Category: MAPF

MAPF

MAPF : Preferred Share Fund 2007 Financials Posted

The audited financial statements for my pooled fund, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, for 2007, have been posted, together with a full statement of transactions in 2007.

The monthly, quarterly, annual and annualized performances to the end of the first quarter, 2008, have also been published. A commentary on the performance for March 2008 is in preparation.

While the year to March 31 was disappointing in terms of absolute return, I was very pleased to see that the fund handily outperformed its benchmark during a vicious downturn – the causes of this downturn have been previously discussed. Large market moves are, in general, good for the fund’s relative performance because individual issues will become out of alignment with their peers, which allows trading opportunities. Unitholders can be assured that I work constantly to ensure that the fund’s outperformance will be maintained in the future, in both up and down markets.

Full information regarding the fund is available at the fund’s main page, where subscription information is also available.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : March 2008

There was a good level of trading in March, almost all within the perpetualDiscount sector.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 3.1% (-7.4) 5.59% 3.48
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.4% (+0.1) -7.63% 0.08
PerpetualDiscount 101.2% (+4.8) 5.95% 14.00
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -4.7% (+2.5) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.17% 14.29
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-3-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 53.2% (-0.3)
Pfd-1(low) 20.5% (+13.3)
Pfd-2(high) 11.7% (0)
Pfd-2 2.4% (-7.4)
Pfd-2(low) 17.0% (-8.0)
Cash -4.7% (+2.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-3-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 12.4% (+11.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 3.4% (-19.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 0.0% (0.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 26.1% (+4.6)
>$300,000 62.9% (+1.1)
Cash -4.7% (+2.5)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from February month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

As noted above, there was a fair bit of intra-sectoral trading this month. I’ll highlight one sequence that was not just intra-sectoral, but intra-issuer.

Simplified Trading Sequence
Issue CM.PR.J CM.PR.E CM.PR.H
March #1 Sold
$20.25
Bought
$24.05
 
March #2 Sold
$20.10
  Bought
$21.00
Dividend
ex-date
after
all
trades
$0.28125 $0.35 $0.30
Bid
3/31
$19.26 $23.19 $20.18
Change
From
March #1
-3.50% -2.12%  
Change
From
March #2
-2.78%   -2.48%

So, yes, there were losses, but at least these were mitigated somewhat by trading.

Performance for the fund will be available on the weekend. I regret the delay – it’s due to being on-site at a client’s office. March’s performance was, frankly, not very good: about -4.75% for the month. Unfortunately, you can’t win them all; but a performance of -4.75% for the month will result in a return for the quarter of -0.04%. The market has gone down – but the actively managed fund will have handily out-performed the passive benchmarks for the quarter. Eventually the tide will turn as the high level of dividends overwhelms the overall market decline.

MAPF

MAPF Performance: February 2008

Sometimes it works … sometimes it doesn’t … sometimes it really really works!

Assiduous Readers will be only too aware that I am fond of saying that if I’m right 60% of the time, then I’m doing well and the fund will do well. Assiduous Readers will also be thoroughly fed up with my constant reiteration that financial markets represent a chaotic system, with the implication that long-term, large-scale market timing is doomed to failure, and that “selling liquidity” and making small differentiations between similar issues is the key to success.

So, while I like to think I’m correct on these small differentiations 60% of the time, it’s not 60% each and every month, or even each and every quarter.

I am very pleased to announce that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund had another very good month in February, to make it three in a row. The Net Asset Value Per Unit as of February 29 was $9.4527, with the result that returns are:

Returns to February 29, 2008
Period MAPF Index
One Month +3.62% +1.68%
Three Months +9.67% +3.23%
One Year +3.55% -4.16%
Two Years (annualized) +5.10% +0.07%
Three Years (annualized) +5.29% +1.34%
Four Years (annualized) +6.25% +1.92%
Five Years (annualized) +10.70% +3.46%
Six Years (annualized) +9.02% +3.24%
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The competition was outpaced: the fund outperformed the closed-end fund (DPS.UN), which returned an estimated +2.04% on the month and an estimated +3.00% on the quarter, as well as the exchange-traded fund (CPD) which returned +2.17% and +3.33% on the month and quarter. Calculation details for these two performances have been posted separately.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 0.5288
February, 2008 9.4527 5.93% 1.072 0.5229
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.

