Archive for July, 2011

July 15, 2011

Friday, July 15th, 2011

Eight European banks failed their stress test:

Eight banks failed the European Union stress tests after regulators said they had a combined capital shortfall of 2.5 billion euros ($3.5 billion).

The banks were found to have insufficient reserves to maintain a core tier 1 capital ratio of 5 percent in the event of an economic slowdown, the European Banking Authority said.

The assessments are the first by the European Banking Authority since it was set up earlier this year. Last year’s tests by its predecessor were criticized for not being tough enough because banks were shown to need only 3.5 billion euros more capital, a 10th of the lowest analyst estimate. Banks that fail the stress test must present a plan to raise more capital within three months.

Rating company Standard & Poor’s own stress test, published in March, found European banks would need as much as 250 billion euros in fresh capital if faced with a “sharp” increase in yields and a “severe” economic downturn. In contrast, a survey of 113 investors by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) last month showed they expect banks to raise 29 billion euros after the tests.

It is not clear just how stressful the tests were – the last batch involved a rise in government yields, but no defaults – which was a rosy projection even at the time.

This test included what are referred to as write-downs on EU government bonds:

European Union regulators’ stress tests on the region’s banks include a 25 percent writedown on Greek government bonds. The market has already driven down the price of 10-year Greek debt to 52 cents on the euro.

Regulators didn’t include the possibility of a sovereign default in the tests even though credit-default swaps indicate about an 87 percent chance that Greece won’t be able to repay its debts. The tests included a 22.3 percent writedown on Portuguese 10-year securities, while they currently trade at 54 cents per euro.

“Current market expectations regarding sovereign risk are not incorporated in the tests,” Hank Calenti, a bank strategist at Societe Generale (GLE) SA in London, wrote in a note to clients today.

… but it is not clear to me whether these were actually write-downs, or merely market value adjustments (which affect the trading book but not the banking book). Last time ’round, the test included only a temporary decline in the market value of government debt, not a permanent impairment.

There is more discussion from the Peterson Institute:

Second, and perhaps more importantly given the importance of “tail-end events” for bank stress tests, it remains unclear what the “sovereign risk shock” will entail in terms of assumed haircuts for sovereign bonds. Here it is clear that the stress test focus on “a shock on [government bond] interest rates” in its sovereign component is a clever way to avoid explicitly stating the politically explosive number for just how large a haircut on sovereign bonds banks should be expected in the EU “adverse scenario.” On the other hand, as anyone can calculate the “implied bond haircut” from the assumed increase in the interest rate, the avoidance of any explicit reference to a default is clearly a political exercise.

Several “press leaks” suggest that differentiated haircuts are being assumed in the EU stress tests, with some reports stating that Greek bonds will suffer a 17 percent haircut and Spanish bonds 3 percent. Other reports suggest that the implied Greek haircut could be 20 percent, 8 percent for Spanish bonds and 5 percent for Portugal.

C-EBS states merely:

The exercise also envisages adverse conditions in financial markets and a shock on interest rates to capture an increase in risk premia linked to a deterioration in the EU government bond markets.

… which is not the same thing as a default. This is more than just a little disingenuous. There is more than one dimension of risk in bonds, and recent prices are clearly a reflection of credit, not interest-rates.

So the Europeans will do what they do best:

Eurozone leaders will meet in Brussels on July 21 to discuss a second bailout package for Greece and the financial stability of the euro area, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy said on Friday.

The summit, which will start at 1000 GMT, could prove a critical moment in determining what role private sector creditors play in further aid to Greece, and how EU leaders will stem the threat of debt contagion to Italy and Spain.

“Our agenda will be the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and the future financing of the Greek program,” Van Rompuy said in a statement posted on Twitter.

“I have asked the preparatory work to be brought forward inter alia by the finance ministries,” he said, indicating that senior finance officials would meet ahead of time, probably on Wednesday July 21, to agree the agenda.

There’s an ownership change for Betapro:

Jovian Capital Corp. announced Friday it will sell its stake in exchange traded funds business BetaPro Management Inc. to a South Korean firm, confirming plans hinted at last week.

Seoul-based Mirae Asset Global Investments Co. will acquire Jovian’s approximately 58% interest in the ETF business, among other things, based on an enterprise value of about $150-million. Jovian’s portion of the purchase price is expected to be about $90-million.

The Mirae deal includes: Jovian’s interest in BetaPro; AlphaPro Management Inc. (a subsidiary of BetaPro); BetaPro’s 40% interest in BetaShares Holdings Pty. Ltd. (the parent company of an Australian ETF company); Jovian’s wholly owned subsidiary Horizons Exchange Traded Funds Inc.; and Jovian’s wholly owned subsidiary JovInvestment Management Inc.

Jovian’s interest in ETF manager Hahn Investment Stewards & Co. Inc. is not part of the deal.

The amazing thing about this business is that you only have to make one good, well-publicized market forecast to be set up for life (if they’re not well publicized, you just talk about it all the time; then it will be well-publicized to your clients). The latest example is Meredith Whitney:

Time is running out on the credibility of Meredith Whitney, who has yet to acknowledge that her eight-month-old prediction of widespread defaults this year in the market for state and local government debt is proving unfounded.

Defaults fell 60 percent in the first half of 2011 compared with the same period last year, including a $12.5 million Austin, Texas, apartment project that made a late payment in June, according to Distressed Debt Securities Newsletter.

Whitney, the analyst who rose to prominence by predicting Citigroup Inc.’s 2008 dividend cut, predicted “hundreds of billions of dollars” of municipal defaults within 12 months in a Dec. 19 “60 Minutes” broadcast, fueling a wave of selling in the $2.9 trillion market. Instead, the number has fallen as cities slashed spending to balance budgets and state lawmakers stepped in to guard against insolvency and local bankruptcies.

