Category: Issue Comments

Issue Comments

TD.PF.G Closes at Good Premium on Enormous Volume

IIROC announced:

The following issues have been halted by IIROC:

Company: The Toronto-Dominion BankNON-CUMULATIVE 5-YEAR RATE RESET CLASS AFIRST PREFERRED SHARES, SERIES 12

TSX Symbol: TD.PF.G

Reason: Pending Closing

Halt Time (ET): 7:57 AM ET

They later announced:

Trading resumes in:

Company: The Toronto-Dominion Bank NON-CUMULATIVE 5-YEAR RATE RESET CLASS A FIRST PREFERRED SHARES, SERIES 12

TSX Symbol: TD.PF.G

Resumption (ET): 9:30 AM ET

There was no announcement from the company.

TD.PF.G is a FixedReset, 5.50%+466, NVCC-compliant issue, announced January 5. This issue will be tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedReset subindex.

The issue traded 2,212,913 shares in a range of 25.27-44 before closing at 25.34-35, 8×8. This enormous volume gains it 19th place in the HIMIPref™ database ranked by one-day volume and the largest since 2006-12-15, when FBS.PR.B was issued. That was only a Split-Share, though, with a $10 par value; if we restrict the list to $25 pv issues, today’s TD.PF.G volume is the greatest since 2005-11-8, when 2,540,400 shares of BCE.PR.A changed hands … PrefBlog didn’t exist then!

So, yeah, that was a lot of trading, as befits an issue size of $700-million!

Vital statistics are:

TD.PF.G FixedReset YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2046-01-14
Maturity Price : 23.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 5.21 %
Issue Comments

GMP.PR.B On Review-Negative by DBRS

Yesterday I mentioned GMP Capital’s restructuring:

GMP, proud issuer of GMP.PR.B, has swallowed hard and acknowledged hard times:

GMP Capital Inc.’s radical restructuring, which involves shutting down its United Kingdom and Australian operations as well as eliminating its dividend, is also hitting senior staff at home.

In total, seventy-three jobs are being axed in a new round of cuts announced Wednesday, affecting investment bankers, research analysts and employees in sales and trading. Twenty-nine positions are being eliminated in Canada, 22 in the U.K., 12 in Australia and 10 in the U.S. GMP said 97 positions – a quarter of its work force – have now been eliminated since the end of the third quarter.

GMP has lost money in three of the past four quarters. In the third quarter of 2015, revenue from the company’s energy sector investment banking cratered 87 per cent from a year ago.

The brokerage was founded in 1995 and went public in December, 2003. GMP was immensely profitable during the great bull run in resources and some of its proprietary traders, such as Michael Wekerle, were among the best paid people on Bay Street. In mid-2006, GMP’s share price peaked at $28. It closed Tuesday at $3.92 – not far from an all-time low.

I have not seen any reaction from the Credit Rating Agencies yet.

Today, DBRS reacted:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today placed the Cumulative Preferred Shares rating of Pfd-3 (low) for GMP Capital Inc. (GMP or the Company) Under Review with Negative Implications. This review follows GMP’s announcement that it is undertaking a series of fundamental organizational changes in its Capital Markets division which have the potential to have an impact on the Company’s franchise positioning and further weaken its earnings generation ability.

During the review period, DBRS will also focus on the ongoing weakness in the Company’s earnings. While GMP’s intention is to improve earnings over the longer term by reducing fixed costs in its expense base, the near- to medium-term results will likely be pressured by the very adverse market environment, given the challenges posed by the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices, especially if the Company’s franchise position is weakened during its restructuring. GMP’s Q4 2015 results will be affected by the restructuring charge, and DBRS expects that the Company will report a loss in the quarter and for the full year 2015. DBRS will evaluate the size of the loss and impact on capital following the release of results.

The severity of a downgrade will consider various factors during the review period. These factors include the Company’s vulnerability to the uncertain economic outlook and market conditions, the degree to which its franchise strength has been impaired, the sufficiency and quality of its capital, and the potential for it to return to sustained profitability.

DBRS expects to conclude its review shortly after the release of GMP’s Q4 2015 results.

GMP has been labeled Trend-Negative by DBRS since November, 2012.

GMP has only a single preferred issue outstanding, GMP.PR.B, a FixedReset 5.50%+289, which commenced trading 2011-2-22 after being announced 2011-2-1

Issue Comments

PWF.PR.P: Convert Or Hold?

It will be recalled that PWF.PR.P will reset to 2.306% effective February 1.

Holders of PWF.PR.P have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 160bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on January 18, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., PWF.PR.P and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160113
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.63% and -0.28%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the PWF.PR.P FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for PWF.PR.P) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.50% -0.25% -1.00%
PWF.PR.P 12.00 160bp 11.79 11.03 10.27

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of PWF.PR.P continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of PWF.PR.P are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of PWF.PR.P will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 38 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

Issue Comments

DBRS Places BRF on Review-Developing

Brookfield Renewable is making a big fat acquisition:

Brookfield Renewable Energy Partners L.P. (TSX: BEP.UN; NYSE: BEP) (“Brookfield Renewable”) today announced that with its institutional partners it has committed to acquire 57.6% of the outstanding common shares of Isagen S.A. (“Isagen”) from the Colombian government. Isagen owns and operates a renewable energy portfolio consisting of 3,032 MW of principally hydroelectric generating capacity and a 3,800 MW development portfolio in Colombia.

A Brookfield led consortium will acquire 1,570,490,767 common shares of Isagen for aggregate consideration of COP 6,486 billion1 (approximately US$2.2 billion), payable in cash in US dollars on the expected closing date of January 26, 2016. This reflects a purchase price of COP 4,130 per share (approximately US$1.38). Brookfield Renewable’s equity commitment will be approximately US$243 million giving it an approximate 9% interest in Isagen. Brookfield Renewable currently has $1.2 billion of available liquidity and will fund its commitment with available resources.

DBRS notes:

The Acquisition is expected to close on January 26, 2016. As part of the Acquisition, two mandatory tender offers (MTO) will also be provided to all remaining shareholders of ISAGEN within six months after closing of the initial investment. This could increase BREP’s equity commitment by approximately $517 million if all remaining ISAGEN shares are tendered, which would bring BREP’s interest in ISAGEN to approximately 25%. BREP is expected to initially fund its $243 million equity commitment with $1.2 billion of available liquidity (comprising available credit facilities and cash on hand). The additional MTO commitment is expected to initially be funded with a $500 million acquisition facility and existing liquidity. The rating actions largely reflect the current uncertainty with the final MTO commitment net to BREP and the Company’s permanent financing strategy for the Acquisition. The Acquisition is not expected to have a significant impact on the Company’s business risk profile.

BREP’s financial risk profile is based on its deconsolidated key credit metrics. The Acquisition (including the MTO commitment), combined with the 292 MW Pennsylvania hydroelectric portfolio acquisition (the Pennsylvania Acquisition) expected to close in Q1 2016 (see DBRS press release dated October 9, 2015), have increased the funding pressure on the Company’s deconsolidated balance sheet over the near term as the Company finalizes its permanent financing alternatives for these growth initiatives. Pro forma the (1) $243 million initial investment in the Acquisition, (2) $224 million equity commitment for the Pennsylvania Acquisition, (3) CAD 175 million Preferred LP Units issuance in December 2015 and (4) $135 million of incremental proceeds from the Bear Swamp refinancing in October 2015, BREP’s deconsolidated debt-to-capital was approximately 25% as of September 30, 2015. Assuming the MTO is fully tendered, the $517 million equity commitment would result in a pro forma deconsolidated debt-to-capital of approximately 28%. DBRS notes that BREP’s ratings reflect the Company’s history of prudently financing its growth initiatives to maintain its deconsolidated key credit metrics at a level that is commensurate with the BBB (high) rating category, which has included a mix of equity, preferred shares, asset divestitures and debt. In its review, DBRS will assess BREP’s permanent financing plan and the impact on the Company’s deconsolidated key credit metrics. Upon final review, if the Company prudently finances the Acquisition in a way that its deconsolidated debt-to-capital remains around the 20% threshold over time, and other deconsolidated credit metrics, such as cash flow-to-debt and interest coverage ratios, remain supportive of the current rating, DBRS will likely confirm BREP’s ratings. However, if the Company finances the Acquisition in such a way that its non-consolidated debt-to-capital structure exceeds 20% significantly on a sustained basis and its other non-consolidated credit metrics deteriorate significantly without corrective action within a reasonable time frame, then a negative rating action is likely to occur.

DBRS will proceed with its review as more information becomes available and aims to resolve the Under Review status once the equity commitment (pending MTO clarity) and permanent financing details are known.

Brookfield Renewable is the proud issuer of BRF.PR.A, BRF.PR.B, BRF.PR.C, BRF.PR.E and BRF.PR.F. One of these issues, BRF.PR.E, is the subject of an Exchange Offer that will expire January 20.

Issue Comments

BNS.PR.Z: Convert Or Hold?

It will be recalled that BNS.PR.Z will reset to 2.063% effective February 2.

Holders of BNS.PR.Z have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 134bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is 5:00 p.m. (EST) on January 18, 2016; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., BNS.PR.Z and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160112
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.62% and -0.26%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

It should also be noted that although BNS.PR.Z is NVCC non-compliant and therefore subject to a Deemed Maturity 2021-1-31 (according to my analysis!), this has no effect on the analysis: the essential point is that the elements of the Strong Pair will be equivalent on the next Exchange Date, regardless of anything that might or might not happen afterwards.

If we plug in the current bid price of the BNS.PR.Z FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for BNS.PR.Z) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.50% -0.25% -1.00%
BNS.PR.Z 18.55 134bp 18.30 17.47 16.64

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of BNS.PR.Z continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of BNS.PR.Z are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of BNS.PR.Z will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 38 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

Issue Comments

VNR.PR.A: S&P Slashes Rating, Gets Fired

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • •Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services published its “Methodology For Companies With Noncontrolling Equity Interests” criteria Jan. 5, 2016.
  • •We are removing all ratings on Valener Inc. from “under criteria observation” (UCO) and lowering the corporate credit rating to ‘BB+’ from ‘BBB+’.
  • •We are also lowering our global-scale preferred share rating to ‘B+’ from ‘BBB-‘, and our Canada-scale preferred share rating to ‘P-4(High)’ from ‘P-2(Low)’.
  • •The criteria look at structural subordination of Valener relative to the investee company, Gaz Metro L.P., and its discretionary dividends that Valener does not control.
  • •Finally, we are withdrawing all ratings at the company’s request.

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services removed all its ratings on Montreal-based Valener Inc. from “under criteria observation” (UCO) and lowered its long-term corporate credit rating on Valener to ‘BB+’ from ‘BBB+’. The outlook is stable.

At the same time, Standard & Poor’s lowered its issue-level rating on Valener’s preferred shares to ‘B+’ from ‘BBB-‘ and its national scale rating preferred shares to ‘P-4(High)’ from ‘P-2(Low)’. Standard & Poor’s then withdrew all ratings at the company’s request.

“The downgrade reflects the implementation of the ‘Methodology For Companies With Noncontrolling Equity Interests’ criteria,” said Standard & Poor’s credit analyst Andrew Ng.

We base this on the seniority of the distributions from Gaz Metro L.P. (GMLP), which are the only material source of cash flow for the company. The difference relative to the corporate credit rating on Gaz Metro L.P. (A/Stable/–), of which Valener owns a 29% equity interest, would be four notches as per the criteria if not for the SACP’s capping at ‘bb+’ based on the factors outlined in the criteria.

In the criteria, we developed an approach to establish an SACP on companies whose only significant assets consist of one or two noncontrolling equity stakes in other unrelated corporate entities. We typically rate these entities three-to-six notches below the underlying entity.

The notching differential reflects the structural subordination of Valener relative to GMLP and its discretionary dividends that Valener does not completely control. The main factors that determine the number of notches below the SACP on the investee company include cash flow stability, corporate governance and financial policy, financial ratios, and the ability to liquidate investments.

DBRS confirmed their rating at Pfd-2(low) on December 21:

DBRS Limited (DBRS) has today confirmed Valener Inc.’s (Valener or the Company) Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A rating at Pfd-2 (low) with a Stable trend. Valener’s preferred share rating is based on the credit quality of Gaz Métro Limited Partnership (the Partnership), which guarantees the First Mortgage Bonds and Senior Secured Notes (rated “A”) of Gaz Métro inc. The one-notch differential in the ratings of Valener and the Partnership reflects the structural subordination at Valener.

For the fiscal year ended September 30, 2015 (F2015), Valener’s operating cash flow continued to support its common and preferred shares dividend payments ($33.8 million and $4.4 million, respectively). The Company’s operating cash flow primarily consists of distributions from its 29% ownership in the Partnership and, to a lesser extent, distributions from its financial interest in wind farm projects. Distributions received from GMLP and the wind assets combined improved favourably to $53.5 million in F2015 from $50.4 million in F2014, driven by record results at GMLP and strong wind farm performance. The distributions from the aforementioned entities are expected to further rise in F2016 as a result of the sustained growth of GMLP’s regulated activities.

Although distributions from the Partnership could be curtailed if the viability of the Partnership were to need safeguarding, the Partnership has historically provided stable distributions to its equity holders. The Partnership has made cash distributions to its partners in an amount of over 90% of its net income, excluding non-recurring items, for most of the last 20 years.

As the Company has no bonds/debentures issued, and is not expected to issue any long-term debt in the foreseeable future, its leverage solely consists of its credit facility outstanding. As at September 30, 2015, Valener utilized approximately $120 million of the $200 million credit facility which matures on September 30, 2020. Valener’s debt-to-capital ratio was reasonable at approximately 14.3% as at September 30, 2015. Valener is expected to fund future growth investments in a prudent manner to maintain leverage within the 20% threshold. If Valener is unable to do so on a sustained basis, this could result in a negative rating action. Other key non-consolidated credit metrics have also remained supportive of the current rating category, including cash flow-to-interest at 38.8 times, cash-flow fixed coverage at 10.4 times and cash flow-to-debt at 49.7% in F2015.

Update, 2016-1-15: Valener commented:

Valener Inc. (“Valener”) (TSX: VNR) (TSX: VNR.PR.A) today announced that it has requested a withdrawal of its Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) corporate credit rating following a methodology change that resulted in what it views as an unjustified downgrade by the rating agency.

As a result of the application of new criteria set forth by S&P when rating companies with one or two non-controlling equity interests (“NCEI”), Valener’s corporate credit rating was downgraded from BBB+ to BB+ earlier today. Upon review of the new methodology, which includes the introduction of a cap of BB+ on companies with one or two NCEI, Valener notified S&P that the resulting credit rating would not accurately take into consideration the company’s investment in Gaz Métro Limited Partnership (“Gaz Métro”), an investment grade company with a corporate credit rating of A. Also, it would fail to provide an accurate assessment of Valener’s creditworthiness, especially considering that just a few weeks ago, in December, S&P reiterated Valener’s BBB+ rating, and that there has been no change in the company’s financial situation since.

“It is Valener’s opinion that the new methodology does not accurately reflect the quality and stability of cash flows of Gaz Métro, Valener’s principal investment, and as such is unfairly punitive. What’s more, Valener is well represented on Gaz Métro’s board and has significant influence on Gaz Métro’s distributions to unitholders,” said Pierre Monahan, Chairman of Valener’s board of directors. “The downgrade attributed by S&P is purely the result of an amendment to the rating agency’s methodology, not the outcome of an event affecting Valener’s or Gaz Métro’s operations, and as such, Valener has suspended its relationship with Standard & Poor’s and has asked to have its credit rating withdrawn. We are confident that this will not affect Valener’s ability to borrow additional funds”.

Valener remains rated by DBRS, with a current corporate credit rating of BBB+.

Issue Comments

TRP.PR.C: Convert or Hold?

It will be recalled that TRP.PR.C will reset to 2.263% effective January 30.

Holders of TRP.PR.C have the option to convert to FloatingResets, which will pay 3-month bills plus 154bp on the par value of $25.00. The deadline for notifying the company of the intent to convert is January 15 at 5pm EDT; but note that this is a company deadline and that brokers will generally set their deadlines a day or two in advance, so there’s not much time to lose if you’re planning to convert! However, if you miss the brokerage deadline they’ll probably do it on a ‘best efforts’ basis if you grovel in a sufficiently entertaining fashion. The ticker for the new FloatingReset is not yet known.

The most logical way to analyze the question of whether or not to convert is through the theory of Preferred Pairs, for which a calculator is available. Briefly, a Strong Pair is defined as a pair of securities that can be interconverted in the future (e.g., TRP.PR.C and the FloatingReset that will exist if enough holders convert). Since they will be interconvertible on this future date, it may be assumed that they will be priced identically on this date (if they aren’t then holders will simply convert en masse to the higher-priced issue). And since they will be priced identically on a given date in the future, any current difference in price must be offset by expectations of an equal and opposite value of dividends to be received in the interim. And since the dividend rate on one element of the pair is both fixed and known, the implied average rate of the other, floating rate, instrument can be determined. Finally, we say, we may compare these average rates and take a view regarding the actual future course of that rate relative to the implied rate, which will provide us with guidance on which element of the pair is likely to outperform the other until the next interconversion date, at which time the process will be repeated.

We can show the break-even rates for each FixedReset / FloatingReset Strong Pair graphically by plotting the implied average 3-month bill rate against the next Exchange Date (which is the date to which the average will be calculated).

pairs_FR_160111
Click for Big

The market appears to have a distaste at the moment for floating rate product; almost all of the implied rates until the next interconversion are lower than the current 3-month bill rate and the averages for investment-grade and junk issues are both well below zero, at -0.78% and -0.47%, respectively! Whatever might be the result of the next few Bank of Canada overnight rate decisions, I suggest that it is unlikely that the average rate over the next five years will be lower than current – but if you disagree, of course, you may interpret the data any way you like.

Since credit quality of each element of the pair is equal to the other element, it should not make any difference whether the pair examined is investment-grade or junk, although we might expect greater variation of implied rates between junk issues on grounds of lower liquidity, and this is just what we see.

If we plug in the current bid price of the TRP.PR.C FixedReset, we may construct the following table showing consistent prices for its soon-to-be-issued FloatingReset counterpart given a variety of Implied Breakeven yields consistent with issues currently trading:

Estimate of FloatingReset (received in exchange for TRP.PR.C) Trading Price In Current Conditions
  Assumed FloatingReset
Price if Implied Bill
is equal to
FixedReset Bid Price Spread 0.00% -0.75% -1.50%
TRP.PR.C 10.85 154bp 10.15 9.38 8.62

Based on current market conditions, I suggest that the FloatingResets that will result from conversion are likely to be cheap and trading below the price of their FixedReset counterparts. Therefore, I recommend that holders of TRP.PR.C continue to hold the issue and not to convert. I will note that, given the apparent cheapness of the FloatingResets, it may be a good trade to swap the FixedReset for the FloatingReset in the market once both elements of each pair are trading and you can – presumably, according to this analysis – do it with a reasonably good take-out in price, rather than doing it through the company on a 1:1 basis. But that, of course, will depend on the prices at that time and your forecast for the future path of policy rates. There are no guarantees – my recommendation is based on the assumption that current market conditions with respect to the pairs will continue until the FloatingResets commence trading and that the relative pricing of the two new pairs will reflect these conditions.

Note as well that conversion rights are dependent upon at least one million shares of each series being outstanding after giving effect to holders’ instructions; e.g., if only 100,000 shares of TRP.PR.C are tendered for conversion, then no conversions will be allowed; but if only 100,000 shares of TRP.PR.C will remain after the rest are all tendered, then conversion will be mandatory. However, this is relatively rare: all 38 Strong Pairs currently extant have some version of this condition and all but four have both series outstanding.

Issue Comments

INE.PR.A: No Conversion To FloatingReset

Innergex Renewable Energy Inc. has announced:

that after having taken into account all election notices received following the December 31, 2015 conversion deadline, in respect to the Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series A (“Series A Shares”) tendered for conversion into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series B (“Series B Shares”), the holders of Series A Shares are not entitled to convert their shares. There were 357,543 Series A Shares tendered for conversion, which is fewer than the 1,000,000 shares required for the ability to proceed with the conversion, in accordance with the terms of the Series A Shares.

There are 3,400,000 Series A Shares listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) under the symbol INE.PR.A. The dividend rate for the five year period commencing on January 15, 2016 to but excluding January 15, 2021 will be 3.608% or $0.2255 per share per quarter.

It will be recalled that I recommended against conversion and INE.PR.A will reset to 3.608% effective January 15.

Issue Comments

DC.PR.C: The Debate Continues

Niall McGee of the Globe was kind enough to quote me in his piece Daily Deals: Dundee sweetens preferreds offer and Canaccord hires bankers:

“Since launching our initial proposal, we have learned who our larger holders are and have sought input from a broader group in coming to our revised proposal,” David Goodman, chief executive officer of Dundee, said in an e-mail.

“We listened to the position of others and responded with a proposal that we believe is in everyone’s best interest.”

Preferred share fund manager James Hymas, president of Hymas Investment Management Inc., who didn’t care for the original offer, doesn’t like the revised offer much either – calling it “abusive” in a published note on his website, partly because of the omission of a “special retraction right” that allows shareholders to cash out under the original terms.

“Virtually every preferred share term extension voted on by shareholders provides for a special retraction right,” Mr. Hymas wrote.

“No such provision implies that the company is afraid of a mass retraction, which indicates that the company knows its offer is no good.”

Barry Critchley of the Financial Post has declared victory:

The people have spoken and the people, in this case holders of Series 4 preferred shares issued by Dundee Corp. who responded negatively to an initial proposal, have emerged victorious.

But they only won because Dundee listened and changed a plan that seemed destined to be shot down at a meeting originally scheduled for Jan. 7. Put it down as a victory for shareholders and common sense, a victory reflected by the market’s reaction: the prefs shares closed at $16.60 Thursday, up 15 per cent on the news.

“We have consulted and we responded with what we think is a win-win solution,” said David Goodman, chief executive of Dundee.

And I’ll also quote Sacha Peter of the Divestor blog. I don’t normally quote blog posts by those who are not market professionals … but Mr. Peter uses his own name, is a professional in another field [and therefore has something to lose if he says something stupid] and, most importantly, says nice things about me, so why not? His post is titled Dundee Corporation – DC.PR.C – Series 4 Preferred Shares – Amended Exchange Offer:

My own quick summary is: the deal stinks less compared to the original offer, but it still stinks.

By far and away the most important provision is the removal of the $0.223/share consent payment. This consent payment introduced the concept of a prisoner’s dilemma where if you believe the deal was going to pass, you would be incentivized to vote in favour of the deal despite how bad it was.

Without a prisoner’s dilemma, there is no incentive to voting yes for a marginal or mildly adverse offering (which was the only way the previous offering had any chance of passing).

This deal still stinks, but the removal of the $0.223/share carrot will remove votes in favour because (and this is my personal speculation) most of the shareholders are angling for the June 30, 2016 redemption.

Using Black-Scholes valuation (which is not the best way to value long-dated options, but is good enough for paper napkin purposes such as this post) we get an option value of $1.84/share, or about 46 cents per preferred share (as each share would receive a quarter warrant).

Using some more formal methods involves different results – if you are that bullish on Dundee’s common stock, why bother playing around with the preferred shares when you can simply buy the common shares or even the other preferred shares?

Preferred shareholders have an even easier decision this time around – vote against the offer. It is still terrible compared to the existing Series 4 preferred shares.

Today’s closing price of 16.60 allows us to estimate the packages total yield, ignoring the warrant value.

Analysis of DC.PR.C Yield
If Plan Succeeds
At Current Price of 16.60
Note: Faulty Analysis
Revised: see comments
Maturity Proportion of Shares Yield to Call
2016-6-30 15% 23.60%
2018-1-31 14.45% 11.41%
2019-6-30 70.55% 9.94%
Total 100% 12.20%

But, as stated in the title of the table, this analysis is wrong. Portfolio Yield is not the mean average of the yield of the individual securities, although it is usually presented this way as being close enough. In this particular case, the total portfolio cash flows are simple enough that we can calculate the Portfolio Yield from first principles, thus:

Date Face Value Cash Flow Div Cash Flow Rdpt Total Cash Flow
2016-01-07 -16.6
2016-03-31 17.84 0.3345 0 0.3345
2016-06-30 17.84 0.3345 2.676 3.0105
2016-09-30 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2016-12-31 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2017-03-31 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2017-06-30 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2017-09-30 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2017-12-31 15.164 0.284325 0 0.284325
2018-01-31 15.164 0.094775 2.57788 2.672655
2018-03-31 12.58612 0.1573265 0 0.1573265
2018-06-30 12.58612 0.23598975 0 0.23598975
2018-09-30 12.58612 0.23598975 0 0.23598975
2018-09-30 12.58612 0.23598975 0 0.23598975
2018-12-31 12.58612 0.23598975 0 0.23598975
2019-03-31 12.58612 0.23598975 0 0.23598975
2019-06-30 12.58612 0.23598975 12.58612 12.82210975
XIRR 11.39%
Compounded Q’ly 10.94%

So that’s a bit of a difference, eh? An xlsx spreadsheet for the calculation is available: DCPRC_YieldAnalysis_160107 [Revised – see comments] and varying the price as it might be today allows us to construct the following chart:

DCPRC_PackageYield_varyPx_Rev
Click for Big

So, from looking at this, and making a ballpark allowance for the value of the warrants which I don’t want and are only offered to provide a little bit of flim-flam for advisors eager to collect their unconscionable proxy-solicitation fees, I’d say that the coupon needs to be 10% or so for the package to trade at par, based on today’s market reaction [in which 67,625 shares traded, mostly at a very steady price of 16.60 and a VWAP of 16.55. This was good volume and a steady price!].

So, I will reiterate my previous recommendation, with a slight alteration to the desired coupon:

I recommend holders of DC.PR.C vote No to the deal and, as before, seriously consider exercising right of dissent. What we want is:

  • A Special Retraction Right allowing holders to cash out in June on the original terms [which may involve being paid in discounted DC.A shares]
  • an offered dividend rate that allows a reasonable prospect of the issue trading near par; at the moment, I estimate this at about 13% 11% to 12%
  • a commitment from the company to maintain a credit rating from two major agencies until the retraction date of the issue
Issue Comments

DC.PR.C: Dundee Sweetens Exchange Offer … Still Abusive

Dundee Corporation has announced:

the postponement of its special meeting of holders of its First Preference Shares, Series 4 par value of $17.84 (the “Series 4 Preferred Shares” and the holders thereof, the “Series 4 Preferred Shareholders”), which was originally scheduled for January 7, 2016 until January 28, 2016 in order for Series 4 Preferred Shareholders to consider amendments to the terms of the Company’s previously announced preferred share exchange transaction (the “Amended Exchange Transaction”). The December 3, 2015 record date will remain the same. The amendment follows consultations with a number of the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders. The terms of the Amended Exchange Transaction are outlined below:

  • •In consideration for extending the date on which the Series 4 Preferred Shares would become retractable by the holder thereof, being June 30, 2016, for an additional three year period to June 30, 2019, each Series 4 Preferred Shareholder will exchange their Series 4 Preferred Share pursuant to a statutory plan of arrangement under the Business Corporations Act (Ontario) for:
    • ◦0.7136 of a First Preference Share, Series 5 par value $25.00 (the “Series 5 Preferred Shares” and each holder thereof a “Series 5 Preferred Shareholder”); plus
    • ◦0.25 of a subordinate voting share purchase warrant (“Warrant”), each whole Warrant entitling the holder thereof to purchase one class A subordinate voting share of the Company (a “Subordinate Voting Share”) at a price of $6.00 per Subordinate Voting Share at any time on or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on June 30, 2019. The Company is applying to the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”) for the listing of the Warrants.

The Terms of the Series 5 Preferred Shares

The rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions of the Series 5 Preferred Shares are identical to those of the Series 4 Preferred Shares, except that:

  • •The cumulative dividend rate will increase from 5.0% to 7.5% per annum, being an annual dividend of $1.875 per Series 5 Preferred Share, or a quarterly dividend of $0.46875 per Series 5 Preferred Share;
  • •Up to 15% of the then outstanding Series 5 Preferred Shares of each Series 5 Preferred Shareholder will be subject to redemption at the holder’s option for its par value on June 30, 2016;
  • •A further 17% of the then outstanding Series 5 Preferred Shares of each Series 5 Preferred Shareholder will be subject to redemption at the holder’s option for its par value on January 31, 2018; and
  • •The Series 5 Preferred Shares will be redeemable by Dundee at (i) $25.75 per share if redeemed prior to June 30, 2017, (ii) $25.50 per share if redeemed on or after June 30, 2017 and prior to June 30, 2018, (iii) $25.25 per share if redeemed on or after June 30, 2018 and prior to June 30, 2019, and (iv) $25.00 per share if redeemed on or after June 30, 2019, plus, in each case, an amount equal to all accrued and unpaid dividends thereon to but excluding the date fixed for redemption. Currently, the Series 4 Preferred Shares are redeemable by the Company at par together with any accrued and unpaid dividends to but excluding the redemption date.

Consent Payments

The one-time consent fee of up to 1.25% that would have been payable to Series 4 Preferred Shareholders who voted in favour of the prior proposal has been replaced by a 1.5% per year increase in the dividend rate payable to all Series 5 Preferred Shareholders in the event that the Amended Exchange Transaction proceeds. If the Amended Exchange Transaction is completed, Dundee will make certain payments (the “Consent Payments”) to the brokers, investment dealers, banks, trust companies or other intermediaries of the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders (collectively, the “Intermediaries”), subject to certain procedures and conditions which will be outlined in the revised Circular (as defined below):

  • •a Consent Payment of $0.1784 per Series 4 Preferred Share, representing 1.00% of the par value of the Series 4 Preferred Shares, will be paid by Dundee to Intermediaries in respect of each Series 4 Preferred Share that is voted FOR the Arrangement Resolution (as defined below) on or prior to January 21, 2016, provided such vote is valid and is not subsequently withdrawn; and
  • •a Consent Payment of $0.0892 per Series 4 Preferred Share, representing 0.50% of the par value of the Series 4 Preferred Shares, will be paid by Dundee to Intermediaries in respect of each Series 4 Preferred Share that is voted FOR the Arrangement Resolution after January 21, 2016 but on or prior to the proxy cut off time of 9:00 a.m. (Toronto time) on January 26, 2016, provided such vote is valid and is not subsequently withdrawn.

The Postponed Meeting

In connection with the Amended Exchange Transaction, a special meeting of the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders has been scheduled for 9:00 a.m. (Toronto time) on January 28, 2016 (the “Meeting”), at the offices of Dundee Corporation, 1 Adelaide St. East, Suite 2100, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5C 2V9. The Amended and Restated Management Information Circular of the Company (the “Circular”) for the postponed Meeting will be mailed to the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders and filed on SEDAR shortly.

Series 4 Preferred Shareholders are encouraged to vote regardless of how many Series 4 Preferred Shares they own. Series 4 Preferred Shareholders should follow the instructions on the voting instruction form to be provided by their Intermediary to ensure their vote is counted at the Meeting.

Due to the changes in the proposed terms, any votes and any dissents previously submitted by Series 4 Preferred Shareholders in accordance with the instructions provided in the previous management information circular dated December 3, 2015 will not apply to the amended terms. Shareholders can anticipate receiving a new voting instruction form and control number in the mail. Even if Series 4 Preferred Shareholders have voted previously, in order for their vote to count, they must use the new voting instruction form to instruct their Intermediary how to vote on their behalf. Series 4 Preferred Shareholders who wish to vote or dissent in respect of the Amended Exchange Transaction should refer to the instructions in the Circular on how to do so.

To be effective, the Amended Exchange Transaction must be approved by a resolution (the “Arrangement Resolution”) passed at the postponed Meeting by not less than two-thirds (66 2/3%) of the votes validly cast by the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders present in person or represented by proxy.

The completion of the Amended Exchange Transaction is conditional on, among other things, the holders of the Series 4 Preferred Shares approving the Arrangement Resolution, the approval of the TSX, dissent rights not having been exercised with respect to more than 10% of the issued and outstanding Series 4 Preferred Shares, any required lender approvals and other customary conditions (unless waived by the Company).

Reasons for the Amended Exchange Transaction

The Company has engaged GMP Securities L.P. (“GMP”) as its financial advisor and dealer manager, and Shorecrest Group Ltd. as its proxy advisor and paying agent in connection with the Amended Exchange Transaction.

The board of directors of Dundee (the “Board of Directors”) has unanimously determined that the Amended Exchange Transaction is fair to the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders (as well as to the holders of all other classes and series of shares) and is in the best interests of Dundee, and unanimously recommends that the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders vote FOR the Arrangement Resolution. The determination of the Board of Directors is based on various factors, including a fairness opinion prepared by GMP.

By recommending the Arrangement Resolution to the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders, the Board of Directors believes the Arrangement Resolution provides a number of anticipated benefits to the Series 4 Preferred Shareholders, including, without limitation, the following:

  • a.The Series 5 Preferred Shares will have a dividend rate of 7.5% per annum, which is greater than the current dividend rate on the Series 4 Preferred Shares of 5% per annum;
  • b.Each Series 4 Preferred Share (each having a par value and redemption price of $17.84 per Series 4 Preferred Share) will be exchanged for (i) 0.7136 of a Series 5 Preferred Share par value $25.00, aligning with standard market convention; plus (ii) 0.25 of a Warrant, each whole Warrant entitling the holder thereof to purchase one Subordinate Voting Share at a price of $6.00 per Subordinate Voting Share at any time prior to 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on June 30, 2019;
  • c.Up to 15% of the then outstanding Series 5 Preferred Shares of each Series 5 Preferred Shareholder will be subject to redemption at the holder’s option for its par value on June 30, 2016;
  • d.Up to an additional 17% of the then outstanding Series 5 Preferred Shares of each Series 5 Preferred Shareholder will be subject to redemption at the holder’s option for its par value on January 31, 2018; and
  • e.Currently, the Series 4 Preferred Shares are redeemable by the Company at its option at par, together with any accrued and unpaid dividends to but excluding June 30, 2016. The Company will not be able to redeem the Series 5 Preferred Shares at its option prior to June 30, 2019 unless it pays a redemption premium over par.

The Board of Directors also believes that the Arrangement Resolution provides a number of anticipated benefits to the Company and indirect benefits to the holders of the other classes (and series) of shares of the Company as follows:

  • a.By extending the retraction date of the Series 4 Preferred Shares through the issuance of the Series 5 Preferred Shares from June 30, 2016 to June 30, 2019, the Company can repurpose certain capital that would have been needed should the holders have required the Company to redeem the Series 4 Preferred Shares on or after June 30, 2016 at the par price of $17.84 per Series 4 Preferred Share;
  • b.The Company will maintain financial flexibility for future opportunistic business developments; and
  • c.The Series 5 Preferred Shares will continue to be serviceable at an attractive cost of capital.

Why is this offer still abusive? Because there is no provision for shareholders who want the original deal to get the original deal. Virtually every preferred share term extension voted on by shareholders provides for a Special Retraction Right, which allows shareholders who so desire to cash out their shares on the original terms. I get extremely upset when such a provision is not made.

The fact that there is no such provision implies that the company is afraid of a mass retraction, which indicates that the company knows its offer is no good – an implication that is given further support by the fact that consent payments to intermediaries are still revoltingly high. But how good should the offer be?

The closing price of 14.43 today will reflect a number of things:

  • Widespread feeling that the original offer would pass
  • Some buying pressure from those hoping the deal would fail, and
  • Some buying pressure from those hoping for a sweetened deal

Ignore, for now, the two positive influences on the share price and consider only the price as it reflects the original offer. The closing price today was 14.43, which the YTC Yield Calculator shows an annual quarterly yield-to-call of 12.94%. So, ignoring relatively minor tax effects, the dividend rate demanded by the market is about 13%, a far cry from the paltry 7.5% offered by the company.

The potential 7.5% coupon implies a price of 15.18 if the issue is to yield 12.94% … a modest improvement, but nowhere near the par value of 17.84.

But, you say, there will be two interim retractions allowed, in June 2016 and June 2018, totalling roughly 1/3 of the issue! Surely that’s worth something! And yes, you’re right … but it’s not clear whether the company will be entitled to pay that out with shares, and it still only applies to a third of the holdings. But, for the sake of an argument, let’s say that these interim retractions make up one-third of the discount, bringing the estimated value of the new shares to $16.07, still far below par.

But that’s not all, shrieks the late night infomercial of a press release! You also get a quarter of a warrant to buy DC.A subordinated voting stock at the low, low price of only $6.00 / share, effective until June 30, 2019. Surely that’s worth something! Well, yes, it is worth something, but not much. It’s only a quarter of a share, after all, so you’d have to make a profit of $1.77 x 4 [the estimated effective discount times 4] = $7.08 on each warrant to cover the current loss of value. This implies a future price of DC.A of 13.08, which I suggest is a very generous price target given today’s closing price of 5.95 [which has been boosted recently by the potential for massive profits on Dundee’s TauRx holding]. I will leave the matter for others better versed in option theory and Dundee’s prospects to value the option: I’ll just say that I don’t think it’s worth very much; that given the nature of Dundee’s prospects I don’t think it can be valued as normal option anyway; and that I think it’s a chrome-plated gizmo that has the intended purpose of confusing retail investors.

So, I recommend holders of DC.PR.C vote No to the deal and, as before, seriously consider exercising right of dissent. What we want is:

  • A Special Retraction Right allowing holders to cash out in June on the original terms [which may involve being paid in discounted DC.A shares]
  • an offered dividend rate that allows a reasonable prospect of the issue trading near par; at the moment, I estimate this at about 13%
  • a commitment from the company to maintain a credit rating from two major agencies until the retraction date of the issue