It should be noted that I do not have this calculation audited in any way, so once the audited financials are available you will not be able to see an explicit confirmation of these figures, although you will be able to derive the year end figure for yourselves. Readers should also note that the fund is indifferent to whether investment returns are in the form of capital gains or dividends – portfolio management seeks to maximize total return after tax for a notional high-marginal-rate investor based in Ontario. It should also be noted that this sustainable income figure is not targetted in any manner; it may well go down if, for instance, it is decided that quality is cheap and trades are executed to increase credit quality at the expense of yield.

For all that, though, there is a point to the calculation – it shows that in the recent past, and subject to the usual warning that historical performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns:

  • Income expectations are a lot more stable than market prices, and
  • the overall trend is upwards

The market was seems to have recovered from the horrors of 2007; while this did not trigger any issuance of note in February, a new issue was announced on March 3, which has knocked the market down a bit but only time will tell whether or not this is a trend reversal. Of greater interest were the taxation changes in the Federal Budget which, over the long term, are preferred unfriendly … but remember what I said above about long-range macro-forecasts! For what it’s worth, I consider preferreds to be cheap to long corporates at the present time, and long corporates to be cheap to long Canadas.

The fund did considerable trading during the month, but most of this trading was simply opportunistic switching between issues with similar characteristics. The reversal of a BNA.PR.C / BAM.PR.N switch was the high point of the month; this has been discussed elsewhere. Critics, naysayers and other unkind souls may wish to observe that a large portion of the fund’s outperformance in February was due to its holding of BNA.PR.C (which had an astonishing return) … I can only point out that this issue underperformed in December and January and that performance through the three months – while quite good and well worth taking the position – was not quite so dramatic.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition: February 29, 2008

There was a good level of trading in February, most of it intra-sector – but capped with a long-awaited inter-sectoral trade.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-2-29
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 10.5% (-15.3) 4.95% 2.76
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.3% (-12.5) 1.97% 0.08
PerpetualDiscount 96.4% (+35.0) 5.61% 14.50
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -7.2% (-7.2) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.93% 14.26
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-2-29
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 53.5% (-7.7)
Pfd-1(low) 7.2% (+6.9)
Pfd-2(high) 11.7% (-1.7)
Pfd-2 9.8% (-2.8)
Pfd-2(low) 25.0% (+11.4)
Cash -7.2% (-7.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-2-29
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 1.0% (+0.4)
$50,000 – $100,000 22.9% (+9.2)
$100,000 – $200,000 0.0% (-27.8)
$200,000 – $300,000 21.5% (+4.5)
>$300,000 61.8% (+20.8)
Cash -7.2% (-7.1)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from January month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

The major reason for the decrease in split-share weight and corresponding increase in PerpetualDiscount weight is a February switch from BNA.PR.C to BAM.PR.N. Readers will remember that the former issue is backed by BAM.A shares, making the underlying credit essentially equivalent for risk control purposes. This switch is of particular interest since it reverses switches performed in October and November of 2007 … let’s do a post-mortem!

BNA.PR.C / BAM.PR.N Post-Mortem
Month BNA.PR.C
Activity
BAM.PR.N
Activity
October 2007 Bought 1900 at 21.72 Sold 1300 at 19.75
November 2007 Bought 4500 at 18.38
Booked Dividend of $0.27
Sold 4500 at 17.95
December 2007   Missed dividend of $0.30
February 2008 Sold 5300 at 20.64
Booked Dividend of $0.27
Bought 2800 at 19.07
Net Result Capital Gain of $1.27 per share
plus dividends of $0.54
Missed capital gain of $0.72 per share
Missed dividend of $0.30 
Net Net Result Improvement of $0.79 per share, about 4%
Not all activity is recorded here, but the figures shown are representative and include commissions. Details of 2007 trades will be published via the MAPF webpage in the near future; 2008 trades will be published … eventually

Well … if I can keep doing that … then results will be pretty good over time! 

Performance of the fund and of the indices will be discussed in other posts. 