Whitney, 41, who started New York-based Meredith Whitney Advisory Group LLC in 2009 after leaving Oppenheimer & Co., predicted 50 to 100 “sizable” municipal defaults as states slashed spending, in the interview with CBS Corp.’s “60 Minutes.” As for timing, she said it would be “something to worry about within the next 12 months.”

“There’s absolutely nothing about our thesis that has changed,” she said on July 12 in an interview with Tom Keene on Bloomberg Radio’s “Bloomberg Surveillance” show in New York. “There are not enough revenues to go around and service all of the debt obligations or debt commitments outstanding.”

Whitney also sought to amend her prediction in the radio interview, saying that she said in December “you’d start to see defaults within 12 months.” She didn’t respond to telephone calls and e-mails seeking additional comment.

DBRS confirmed RBC:

The Bank’s ratings are underpinned by its highly diversified business model. This is reflected in its resilient performance, generating average annual ROE of 17.6% since 1994 and a minimum annual ROE over this same period of 11.9% (2009). RBC’s diversified model consists of a superior domestic franchise, growing international businesses (wealth management and capital markets) plus solid credit and financial risk profiles.

The Bank’s operations are divided into six segments: Canadian Banking, Wealth Management, Insurance, International Banking, Capital Markets and Corporate Support, which represented 51%, 13%, 6%, minus 2%, 32% and minus 1% of pre-tax earnings in H1 2011, respectively.

CIBC has bought a 41% interest in American Century Investments:

CIBC (TSX: CM) (NYSE: CM) announced today that it will acquire a 41% equity interest in American Century Investments, a major U.S. asset management company with US$112 billion under management and a track record of solid earnings and strong investment performance. Total consideration is US$848 million. The 100% cash transaction will be immediately accretive and CIBC’s share of American Century earnings is expected to contribute approximately 15 cents per share of earnings in 2012 on a cash basis.

CIBC is purchasing the minority interest held by JP Morgan Chase & Co. pursuant to a shareholder agreement using a pre-determined valuation methodology conducted by an independent third party.

According to the investor presentation, American Century is:

  • Ranked 3rd among its peer group by Morningstar with 65% of assets holding four- or five-star ratings
  • 84% of rated funds in first or second quartile rankings by Lipper
  • Named “Best Large Mutual Fund Company” by Lipper in 2009

The emphasis on “assets” in the first point is interesting, since the similar statistic for CIBC Asset Management is presented by number of funds. Figures don’t lie, but liars can figure! I note that five out of nine 5-star funds are from the “LIvestrong” class, which are target date funds and another is the Zero-Coupon 2015 Fund.

According to Bloomberg:

Kansas City-based American Century, founded in 1958, has $112 billion in assets under management and was named the “Best Large Mutual Fund Company” at the 2009 Lipper Fund Awards. American Century’s majority shareholder is the Stowers Institute for Medical Research.

American Century is known for its focus on growth stocks, or shares in companies whose profit is expected to grow faster than the broader market, fund industry consultant Geoff Bobroff said in a telephone interview.

The growth-oriented American Century Ultra Fund (TWCUX) was once considered the company’s flagship product, Bobroff said. Its assets have fallen from $23.8 billion in 2004 to $6.5 billion as of June 30. Ultra has returned 5.3 percent annually in the past five years, beating 64 percent of competing funds, Bloomberg data show.

“One has to puzzle over why CIBC would want a minority stake, unless it saw the opportunity to either buy more or use American Century as a platform for the entry of its own products into the U.S.,” Bobroff said.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 8bp, FixedResets losing 14bp and DeemedRetractibles winning 23bp. Volatility was fair, volume was average-to-sub-par.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6277 % 2,418.5
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6277 % 3,637.4
Floater 2.50 % 2.35 % 41,977 21.33 4 -0.6277 % 2,611.3
OpRet 4.87 % 2.87 % 63,744 1.79 9 -0.2182 % 2,443.7
SplitShare 5.24 % 1.37 % 54,110 0.61 6 0.1112 % 2,510.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2182 % 2,234.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.68 % 4.63 % 131,188 0.77 13 0.1037 % 2,092.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.49 % 112,078 14.65 17 0.0820 % 2,201.2
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.17 % 205,956 2.67 58 -0.1421 % 2,319.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.08 % 4.79 % 254,850 8.03 47 0.2295 % 2,160.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -6.20 % A nonsensical quote, although it is not clear whether the culprit is the market-maker or the TMX (for its habit of providing “Last” quotes rather than “Closing” quotes). The issue traded a big 200 shares in a range of 24.00-52
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %
TRI.PR.B Floater -3.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 22.97
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %
FTS.PR.C OpRet -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.03
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.B FixedReset 183,002 RBC crossed blocks of 14,900 and 157,200, both at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.39
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 126,004 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 25.54; Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.52.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-08-14
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.53
Bid-YTW : 0.72 %
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 89,340 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-08-14
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.73
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 84,485 RBC crossed blocks of 49,100 and 20,000, both at 25.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 68,462 RBC crossed 49,100 at 25.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.07
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 68,408 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 24.77.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 4.61 %
There were 29 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IAG.PR.C FixedReset Traded 200 shares in a range of 26.86-87. Ha-ha-ha!
Quote: 26.78 – 33.78
Spot Rate : 7.0000
Average : 3.8283

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.78
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

BNS.PR.Z FixedReset Quote: 23.00 – 24.70
Spot Rate : 1.7000
Average : 0.9783

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.53 %

FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.32 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.4519

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 23.37
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 22.97 – 23.70
Spot Rate : 0.7300
Average : 0.5262

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-15
Maturity Price : 22.68
Evaluated at bid price : 22.97
Bid-YTW : 2.26 %

FTS.PR.C OpRet Quote: 25.62 – 26.10
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.2975

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-08-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 4.57 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 25.21 – 25.64
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.3092

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

July 14, 2011

Thursday, July 14th, 2011

Fitch had better prepare for a crowd of sans culottes shouting ‘a la lanterne’:

Greece’s credit rating was cut three levels to Fitch Ratings’ lowest grade for any country in the world as the company followed rivals and said that a default is a “real possibility.”

