday.

The temporary loan is one option being considered to give CIT room to strengthen its balance sheet by raising additional capital through debt or equity, said the source who requested anonymity because the plans could change.

Other options include access to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s discount window and asset transfers, the source said. The source said there was no guarantee a plan would be reached.

But just after 6pm, CIT aanounced everything had fizzled:

CIT Group Inc. (NYSE: CIT), a leading provider of financing to small businesses and middle market companies, today announced that it has been advised that there is no appreciable likelihood of additional government support being provided over the near term.

The Company’s Board of Directors and management, in consultation with its advisors, are evaluating alternatives.

And in California they’re singing Whoops! I did it again:

Moody’s Investors Service yesterday lowered California’s credit rating two steps to Baa1 from A2 and said its evaluation may be reduced further unless legislators quickly solve the cash crisis.

The BofA/Merrill investigation continues:

Former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said letting Bank of America Corp. scuttle its takeover of Merrill Lynch & Co. last year was “unthinkable,” and his remarks about ousting management were “appropriate.”

Paulson “intended to deliver a strong message” to Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis in December “that it would be unthinkable for Bank of America to take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable legal basis and which would show a lack of judgment,” the former official said in remarks prepared for a congressional hearing tomorrow. The text was obtained today by Bloomberg News.

Paulson told Lewis on Dec. 21 that backing out of the deal “would show a colossal lack of judgment and would jeopardize Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, and the financial system,” according to the testimony. Paulson confirmed he had told Lewis the Fed might remove management and the board of the Charlotte, North Carolina-based bank if they failed to complete the takeover of New York-based Merrill Lynch.

Seems to me that Paulson is preparing to talk out of both sides of his mouth. If backing out would have showed misjudgement, why is Treasury presenting an insurance bill for $4-billion?

Bank of America Corp., the largest U.S. bank by assets, benefited from implied federal backing on about $118 billion of Merrill Lynch & Co. assets and owes the government compensation, the chairman of a House of Representatives committee studying the purchase of Merrill said.

“If you or anyone at Bank of America made a commitment, verbal or otherwise, to enter into this deal with the United States government, I urge you to honor that commitment,” Edolphus Towns, a New York Democrat, said in a letter yesterday to Chief Executive Officer Kenneth Lewis that was obtained by Bloomberg News. “It is the right thing to do.”

Regulators say Bank of America owes at least part of a $4 billion fee it agreed to pay in January because the company benefited from U.S. backing on Merrill assets such as mortgage- backed bonds, Bloomberg News reported on July 13, citing people familiar with the matter.

The U.S. provided the bank $20 billion in capital plus the asset guarantees to keep Lewis from abandoning the takeover of Merrill Lynch.

The discussion in the US regarding the regulatory approach to the size of banks is getting more heated, but there’s nothing really new:

The FDIC will propose slapping fees on the biggest bank holding companies to the extent that they carry on activities, such as proprietary trading, outside of traditional lending. The idea goes beyond the Obama administration’s regulation-overhaul plan, which would have the Fed adjust capital and liquidity standards for the biggest firms, without any pre-set fees.

“What we have suggested is financial disincentives for size and complexity,” Bair said in a July 9 interview. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke told lawmakers last month that restricting size is a “legitimate” option.

PerpetualDiscounts closed today with a median bid-YTW of 6.27%, equivalent to 8.78 interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates remain at around 6.4% – well, maybe just a smidgen higher – and so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread has narrowed in a little over the week, to about 235bp; still in excess of levels seen throughout most of the Credit Crunch.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3630 % 1,159.0
FixedFloater 7.25 % 5.47 % 35,355 16.67 1 -0.6623 % 2,118.3
Floater 3.29 % 3.87 % 74,956 17.71 3 0.3630 % 1,447.9
OpRet 4.98 % -3.07 % 131,275 0.09 15 0.1701 % 2,217.9
SplitShare 6.10 % 4.21 % 97,584 4.15 4 0.1413 % 1,920.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1701 % 2,028.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4090 % 1,772.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.25 % 6.27 % 160,573 13.53 71 0.4090 % 1,632.8
FixedReset 5.56 % 4.29 % 556,091 4.25 40 -0.0271 % 2,067.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.56
Evaluated at bid price : 20.56
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 5.96 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.22
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 6.67 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.66
Evaluated at bid price : 21.91
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.58
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 24.60
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 10.23
Evaluated at bid price : 10.23
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.77
Evaluated at bid price : 18.77
Bid-YTW : 6.46 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 15.66
Evaluated at bid price : 15.66
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 6.56 %
RY.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.03
Evaluated at bid price : 19.03
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %
CM.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 2.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.86
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset 188,605 Nesbitt crossed 100,000; Scotia crossed 17,900; Nesbitt bought 16,700 from Scotia; and RBC crossed 20,000; all at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 141,452 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-15
Maturity Price : 20.18
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BMO.PR.O FixedReset 93,004 RBC sold 10,000 to Nesbitt and crossed 50,000; both blocks at 28.01.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.01
Bid-YTW : 4.30 %
BNA.PR.D SplitShare 84,601 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-07-09
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 83,143 Scotia crossed blocks of 28,900 and 25,000, both at 26.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
ACO.PR.A OpRet 76,401 RBC crossed 75,700 at 26.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-08-14
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.36
Bid-YTW : -3.16 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