Update, 2008-3-4: Index Performance, February 2008

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : January 31, 2008

There was a good level of trading in January, most of it intra-sector.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-1-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 25.8% (-3.2) 7.03% 5.37
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 12.8% (+12.8) 5.61% 14.20
PerpetualDiscount 61.4% (-2.6) 5.50% 14.69
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -0.1% (-5.9) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.92% 12.23
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.
Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-1-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 61.2% (+16.7)
Pfd-1(low) 0.3% (-12.7)
Pfd-2(high) 13.4% (+5.6)
Pfd-2 12.6% (-1.1)
Pfd-2(low) 12.6% (-2.5)
Cash -0.1% (-5.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-1-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.6% (-0.3)
$50,000 – $100,000 13.7% (+13.2)
$100,000 – $200,000 27.8% (+20.0)
$200,000 – $300,000 17.0% (-11.3)
>$300,000 41.0% (-15.6)
Cash -0.1% (-5.9)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from December month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

The fund’s performance in January and the performance of the indices has already been discussed.

MAPF

MAPF Performance : January, 2008

Well, that’s a relief!

After a month’s superb performance – up 4.50% in December –  there is often a pullback. Perhaps some issues were expensive at month-end, for instance, not by enough to trade (or they would have been traded), but by enough so that all holdings were at the top of their range and all had a downward bias for the next time.

Not this month! I’m very pleased to say that Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for January, 2008, month-end; the unit value is $9.1224. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to January 31, 2008
One Month +1.28%
Three Months +5.66%
One Year +0.61%
Two Years (annualized) +3.06%
Three Years (annualized) +3.95%
Four Years (annualized) +5.82%
Five Years (annualized) +9.79%
Six Years (annualized) +8.59%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The competition was outpaced: the fund outperformed the closed-end fund (DPS.UN), which returned an estimated -0.97% on the month and an estimated -0.21% on the quarter, as well as the exchange-traded fund (CPD) which returned 0.00% and -0.28% on the month and quarter. Calculation details for these two performances have been posted separately.

 The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 0.5288
January, 2008 9.1224 5.92% 1.00 0.5400
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.

It should be noted that I do not have this calculation audited in any way, so once the audited financials are available you will not be able to see an explicit confirmation of these figures, although you will be able to derive the year end figure for yourselves. Readers should also note that the fund is indifferent to whether investment returns are in the form of capital gains or dividends – portfolio management seeks to maximize total return after tax for a notional high-marginal-rate investor based in Ontario. It should also be noted that this sustainable income figure is not targetted in any manner; it may well go down if, for instance, it is decided that quality is cheap and trades are executed to increase credit quality at the expense of yield.

For all that, though, there is a point to the calculation – it shows that in the recent past, and subject to the usual warning that historical performance is not necessarily indicative of future returns:

  • Income expectations are a lot more stable than market prices, and
  • the overall trend is upwards

It was another interesting month, in terms of trends. Readers will remember that strength in early December evaporated in the face of tax-loss selling, exacerbated by sudden concerns regarding the credit quality of CIBC. In January, early strength was blown away by the new BNS perpetual issue, which raised fears that the market would reprice itself to reflect the concessionary 5.6% coupon. These fears proved to be unfounded … but not before the market came very close to dipping below its November 30 value – which, for now, remains the month-end marking the market’s low point.

The fund did considerable trading during the month, but most of this trading was simply opportunistic switching between issues with similar characteristics. One trend that was noticable was the build-up of a large position in Royal Bank perpetuals, which seemed very cheap even though a dividend was earned with an ex-dividend date of January 22. This position was largely unwound – profitably! – by the end of the month.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : December 2007

There was a good level of trading in December, most of it intra-sector.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2007-12-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 29% (-9) 6.82% 5.56
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 64% (+2) 5.48% 14.70
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash 6% (+6) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 5.53% 11.10
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2007-12-31
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 44.5% (+10.5)
Pfd-1(low) 13.0% (-4.0)
Pfd-2(high) 7.8% (+7.8)
Pfd-2 13.7% (-7.3)
Pfd-2(low) 15.1% (-11.9)
Cash 5.8% (+5.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end. 

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.
Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2007-12-31
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.9% (-0.1)
$50,000 – $100,000 0.5% (+0.5)
$100,000 – $200,000 7.8% (-55.2)
$200,000 – $300,000 28.3% (+10.3)
>$300,000 56.6% (+38.6)
Cash 5.8% (+5.8)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
Bracketted figures represent change from November month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available on the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

The fund’s performance and the performance of the indices has already been discussed.

Update: Some doubting Thomases, unconvinced of the abject failure of the Efficient Market Hypothesis in characterizing the Canadian preferred share market, might object that outperformance this month is due simply to long duration in an up-month.

I attach a graph and an associated Regression Report plotting total return against Modified Duration (YTW) of issues in the HIMIPref™ Universe that are in the top three rating classes (by DBRS). It may be seen that although Specific Risk increases with MD-YTW, there does not appear to be any Systemic Risk associated with term … at least, not this month!

As a further illustration, I attach an evaluation of the December performances of the individual issues in the PerpetualDiscount index, sorted by performance and by issuer.

While classes will very often show a normal qualitative relationship amongst themselves, variance is generally very high compared to the average (in other words, there’s a lot of noise around each signal).

MAPF

MAPF Performance : December 2007

You know, sometimes everything works. 

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for December, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $9.0070, after giving effect to a dividend distribution of $0.173192. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to December 31, 2007
One Month +4.50%
Three Months +0.34%
One Year -1.63%
Two Years (annualized) +2.54%
Three Years (annualized) +3.66%
Four Years (annualized) +6.01%
Five Years (annualized) +11.02%
Six Years (annualized) +9.31%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The December returns reflect outperformance against CPD (which returned +1.14% on the month) and DPS.UN (estimated at +1.93%).

The quarterly performance includes October’s poor performance, which I have attributed to a move into perpetualDiscount issues that proved to be somewhat early. The move has now been amply rewarded, as volatility in December provided the setting for several profitable trades. The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
October 8.8084 5.71% 1.00 0.5030
November 8.7845 6.11% 1.00 0.5357
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 0.5288
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions. 

It was something of an interesting month, as early strength crumbled in the face of tax-loss selling; after the December 24 deadline for 2007 settlement passed the market rocketted upwards. Actually, many issues started to bounce back on the 24th – it was December 21 that the selling peaked.

One issuer that appeared to be particularly hard hit by tax loss selling was the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CM), which announced on December 19 that:

Following Standard and Poor’s announcement today that it had reduced the credit rating of ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. from “A” to “CCC”, CIBC confirmed that ACA is a hedge counterparty to CIBC in respect of approximately U.S. $3.5 billion of its U.S. subprime real estate exposure.
    It is not known whether ACA will continue as a viable counterparty to CIBC. Although CIBC believes it is premature to predict the outcome, CIBC believes there is a reasonably high probability that it will incur a large charge in its financial results for the First Quarter ending January 31, 2008.

Well, I’m not going to say this news is meaningless to preferred shareholders. Credit Ratings Agencies are annoyed; due, I think, both the loss itself and the revelation that so many eggs were placed in the ACA basket. But. But! The loss will be borne by the common shareholders. That’s what common shareholders are good for, taking the first loss. While this is indeed meaningful to preferred shareholders, the market grossly over-reacted, and MAPF was able to scoop up a good position in two of CM’s perpetual issues – some of which was unwound prior to month end with both a chunky capital gain and a dividend.

There were many other trades, but the CM is the easiest to explain!

I consider 2007 to have been a very successful year for the fund. Although the fund lost 1.63% on the year, it outperformed the benchmark quite handsomely – for those who are seeking a long-term investment in preferred shares due to the various qualities of this asset class, outperformance in a down year is just as good as the same outperformance in an up year.

And down years are rare. Subscribers to Canadian Moneysaver will have seen my exposition of just how bad 2007 was for preferred shareholders (and my attempts to explain why) … cheapskates who don’t subscribe will just have to wait until I republish it after the black-out period is over.

Update, 2008-01-08: The main returns pages have been updated to reflect the BMO-CM 50 index returns: Monthly, Quarterly, Annually to Dec. 31 and Annualized to Dec. 31.

MAPF

MAPF : Questions from a Potential Client

I received some questions from a potential client based in Calgary recently; for the interest and edification of other potential clients, I am transcribing the questions and answers here:

What do you see as the advantages/ differences of investing in the fund or having my own account managed?  I know the fees are higher for the managed account.   I plan to invest under $100k I would be interested in your perspective.  Since I am entering the market now is there an advantage today for one or the other?

The major advantage to an investment in the fund vs. a segregated account is size. Small accounts are difficult to trade, because the perils of a partial fill are magnified – the fund can, for instance, offer 4,000 shares at a certain price; if it only gets filled for 500, that still leaves enough of a position that it may be efficiently traded.

If a smaller account offers 700 shares and gets that fill of 500, that leaves the uncomfortable option of either changing the order to a market order – to clear out the position, but getting a worse price than hoped – or of keeping the 200 shares on the books, which will be relatively expensive to trade.

Do I have the fees correct 1% for the fund and 1.5% for managed account for an investment of under $100k?

Yes, your understanding of the fees is correct; but note that I cannot currently offer you a segregated account for an investment of under $100k due to registration expenses. You should also note that the fund also incurs expenses of (currently) 0.5% [which are deducted directly from the fund prior to calculation of net asset value and performance; thus, the returns quoted on my site are before fees, but after expenses].

How are paid dividends handled in the accounts?  Do they get paid out as cash according to their schedule?

Subscribers to the fund may have quarterly dividends paid in cash or have them reinvested in the fund (the same option applies to the annual capital gains dividend – which, unfortunately, will be zero this year unless something dramatic happens in the next three weeks!). For a segregated account, anything is possible by arrangement. 

The shorterm, medium term and long term future that you see for preferred shares? I know this is a loaded question, especially with the current credit scare in the market.  I would be interested in understanding your perspective of today versus history.  For example, looking at previous years performance of the fund, there are years that have a  higher performance compared to other years  I would be interested in understanding how the economic environment contributed to the performance that year or lesser performance in some other years?  I’m trying to understand the economic environment in which preferred shares do well.  Are the main factors – decreasing interest rates and an experienced manager who can buy and sell opportunities?  Are there other factors?

If you ever come to a solid understanding of the economic environment in which preferred shares do well, tell me quickly what it is, because I’d love to know!

Joking aside, preferred should normally behave much like long-term corporate bonds. They should do well in times when long-term interest rates decline (which is a bit related, but not 100%, to a decline in short-term rates). They should do better than this base in an expanding, happy economy (as perceived default risk declines) and somewhat worse during times such as this year, when there are worries (exaggerated, according to me, but what do I know?) of mass defaults. 

I know “timing the market” is not realistic, however, since this is my first purchase of preferreds, I am interested in understanding if this is a reasonable time to enter?  Is there any obvious reason to wait or to enter  immediately?

Given the current spread of the interest-rate equivalent of discounted perpetual preferreds to long-term corporate bonds (now about 210bp – that is, the average investment-grade PerpetualDiscount issue now yields the equivalent of the long-term investment-grade corporate bond index plus 2.10%, given a tax-equivalency factor of 1.4), I have to say that now looks like a more attractive time than normal. However, there is no reason that the spread couldn’t go to 310bp, which would cause underperformance of such an investment.I talked a bit about spreads in my blog at:
http://www.prefblog.com/?p=1394     

According to me, a spread of 100-150bp is “normal” – whatever “normal” means!My advice is to come up with an asset allocation that makes sense for you over the long term and not vary it much – for instance, 60% stocks, 20% bonds, 20% referreds, with the stocks further subdivided by sector and geography; and all numbers based on how much risk you, personally, can live with, which will be based on both your portfolio objectives and your personal comfort with risk.

I would not adjust these allocations without a compelling reason; for instance, you might say your fixed income will be 50/50 bonds/preferreds when spreads are more than 100bp, but 75/25 when spreads are below this figure; with similar rules applying to your estimated long-term returns on stocks & bonds.

I cannot receive your preferred letter, as I reside in Alberta.  However, I am curious: do individuals follow your recommendations and manage their own accounts or even for those that can get the letter, do you still recommend the fund?

A number of subscribers to PrefLetter are market professionals, who use the recommendations either as their primary source of recommendations to their clients or as a ‘second-opinion’ on their own or their firm’s views. (As a matter of fact, I had been toying with the idea of offering this service for quite some time; then a financial advisor with a national firm called me and demanded that I offer it!)

Others are individual investors who want full control over every aspect of their portfolio, but do recognize that advice from a specialist is a useful thing. Some individual investors have very specific portfolio objectives and risk tolerances that mean, really, that they are the only ones who can possibly manage the account.

From a perspective of pure returns, I recommend the fund since the market is examined constantly with fresh results from my analytical programme and trading is efficient.

MAPF

MAPF Performance : November 2007

Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund has been valued for November, 2007, month-end. The unit value is $8.7845. Returns over various periods are:

MAPF Returns to November 30, 2007
One Month -0.27%
Three Months -4.65%
One Year -4.98%
Two Years (annualized) +0.65%
Three Years (annualized) +2.53%
Four Years (annualized) +5.48%
Five Years (annualized) +10.09%
Six Years (annualized) +8.05%

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not  a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The November returns reflect outperformance against CPD (which returned -1.21%) and DPS.UN (estimated at -1.14%).

The quarterly performance still reflects October’s poor performance, which I attributed last month to a move into perpetualDiscount issues that proved to be somewhat early. However, given the quarterly performance of CPD (-4.52%) and DPS.UN (-3.87%), I think I am justified in thinking that the past three months, while disappointing and not reflective of the returns I aim to achieve for clients, have not been a disaster for the fund, which has a superb yield while retaining good credit quality and liquidity.

The BMO-CM-50 Index is not yet available, but I believe that I have outperformed it by about 200bp over the past twelve months. Update: I have just received the report: this index returned -0.83% for the month, -6.55% for the trailing 12 months; hence MAPF has outperformed the index by 157bp over the past twelve months (after expenses, before fees)

The yield is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Sustainable
Income
April, 2007 9.4083 4.52% 0.89 $0.4778
May 9.3259 4.59% 0.95 0.4506
June 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 0.4665
July 9.3627 5.10% 1.01 0.4728
August 9.3309 4.55% 0.89 0.4770
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 0.4995
October 8.8084 5.71% 1.00 0.5030
November, 2007 8.7845 6.11% 1.00 0.5357
NAVPU is shown after distributions of 0.066279 in June
and 0.116224 in September

While I attempt at all times not to say anything that might be interpreted as an exhortation to time the markets, I will say that there are some signs the market is normalizing … it may still be very low, but a few things lead me to believe that irrationality is abating somewhat.

To illustrate my point, I present the following table tracing the flow of money through a series of trades in November within the perpetualDiscount sector that worked out quite well:

A Sequence of MAPF Trades, November 2007
Date 10/31 11/19 11/26 11/30
POW.PR.B Held at
23.13
Sold at 23.31  
GWO.PR.G   Bought at 22.99 Sold at 22.59
(average)
 
HSB.PR.D   Bought at 21.71
(average)
Held at
22.30
Return on Position    +0.78% -1.74%  +2.72% 
Perpetual
Discount
Index
Level
 905.0 903.09  900.2  904.3 
Perpetual
Discount
Index
Return
   -0.21% -0.32%  +0.46% 

I hope the table is clear! It makes perfect sense to me – but let me know in the comments if it’s really just a jumble of numbers. At any rate, the point is that the money flowing through this series of trades  had a total return of +1.72% for the month, while invested at all times in PerpetualDiscount issues. The PerpetualDiscount index returned -0.07% as has been previously reported.

It would, of course, have been much nicer to have held something other than GWO.PR.G during the period 11/19 to 11/26 – but I didn’t know that when I bought it, did I? And when the HSB.PR.D got cheap – the trade picked up credit, picked up yield AND increased the discount to call price – I had to sell something.

My point is that the sequence of trades was both rapid-fire and profitable. It may have been just a flash in the pan, but that is the sort of trading HIMIPref™ has historically indicated in “normal” markets and its success gives me hope that the market is normalizing.

I just wish the month had ended with December 3 prices … I would have been able to report a gain for November!