The move to CCC from B+ “reflects the absence of a new, fully funded and credible” program by the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, the ratings company said yesterday in a statement in London. It also reflects “heightened uncertainty surrounding the role of private creditors in any future funding, as well as Greece’s weakening macroeconomic outlook.”

BIS continues its drive to make finance a cooperative game with its release of a Report on asset securitisation incentives:

The Report recognises regulators can play a role in establishing a framework for securitisation that ensures that it is conducted in a prudent manner, continues to be an alternative funding source for institutions, and contributes to the availability of credit to support the real economy. They can do this by building a regulatory and supervisory framework which addresses the misaligned incentives and conflicts of interest and which supports enhanced disclosure and transparency for investors. The Report encourages policy makers, regulators and supervisors to strive for internationally and cross-sectorally consistent supervisory frameworks, and to develop and implement regulations in a timely manner. The Report further sets out three recommendations (some of which build on earlier work of Parent Committees). These recommendations specify that:

  • Authorities should employ a broad suite of tools to address misaligned incentives, which may include measures to improve loan origination standards, and to align compensation arrangements with long-term performance and asset quality.
  • Authorities should encourage markets to improve transparency to ensure that investors, other market participants, and supervisors have access to relevant and reliable information.
  • Authorities should encourage greater document standardisation and less product complexity, which should assist in reducing information asymmetries and stimulating liquidity in secondary securitisation markets.

OSFI is requiring quarterly disclosures of new information:

Enhancements to the Basel II Framework strengthen disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 in several key areas, including: securitisation exposures in the trading book; sponsorship of off-balance sheet vehicles; resecuritisation exposures; and, pipeline and warehousing risks with regard to securitisation exposures. Revisions to the Basel II Market Risk Framework incorporate additional disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 including disclosures on the incremental risk capital charge, the comprehensive risk capital charge and the stressed value-at-risk (VaR) requirement

Further, while the Basel II text5 indicates that qualitative disclosures that provide a general summary of a bank’s risk management objectives and policies, reporting systems and definitions may be published on an annual basis, it is OSFI’s view that the qualitative disclosures enable investors and other users of financial statements to have a better understanding of the quantitative disclosures that are required in quarterly reports. As such, OSFI expects that the first quarter of fiscal 2012 disclosures should include full qualitative disclosures in Pillar 3 enhancements and revisions to complement the required quantitative disclosures.

These enhancements are described in the BCBS document Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework. It is noteworthy that the BCBS has entirely missed the whole point of the credit crisis: the aging of trading inventory. If a bank has a significant position in its trading book that it hasn’t turned over in three months, I want to know that. And if they’ve got stuff in their trading book that they haven’t turned over in a year … well then, that’s not really trading inventory, is it? That’s banking, not trading.

Tim Kiladze of the Globe noted that, in contrast to the European ETFs discussed on July 11, Canadian ETFs are less risky, and less profitable:

Because most Canadian ETFs are more vanilla, the fees earned are lower. Generally, for low cost products, ETF providers here will earn 5 to 7 basis points, while higher cost products bring in 20 to 30 basis points. Leveraged ETFs can earn more because they typically charge higher management fees that typically range from 1 to 1.25 per cent.

Those numbers differ drastically from Deutsche Bank’s report, which estimated profits around 60 basis points for traditional ETFs. Mr. Seif said that the big difference between North America and Europe is that the securities held in ETFs here don’t earn much money by the way of securities lending. The Deutsche Bank report’s authors estimated 26 basis points on securities lending.

Why such a big difference? In Europe, investment banks are the big providers of ETFs, with everyone from UBS to Deutsche Bank to Credit Suisse selling their own suite of products. Here in North America, the big ETF providers are largely independent fund management firms such as Claymore, Horizons BetaPro, Vanguard and State Street.

The NYSE / Deutsche Bourse deal is basically done, with a minimum of cry-babyism. Speaking of crybabies, the milkfare bums are whining about competition.

DBRS confirmed BNS:

Other acquisitions, albeit more modest, include an advisor to ultra-high net worth clients and their families and a few global wealth management divisions. BNS has also been expanding its insurance offering by introducing new products and building additional retail insurance centres. DBRS expects Scotiabank will continue to expand its wealth management businesses in order to maintain proportional growth among its other segments such that the risk profile of the Bank does not materially change in the medium term. Global Wealth Management accounted for 15% of pre-tax earnings (excluding the gain related to the write-up of the original investment in DundeeWealth Inc. and the Other segment) in H1 2011.

Scotiabank has a significant cost advantage relative to its Canadian banking peers. Although this differential has been narrowing over the last few years, it nevertheless is a key success factor and a contributor to earnings growth. Since 2000, except for one year, Scotiabank has had the lowest expense ratio of the largest five Canadian banks.