GPA.PR.A: Also Hit by Lear Credit Event

Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

Global Credit Pref Corp has announced:

that it received a credit event notice today from The Toronto-Dominion Bank with respect to Lear Corp. as a result of that entity failing to make the $38 million required interest payments within the 30 day grace period on its 8.5% and 8.75% senior notes.

Global Credit Pref Corp. is a mutual fund corporation that issued 10-year redeemable, retractable cumulative preferred shares. The Company has exposure, by way of an equity forward sale agreement, to a structured credit linked note issued by The Toronto-Dominion Bank and held by Global Credit Trust, the return on which is currently linked to the credit performance of 122 reference entities, subsequent to the removal of Lear Corp. (the “CLN Portfolio”).

The return on the credit linked note is linked to the number of defaults experienced over its term among the reference entities in the CLN Portfolio. The credit linked note has been structured so that it is unaffected by the first net losses on the CLN Portfolio up to 5.12% of the initial value of the CLN Portfolio (initially representing defaults by 11 reference entities in a CLN Portfolio comprised of 129 reference entities). The net loss on a reference entity that defaults is calculated as the percentage exposure in the CLN Portfolio to such reference entity reduced by a 40% fixed recovery rate. Following the credit event, the credit linked note will be able to withstand approximately 5 further credit events in the CLN Portfolio. Global Credit Pref Corp.’s capacity to return $25.00 per preferred share on the scheduled redemption date of September 30, 2015 and the payment of quarterly fixed cumulative preferential distributions of $0.3281 per preferred share (a 5.25% yield on the original subscription price of $25.00 per preferred share) will not be affected by this credit event.

These prefs are currently rated P-5(low)/Watch Negative by S&P. RPB.PR.A was not the only synthetic affected by the Lear event!

GPA.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™. The last mention on PrefBlog was with respect to its downgrade to P-5.

July 14, 2009

Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

More nonsense from Congress about user-pay credit ratings:

“We are not going to correct this problem if in the future they can let us down again by the user paying the ratings agency for the value of their valuation,” Mr. Kanjorski said.

While Mr. Kanjorsky did not go into specifics on how the ratings agencies might be compensated for their analysis in the future — currently, they get paid by the debt issuers, which many see as a huge conflict of interest — the lawmaker did mention that in the past, it was the user that paid for the rating.

CIT’s problems are two-fold: first, it has to deal with deteriorating credit quality of its assets – like every other lender, particularly in America – and second, it has been shut out of the bond market for well over a year. The second is usually related to the first, of course, but the descent to hell was so swift, so deep, so thorough and so extended that I think there’s other things going on. The bond market simply isn’t all that smart, y’know? I suggest technical factors like, f’rinstance, forced liquidation of CPDOs (they’ve been out of the news for a while, since 2008-9-4): CIT was a favoured ingredient of CDOs and I assume the same could be said for CPDOs – although that thought must be marked “speculative”. The potential for a near-term credit event could have widespread impact:

CIT Group Inc (CIT.N) tops the list of names in portfolios of European synthetic CDOs rated by Standard & Poor’s, which would mean widespread default losses in the nearly $600 billion market if it files for bankruptcy.

S&P said in late 2008 that 1,053 European synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) — 66 percent — included CIT, a New York-based lender to small and mid-sized businesses, in their portfolios of credit default swaps (CDS).

Meanwhile, in the underlying CDS market, net notional exposure to CIT amounted to $3.465 billion in the week ended July 3, according to data from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp (DTCC).

