April 24, 2009

It appears that we will be treated to the spectacle of a regulatory cat-fight in the States. Andrew Cuomo has released a letter to Congress in which he discusses the BofA / Merrill Lynch merger:

Immediately after learning on December 14,2008 of what Lewis described as the “staggering amount of deterioration” at Merrill Lynch, Lewis conferred with counsel to determine if Bank of America had grounds to rescind the merger agreement by using a clause that allowed Bank of America to exit the deal if a material adverse event (“MAC”) occurred. After a series of internal consultations and consultations with counsel, on December 17,2008, Lewis informed then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that Bank of America was seriously considering invoking the MAC clause. Paulson asked Lewis to come to Washington that evening to discuss the matter.

At a meeting that evening Secretary Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Lewis, Bank of America’s CFO, and other officials discussed the issues surrounding invocation of the MAC clause by Bank of America. The Federal officials asked Bank of America not to invoke the MAC until there was further consultation. There were follow-up calls with various Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, including with Treasury Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke. During those meetings, the federal government officials pressured Bank of America not to seek to rescind the merger agreement. We do not yet have a complete picture of the Federal Reserve’s role in these matters because the Federal Reserve has invoked the bank examination privilege.

Bank of America’s attempt to exit the merger came to a halt on December 21, 2008. That day, Lewis informed Secretary Paulson that Bank of America still wanted to exit the merger agreement. According to Lewis, Secretary Paulson then advised Lewis that, if Bank of America invoked the MAC, its management and Board would be replaced.

In an interview with this Office, Secretary Paulson [argely corroborated Lewis’s account. On the issue of terminating management and the Board, Secretary Paulson indicated that he told Lewis that if Bank of America were to back out of the Merrill Lynch deal, the government either could or would remove the Board and management. Secretary Paulson told Lewis a series of concerns, including that Bank of America’s invocation of the MAC would create systemic risk and that Bank of America did not have a legal basis to invoke the MAC (though Secretary Paulson’s basis for the opinion was e,ntirely based on what he was told by Federal Reserve officials).

Notably, during Bank of America’s important communications with federal banking officials in late December 2008, the lone federal agency charged with protecting investor interests, the Securities and Exchange Commission, appears to have been kept in the dark. Indeed, Secretary Paulson informed this Office that he did not keep the SEC Chairman in the loop during the discussions and negotiations with Bank of America in December 2008.

The proper thing for Lewis and the board to do, of course, was to back out and get fired with honour; the claim is made that this would have increased systemic risk and they were craven in the best interests of the global financial system.

Now, Bloomberg reports that:

Bank of America Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth D. Lewis may face scrutiny by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for failing to disclose mounting losses at Merrill Lynch & Co. because of pressure from federal regulators to complete the takeover.

“We have been actively reviewing the disclosure surrounding the merger between Bank of America and Merrill Lynch,” said agency spokesman John Nester. “The issues identified in New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s letter are part of our review.”

Sounds like Ken Lewis will be hung out to dry. While I think he made the wrong decision, he certainly has my sympathy; I know very well that being a mouse in a roomful of angry elephants is not a lot of fun.

One of the Master Asset Vehicle notes has been placed under Review-Negative:

In addition to the potential impact of the interest shortfall, the following factors contributed to DBRS placing the rating of the MAVII A-2 Notes Under Review with Negative Implications:

(1) On March 16, 2009, DBRS was advised that MAVII’s credit default swap transactions with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) were terminated due to the failure of MAVII to post additional collateral to meet a margin call. The termination resulted in losses of $107,742,597 (or approximately 1.1% of the assets of MAVII). As a result, the enhancement available to the MAVII A-2 Notes has been reduced by 1.1%, whereas the enhancement percentage for the MAVI Class A-2 Notes was unaffected.

Sorry that this is being published so late, folks, but I had an engagement Friday night.

The market was up today, FixedResets and PerpetualDiscounts gaining about 15bp each total return, but volume was down sharply to below-average levels, something that might be considered significant by the chartists among us (yes, there are still a few!) but not considered significant by right-thinking people.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1713 % 977.9
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1713 % 1,581.4
Floater 4.49 % 4.52 % 68,413 16.39 2 0.1713 % 1,221.6
OpRet 5.09 % 4.39 % 142,900 3.70 15 -0.0935 % 2,136.8
SplitShare 6.63 % 8.43 % 47,315 5.63 3 0.3421 % 1,744.2
Interest-Bearing 6.09 % 8.42 % 26,204 0.66 1 0.5097 % 1,959.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1433 % 1,633.2
Perpetual-Discount 6.69 % 6.84 % 141,327 12.78 71 0.1433 % 1,504.2
FixedReset 5.90 % 5.22 % 652,847 4.55 35 0.1546 % 1,913.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
RY.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -2.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.73
Evaluated at bid price : 17.73
Bid-YTW : 6.50 %
BAM.PR.O OpRet -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Option Certainty
Maturity Date : 2013-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.20
Bid-YTW : 7.15 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 23.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
CU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 23.32
Evaluated at bid price : 23.60
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
TD.PR.S FixedReset -1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 22.93
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.79
Evaluated at bid price : 17.79
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 16.79
Evaluated at bid price : 16.79
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-12-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.28
Bid-YTW : 6.35 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 25.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 5.19 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 18.81
Evaluated at bid price : 18.81
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 1.56 % Asset coverage of 1.7+:1 as of March 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 13.05
Bid-YTW : 13.51 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 15.25
Evaluated at bid price : 15.25
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 106,745 Nesbitt crossed 98,900 at 26.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.16
Bid-YTW : 5.22 %
RY.PR.X FixedReset 39,132 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 5.55 %
BNS.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 34,925 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-04-24
Maturity Price : 17.56
Evaluated at bid price : 17.56
Bid-YTW : 6.45 %
RY.PR.T FixedReset 32,576 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %
BAM.PR.H OpRet 31,132 Nesbitt bought 18,000 from RBC at 24.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.95
Bid-YTW : 7.56 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 31,029 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
There were 15 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

3 Responses to “April 24, 2009”

  1. […] Mr. Lewis’ travails, publicized by Andrew Cuomo, were discussed on PrefBlog on April 24. […]

  2. […] with respect to Bernanke’s involvment in the BofA / Merrill Lynch cover-up, discussed on April 24: “I absolutely did not in any way ask Mr. Lewis to obscure any disclosures or to fail to report […]

  3. […] Lewis affair was discussed on April 24: Lewis’ BofA was basically forced by Treasury to buy Merrill, despite “staggering […]

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