It was a quiet day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 1bp, FixedResets down 1bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 10bp. Volatility was low. Volume was slow.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3070 % 2,433.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.3070 % 3,660.4
Floater 2.49 % 2.37 % 42,504 21.26 4 -0.3070 % 2,627.8
OpRet 4.86 % 2.34 % 64,596 0.21 9 0.1757 % 2,449.0
SplitShare 5.24 % 1.95 % 53,328 0.62 6 0.0043 % 2,508.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1757 % 2,239.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 4.80 % 131,671 0.78 13 0.0076 % 2,090.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.54 % 113,593 14.61 17 0.0149 % 2,199.4
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.13 % 207,124 2.67 58 -0.0072 % 2,323.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.09 % 4.88 % 257,589 8.08 47 0.0993 % 2,155.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -2.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-14
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -2.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-14
Maturity Price : 21.78
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %
IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 460,000 RBC crossed 389,100 at 26.10, then bought 10,000 from anonymous at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.17
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 132,570 RBC crossed 45,000, then sold 10,000 to anonymous at the same price. RBC then repeated the two tickets at 27.20; then sold 11,700 to Nesbitt at 27.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.01 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 84,530 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 26.08.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.03
Bid-YTW : 3.13 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 83,070 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %
TD.PR.K FixedReset 79,750 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 27.31.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.33
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 25,300 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 26.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.41 – 21.97
Spot Rate : 0.5600
Average : 0.3395

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-14
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.02 – 23.00
Spot Rate : 0.9800
Average : 0.7894

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-14
Maturity Price : 21.78
Evaluated at bid price : 22.02
Bid-YTW : 2.37 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.76 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3507

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.30 – 22.65
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2261

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.88 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3061

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.88
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

TD.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 27.33 – 27.59
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1533

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.33
Bid-YTW : 2.95 %

July 13, 2011

Wednesday, July 13th, 2011

This is cool: Capital Structure Arbitrage-Implied Index Trading:

In this paper, we develop long-short trading strategies derived from the work of Merton [1974], which provides theoretical relationships between equity, equity volatility, and credit. We then apply the strategies to index products structured primarily based on U.S. investment grade assets.

We find that an optimized Merton-based strategy results in significant trading profits when applied over the span of time for which data is available. Furthermore, we find that trading profits can be enhanced by incorporating information derived from short-term volatility. Given the unlimited number of index combinations spanning different asset classes, geographies and tranche levels, we recommend that further work be allocated to the promising area of capital-structure arbitrage implied index trading.


Click for Big

Figure 2 shows a graphical summary of the relationship among the CDX Investment Grade index, S&P 500, and the VIX. There are a few general qualitative observations from this graph. First of all, high levels of CDX IG are typically accompanied by high levels of volatility. This suggests that volatility may be a reasonable predictor for the credit spread. Another important observation is that the slope of CDX.IG as a function of SPX changes over time and over different market conditions. The time-varying relationship is expected, since credit spread is fundamentally a stationary process, while the equity index is obviously non-stationary. This time-varying relationship makes it difficult to directly use the slope as the hedge ratio in the credit-index index arbitrage.

Overview of Merton Model

In a seminal paper, Merton [1974] proposed a structural model that provides a theoretical relationship between a firm’s equity value and its credit risk. The key concept behind the Merton model is that default occurs when the firm’s asset value falls below its debt value. Hence, investment in a firm’s equity can be viewed as purchasing a call option on the firm’s assets, with the value of the debt as the strike price. The Merton model makes the same assumptions as in the Black-Scholes options pricing framework, such as the log-normal distribution of asset value.

Italian regulators are ratcheting up pressure on short-sellers:

Italy’s market regulator has recommended to stakeholders who have lent shares in Italian companies to retrieve them, Consob head said on Wednesday, confirming reports of a move aimed at curbing short-selling. “Yes, we’ve exercised moral suasion by asking all those who have lent shares to retrieve them,” Consob Chairman Giuseppe Vegas told journalists on the sideline of a conference.

He added the request was not binding.

More opinions on the Yellow / Trader / Apax deal:

Moody’s has trouble wrapping its head around the [Trader] company’s strength as it moves into the digital environment.

“While this is a plausible proposition that has been successfully executed in the U.K. and elsewhere using the Trader brand, there is some uncertainty that the same formula can be applied in Trader’s circumstances in Canada,” the rating agency noted.

“Trader will have to grow its per digital customer yield and increase market penetration, neither of which is a given.”

Moody’s ultimately slapped a B3 rating on the name.

Speaking of Moody’s they put the US on Review Negative:

Moody’s Investors Service put the U.S. under review for a credit rating downgrade as talks to raise the government’s $14.3 trillion debt limit stall, adding to concern that political gridlock will lead to a default.

The Aaa ratings of financial institutions directly linked to the U.S. government, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the Federal Farm Credit Banks, were also put on review for cuts, Moody’s said in a statement today.

The U.S., rated Aaa since 1917, was put on review for the first time since 1995 on concern the debt limit will not be raised in time to prevent a missed payment of interest or principal on outstanding bonds and notes even though the risk remains low, Moody’s said. The rating would likely be reduced to the Aa range and there is no assurance that Moody’s would return its top rating even if a default is quickly cured.

DBRS has released its Split Share Funds Quarterly Report – Q2 2011:

Q2 2011 was the first quarter since Q2 2010 that the average downside protection for split shares rated by DBRS decreased. Notwithstanding the declines over the past three months, the average downside protection of DBRS-rated preferred shares was about 51% at the end of Q2 2011, a signifi cant increase over the 45% and 40% averages at the end of Q2 2010 and Q2 2009, respectively. As a result of the additional buffer of downside protection built up over time, it is expected that the negative performance during Q2 2011 will generally not result in negative rating actions for preferred shares or securities rated by DBRS.

It was a mixed day in the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 25bp, FixedResets up 16bp and DeemedRetractibles down 8bp. Not much volatility. Volume was average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.45%, equivalent to 7.08% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 5.2% (!) so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 190bp, a significant widening from the 175bp reported on July 6, as preferreds did not participate in the extraordinary 15bp week’s decline in long corporate yields.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1650 % 2,441.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1650 % 3,671.7
Floater 2.48 % 2.32 % 42,413 21.41 4 -0.1650 % 2,635.9
OpRet 4.86 % 2.06 % 63,754 0.22 9 -0.0171 % 2,444.7
SplitShare 5.24 % 2.02 % 55,511 0.62 6 -0.0287 % 2,508.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0171 % 2,235.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.15 % 133,485 0.78 13 0.0748 % 2,090.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.44 % 5.45 % 110,902 14.72 17 0.2466 % 2,199.1
FixedReset 5.14 % 3.15 % 212,031 2.67 58 0.1606 % 2,323.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.10 % 4.87 % 261,071 8.09 47 -0.0828 % 2,153.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-13
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.I FixedReset 207,525 Nesbitt crossed five blocks: 50,000 shares, 54,000 shares, 40,000 shares, 20,000 shares and 30,000 shares; all at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.21
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 140,800 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 116,473 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.58; Desjardins crossed blocks of 40,00 and 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 51,900 TD crossed 40,000 at 27.25; Desjardins crossed 10,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : 3.05 %
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 45,290 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.43
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 41,630 RBC crossed 29,200 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.11
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.L Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.86 – 25.15
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1944

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %

GWO.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 26.90 – 27.25
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2557

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 2.89 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.68 – 22.97
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2149

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.68
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.16 – 24.44
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2053

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.16
Bid-YTW : 5.60 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.24 – 25.43
Spot Rate : 0.1900
Average : 0.1260

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %

RY.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 27.46 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1819

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.22 %

Fixed Income Strategies of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds

Wednesday, July 13th, 2011

The Committee on the Global Financial System, a unit of the Bank for International Settlements, has released a Working Group Report titled Fixed income strategies of insurance companies and pension funds:

Insurance companies will be affected to a greater extent by the introduction of Solvency II, a comprehensive risk-based regulatory framework to be phased in from 2013. Solvency II and other risk-based regulatory regimes in Europe require that assets should be marked to market and that liabilities be discounted at risk-free rates (possibly augmented by an illiquidity premium). Solvency II also requires insurers to hold loss-absorbing capital against the full range of risks on both their asset and liability side to weather unexpected losses with a probability of 99.5% over a one-year horizon. While the latest quantitative impact study by European insurance regulators suggests that the majority of insurance companies will not face an imminent need to raise new equity, they may rebalance their asset portfolios in line with the new risk charges. The proposed changes tend to make it more expensive to hold equity-like instruments, structured products, and long-term or low-rated corporate bonds, whereas government bonds and covered bonds will receive relatively favourable capital treatment.

A related concern is whether life insurers and pension funds can maintain a long-term investor perspective. Factors contributing to this concern among market participants include the steep regulatory risk charges and short horizons to be used for assessing solvency and for addressing funding shortfalls. Prospective volatility in financial statements under international accounting rules may also limit the scope for taking long-term or illiquid positions without any concern for short-term fluctuations in their value. As is the case for institutional investors more generally, these factors tend to encourage a shift away from long term investing in risky assets, in addition to the ongoing trend toward more conservative asset allocations in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This could alter the traditional role of life insurance companies and pension funds as global providers of long-term risk capital. A partial retreat of institutional investors from the long-term and/or illiquid segment of the credit market could reduce the private and social benefits the sector generates through long-term investing, and the extent to which it mitigates the procyclicality of the financial system.

In Solvency II, both assets and liabilities are marked to market, ie fair valued. The present value of liabilities, or technical provision, is defined as the amount an insurer would have to pay to transfer its insurance obligations immediately to another willing buyer. It consists of the best estimate, the present value of the expected future cash flows (net payments to policyholders), calculated on a specified discount rate curve (term structure), and the risk margin, which is an additional premium above the best estimate. How the discount rate is constructed is of considerable importance given that the risk margin, and the present value of liabilities, will increase when this rate decreases.

The current expectation of how this rate will be constructed, is the swap curve (excluding credit risk), augmented by an illiquidity premium for those obligations coming due more than a year ahead. (This was also the discount rate used in Quantitative Impact Study 5.) In addition, an extrapolation (technique) towards a fixed rate (ultimate forward rate) will be used to get the discount rates for longer maturities than those available from market rates in different countries.

The motivation for adding an illiquidity premium, according to the proponents, is that there is general acceptance that the valuation of corporate bonds should take into account risk spreads in the discounting of future cash flows.35 Bond spreads during the crisis far exceeded the cost of credit risk mitigation (CDS spreads), and therefore included a substantial component pricing in illiquidity. The important role the illiquidity premium played in the valuation of assets, while liability cash flows continued to be discounted at the risk free rate, was largely responsible for a substantial shortfall in insurers’ balance sheets. The application of the illiquidity premium on the liability side would aim to reduce this valuation mismatch to avoid situations where insurers are forced to dispose of illiquid assets. The financial condition of insurers would be improved by allowing them to discount liabilities at a higher rate when markets are illiquid. Such a countercyclical mechanism might even mean that insurers would be willing to take on additional illiquid assets in a period of market distress, depending on whether the change in their net asset-liability position would improve their capital position.

Government bonds. Since European government bonds in domestic currency are classified as risk-free under Solvency II, there is a clear regulatory incentive to increase exposure to this asset class, including to euro area periphery debt. However, major insurance companies also rely on internal risk models that account for spread and default risk on sovereign debt. As in the case of banks, this would tend to moderate the incentive to shift toward high-yield sovereign debt even if the overall demand for sovereign debt is likely to rise. On balance, however, one may expect greater demand for long-dated sovereign debt which, all else equal, will further contribute to low long-term interest rates. In addition, insurers’ efforts to reduce their duration gaps tend to reinforce the demand for long-dated government debt from an ALM perspective.

Any sizeable shifts in the government bond space may lead to noticeable financial market implications, given the volume of government bonds on the balance sheets of insurers (as well as on those of pension funds, see Section 2.4). Depending on initial conditions and current bond holdings, further shifts into government bonds may well produce downward pressure on yields, although differentiation across issuer countries is likely to occur.

Corporate and covered bonds. The impact of Solvency II on the corporate bond market is also potentially significant. Historically, insurance companies constitute a key investor base, holding more than 30% of the corporate bond supply.48 Solvency II will impose capital charges on corporate and covered bonds that did not exist under Solvency I, although internal models at large insurers had taken into account credit risk before Solvency II was developed.

Under the standard formula, Solvency II capital charges have relatively steep duration and credit slopes which can be expected to lead to some portfolio adjustments. The capital requirements for corporate and covered bonds are calculated by multiplying a rating-induced shock factor with the duration of the bonds. A BBB-rated bond with a duration of 10 therefore requires 25% (=2.5%*10) in equity capital before diversification benefits. This formula appears to penalise long-term bonds since credit spreads at the long end are less volatile than those at the short end. The credit slope is similarly steep.49 Corporate bonds with a low rating effectively attract a capital charge similar to that of equities.

Under the instrument-specific capital requirements in Solvency II, the following
investment allocations generate the same capital requirement under the standard formula:

  • 100% in covered bonds (AAA-rated) with a duration of one year,
  • 20% in covered bonds (AAA-rated) with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 13.3% in corporate bonds, AAA-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 8.6% in corporate bonds, A-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.6% in corporate bonds, B-rated, with a duration of five years, and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.5% in “global equities” and the rest in EEA government bonds,
  • 1.2% in “other equities” and the rest in EEA government bonds.

What it looks like to me is that the net effect will be to shift funding risk from the financial economy to the real economy. Once this is in place look for the next financial crisis to be propogated much more thoroughly to the real economy, with lots of firms finding they have debt coming due that cannot be rolled.

July 12, 2012

Tuesday, July 12th, 2011

Trader Corporation is issuing USD junk bonds:

One deal has launched in the high-yield market this morning as issuance remains slow. Trader Corporation, a Canadian online automotive marketplace, announced a US$275m seven-year non-call three senior secured offering via RBC sole books. The roadshow begins tomorrow with pricing expected late next week. Proceeds will fund the acquisition of Trader Corp by Apax Partners.

So what’s the better bet for junk? Yellow Media, Trader Corp, or Ireland?:

A late-day rally in U.S. stocks faded after Ireland’s debt rating was cut to junk at Moody’s Investors Service, overshadowing signs the Federal Reserve had not ruled out further stimulus efforts.

The Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost 0.1 percent to 1,318.06 at 3:33 p.m. in New York after climbing as much as 0.6 percent. The benchmark gauge tumbled 2.5 percent in the previous two days, its worst back-to-back slump since March. Moody’s cut Ireland’s government bond rating one notch to Ba1 from Baa3, spurring concern Europe’s debt crisis is worsening.

DBRS confirmed CM:

CIBC’s current strategy should contribute to earnings stability and improved capital levels, thereby better positioning the Bank for future downturns. As capital is freed up from the reduction in the run-off book, DBRS would like to see resources deployed in less volatile businesses that are a natural extension of existing capabilities. The latest financial crisis provided CIBC with the opportunity to purchase CITI Cards Canada Inc.’s Canadian MasterCard portfolio which DBRS believes is consistent with CIBC’s desire to accelerate growth in its core banking business by strengthening its number one position in credit cards and being a dual credit card issuer in Canada.

DBRS assigned some Allied Irish notes as Default:

In respect of the Notes, the High Court has declared that the subordinated liabilities order (SLO) issued by the High Court on 14 April 2011 under the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010 is effective as of 22 April 2011. The SLO amends the terms of the subordinated debt, including interest due, so that it is payable only at the option of AIB; and the maturity date of the Notes has been extended to June 2035. Additionally, in accordance with the amendments, AIB announced that no payment of interest that would have been due to holders of the Notes on 25 June 2011 will be made by AIB.

The downgrade reflects the halting of interest payments on the Notes by AIB and DBRS’s expectation that the future interest payments of these outstanding subordinated instruments will be halted, as allowed by the High Court. Further, the downgrade considers the aforementioned extension of the final maturity date. Given that bondholders are unlikely to receive interest as agreed upon and that the expected maturity has been extended, DBRS views these actions as disadvantageous to bondholders, which is considered a default under DBRS policy.

Thre was similar action on Irish Life & Permanent:

DBRS Inc. (DBRS) today has downgraded the Dated Subordinated Debt rating of Irish Life & Permanent plc (IL&P or the Group) to “D” from “C”. Today’s downgrade follows the execution of the Group’s note tender offer.

The default status for the purchased and now-extinguished notes reflects DBRS’s view that bondholders were offered limited options and that a distressed exchange has now occurred, which is considered a default under DBRS policy, as discussed in DBRS’s press release dated 8 June 2011.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 12bp, FixedResets up 1bp and DeemedRetractibles down 8bp. Volatility was good. Volume remained very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.7512 % 2,445.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 1.7512 % 3,677.7
Floater 2.48 % 2.29 % 43,048 21.50 4 1.7512 % 2,640.3
OpRet 4.86 % 2.25 % 64,666 0.22 9 0.0514 % 2,445.2
SplitShare 5.24 % 2.01 % 55,517 0.62 6 -0.0055 % 2,508.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0514 % 2,235.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.06 % 134,358 0.78 13 0.0580 % 2,089.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.46 % 114,555 14.70 17 0.1222 % 2,193.6
FixedReset 5.15 % 3.19 % 208,976 2.67 58 0.0073 % 2,319.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.10 % 4.86 % 264,688 8.10 47 -0.0793 % 2,155.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 6.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 2.29 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 542,720 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 136,070 Nesbitt crossd 100,000 at 26.20; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 87,661 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 64,775 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.18
Bid-YTW : 3.11 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 58,435 TD bought three blocks from Nesbitt, of 10,300 shares, 19,900 and 15,500, all at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-08-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 2.99 %
RY.PR.N FixedReset 56,900 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
There were 23 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 25.46 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.5400
Average : 0.3362

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.00 – 25.45
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3360

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-12
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.43 %

RY.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 26.20 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2859

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.20
Bid-YTW : 3.35 %

HSB.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 27.40 – 27.69
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1913

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.40
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

IAG.PR.E Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.90 – 26.30
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.3032

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.48 %

RY.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 27.45 – 27.70
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1588

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.28 %

IFC.PR.A Above Par on Excellent Volume

Tuesday, July 12th, 2011

Intact Financial Corporation has announced:

that it has closed its bought deal offering (the “Offering”) of Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class A Shares Series 1 (the “Series 1 Preferred Shares”) underwritten by a syndicate of underwriters led by CIBC, RBC Capital Markets, Scotia Capital Inc. and TD Securities Inc., and including BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., National Bank Financial Inc., Canaccord Genuity Corp., GMP Securities L.P., Macquarie Capital Markets Canada Ltd., HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc. and Raymond James Ltd. (the “Underwriters”), resulting in gross proceeds (including the over-allotment option proceeds) to IFC of $250,000,000.

IFC entered into an underwriting agreement dated June 27, 2011 with the Underwriters under which the Underwriters agreed to purchase from IFC and sell to the public 9,000,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Preferred Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $225,000,000. The Underwriters have exercised their over-allotment option and purchased an additional 1,000,000 Series 1 Preferred Shares at a price of $25.00 per Series 1 Preferred Share for gross proceeds to IFC of $25,000,000.

The net proceeds from the Offering, together with borrowings under acquisition credit facilities previously arranged by IFC, the proceeds of a previously announced subscription receipt offering, the net proceeds from a previously announced private placement of medium term notes and a portion of IFC’s existing cash resources are intended to be used by IFC to fund the purchase price for its previously announced acquisition of all of the issued and outstanding shares of AXA Canada Inc. (the “Acquisition”). The closing of the Acquisition is expected to occur in the fall of 2011 and is subject to receipt of required competition and insurance regulatory approvals and the satisfaction of certain closing conditions. The Offering is not conditional upon closing of the Acquisition; if the Acquisition is not completed, the net proceeds of the Offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

The holders of Series 1 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, on a quarterly basis (with the first quarterly dividend to be paid on September 30, 2011), for the initial fixed rate period ending on December 31, 2017, based on an annual rate of 4.20%. The dividend rate will be reset on December 31, 2017 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the 5-year Government of Canada bond yield plus 1.72%.

Holders of the Series 1 Preferred Shares will have the right, at their option, to convert their Series 1 Preferred Shares into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Class A Shares Series 2 (the “Series 2 Preferred Shares”), subject to certain conditions, on December 31, 2017 and on December 31 every five years thereafter. The holders of Series 2 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of IFC, at a rate equal to the 90-day Canadian Treasury Bill rate plus 1.72%.

DBRS Limited has assigned a rating of Pfd-2(low) with a Stable trend for the Series 1 Preferred Shares.

The Series 1 Preferred Shares will commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange on July 12, 2011 under the symbol IFC.PR.A.

IFC.PR.A is a FixedReset, 4.20%+172 announced June 22. The issue traded 542,720 shares today in a range of 24.95-17 before closing at 25.08-15.

IFC.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedReset index. As Intact Financial is an insurance holding company and the issue does not have an NVCC clause, a DeemedMaturity entry has been added to the call schedule for this issue – see the January, February, March and June editions of PrefLetter for discusion.

Vital Statistics are:

IFC.PR.A FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %

July 11, 2011

Tuesday, July 12th, 2011

Is your country falling apart? Blame the short sellers!

Italy’s financial-market regulator moved to curb short selling after the country’s benchmark stock index fell the most in almost five months and bonds tumbled on investor concern Italy would be the next victim of the region’s debt crisis.

The regulator known as Consob ordered last night that short sellers must reveal their positions when they reach 0.2 percent or more of a company’s capital and then make additional filings for each additional 0.1 percent. The measure takes effect today and lasts until Sept. 9.

Another good technique is to bury the critics in paperwork:

Credit-ratings companies may be forced to disclose the internal analyses they use when they decide to cut a European Union government’s rating, the region’s financial services commissioner said.

Nations may win the right to check the data used by the companies in advance of downgrades of their sovereign ratings, Michel Barnier said in the text of a speech in Paris speech today. The measures may be included in legislation to rein in the ratings firms, he said.

But life is tough when you’re squaring the circle:

European finance chiefs clashed over how to dig Greece out of its financial hole just as markets battered the bonds of Spain and Italy, opening a new front in the debt crisis.

Finance ministers weighed how to get private bondholders to maintain their exposure to Greek debt in a way that doesn’t prompt credit-rating companies to declare a formal default.

Forcing bondholders to chip in would be “fatal,” Austrian Finance Minister Maria Fekter told reporters before a crisis meeting in Brussels today.

Late news is that maybe the taxpayers will foot the bill:

European finance ministers revived the prospect of bond buybacks to ease Greece’s plight and declined to rule out a temporary default, struggling to contain the debt crisis as investors pounded Italy, the continent’s third-largest economy.

Prodded by investors and the European Central Bank, the euro’s guardians said a bailout fund set up last year may be used to buy bonds in the secondary market or enable Greece to retire its debt at a discount. They offered another cut in rates on its emergency loans.

For all their recent problems, US brokerages have always been a far better and far more profitable place to work than those in Canada. Here’s why:

A headhunter put Muller in touch with Morgan Stanley, which was then looking for a quant strategist to drum up business. Muller had bigger aspirations and cut a deal with Derek Bandeen, a prop-trading executive. Muller had two years to get a profitable trading system running. If he failed, he would perform the strategist’s job. PDT was born.

The CSA has released a staff notice titled MARKETING PRACTICES OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS:

We identified a number of deficiencies in the preparation, review and use of marketing materials by the PMs we reviewed.
Generally, the deficiencies were grouped into one of the following areas:
1. Preparation and use of hypothetical performance data
2. Exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims
3. Policies, procedures and internal controls
4. Use of benchmarks
5. Performance composites
6. Holding out and use of names
7. Other performance return issues
8. Disclosure related issues

Interesting piece on ETFs:

Using Deutsche Bank’s numbers, and then comparing them to a recent McKinsey & Co. analysis of Europe’s fund management industry, the Financial Times found that ETF’s likely account for 13 per cent of the Europe’s €9-billion in fund profits. More importantly, the profit margins on ETFs are sky high — 55.5 basis points of assets under management for ETFs versus 12.5 basis points for traditional funds.

And within ETFs, there’s a difference in profit margins between synthetic ETFs and physically replicated ETFs. The first type posts profit margins of 69 per cent, while the latter has profit margins of 64 per cent.

Past studies have found that over 50 per cent of assets under management in European ETFs are now placed in synthetic ETFs.

Makes sense. All the MER on funds goes to the salesman.

It was a mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 13bp, FixedResets ahead 1bp and DeemedRetractibles losing 9bp. Volatility was good. Volume was extremely light.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4539 % 2,403.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.4539 % 3,614.4
Floater 2.52 % 2.47 % 43,153 21.09 4 -1.4539 % 2,594.9
OpRet 4.87 % 2.33 % 62,558 0.22 9 0.1116 % 2,443.9
SplitShare 5.24 % 1.35 % 55,283 0.63 6 -0.2567 % 2,508.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1116 % 2,234.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.69 % 5.21 % 135,384 0.86 13 0.0657 % 2,087.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.46 % 5.46 % 115,635 14.70 17 0.1274 % 2,191.0
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.16 % 211,446 2.68 57 0.0126 % 2,319.3
Deemed-Retractible 5.09 % 4.87 % 265,887 8.10 47 -0.0939 % 2,157.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -5.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.41
Evaluated at bid price : 25.47
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.05
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 5.09 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.H Deemed-Retractible 60,576 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.71
Bid-YTW : 3.32 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 53,400 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 26.20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 51,710 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.46
Bid-YTW : 3.21 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 30,760 Nesbitt crossed 12,000 at 24.94.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.81
Bid-YTW : 4.89 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Premium 29,090 RBC crossed 25,000 at 25.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.96
Bid-YTW : 5.37 %
GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible 25,228 Nesbitt crossed 25,000 at 25.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 21.41 – 23.20
Spot Rate : 1.7900
Average : 1.2050

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 2.47 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.55 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.6900
Average : 0.4677

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.55
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

GWO.PR.M Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.39 – 25.92
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.30 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.7000
Average : 0.5742

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.31 – 23.75
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3226

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-07-11
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 5.31 %

BAM.PR.O OpRet Quote: 25.85 – 26.29
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3227

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %

BCE.PR.I: Rate Change to 4.15%; Exchangeable to Ratchets

Monday, July 11th, 2011

BCE announced earlier:

Beginning on June 17, 2011 and ending on July 22, 2011, holders of Series AI Preferred Shares will have the right to choose one of the following options with regards to their shares:

1. To retain any or all of their Series AI Preferred Shares and continue to receive a fixed quarterly dividend; or
2. To convert, on a one-for-one basis, any or all of their Series AI Preferred Shares into BCE Inc. Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AJ (the “Series AJ Preferred Shares”) and receive a floating monthly dividend.

Effective August 1, 2011, the fixed dividend rate for the Series AI Preferred Shares will be set for a five-year period as explained in more detail in paragraph 5 of the attached Notice of Conversion Privilege. Should you wish to continue receiving a fixed quarterly dividend for the five-year period beginning August 1, 2011, you do not need to take any action with respect to this notice. However, should you wish to receive a floating monthly dividend, you must elect to convert your Series AI Preferred Shares into Series AJ Preferred Shares as explained in more detail in the attached Notice of Conversion Privilege.

Today BCE announced the chosen rate:

BCE Inc. will, on August 1, 2011, continue to have Cumulative Redeemable First Preferred Shares, Series AI outstanding if, following the end of the conversion period on July 22, 2011, BCE Inc. determines that at least two million Series AI Preferred Shares would remain outstanding. In such a case, as of August 1, 2011, the Series AI Preferred Shares will pay, on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of BCE Inc., a fixed cash dividend for the following five years that will be based on an annual fixed dividend rate equal to 4.15%.

If converted, the symbol for the Ratchet Rate issue will be BCE.PR.J, which does not currently exist.

July PrefLetter Released!

Monday, July 11th, 2011

The July, 2011, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The July edition contains a short appendix reviewing yield calculations; some of the assumptions inherent in the calculations; and notes about how those assumptions can become invalid.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the July, 2011, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the August, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close August 12 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on August 15.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

SBN.PR.A Annual Report 2010

Sunday, July 10th, 2011

S Split Corp. has released its Annual Report to December 31, 2010.

SBN / SBN.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Whole Unit +8.65% +3.20%
SBN.PR.A +5.38% +5.38%
SBN +11.71% +1.45%
BNS (underlying) +20.4% +8.99%

Figures of interest are:

MER: 2.26% of the whole unit value

Average Asset Value: $82-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: When fully invested will be equal to BNS common: 3.63%

Income Coverage: 0.5:1 – they have often kept a lot of cash on the books.