Given that CIT is a member of the CDX IG, which is the main U.S. investment-grade CDS index, “further developments are likely to be a focus for the market in the near term”, Deutsche Bank credit strategists wrote.

Out of the 1,000 top reference entities in the CDS market listed by the DTCC, CIT ranked 34th in net notional exposure.

Excluding sovereign CDS, it ranked 19th among corporate names after General Electric Capital Corp (GEA.N) and mostly banks including Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE), Morgan Stanley (MS.N) and Goldman Sachs (GS.N).

DBRS downgraded CIT today.

I’ve been reporting the CIT news as it comes in, but California is also dreamin’:

California had its credit rating, already the lowest of all U.S. states, cut for the second time in as many weeks over lawmakers’ failure to close a $26 billion deficit that left the most-populous U.S. state issuing IOUs to creditors.

Moody’s Investors Service said it lowered California’s credit rating two steps to Baa1 from A2 and said it could be reduced further if legislators don’t quickly address the state’s cash problem. The new grade is three levels above non-investment grade. Fitch Investors on July 6 lowered its evaluation of California’s general obligation bonds by two steps to BBB from A-, placing the debt two ranks above so-called high-yield, high- risk junk ratings.

Even with the credit rating tumbling, investors say there is little risk of default. California Controller John Chiang resorted to issuing IOUs to insure that the state would have enough cash to make payments that have the highest priority under the state constitution, including those on its bonds, if there is a prolonged battle over the budget. Chiang said the IOUs mean the state should have funds to meet those obligations through September.

All the way through September, eh? Wow.

A rip-roaring day for the preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts regaining ground vs. the somewhat-less-strong-but-still-quite-strong FixedResets, on good volume throughout.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 1,154.8
FixedFloater 7.20 % 5.43 % 35,826 16.72 1 0.0000 % 2,132.4
Floater 3.30 % 3.88 % 74,449 17.68 3 0.0000 % 1,442.7
OpRet 4.99 % -0.65 % 122,282 0.09 15 0.1651 % 2,214.2
SplitShare 6.11 % 4.04 % 93,096 4.15 4 0.2288 % 1,917.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1651 % 2,024.7
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4169 % 1,765.6
Perpetual-Discount 6.28 % 6.29 % 160,222 13.48 71 0.4169 % 1,626.1
FixedReset 5.56 % 4.27 % 556,679 4.25 40 0.1945 % 2,068.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.56 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 10.10
Evaluated at bid price : 10.10
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.32
Bid-YTW : 6.63 %
SLF.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.00
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
CM.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 17.80
Evaluated at bid price : 17.80
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.67
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
MFC.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.06
Evaluated at bid price : 19.06
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 20.86
Evaluated at bid price : 20.86
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 15.51
Evaluated at bid price : 15.51
Bid-YTW : 2.55 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 4.33 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.01
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.74
Evaluated at bid price : 19.74
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
RY.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.13
Evaluated at bid price : 19.13
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 19.76
Evaluated at bid price : 19.76
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
CL.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 2.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 24.77
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 2.68 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.04
Evaluated at bid price : 18.04
Bid-YTW : 6.32 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 61,928 National bought 49,500 from Nesbitt at 25.51.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 25.51
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 4.47 %
GWO.PR.X OpRet 52,782 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.20, then another 22,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-10-30
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.26
Bid-YTW : 1.79 %
TD.PR.G FixedReset 47,616 Nesbitt bought 10,000 from National at 27.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.60
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 43,950 Scotia crossed 40,000 at 18.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 18.23
Evaluated at bid price : 18.23
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
RY.PR.W Perpetual-Discount 43,231 RBC crossed 21,900 at 20.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 20.22
Evaluated at bid price : 20.22
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 41,993 Scotia crossed 37,100 at 23.29.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-07-14
Maturity Price : 23.07
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 6.38 %
There were 44 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

James Hymas on BNN today, 3:45pm

Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

Really, I don’t have much to say beyond the headline … but tune in and tell me what you think!

BIS Tweaks Capital Rules

Tuesday, July 14th, 2009

The Bank for International Settlements has tweaked its capital rules, announcing:

At its 8-9 July meeting, the newly expanded Basel Committee on Banking Supervision approved a final package of measures to strengthen the 1996 rules governing trading book capital and to enhance the three pillars of the Basel II framework.

Most of the modifications have to do with securitizations. The document Enhancements to the Basel II framework gives the details; the most interesting – to me! – extracts are:

During the recent market turmoil, several banks that provided LFs to ABCP programmes chose to purchase commercial paper issued by the ABCP conduit instead of having the conduit draw on its LF. The LF provider then risk weighted the ABCP based on the paper’s external rating. As a result, the LF provider benefited from the external rating on the commercial paper when assigning a risk weight to that paper, even though the rating was due in large part to the bank’s own support of the conduit in the form of the LF.

That particular loophole has been plugged!

In a nod to the political needs of the Canadian government, GMD facilities (which became one of the scapegoats for the non-bank ABCP fiasco) have been eliminated:

More specifically, paragraph 580 states that banks may apply a 0% CCF to eligible liquidity facilities that are only available in the event of a general market disruption (ie where more than one SPE across different transactions are unable to roll over maturing commercial paper, and that inability is not the result of an impairment in the SPEs’ credit quality or in the credit quality of the underlying exposures). Paragraph 638 states that an eligible liquidity facility that can only be drawn in the event of a general market disruption is assigned a 20% CCF under the SF. That is, an IRB bank is to recognise 20% of the capital charge generated under the SF for the facility.

The framework has been changed to eliminate paragraphs 580 and 638, in the SA and IRB Approach, respectively. This eliminates any favourable treatment accorded to market disruption liquidity facilities under Basel II.

I asked OSFI if they had any examples of a GMD line causing problems for a bank when the the GMD line was independent of reputational concern. With their customary aplomb, OSFI has declined to answer the question.

The section on Supervision discusses reputational risk:

Reputational risk can be defined as the risk arising from negative perception on the part of customers, counterparties, shareholders, investors, debt-holders, market analysts, other relevant parties or regulators that can adversely affect a bank’s ability to maintain existing, or establish new, business relationships and continued access to sources of funding (eg through the interbank or securitisation markets).

A bank should incorporate the exposures that could give rise to reputational risk into its assessments of whether the requirements under the securitisation framework have been met and the potential adverse impact of providing implicit support.

Reputational risk also arises when a bank sponsors activities such as money market mutual funds, in-house hedge funds and real estate investment trusts (REITs). In these cases, a bank may decide to support the value of shares/units held by investors even though is not contractually required to provide the support.

For instance, to avoid damaging its reputation, a bank may call its liabilities even though this might negatively affect its liquidity profile. This is particularly true for liabilities that are components of regulatory capital, such as hybrid/subordinated debt.

By providing implicit support, a bank signals to the market that all of the risks inherent in the securitised assets are still held by the organisation and, in effect, had not been transferred. Since the risk arising from the potential provision of implicit support is not captured ex ante under Pillar 1, it must be considered as part of the Pillar 2 process.

There are also changes to calculation of market risk for the trading book:

In October 2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) released guidelines for computing capital for incremental default risk for public comments. At its meeting in March 2008, it reviewed comments received and decided to expand the scope of the capital charge. The decision was taken in light of the recent credit market turmoil where a number of major banking organisations have experienced large losses, most of which were sustained in banks’ trading books. Most of those losses were not captured in the 99%/10-day VaR. Since the losses have not arisen from actual defaults but rather from credit migrations combined with widening of credit spreads and the loss of liquidity, applying an incremental risk charge covering default risk only would not appear adequate. For example, a number of global financial institutions commented that singling out just default risk was inconsistent with their internal practices and could be potentially burdensome.

The incremental risk charge (IRC) is intended to complement additional standards being applied to the value-at-risk modelling framework.

This is a major issue for insurers. Assiduous Readers may recall that one of the issues regarding capital adequacy of insurers is their practice of estimating bond risk without consideration of price; if the rating – or their internal analysis – indicated a 0.1% chance of default, say, that’s what was used for risk purposes, regardless of whether the bond was trading at governments +10bp or governments +500bp. To some extent this is rational; to some extent it ain’t. The question of how forcefully this idea is applied to the investment book of insurers will be a fascinating subject over the next few years.

These BIS tweaks further extend into the calculation of market risks.

FixedReset Video Seminar Accredited for CE Hours

Monday, July 13th, 2009

I am pleased to announce that the Seminar on FixedReset issues has been accredited for four hours of IDA Continuing Education – Professional Development.

Access to the material may be purchased by clicking the icon below: