Category: Market Action

Market Action

June 9, 2014

Assiduous Reader JP brings the following to my attention, in response to the bit about renewables’ effect on utilities:

Europe’s drive toward a power system based on renewable energy has gone so far that output will probably need to be cut within months because of oversupply.

Network operators are likely to curb solar and wind generation at times of low demand to prevent overloading the region’s 188,000 miles (302,557 kilometers) of power lines, Entso-e, the grid association in Brussels, said last month. Renewable output is poised to almost double to 18 percent by 2020, according to Energy Brainpool GmbH & Co. KG, a consulting firm in Berlin.

Europe’s fivefold surge in green energy in the past decade pushed prices to a nine-year low and wiped out $400 billion in market value of utilities from Germany’s RWE AG to GDF Suez SA in Paris.

European governments handed out $57 billion in 2012 for green energy projects, more than half of the global $101 billion, according to the International Energy Agency in Paris.

Investment in new European projects slowed to $43 billion last year from as much as $80.2 billion in 2012, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance in London.

The spending came even as EU’s power demand peaked in 2008 and is poised to slide 0.3 percent this year, according to IHS Inc., a consulting firm based in Englewood, Colorado.

At some point, grid operators and power suppliers are going to have to come up with some way to store electricity, de facto if not de jure. My guess is that the best way to do this is to increase surge capacity in hydroelectric plants, so you just turn off the generators and let the water build up a little bit more behind the dam, until you need the power and can let things run flat out. This happens every day at Niagara Falls; surely the method could be extended to cover intermittent wind and solar supply with minimal tinkering.

Anybody with more insights into this … eMail me! I have posted a question on the Straight Dope Message Board, which is always a good resource.

What with it being close to election day and all, I thought I’d pass along Assiduous Reader JP’s note about promises, promises:

In what appears to be a first, the Lisgar GO station in Mississauga is going green.

As of about April 1 [2009], if plans stay on track, about 80 per cent of the busy train station’s electrical needs will be powered by the wind, courtesy of a brand new turbine that will generate roughly 56,000 kilowatts a day.

GO Transit spokeswoman Jessica Kosmack suggests the turbine’s $620,000 price tag will prove a bargain and perhaps become a prototype for other eco-oriented initiatives across the 8,000-kilometre GO network, which comprises 59 rail stations and numerous bus routes.

reality, reality:

A wind turbine pilot project at a GO station in Mississauga, built for $620,000, is producing 91 per cent less electricity than originally projected.

The turbine, unveiled at Lisgar GO station in April 2009, was expected to produce 98,550 kilowatt hours (kWh) per year — enough to power 80 per cent of the station’s electricity needs.

More than four years later, it is only producing around 9,000 kWh per year, or about 9 per cent of projections.

That’s enough electricity to power a single typical household in Toronto for nine months.

Metrolinx blamed “inconsistent localized wind levels” and new development in the area for the turbine’s underperformance. A spokeswoman still called it a “marginal success.”

Other marginal successes include Enron, Chrysler, Bre-X and Nortel.

It was a good day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts winning 14bp, FixedResets up 12bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 8bp. Volatility was average and the Performance Highlights table is comprised entirely of FixedResets, which continue to adjust after the recent carnage and partial recovery. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2618 % 2,513.3
FixedFloater 4.56 % 3.81 % 30,237 17.78 1 0.0000 % 3,768.4
Floater 2.90 % 3.03 % 45,595 19.58 4 -0.2618 % 2,713.7
OpRet 4.38 % -12.47 % 27,822 0.08 2 -0.1748 % 2,713.2
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.30 % 64,716 4.14 5 0.1753 % 3,114.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1748 % 2,480.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % 2.65 % 82,715 0.08 17 -0.0139 % 2,398.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.27 % 5.28 % 107,160 14.97 20 0.1374 % 2,542.2
FixedReset 4.51 % 3.74 % 220,259 6.78 78 0.1214 % 2,525.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 1.44 % 148,691 0.21 43 0.0773 % 2,526.2
FloatingReset 2.68 % 2.52 % 134,814 3.97 6 -0.0199 % 2,479.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.28
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 24.79
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 239,548 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 215,207 RBC crossed blocks of 133,700 and 64,800, both at 23.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 135,410 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 113,905 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 110,571 Scotia crossed blocks of 58,200 and 30,000, both at 22.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 5.57 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 106,020 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.15
Evaluated at bid price : 25.04
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
There were 18 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.32 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4507

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.32
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.46 – 25.70
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1604

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : -1.03 %

ELF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.75 – 25.03
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.2075

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 24.33
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %

RY.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.12 – 25.33
Spot Rate : 0.2100
Average : 0.1390

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.65 – 26.00
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2827

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

ENB.PF.A FixedReset Quote: 25.10 – 25.33
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1648

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-09
Maturity Price : 23.17
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %

Market Action

June 6, 2014

So the big news of the day was the US jobs number:

Payrolls pushed past their U.S. pre-recession peak for the first time in May, a milestone that’s been five years in the making.

The 217,000 advance in hiring followed a 282,000 gain in April, figures from the Labor Department showed today in Washington. It marked the fourth consecutive month employment increased by more than 200,000, the first time that’s happened since early 2000. The jobless rate unexpectedly held at an almost six-year low of 6.3 percent.

The report also showed incomes climbed, the ranks of the long-term unemployed decreased and businesses took on more full-time help, evidence of the type of economic progress that will keep the Federal Reserve paring record monetary stimulus.

The so-called participation rate, which indicates the share of working-age people in the labor force, held at 62.8 percent, matching the lowest since March 1978.

Drew DeSilver of Pew Research points out:

But while the country may have climbed out of the deepest jobs hole since the Depression, that hardly means everything is peachy. There are about 15 million more working-age people now than there were in January 2008, but essentially the same number of jobs. Only 58.9% of the adult population is employed, four percentage points below the level in January 2008.

As the above chart from the Economic Policy Institute (prepared before today’s jobs report) shows, the economy is still some 7 million jobs short of what it would need for the employment-to-population ratio to reach its pre-recession level. EPI economist Heidi Shierholz commented, “We are far, far from healthy labor market conditions.”

The morally pure among us will be thrilled that Christian Bittar has been fined megabucks for a back-dated crime:

Britain’s markets regulator is seeking to fine former Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) trader Christian Bittar about 10 million pounds ($17 million) for trying to rig benchmark interest rates, its largest ever penalty against an individual, said a person with knowledge of the situation.

The penalty would dwarf the $9.6 million imposed on Rameshkumar Goenka, a Dubai-based investor, for manipulating stocks in London, the regulator’s biggest to date. The FCA has said it’s preparing to fine at least seven other traders it didn’t identify for their roles in trying to rig the London interbank offered rate or similar benchmarks. At least two may be fined more than one million pounds each, according to people with knowledge of the talks.

Well, Zero Hedge will be happy, anyway:

So to summarize:

1.Deutsche tells an internal prop trader to invest billions in the Libor market,but tells him: “do everything legally and by the book or else.”
2.Bittar colludes with virtually everyone else under the sun (for a full roster of names all of which point to one place: Switzerland, and secondly Singapore, see here), to generate billions in profits;
3.Bittar makes tens if not hundreds of millions of bonuses for himself;
4.Finally, DB no longer can hide the deception and claws back a portion of Bittar’s bonuses, while washing its hands of the full affair;
5.Scapegoat punished, life goes on.
And then what happened to Bittar?

He now works for Bluecrest Capital Management LLP, Europe’s third- biggest hedge fund with $30 billion under management.

I.e., nothing changes.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 4bp, FixedResets up 15bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 5bp. Volatility was minimal. Volume was extremely low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1380 % 2,519.9
FixedFloater 4.56 % 3.81 % 30,598 17.79 1 0.0000 % 3,768.4
Floater 2.89 % 3.02 % 46,130 19.61 4 0.1380 % 2,720.8
OpRet 4.37 % -13.36 % 28,178 0.08 2 0.2336 % 2,717.9
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.31 % 65,310 4.15 5 -0.1750 % 3,109.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2336 % 2,485.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % 3.63 % 83,738 0.09 17 -0.0785 % 2,399.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.27 % 5.27 % 104,443 14.99 20 -0.0408 % 2,538.7
FixedReset 4.52 % 3.70 % 221,981 8.57 78 0.1465 % 2,522.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 1.38 % 149,083 0.15 43 0.0466 % 2,524.3
FloatingReset 2.68 % 2.53 % 136,565 3.98 6 0.0332 % 2,480.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.87
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.T FixedReset 1,105,469 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 167,080 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 107,539 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.98
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 83,105 Recent new issue
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 4.35 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset 77,881 TD crossed 67,700 at 24.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.23
Evaluated at bid price : 24.52
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 29,540 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
There were 16 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 21.13 – 22.25
Spot Rate : 1.1200
Average : 0.6481

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 21.13
Evaluated at bid price : 21.13
Bid-YTW : 3.64 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.35 – 23.10
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.4865

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.35
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %

FTS.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.85 – 24.47
Spot Rate : 0.6200
Average : 0.3938

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 20.93 – 21.70
Spot Rate : 0.7700
Average : 0.5972

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 20.93
Evaluated at bid price : 20.93
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 25.06 – 25.44
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2243

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.16
Evaluated at bid price : 25.06
Bid-YTW : 3.90 %

ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.01 – 24.43
Spot Rate : 0.4200
Average : 0.3036

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-06
Maturity Price : 23.70
Evaluated at bid price : 24.01
Bid-YTW : 5.59 %

Market Action

June 5, 2014

DBRS commented on the Quebec budget:

Following disappointing real GDP growth of just 1.1% in 2013, the new budget assumes accelerating growth of 1.8% in 2014 and 2.0% in 2015, supported by an improvement in domestic demand and the external environment. This is consistent with the private sector consensus tracked by DBRS. Despite a difficult first quarter, the outlook for the U.S. economy is encouraging and a lower Canadian dollar will add further support to Québec exports.

At the time of last year’s rating review, DBRS anticipated that the debt-to-GDP ratio had peaked around 61% in 2012-13 and would begin to decline in 2013-14. As a result of the deterioration in fiscal performance, the latest estimates again point to a debt burden of approximately 61% in 2013-14, with another modest increase projected in 2014-15. After which, the debt burden is forecast to gradually decline to roughly 56% by 2018-19, provided that the fiscal recovery remains on target and capital spending moderates as planned.

Assiduous Reader BC wrote in and said:

One other thing I was curious about and thought you might well be the best source to ask.

Years ago, in 2006, the government outlawed income trusts and in the aftermath, a lot of companies began paying eligible dividends that qualify for the dividend tax credit

What possibility might there be that in the future, a revenue hungry government might decide to take similar action in connection with the dividend tax credit.

Thanks very much for any input you can provide

Well, nothing’s guaranteed. For all I know, the Trotskyists will form the next federal government and then I’ll be harvesting potatoes for a living.

That being said, the dividend tax credit seems politically safe to me; none of the three major parties is making it an issue and the major influence on it since it was introduced in 1972 (over the past ten years, anyway) has been changes in corporate tax rates.

However, it should be noted that the explicit purpose of the DTC is to encourage equity investment:

There will be a major increase in the dividend tax credit. Starting January 1, 1978, the amount of dividends received from taxable Canadian corporations will be grossed-up by one-half, as opposed to the current one-third, and taxpayers will be allowed to claim against tax a credit equal to this higher amount.

This measure will provide benefits in a progressive manner in that the net tax on each dollar of cash dividend received will decline by a larger dollar amount the lower the income of the taxpayer. This is shown in the table included in the Supplementary Information. The table also illustrates how this measure will improve the return on equity investments. The proposed increase in the dividend tax credit should thus make it more attractive for investors in all income brackets to return to the equity market. The federal revenue loss from this measure is estimated to be $120 million in the first full year of operation and the measure will also affect provincial tax revenues.

Geez, those were the days, eh? When a tax expenditure of $120-million wasn’t just a rounding error?

However, there are rising concerns about income inequality and its cause:

More than a quarter (26%) of self-identified Democrats and those who lean Democratic cited the tax system as a main reason for the gap. Just 14% of self-identified Republicans and those who lean Republican said the same.

This is particularly evident at the very top of the tree:

But Mr. Zucman and Mr. Saez show a dramatic increase in wealth inequality at the very top of the distribution, among households with more than $20 million in wealth – and especially among those with more than $100 million.

… and we all remember Warren Buffet’s secretary:

Buffett cited himself, the third-richest person in the world, as an example. Last year, Buffett said, he was taxed at 17.7 percent on his taxable income of more than $46 million. His receptionist was taxed at about 30 percent.

Buffett said that was despite the fact that he was not trying to avoid paying higher taxes. “I don’t have a tax shelter,” he said. And he challenged Congress and his audience to see what the people who “clean our offices” are taxed, to loud applause.

And why does this happen:

You might wonder how Mr Buffett managed such a low tax rate. Most likely, it arose because corporate dividends and capital gains are taxed at only 15 percent. But the corporate income that funded those returns was already taxed at the corporate level, where the tax rate is 35 percent. Mr Buffett seems to be ignoring the first round of taxation. Is it possible that the world’s most successful has failed to pierce the corporate veil? (If you want to more reliable data on the progressivity of the tax code, see this old post for numbers from the CBO.)

Even more striking to me is a fact that Mr Buffett did not emphasize: how low his taxable income is. His income of $46 million represents a mere 0.1 percent of his reported net worth of over $50 billion. That is not an impressive rate of return!

Why is it so low? I can think of at least four possible ways investors like Mr Buffet can keep their taxable income, as opposed to their true income, low:
1.They hold stocks that pay minimal dividends.
2.They avoid realizing capital gains.
3.They hold some of their portfolios in tax-free municipal bonds.
4.They give appreciated assets to charity, getting a deduction for the current market value without ever having to realize and pay tax on the capital gain

… and at least some of the super-rich are indulging in conspicuous consumption:

Money managers may resent Prof. Piketty’s book but they appear to love its takeaway notion, especially the implication that the market for expensive goods is just going to keep on getting bigger.

Further evidence for that viewpoint came this week when McLaren Automotive reported that it had made a profit in only its third year of operation. The British auto maker, which was spun out of McLaren Group, the Formula One racer, sells high-performance but road-legal cars that go for about $1.8-million.

This is a company that considers Ferrari and Porsche to be downmarket. Yet it has had no trouble selling out production of its P1 supercar.

Call it the 0.01 per cent market. Before Prof. Piketty and colleagues such as Emmanuel Saez at the University of California in Berkeley came on the scene, economists tended to pooh-pooh concerns about wealth distribution, since the middle class was clearly getting richer and at a pace not wildly different from that of the top 10 per cent of society.

It’s the old story, one that particularly impressed me when I visited Russia a few times and saw the glorious architecture in Moscow and St. Petersburg and the awesome craftsmanship of the relics in the Hermitage. I was so overwhelmed in the Hermitage that I decided I needed to concentrate my attention on one thing and just wandered from room to room looking at tables. How do you get such awesome craftsmanship? Well, first you spend ten years training a guy to make tables of superb quality. And then you tell him to spend the next five years to make a table for you. You can only afford to do this in conditions of extreme income inequality.

So, given all the above, I think that at some point the Dividend Tax Credit and Gross Up will attract some populist political criticism, as will the capital gains inclusion rate. It might well be that people will decide that double-taxation of distributed corporate profits is a Good Thing, particularly if snooty rich folks on Bay Street are getting the benefit of the tax breaks instead of hard-working ordinary Canadians on Main Street.

On the other hand, perhaps one of the biggest macro-economic problems facing governments nowadays is that hard-working ordinary Canadians on Main Street are showing an increasing preference for personal real-estate as an investment rather than productive investment. So my political prediction is that eventually the DTC and the lower inclusion rate capital gains will be capped at some figure that is extremely high as far as the man in the street is concerned (say, income of $150,000) but is mere pocket change to the about-to-be-soaked rich. And remember: with one of my political predictions and $2.00, you can get a coffee at Timmy’s. After all, I didn’t expect the The Pickton-ization of Communities and Exploited Persons Act.

On a less philosophical note, Draghi has earned himself a chapter in future histories of monetary policy:

Mario Draghi unveiled an unprecedented round of measures to help the European Central Bank’s record-low interest rates feed through to an economy threatened by deflation.

The ECB today cut its deposit rate to minus 0.1 percent, becoming the first major central bank to take one of its main rates negative. In a bid to get credit flowing to parts of the economy that need it, the ECB also opened a 400-billion-euro ($542 billion) liquidity channel tied to bank lending and officials will start work on an asset-purchase plan. While conceding that rates are at the lower bound “for all practical purposes,” the ECB president signaled policy makers are willing to act again.

Draghi announced a new liquidity program designed to encourage lending. Financial institutions will be allowed to borrow money from the ECB equivalent to as much as 7 percent of their outstanding loans to non-financial corporations and households, excluding mortgages.

The negative deposit rate, which means charging banks that want to deposit excess funds with the ECB, has been heralded by Draghi as a way to stem unwarranted increases in money-market rates, as well as to curb euro strength that has contributed to slower inflation.

The measure has been used by a handful of smaller central banks in recent years, including Sweden’s, which conducted a 14-month experiment in 2009-2010. Denmark moved below zero in July 2012 — though the cut was aimed more at protecting its currency than stimulating growth — and ended the policy in April.

“It’s another whatever-it-takes moment in the life of the ECB and the euro zone,” said Carsten Brzeski, chief economist at ING-DiBa AG in Brussels “He threw in all he had.”

Excluding mortgages, mind you. Don’t spend no more damned money on your damned houses, people! Use it to collateralize your carry trades:

The policy divergences will widen even further over the next three years as the Fed and then the BOE raise rates, putting them on a course counter to the ECB and the BOJ, according to Andrew Kenningham, an economist at Capital Economics Ltd. in London. By 2017, he estimates, the gap between the U.S. benchmark and those of the euro area and Japan could be nearing four percentage points.

Such divides, he says, are unusual although not unprecedented. The split between U.S. and Japanese rates has often exceeded four percentage points in recent decades and between the U.S. and Germany it topped three percentage points for much of the 1980s.

There are some very interesting musings about solar power:

Deregulated electricity generators make most of their profits on hot summer afternoons, when air conditioners and offices force grid operators to call up their most expensive electricity: natural gas “peaker” plants. Cheap to build but expensive to operate, these plants are essentially jet engines, producing power on demand for a few hours at a time. However, the entire industry benefits when peaker plants kick in, because every other generator, including the cheapest hydropower operator, receives the same top dollar during those peak hours.

Solar panels — whether utility scale or residential rooftop — generate maximum power on exactly those hot afternoons when demand peaks. What’s more, they do so at no marginal cost; the sun is free. This reduces reliance on peakers, causing prices to fall across the board, including for customers without solar power.

This is what terrifies power companies. In California, the afternoon peak has effectively collapsed. CAISO, the state’s grid manager, projects that the peak will become an afternoon chasm, so low that even power plants designed to operate 24 hours a day as “baseload power” (nuclear energy is a good example) may face difficult decisions about when to operate.

The first victims among utilities will be generators that sell electricity from peakers and other plants in the open market. Soon, their plants will be needed only for the few hours around dusk when the sun is weak but demand is still relatively high.

Arizona has net metering, but is considering changes:

The future of solar net metering in Arizona is under attack, with the state’s largest utility Arizona Public Service (APS) proposing changes that undermine cost benefits for residential solar installations.

Under a plan submitted in July with the state’s public utility commission, APS proposes two options for future residential solar customers – both of which will reduce potential financial returns homeowners would receive on their investment.

One alternative would model net-metering contracts much the same as today but require residential customers to pay what APS calls a “convenience fee” – a monthly charge for sending power to the grid. The other option would give homeowners a small ongoing bill reduction, based on market rates APS pays to other power generators.

Seems to me a two-part electricity bill is what’s required – one part for actual electricity use, one part for access to the grid. This would be similar to Toronto Hydro’s charges, but ideally the grid access charge will be based on capacity rather that usage.

TransCanada, proud issuer of TRP.PR.A, TRP.PR.B, TRP.PR.C, TRP.PR.D and TRP.PR.E, was confirmed at Pfd-2(low) by DBRS:

DBRS has today confirmed the ratings of TransCanada Corporation (TCC or the Company) and its wholly owned subsidiary, TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TCPL), both with Stable trends. The ratings primarily reflect (1) expected improvement in TCC’s overall business risk profile over the medium term, (2) potential medium term pressure on its credit metrics and (3) environmental, regulatory and political risks with respect to its natural gas and liquids pipelines segments.

It was a positive day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 3bp, FixedResets winning 19bp and DeemedRetractibles up 9bp. The longer-than-usual Performance Highlights table, still reflecting the dislocations of the past two weeks, is dominated by winning FixedResets. Volume was quite low and dominated by recent new issues.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.6947 % 2,516.4
FixedFloater 4.56 % 3.81 % 30,670 17.79 1 0.2404 % 3,768.4
Floater 2.90 % 3.02 % 46,382 19.61 4 0.6947 % 2,717.1
OpRet 4.38 % -14.38 % 29,338 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,711.6
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.30 % 62,878 4.15 5 0.0159 % 3,114.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,479.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % 1.99 % 84,673 0.09 17 -0.0669 % 2,400.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.27 % 5.27 % 104,272 14.99 20 0.0322 % 2,539.8
FixedReset 4.53 % 3.72 % 220,173 8.57 77 0.1852 % 2,519.2
Deemed-Retractible 5.01 % 1.55 % 150,678 0.22 43 0.0895 % 2,523.1
FloatingReset 2.68 % 2.51 % 138,158 3.99 6 0.1461 % 2,479.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 20.93
Evaluated at bid price : 20.93
Bid-YTW : 3.60 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %
ENB.PR.N FixedReset 1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 4.15 %
ENB.PR.T FixedReset 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 22.80
Evaluated at bid price : 24.06
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-06-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.41
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
ENB.PR.P FixedReset 1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 22.84
Evaluated at bid price : 24.10
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 17.44
Evaluated at bid price : 17.44
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 24.11
Bid-YTW : 4.06 %
ENB.PR.F FixedReset 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
BAM.PR.B Floater 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 17.55
Evaluated at bid price : 17.55
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BAM.PF.F FixedReset 598,107 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.94
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
TD.PF.A FixedReset 335,413 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.97
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 178,865 Nesbitt crossed 150,000 at 25.15.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.17
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 126,844 Recent new issue
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 3.73 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 88,294 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 61,777 Desjardins crossed 11,600 at 25.16; RBC crossed 26,400 at 25.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.10
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
There were 21 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 25.07
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3243

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %

MFC.PR.J FixedReset Quote: 25.24 – 25.63
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2734

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.17 – 24.75
Spot Rate : 0.5800
Average : 0.4653

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 23.79
Evaluated at bid price : 24.17
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.33 – 26.61
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1853

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-05
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.33
Bid-YTW : -14.65 %

CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.24 – 22.50
Spot Rate : 0.2600
Average : 0.1808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.24
Bid-YTW : 5.07 %

TRP.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 22.30 – 22.65
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2774

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-05
Maturity Price : 21.80
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 3.59 %

Market Action

June 4, 2014

It’s nice to see a statistic about how many CLOs lost money in the Credit Crunch:

Issuance of CLOs, which helped finance some of the biggest leveraged buyouts in history during the last credit boom, has picked up following an early 2014 slump brought on by the publication of the Volcker Rule designed to limit risk-taking by banks — major buyers of the funds. CLOs are investors in speculative-grade loans, an asset class in which U.S. banking regulators have said underwriting standards have become too lax.

CLOs pool high-yield corporate loans and slice them into securities of varying risk and return, typically from AAA ratings down to BB. The lowest portion, known as the equity tranche, offers the highest potential returns and the greatest risk because investors are the first to see their interest payouts reduced when loans backing the CLO default.

CLO managers may also be trying to issue deals ahead of risk-retention rules proposed by the Dodd-Frank Act in order to increase assets under management and income, said Kroszner. The regulation may require CLO managers to hold 5 percent of the debt they package or sell.

Out of 719 U.S. CLOs that purchased widely syndicated loans and were rated by Moody’s Investors Service between January 1996 and May 2012, only 14 funds lost any of their principal at maturity, according to a July 2012 report from the ratings firm.

The growth in riskier corporate lending led the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to warn lenders last year to improve lax underwriting practices. Todd Vermilyea, a Fed official, said May 13 that standards “have continued to deteriorate in 2014” and that “stronger supervisory action” may be needed.

While the Volcker Rule hasn’t led to fewer CLOs it has kept the cost to raise the funds elevated.

The average rate paid on CLO portions ranked AAA was about 150 basis points more than the London interbank offered rate in May, according to Wells Fargo. That’s up from a spread as low as 110 basis points on AAA slices last year.

As I have often complained, regulators and politicians are always careful to talk about downgrades of engineered products, rather than actual defaults.

Watch out for falling house prices!

In May, new home prices in 62 Chinese cities edged downward from the month before, dragging down the Chinese average for the first time in nearly two years. The biggest decline came in Shantou, where prices fell 3.64 per cent from April, according to China Index Academy, a research arm of SouFun, which operates the country’s largest real estate portal.

China’s real estate market is the bedrock of its economy. Residential housing is worth some 12.5 per cent of GDP, and homes contain some two-thirds of Chinese household wealth. A fracture in Chinese housing, in other words, is a fracture in China’s financial well-being.

And the slowdown has come with remarkable speed. Last December, Chinese housing prices rose 12 per cent year-on-year, the biggest gain of 2013. By May, sales were down more than 50 per cent from April at Shantou’s Jiacheng Real Estate Agency.

Assiduous Readers will know of my fondness for mocking CalPERS – the politicized fund that doesn’t do credit analysis. I’ve acquired another target – The Norwegian Government Pension Fund, an $853.9 billion pension fund with no trading expertise:

Norway’s $880 billion sovereign wealth fund, the world’s largest, is throwing its support behind Brad Katsuyama’s new exchange.

Katsuyama’s IEX Group Inc., made famous in Michael Lewis’s best-selling book “Flash Boys,” could shield investors from the predatory habits of high-frequency traders, said the fund, which holds $521.2 billion in stocks globally and is Europe’s biggest equity investor.

“IEX is a trading venue where all players participate on the same terms,” oil fund spokesman Thomas Sevang said in an e-mailed response to questions. “We support this.”

The BoC kept overnight rates steady:

Total CPI inflation has moved up to around the 2 per cent target, sooner than anticipated in the Bank’s April Monetary Policy Report (MPR), largely due to the temporary effects of higher energy prices and exchange rate pass-through. Core inflation remains significantly below 2 per cent although it has drifted up slightly, partly owing to past exchange rate movements.

The Canadian economy grew at a modest rate in the first quarter, held back by severe weather and supply constraints. The ingredients for a pickup in exports remain in place, including the lower Canadian dollar and an anticipated strengthening of foreign demand. Improved corporate profits, especially in exchange rate-sensitive sectors, should also support higher business investment in the coming quarters. There are continued signs of a soft landing in the housing market and a constructive evolution of household imbalances. We still expect excess supply to be absorbed gradually as the fundamental drivers of growth and inflation in Canada strengthen.

Weighing recent higher inflation readings against slightly increased risks to economic growth leaves the downside risks to the inflation outlook as important as before. At the same time, the risks associated with household imbalances remain elevated. The Bank judges that the balance of risks remains within the zone for which the current stance of monetary policy is appropriate and therefore has decided to maintain the target for the overnight rate at 1 per cent. The timing and direction of the next change to the policy rate will depend on how new information influences the balance of risks.

There was some chatter about the effect on the dollar:

The loonie had been as high as about 91.7 cents, but began to slip in anticipation of the announcement, to 91.5 cents. In the wake of the statement, it dipped further to 91.3 cents, and by midday stood at 91.4 cents.

Before today, the currency had been hovering around the 92-cent level, having moved up recently.

“It could have been expected that downside interest rates moves were taken off the table but this is not the case,” said Rahim Madhavji of Knightsbridge Foreign Exchange.

“The Canadian dollar fell lower on the Bank of Canada continuing to harp a tone of we’re still nowhere close to raising interest rates,” he added in a research note titled “Bank of Canada slaps loonie lower.”

“It seems that the Bank of Canada is quite content with the lower Canadian dollar boosting exports and assisting with inflation. Today’s BoC statement removes any catalyst for loonie bulls in the near term.”

… and some criticism of the dovish language:

“Comes a point the central bank will have to drop the dovish language, although it’s clear that it will try to delay as long as possible,” said Krishen Rangasamy, senior economist the National Bank of Canada.

The bank’s insistence that disinflation remains a threat could prove tough to defend as as the summer and fall wear on, Bank of Nova Scotia economists Derek Holt and Dov Zigler said in a research note. “The Bank of Canada faces a greater sales job to explain why the ‘downside risks to the inflation outlook [are] as important as before,’” they said.

… though mind you, the dollar isn’t helping exports much:

For months, Mr. Poloz and other bank officials have stressed the importance of exports and business investment to putting the economy back on track.

But so far, exports continue to underperform – a reality underscored by Statistics Canada’s report Wednesday that exports dropped 1.8 per cent in April, tilting the trade balance back into deficit.

I think it’s unclear as to where all this hyperinflation and wheelbarrowfulls of cash are going to come from. Not Europe!

Euro zone price inflation fell unexpectedly in May, increasing the risks of deflation in the currency area and sealing the case for the European Central Bank to act this week.

Annual consumer inflation in the 18 countries sharing the euro fell to 0.5 per cent in May from 0.7 per cent in April, the EU’s statistics office Eurostat said on Tuesday.

not with negative interest rates in Europe, it won’t:

Mario Draghi’s experiment with negative interest rates is unlikely to stop investors from seeking something stronger.

The European Central Bank president will herald a new era today by taking the deposit rate below zero, according to economists in a Bloomberg News survey. That probably won’t quell calls for more radical measures such as quantitative easing to stop the euro area from sliding into deflation.

In the Bloomberg survey, 44 of 50 economists said the ECB will cut its deposit rate to negative from zero, with the median estimate for a level of minus 0.1 percent. The survey also predicts that the benchmark main refinancing rate will be reduced by 15 basis points to a record-low 0.1 percent.

The decision will be announced at 1:45 p.m. in Frankfurt. Draghi will hold a press conference 45 minutes later, where he’ll also release revised ECB forecasts on inflation and economic growth.

… which may help a mouthpiece for the UK government carry out his instructions:

Mark Carney has a new ally in his battle to keep Bank of England policy loose: Mario Draghi.

As the BOE’s nine-person Monetary Policy Committee divides between Carney’s view that low rates are still needed and a faction leaning toward higher borrowing costs, events in Frankfurt may favor the governor by weakening the euro against the pound, helping to curb U.K. inflation pressure. The MPC meets in London today and will announce its decision at noon.

It was a mixed day of adjustment for the Canadian preferred share market today, following yesterday’s fireworks, with PerpetualDiscounts down 26bp, FixedResets up 23bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 4bp. The Performance Highlights table is longer than usual and dominated by winning FixedResets. Volume was on the high side of average.

PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.30%, equivalent to 6.89% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long corporates now yield about 4.35%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context the “Seniority Spread”) is now about 255bp, a slight (and perhaps spurious) widening from the 250bp reported May 28.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4840 % 2,499.1
FixedFloater 4.57 % 3.82 % 31,867 17.77 1 0.3377 % 3,759.4
Floater 2.92 % 3.04 % 46,985 19.57 4 -0.4840 % 2,698.3
OpRet 4.38 % -13.66 % 30,546 0.09 2 0.0389 % 2,711.6
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.31 % 63,765 4.15 5 0.0796 % 3,113.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0389 % 2,479.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % 1.02 % 85,658 0.08 17 0.0069 % 2,402.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.27 % 5.30 % 103,148 14.94 20 -0.2568 % 2,539.0
FixedReset 4.54 % 3.72 % 220,557 8.79 76 0.2269 % 2,514.5
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 1.17 % 151,916 0.22 43 0.0410 % 2,520.9
FloatingReset 2.68 % 2.53 % 143,048 3.99 6 -0.2452 % 2,476.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TD.PR.Z FloatingReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.49
Bid-YTW : 3.41 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 22.76
Evaluated at bid price : 23.46
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.05
Evaluated at bid price : 24.65
Bid-YTW : 4.21 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 22.99
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset 1.66 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.A FixedReset 872,717 New issue settled today. I know this volume is different from the volume reported on the Issue Comments post; here, it’s TSX; there, it’s consolidated. Sue me.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.94
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
RY.PR.H FixedReset 323,000 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.12
Evaluated at bid price : 24.93
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 76,753 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
GWO.PR.G Deemed-Retractible 38,971 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 35,680 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
MFC.PR.G FixedReset 33,809 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 25.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.67
Bid-YTW : 3.23 %
There were 36 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.12 – 25.59
Spot Rate : 0.4700
Average : 0.3468

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.42
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.81 – 22.29
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3596

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 21.81
Evaluated at bid price : 21.81
Bid-YTW : 5.53 %

VNR.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.99
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2626

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

TD.PR.Z FloatingReset Quote: 24.82 – 25.07
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1497

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 2.76 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.45 – 23.78
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2312

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.13
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.08 %

BAM.PR.T FixedReset Quote: 24.22 – 24.55
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2440

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-04
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.22
Bid-YTW : 4.08 %

Market Action

June 3, 2014

Scott Barlow had a polemic in the Globe titled Debt markets’ ‘lunacy’ threatens equity investors:

U.S. credit markets are absurdly overbought and equity investors on both sides of the border will be very much in the way of the inevitable correction when it occurs.

The most common method of gauging whether corporate debt is attractive or expensive is the spread – the difference in yield between a corporate bond issue and a government bond issue of the same maturity. When the spread is low, it is more difficult for investors to generate returns and there is less margin of safety.

The accompanying chart shows that the spread on the riskiest form of corporate debt – high yield bonds – are trading at spreads very close to the pre-2007 lows. At the same time, the CBOE Volatility Index – which uses equity option prices to measure expected volatility and market risk – is hitting all time lows. In other words, debt markets are expensive, and investors are broadly complacent.

New River Investments LLC hedge fund manager Guillermo Roditi Dominguez’s exasperation with current prices was evident on Twitter last week (where insiders can be particularly blunt on this issue) after a Walt Disney Co. three-year bond was issued: “just saw the disney bond. 20 over [treasuries]. twenty. time to pack it up and go hit the pool. i aint abuyin no more bonds this year [sic].”

Well, fine. But the reference to Disney led me to do a little more digging on the deal:

The strong demand for double A rated company’s offering has allowed the deal to price inside its outstanding bonds, which is a market coup for the technology giant.

Apple’s outstanding 2.4% May 2023s are quoted at a G-spread of 75bp, suggesting the new issue concession on the 10-year is around 2bp. The 30-year bonds are offering just 4bp of concession, based on where the outstanding 3.85% May 2043 is trading at Treasuries plus 104bp, while the five-year bonds offer a roughly negative 1.5bp concession compared with the outstanding 1% May 2018s trading at a G-spread of 39bp.

Outstanding three-year bonds were quoted at a G-spread of 19bp, so the concession on the new bonds was about negative 1bp.

A negative concession is fascinating and in conjunction with yesterday‘s discussion of increased underwriting competition – as well as previous discussions of US corporate bond liquidity – lead me to suspect that liquidity is in very short supply in the States. Where else but in the new issue market can a PM buy $10-million in corporates at a reasonable – albeit historically narrow – spread?

Other Disney commentary led into a discussion of Enbridge (briefly mentioned on May 29):

Other deals Wednesday saw spreads tighten even further from IPTs to pricing, which one banker said was down to Disney beginning with little in the way of new issue concession – leaving investors unwilling to lose out on any further pick-up.

At pricing the four-part trade appeared to carry concessions between flat to 8bp compared with the company’s outstandings.

“But broadly, after the recent flurry of issuance, most other issuers may need to be a bit more conservative at the start to create momentum in the book.” [said an unnamed banker].

Canadian energy company Enbridge did just that – and was able to tighten levels on its 10- and 30-year fixed rate bonds and three-year floaters substantially.

The 10s and 30s were announced with IPTs of Treasuries plus 125bp–130bp and plus 145bp–150bp, while the floater came at Libor plus low 60s.

These levels were pushed tighter to final pricing levels of plus 110bp and plus 125bp on the fixed and plus 45bp on the floater.

At the IPT stage, compared with outstanding 4% October 2023s at a G-spread of 114bp, the 10-year seemed to carry about 11bp to 16bp in concession, while the 30-year had about 15bp to 20bp in concession versus 4.55% August 2043s at G+130bp.

These juicy concessions enticed investors to jump in with orders that subsequently allowed it to tighten levels – and end up paying concessions of negative 4bp and negative 5bp.

Low yields are not confined to the US:

Europe’s lowest government bond yields since the Napoleonic Wars are signaling investors want more action from Mario Draghi.

Instead of a vote of confidence, the most pronounced rally in 200 years suggests the European Central Bank president needs to stave off the risks of stagnation and deflation. Austria, Belgium, France (GFRN10) and Germany can borrow at lower rates than the U.S. as inflation less than half the ECB’s target stokes concern the euro zone will take many years to recover from its longest-ever recession.

Speculation the ECB will provide more stimulus pushed yields on euro-region sovereign debt to a record-low 1.43 percent on May 30, according to Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s Euro Government Bond Index. Draghi said May 8 the Governing Council is “comfortable” taking action to boost consumer-price growth, which at 0.7 percent in April was well below the ECB’s aim of keeping it just under 2 percent.

Rates on German 10-year bonds were at 1.37 percent yesterday, less than a quarter of a percentage point away from 1.127 percent reached in June 2012, the lowest since at least 1815, according to “The History of Interest Rates” by Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla. That was the year of Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo, after which the Congress of Vienna redrew the map of Europe, leading to the creation of the German Confederation.

Germany’s current yield compares with an average of 3.03 percent in the past 10 years. The interest rate for government loans was 3.6 percent in 1944 during World War II and 12.5 percent in 1931 amid the Great Depression, according to the book.

I’m not sure I’d want to be a fixed income manager in Germany in 1944, even if I was seeing 3.6% yields!

I understand that marketing for the NEW.PR.C refunding has commenced, but a prospectus is not yet available.

It was a negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with FixedReset prices collapsing in the final hour of trading; PerpetualDiscounts were off 1bp, FixedResets got whacked for 44bp and DeemedRetractibles were flat. A lengthy Performance Highlights table is comprised almost entirely of losing FixedResets, with the solitary exception being a FixedFloater loser. Volume was very heavy.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0967 % 2,511.2
FixedFloater 4.58 % 3.83 % 33,179 17.75 1 -1.2857 % 3,746.7
Floater 2.90 % 3.01 % 47,560 19.63 4 -0.0967 % 2,711.4
OpRet 4.38 % -13.81 % 31,803 0.09 2 0.0000 % 2,710.5
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.22 % 62,357 4.16 5 -0.0318 % 3,111.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,478.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.52 % -2.26 % 84,910 0.09 17 -0.0530 % 2,402.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.27 % 105,152 14.99 20 -0.0086 % 2,545.5
FixedReset 4.56 % 3.75 % 220,363 8.76 75 -0.4410 % 2,508.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 1.33 % 154,769 0.16 43 0.0047 % 2,519.8
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.51 % 122,560 4.13 6 -0.0331 % 2,482.1
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset -2.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -2.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -2.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.50
Evaluated at bid price : 24.82
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 20.05
Evaluated at bid price : 20.05
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 4.45 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 4.20 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.71
Bid-YTW : 3.93 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.27
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
VNR.PR.A FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-10-15
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 20.73
Bid-YTW : 3.83 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.68 %
ENB.PR.B FixedReset -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.88
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.03 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.12
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.H FixedReset 1,106,001 New issue closed today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 464,641 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.27
Bid-YTW : 1.70 %
NA.PR.S FixedReset 182,828 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.24
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 3.85 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 162,850 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 124,070 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 107,754 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.34
Bid-YTW : 1.76 %
There were 60 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset Quote: 24.15 – 24.95
Spot Rate : 0.8000
Average : 0.4743

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 22.85
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 20.05 – 20.45
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2238

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 20.05
Evaluated at bid price : 20.05
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %

CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.30 – 24.85
Spot Rate : 0.5500
Average : 0.3830

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 23.91
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 5.05 %

BNS.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 23.42 – 23.88
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.2962

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.42
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 21.33 – 21.79
Spot Rate : 0.4600
Average : 0.3093

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-03
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %

PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Premium Quote: 25.51 – 25.83
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.1918

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2021-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 5.27 %

Market Action

June 2, 2014

No sooner had I delivered my crushing retort to my cashless friends than I became aware of a piece in the Globe by Ian McGugan titled Why central bankers would like to trash your cash:

An end to folding money could offer many advantages, according to Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard professor and former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund. The most immediate payoffs would come from cracking down on drug traffickers and tax evaders.

This could have surprisingly large benefits for government coffers. In a column in the Financial Times this week, Prof. Rogoff estimates that untaxed, underground transactions account for 7 to 8 per cent of the U.S. economy and probably even more of its European counterpart. Bringing all those cash-only transactions into the light by forcing them to be conducted through the banking system, where the taxman could track them, would provide governments with a nice revenue boost.

One option, in theory, would be to impose negative interest rates – to apply a penalty charge on bank balances to spur people to spend. One big problem with this in practice, however, is that it just won’t work because “people will start bailing out into cash,” as Prof. Rogoff writes.

But what if there was no cash? Government could then adjust rates however it wanted, even well into negative territory, to force people to stop sitting on their wealth.

A miracle has occurred! Competition is having an effect on underwriting fees … maybe!

With trading profits dwindling, more dealers than ever are fighting for assignments managing U.S. corporate-bond sales, one of the few bright spots in fixed income. Companies from the most-creditworthy to the most-indebted have been selling trillions of dollars of debt, locking in record-low borrowing costs ahead of the anticipated rise in interest rates.

A record 144 underwriters for the period have split an estimated $4.2 billion of fees on U.S. sales, the data show.

The five most-active corporate-debt underwriters this year landed 47 percent of the business, the smallest share on record. That’s down from 59 percent of the assignments for all of 2009.

Smaller firms see an opportunity to break into the business as Wall Street’s behemoths unload inventories of riskier securities in the face of higher capital requirements and limits imposed by the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule on the amount of their own money they can use to trade.

Royal Bank of Canada has climbed to 11th most-active underwriter of corporate bonds in the U.S., from 14th place in the period four years earlier, Bloomberg data show.

Debt underwriting fees among the nine-biggest banks were 5.8 percent lower in the first three months of 2014 from the same period last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg Industries. The slump in fees outpaced a 2.6 percent drop in the volume of global corporate bond sales.

The article isn’t all that clear on actual fees. The fee drop among the nine-biggest firms outpaces the drop in total issuance, but the market share of the five-biggest has dropped considerably. It is conceivable that prices haven’t dropped at all and that the quoted differences are due the changes in volume, market share and product mix. But we can hope!

Tobias Adrian, Richard Crump, Benjamin Mills and Emanuel Moench have been working on the Treasury term premium:

Treasury yields can be decomposed into two components: expectations of the future path of short-term Treasury yields and the Treasury term premium. The term premium is the compensation that investors require for bearing the risk that short-term Treasury yields do not evolve as they expected. Studying the term premium over a long time period allows us to investigate what has historically driven changes in Treasury yields. In this blog post, we estimate and analyze the Treasury term premium from 1961 to the present, and make these estimates available for download here.

In a previous post, we compared our estimated term premium to a number of observable variables. We showed that the term premium is a countercyclical variable which tends to move with measures of uncertainty and disagreement about the future level of yields.

The evolution of term premia has been of particular interest since the Federal Reserve began large-scale asset purchases. Over this time, short-term interest rates have been close to zero, and our estimates show that the term premium has been compressed and has at times even been negative. An advantage of our estimate is that it is available back to 1961. Hence, we can study the term premium at another time when short-term interest rates were close to zero. By comparing the ten-year ACM term premium of the past decade to that of the 1960s in the first chart, we find that the ten-year term premium was negative at times in the 1960s, but reverted back to positive. Similarly, our estimate of the term premium has risen above zero recently.

Daily estimates of the ACM term premium from 1961 to the present are now available for download from the Data & Indicators section of the New York Fed’s website. The data are updated weekly and include estimates of the term premium for yearly Treasury maturities from one to ten years, as well as fitted yields and the expected average level of short-term interest rates.

I get lots of ‘friend’ requests on LinkedIn and Facebook from people whose names I don’t recognize. If I don’t recognize the name, I don’t respond; to me, that sounds basic. Some people disagree:

In an unprecedented, three-year cyber espionage campaign, Iranian hackers created false social networking accounts and a fake news website to spy on military and political leaders in the United States, Israel and other countries, a cyber intelligence firm said on Thursday.

ISight Partners, which uncovered the operation, said the hackers’ targets include a four-star U.S. Navy admiral, U.S. lawmakers and ambassadors, members of the U.S.-Israeli lobby, and personnel from Britain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The hackers set up false accounts on Facebook and other online social networks for these 14 personas, populated their profiles with fictitious personal content, and then tried to befriend target victims, according to iSight.

To build credibility, the hackers would approach high-value targets by first establishing ties with the victims’ friends, classmates, colleagues, relatives and other connections over social networks run by Facebook Inc., Google Inc. and its YouTube, LinkedIn Corp. and Twitter Inc.

The hackers would initially send the targets content that was not malicious, such as links to news articles on NewsOnAir.org, in a bid to establish trust. Then they would send links that infected PCs with malicious software, or direct targets to web portals that ask for network log-in credentials, iSight said.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 20bp, FixedResets up 10bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. The Performance Highlights table is of above-average length, with a preponderance of FixedReset issues on the winning side, bouncing back a bit from Friday‘s carnage. Volume was below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.7656 % 2,513.7
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.77 % 32,676 17.85 1 0.0000 % 3,795.5
Floater 2.90 % 3.03 % 47,845 19.60 4 0.7656 % 2,714.1
OpRet 4.38 % -13.95 % 31,765 0.09 2 0.0195 % 2,710.5
SplitShare 4.82 % 4.10 % 62,358 4.16 5 -0.1828 % 3,112.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0195 % 2,478.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % -5.26 % 85,724 0.09 17 -0.0438 % 2,403.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.26 % 5.26 % 104,570 15.00 20 -0.1965 % 2,545.7
FixedReset 4.55 % 3.73 % 214,927 8.77 74 0.0995 % 2,519.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 2.20 % 156,423 0.16 43 0.0149 % 2,519.7
FloatingReset 2.67 % 2.51 % 142,182 3.99 6 0.0597 % 2,482.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
RY.PR.Z FixedReset 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.30
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 24.02
Evaluated at bid price : 24.42
Bid-YTW : 5.02 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.69
Evaluated at bid price : 25.35
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.88
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 20.04
Evaluated at bid price : 20.04
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.K FixedReset 86,855 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.29
Bid-YTW : 1.18 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 86,080 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.39
Bid-YTW : 0.51 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 84,905 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 81,159 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 41,865 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 38,843 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 2.23 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 25.00
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2562

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %

TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible Quote: 26.35 – 26.59
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1556

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-02
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 26.35
Bid-YTW : -16.00 %

FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 24.30 – 24.60
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.2186

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.75 %

MFC.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 24.60 – 24.89
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.2121

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.60
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.03 – 24.54
Spot Rate : 0.5100
Average : 0.4379

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 23.66
Evaluated at bid price : 24.03
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.15 – 22.38
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1591

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-06-02
Maturity Price : 21.76
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %

Market Action

May 30, 2014

There’s an interesting pension fund trend:

Companies eager to “de-risk” their long-term pension obligations are expected to increasingly offer voluntary one-time lump sum payments to former employees as an alternative to a pension’s stream of lifetime income. A Towers Watson survey reports that nearly six in 10 companies with a defined-benefit plan either have offered a lump sum payment or plan to offer one.

The game of pension hot potato between corporations and former employees is partly due to a phased-in rule change that became fully effective in 2012. It centers on the interest rate and investment return assumptions companies use to calculate their future pension liabilities. Pension bean counters can now calculate lump sum obligations using a corporate bond yield for the discount rate, rather than a 30-year Treasury rate. Using that higher corporate bond rate in the calculation reduces the amount of the lump sum. Prudential Retirement estimates that this tweak could reduce corporate lump sum payouts by 5 to 25 percent, depending on the recipient’s age.


For those who will rely primarily on pension income in retirement, the Pension Rights Center, a non-profit consumer advocacy group, suggests turning down the lump sum.

What happens when you force institutions to buy and hold more Treasuries? More Treasuries are bought and held:

It’s getting easier for a smaller group of bulls in the U.S. Treasury market to create angst for the bears.

That’s because government-debt trading volumes have slumped to 18 percent below the decade-long average, Federal Reserve data show. As Brean Capital LLC’s Peter Tchir wrote this week: “There is no liquidity even in the mighty Treasury market.”

So as 10-year Treasury yields plunged toward the lowest level in almost a year, a smaller group of active traders may have had a much bigger influence over the $12 trillion market that determines rates on everything from auto loans to corporate debt.

U.S. government-bond trading has declined even as the size of the market tripled in the last decade. Trading volumes fell to an average $429 billion a day in the week ended May 21, Fed data show. That’s down from daily averages of $502 billion this year and about $566 billion back in 2007.

One reason for the slowdown is there aren’t as many obvious sellers of the notes. The Fed has been buying U.S. bonds for years, making it the biggest single owner of the debt. Other central banks have locked the bonds away in their vaults across the globe.

Another reason is banks have less incentive to trade the debt. They’re reducing fixed-income inventories in response to risk-curbing regulations, such as the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker Rule, which limits the amount of their own money they may use to buy and sell riskier securities. Many are paring fixed-income staff, too, in the face of lower trading revenues.

While banks can still trade government bonds on economic views, the risk management necessary is expensive and the opportunities limited, Vogel wrote in his note.

The moral of the story is: always listen to sell side analysts!

A Bloomberg survey of analysts in February called for the 10-year Treasury rate to jump this quarter to 3.15 percent, which would’ve been the highest since 2011. Instead, the yield fell steadily through May and touched an almost one-year low of 2.40 percent. Sovereign rates reached record lows in Spain and Italy amid speculation European central banksters would puff up prices with imaginary euros so no one notices when they come to grab their Vespas and Nebbiolo.

But that’s all typical. Many preferred share investors have migrated to FixedResets, attracted to the potential for some protection in stormy weather:

piano_140530
Click for Big

It was stormy weather for the Canadian preferred share market today, with PerpetualDiscounts off 4bp, FixedResets losing 53bp and DeemedRetractibles flat. The lengthy Performance Highlights table is exclusively negative and virtually entirely FixedResets – mostly low-Reset ones, since hyper-inflation is old-fashioned now and it’s clear that low rates are here forever. Volume was very high.

And that’s it for another month!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.4848 % 2,494.6
FixedFloater 4.52 % 3.77 % 34,012 17.86 1 -1.0834 % 3,795.5
Floater 2.92 % 3.02 % 48,309 19.62 4 -0.4848 % 2,693.4
OpRet 4.38 % -10.76 % 32,806 0.09 2 0.0195 % 2,710.0
SplitShare 4.81 % 3.98 % 61,321 4.17 5 -0.1270 % 3,118.2
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0195 % 2,478.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.51 % -9.28 % 90,109 0.09 15 -0.0469 % 2,404.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.35 % 103,528 14.86 21 -0.0383 % 2,550.7
FixedReset 4.59 % 3.74 % 213,003 8.77 75 -0.5261 % 2,517.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 2.29 % 160,258 0.23 43 -0.0019 % 2,519.3
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.50 % 143,983 4.00 6 -0.1390 % 2,481.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater -2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 22.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.16
Bid-YTW : 3.74 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.49
Evaluated at bid price : 21.85
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.55
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %
CU.PR.C FixedReset -1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 23.38
Evaluated at bid price : 25.00
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.07
Evaluated at bid price : 21.07
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.28
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %
FTS.PR.G FixedReset -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 22.92
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 3.78 %
BAM.PR.R FixedReset -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 23.57
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 22.35
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
PWF.PR.P FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 23.31
Evaluated at bid price : 23.70
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 4.42 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 22.46
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
MFC.PR.J FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.40
Bid-YTW : 3.46 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 115,565 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
TD.PR.O Deemed-Retractible 94,075 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.32
Bid-YTW : 2.74 %
GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible 90,200 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.25 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 67,319 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.37
Bid-YTW : 1.70 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 60,407 To be called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 2.63 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 51,605 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
There were 56 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.H FixedReset Quote: 21.07 – 21.85
Spot Rate : 0.7800
Average : 0.4741

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.07
Evaluated at bid price : 21.07
Bid-YTW : 3.66 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.00 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 0.5000
Average : 0.3137

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 4.16 %

PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 19.55 – 20.30
Spot Rate : 0.7500
Average : 0.5860

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.00 – 21.60
Spot Rate : 0.6000
Average : 0.4397

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.59
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 21.28 – 21.80
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.3788

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-30
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.28
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

SLF.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.54 – 25.89
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2162

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 3.24 %

Market Action

May 29, 2014

Fasken Martineau has some intelligent things to say about regulation, requesting a cost-benefit analysis in advance of imposing new rules, but some idiot has copy-protected it and damned if I’ll retype the interesting part.

Arvid O. I. Hoffmann and Hersh Shefrin have written a wonderful paper on retail’s use of technical analysis, titled Technical Analysis and Individual Investors:

We find that individual investors who use technical analysis and trade options frequently make poor portfolio decisions, resulting in dramatically lower returns than other investors. The data on which this claim is based consists of transaction records and matched survey responses of a sample of Dutch discount brokerage clients for the period 2000-2006. Overall, our results indicate that individual investors who report using technical analysis are disproportionately prone to have speculation on short-term stock-market developments as their primary investment objective, hold more concentrated portfolios which they turn over at a higher rate, are less inclined to bet on reversals, choose risk exposures featuring a higher ratio of nonsystematic risk to total risk, engage in more options trading, and earn lower returns.

We find that investors who report using technical analysis hold more concentrated portfolios than other investors, and have higher ratios of nonsystematic risk to total risk. They also trade more frequently than other investors, especially in respect to options. As a result of these behavior patterns, investors using technical analysis earn lower raw and risk-adjusted returns than other investors. The magnitudes are economically important: controlling for concentration and turnover, the marginal cost associated with technical analysis is approximately 50 basis points of raw return per month. Turnover associated with technical analysis adds a further 20 basis points per month of cost. Concentration adds an additional 2 basis points.

Most investors who use technical analysis do so in combination with some other strategy. Specifically, 23% of the investors in our sample use technical analysis in conjunction with some other strategy, whereas only 9% of the investors in our sample use technical analysis by itself.

Regarding the control variables, we find that portfolio concentration (Goetzmann and Kumar 2008) and turnover (Barber and Odean 2000) hurt performance, while investors with larger portfolios do better (Dhar and Zhu 2006). Of course, the latter result could be affected by the fact that better returns lead to larger portfolios. In addition, we find that investors with more trading experience (account tenure) achieve worse returns than investors with less experience, suggesting that experience may lead to overconfidence (Gervais and Odean 2001; Barber and Odean 2001a). Finally, consistent with Chalmers and Reuters (2012), Hoechle et al. (2013), and Karabulut (2013) we find that professional advice hurts investor performance.

Our results add to the literature documenting that individual investors are prone to invest in lottery-like securities that feature high risk and negative risk-adjusted returns (see Kumar 2009; Han and Kumar 2013). We find that technical analysis is the high octane gasoline that speculative high derivative rollers use to fuel their lottery-like trading. In this regard, the incremental impact of technical analysis on the risk-adjusted returns to high derivative rollers is 468 basis points per month less for speculators than for non-speculators.

Note that the “professional advice” referred to above is based on a survey of the account holders; the survey question was

3 – Professional advice: I base my investment decisions on the professional advice from an investment advisor

… which could be anything from a subscription to PrefLetter to membership in an Internet Technical Analysis Promotion Scheme. So it’s not really all that informative.

Naturally, there is some squealing from the Chosen:

All the criticism has Bloomberg First Word technical analyst William Maloney, a University of Delaware Fightin’ Blue Hens alumni, flapping his hen wings for a chance to defend technicians.

He’ll gladly show you numerous examples of how technical analysis can work effectively: the S&P 500 has consistently rebounded after slipping below its 100-day moving average over the past year.

Wow. A whole year of qualitative back-testing. Typical.

Philip Cross, a Senior Fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, brings to my attention an interesting OECD statistic:

Outside of industries directly regulated, all industries bear a cost of complying with regulations. The OECD estimates this costs the Canadian economy about 12 per cent of its GDP. While this is slightly below its high in the 1980s, it is significantly more than the 8 per cent of GDP that regulations cost the United States. One estimate conducted for the federal government is that the larger regulatory burden in Canada lowers all our incomes by an average of 2.2 per cent. This does not include the unknown cost to taxpayers of supporting the regulatory bureaucracy.

Tapering, Schmapering. The real story is the lousy economy:

The story told by bonds – especially government bonds in the developed world – is rather downcast. The yield on the Bloomberg Global Developed Sovereign Bond Index hit its lowest point in a year on Wednesday. That suggests investors are coming around to the notion that interest rates will remain lower for longer than they thought a few months back, and so are increasingly willing to load up on bonds, even at their current miserly yields.

Enbridge has issued some USD bonds:

DBRS has today assigned a rating of A (low) with a Stable trend to Enbridge Inc.’s issuance of USD 500 million 3.50% senior unsecured medium-term notes (Notes) maturing on June 10, 2024; USD 500 million 4.50% Notes maturing on June 10, 2044; and USD 500 million Notes with a Floating Rate Coupon of three-month USD LIBOR plus 0.45% due June 2, 2017 (collectively, the Notes). The Notes are expected to settle on June 4, 2014.

OK, so 4.50% for thirty-year USD money … compare it with what’s available on ENB USD FixedResets …

ImpVol_ENBUSD_140529
Click for Big

The highest spread issue is ENB.PF.U, a FixedReset, US Pay, 4.00%+315 resetting 2017-9-1, which closed today at 24.51-60 to yield 4.62%, assuming an end-price of 24.51 in 25 years … the lowest spread issue is ENB.PF.V, a US-Pay FixedReset, 4.40%+282 which closed today at 24.71-72 (HIGHER than ENB.PF.U!) to yield 4.29%, assuming an end-price of 24.71 in 25 years.

Add in the embedded inflation protection and preferential taxation, I’d say the preferreds look pretty good!

It was another poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 3bp, FixedResets losing 33bp and DeemedRetrractibles down 16bp. Volatility was high and dominated by losing FixedResets. Volume was a little above average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.5012 % 2,506.7
FixedFloater 4.47 % 3.72 % 31,659 17.94 1 0.1415 % 3,837.1
Floater 2.91 % 3.03 % 49,051 19.60 4 0.5012 % 2,706.6
OpRet 4.38 % -12.06 % 32,420 0.09 2 0.0195 % 2,709.5
SplitShare 4.80 % 3.86 % 62,190 4.17 5 0.0397 % 3,122.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0195 % 2,477.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.50 % -10.56 % 89,456 0.09 15 -0.1067 % 2,405.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.29 % 5.31 % 103,711 14.90 21 -0.0323 % 2,551.7
FixedReset 4.56 % 3.62 % 202,626 8.75 75 -0.3283 % 2,530.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.02 % 2.14 % 158,686 0.16 43 -0.1641 % 2,519.4
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.45 % 149,809 4.01 6 -0.1124 % 2,484.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -2.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.58 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
BAM.PF.E FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.57
Bid-YTW : 4.25 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 23.44
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.59
Bid-YTW : 3.48 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset -1.18 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 23.28
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
BAM.PR.C Floater 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 17.49
Evaluated at bid price : 17.49
Bid-YTW : 3.03 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.C FixedReset 187,127 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 22.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 3.49 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 152,102 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 24.92
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 88,245 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %
BNS.PR.Z FixedReset 86,734 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.09
Bid-YTW : 3.71 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset 55,735 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.75
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
RY.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 40,350 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-11-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 2.31 %
There were 37 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.23 – 22.86
Spot Rate : 0.6300
Average : 0.4016

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 21.92
Evaluated at bid price : 22.23
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 23.55 – 23.91
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2299

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.55
Bid-YTW : 4.41 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 22.45 – 22.80
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2282

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.46 – 22.90
Spot Rate : 0.4400
Average : 0.3191

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.46
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %

RY.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.33 – 25.71
Spot Rate : 0.3800
Average : 0.2712

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-28
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.33
Bid-YTW : 1.28 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 21.23 – 21.60
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2639

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-29
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 21.23
Bid-YTW : 3.72 %

Market Action

May 28, 2014

I was stunned to see the following chart in the Kansas City Fed paper by Fumiko Hayashi and Terri Bradford titled Mobile Payments: Merchants’ Perspectives:

payments
Click for Big

Geez, I pay cash nearly every time! Does this make me an old Fudd? Mind you, though, the chart needs a footnote: if they are standing directly in front of me, then all three electronic methods will be tried several times each, after which the purchaser will pay the bill in nickels.

Yesterday I took a shot at the Fair Trade do-gooders; today it’s the environmentalists’ turn:

London has a dirty secret.

Levels of the harmful air pollutant nitrogen dioxide at a city-center monitoring station are the highest in Europe. Concentrations are greater even than in Beijing, where expatriates have dubbed the city’s smog the “airpocalypse.”

It’s the law of unintended consequences at work. European Union efforts to fight climate change favored diesel fuel over gasoline because it emits less carbon dioxide, or CO2. However, diesel’s contaminants have swamped benefits from measures that include a toll drivers pay to enter central London, a thriving bike-hire program and growing public-transport network.

Europe-wide policy triggered the problem. The “dieselisation” of London’s cars began with an agreement between car manufacturers and the EU in 1998 that aimed to lower the average CO2 emissions of new vehicles. Because of diesel’s greater fuel economy, it increased in favor.

The European Commission, the EU regulatory arm, “is and always has been technologically neutral,” said Joe Hennon, a spokesman. “It does not favor diesel over petrol-powered cars. How to achieve CO2 reductions is up to member states.”

EU rules enforced since 2000 allowed diesel cars to spew more than three times the amount of oxides of nitrogen including NO2 as those using gasoline. New rules that took effect in September narrow that gap.

In yet another rant with no relationship at all to Canadian preferred shares (what?) how about this explanation of soaring tuition costs … not to mention a little flexing of new-found administrative muscle:

UniversityAdminJobs
Click for Big

In interest-rate related news (for a change!) the Treasury market was on fire today:

The U.S. sale of $35 billion of five-year notes drew the lowest yield in six months as a European bond rally bolstered the attractiveness of U.S. government securities.

The notes yielded 1.513 percent at auction yesterday, the least since November. The bid-to-cover ratio, which gauges demand by comparing total bids with the amount of debt offered, was 2.73, versus an average of 2.65 at the past 10 sales. Treasuries rose earlier along with government securities across Europe as an unexpected jump in German unemployment fueled bets the European Central Bank will introduce further stimulus next week.

“It was a strong auction, given the strength that we saw coming in,” said Sean Murphy, a trader in New York at Societe Generale SA, one of 22 primary dealers obliged to bid at U.S. debt auctions. “In the global safe-bond world, the U.S. looks relatively cheap. And we are seeing that play out in the strength of Treasuries.”

The yield on the current five-year note fell five basis points, or 0.05 percentage point, to 1.48 percent at 5 p.m. yesterday in New York, according to Bloomberg Bond Trader prices. The yield on the benchmark 10-year note fell seven basis points to 2.44 percent.

Yields on European sovereign debt fell to record lows as the number of people out of work in Germany rose 23,937 to 2.91 million in May, the Federal Labor Agency said. Economists surveyed by Bloomberg forecast a decline of 15,000.

ECB President Mario Draghi said in Portugal this week policy makers need to be “particularly watchful” of low inflation. Consumer-price increases in the euro region have been less than half the central bank’s goal of just under 2 percent since October. The ECB meets June 5.

Laurence D. Fink of Blackrock is attempting to distract regulators with other issues:

BlackRock Inc. (BLK)’s Laurence D. Fink, who oversees the world’s biggest exchange-traded fund lineup, said leveraged ETFs are a structural problem and have the potential to “blow up” the industry.

“BlackRock would never do a leveraged ETF,” Fink said in a question-and-answer session with Deutsche Bank AG co-chairman Anshu Jain today in New York. Fink said he doesn’t understand why the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission allows them to operate.

Fink said today that products with embedded leverage should be supervised. Regulators should focus their efforts on products instead of the amount of assets managed when seeking to reduce risk in the financial system, he said. BlackRock is among large money managers that has been lobbying regulators and lawmakers to avoid being labeled a systemically important financial institution, or SIFI.

… and Scotia was unable to find a buyer for CI Financial:

Bank of Nova Scotia has settled on a plan to unload the majority of its stake in asset manager CI Financial Inc., opting to sell shares directly to public investors by way of a bought deal.

Scotiabank is selling 72 million shares at $31.60 each, amounting $2.3-billion, making it one of the largest public offerings in Canada.

It was a poor day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 5bp, FixedResets losing 38bp and DeemedRetractibles down 16bp. The relatively lengthy Performance Highlights table is dominated by losers. Volume was high.

Update: PerpetualDiscounts now yield 5.28%, equivalent to 6.86% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.3x. Long Corporates now yield about 4.35%, so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread (in this context, the Seniority Spread) is now about 250bp, a widening from the 240bp reported May 15.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0418 % 2,494.2
FixedFloater 4.48 % 3.73 % 31,694 17.94 1 0.4263 % 3,831.7
Floater 2.92 % 3.06 % 49,687 19.52 4 0.0418 % 2,693.1
OpRet 4.38 % -11.33 % 33,755 0.10 2 0.0585 % 2,709.0
SplitShare 4.80 % 3.85 % 62,896 4.18 5 0.3374 % 3,120.9
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0585 % 2,477.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.50 % -10.74 % 88,259 0.09 15 0.0000 % 2,408.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.28 % 104,198 14.90 21 -0.0524 % 2,552.5
FixedReset 4.54 % 3.60 % 203,877 6.74 75 -0.3821 % 2,539.1
Deemed-Retractible 5.00 % -0.23 % 155,535 0.09 43 -0.1611 % 2,523.5
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.39 % 151,987 4.01 6 -0.0132 % 2,487.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.G FixedReset -1.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.52
Bid-YTW : 4.26 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.65
Evaluated at bid price : 24.02
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.90
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 21.98
Evaluated at bid price : 22.26
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-04-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.12
Bid-YTW : 3.30 %
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 22.65
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 23.61
Bid-YTW : 5.12 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.S FixedReset 193,518 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 25.18
Bid-YTW : 3.79 %
RY.PR.B Deemed-Retractible 116,152 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-24
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.56
Bid-YTW : -0.23 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 107,814 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 73,260 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 69,411 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.08
Evaluated at bid price : 24.88
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset 65,012 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 21.86
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
There were 47 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
ENB.PR.Y FixedReset Quote: 23.76 – 24.12
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2078

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 22.65
Evaluated at bid price : 23.76
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.60 – 22.89
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1866

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.60
Bid-YTW : 5.87 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.02 – 24.35
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2304

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.65
Evaluated at bid price : 24.02
Bid-YTW : 5.11 %

TRP.PR.E FixedReset Quote: 25.16 – 25.40
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1417

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 23.19
Evaluated at bid price : 25.16
Bid-YTW : 3.88 %

BAM.PR.K Floater Quote: 17.25 – 17.50
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1518

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 17.25
Evaluated at bid price : 17.25
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

BAM.PR.B Floater Quote: 17.26 – 17.60
Spot Rate : 0.3400
Average : 0.2558

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-28
Maturity Price : 17.26
Evaluated at bid price : 17.26
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %

Market Action

May 27, 2014

Well, the huge sums of government money spent persecuting Fabulous Fab have finally had an effect:

Fabrice Tourre, the former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) vice president found liable for his part in selling a pre-crisis mortgage security that lost value, said he won’t file an appeal in the civil case.

“While my lawyers have advised me there are strong grounds to appeal, I prefer to move forward with my education and close this difficult chapter of my life,” Tourre said in a statement today. “I look forward to finishing my Ph.D. in economics and to making meaningful contributions to my field.”

Tourre, 35, was found liable Aug. 1 after a jury trial at which the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission claimed he intentionally misled investors in a subprime-mortgage vehicle called Abacus 2007-AC1. In March, he was ordered to pay more than $825,000 in penalties.

The lawsuit was one of the government’s most prominent efforts to fix responsibility for the housing market crash, which helped precipitate the worst economic downturn since the 1930s.

It looks like all the easy shale oil money has been made:

The U.S. shale patch is facing a shakeout as drillers struggle to keep pace with the relentless spending needed to get oil and gas out of the ground.

Shale debt has almost doubled over the last four years while revenue has gained just 5.6 percent, according to a Bloomberg News analysis of 61 shale drillers. A dozen of those wildcatters are spending at least 10 percent of their sales on interest compared with Exxon Mobil Corp.’s 0.1 percent.

Drillers are caught in a bind. They must keep borrowing to pay for exploration needed to offset the steep production declines typical of shale wells. At the same time, investors have been pushing companies to cut back. Spending tumbled at 26 of the 61 firms examined. For companies that can’t afford to keep drilling, less oil coming out means less money coming in, accelerating the financial tailspin.

Good news, everybody! Not only is Toronto the largest Fair Trade city in North America, but Ethiopian coffee is Canada’s favourite FairTrade product! There’s only one teensy, tiny little problem:

The third main set of FTEPR findings concerns Fairtrade specifically. This research was unable to find any evidence that Fairtrade has made a positive difference to the wages and working conditions of those employed in the production of the commodities produced for Fairtrade certified export in the areas where the research has been conducted. This is the case for ‘smallholder’ crops like coffee – where Fairtrade standards have been based on the erroneous assumption that the vast majority of production is based on family labour – and for ‘hired labour organization’ commodities like the cut flowers produced in factory-style greenhouse conditions in Ethiopia.8 In some cases, indeed, the data suggest that those employed in areas where there are Fairtrade producer organisations are significantly worse paid, and treated, than those employed for wages in the production of the same commodities in areas without any Fairtrade certified institutions (including in areas characterised by smallholder production). At the very least, this research suggests that Fairtrade organizations need to pay far more attention to the conditions of those extremely poor rural people – especially women and girls – employed in the production of commodities labelled and sold to ‘ethical consumers’ who expect their purchases to improve the lives of the poor.

Section 3 discusses other evidence too, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative findings. The FTEPR research design did not set out to capture comprehensive data on child labour. However, in the quantitative survey results and especially in the qualitative life’s work interviews, the fact of widespread wage labour by children and teenagers (specifically, children working for wages and during school time) was inescapable.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 5bp, FixedResets down 33bp and DeemedRetractibles off 8bp. The lengthy Performance Highlights table is dominated by FixedReset losers (although Floaters got hit hard too), particularly BAM issues – presumably due to the new issue announcement. Volume was average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1700 % 2,493.2
FixedFloater 4.50 % 3.74 % 31,418 17.91 1 0.0000 % 3,815.4
Floater 2.92 % 3.04 % 50,151 19.57 4 -1.1700 % 2,691.9
OpRet 4.39 % -7.93 % 33,914 0.10 2 -0.2334 % 2,707.4
SplitShare 4.81 % 4.08 % 62,581 4.18 5 -0.0636 % 3,110.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2334 % 2,475.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.50 % -10.46 % 88,958 0.09 15 -0.0026 % 2,408.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.28 % 5.30 % 104,207 14.88 21 0.0545 % 2,553.9
FixedReset 4.53 % 3.52 % 202,660 4.48 75 -0.3327 % 2,548.8
Deemed-Retractible 4.99 % -3.11 % 146,831 0.09 43 -0.0796 % 2,527.6
FloatingReset 2.66 % 2.42 % 154,283 4.01 6 -0.1782 % 2,488.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.B Floater -2.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 17.19
Evaluated at bid price : 17.19
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.60 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 17.21
Evaluated at bid price : 17.21
Bid-YTW : 3.08 %
BAM.PF.A FixedReset -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2018-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
BAM.PR.C Floater -2.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 17.40
Evaluated at bid price : 17.40
Bid-YTW : 3.04 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset -1.39 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BAM.PR.Z FixedReset -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-12-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.92
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
FTS.PR.H FixedReset -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 21.39
Evaluated at bid price : 21.39
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.23
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 2.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ENB.PF.C FixedReset 176,888 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.94
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 161,750 Called for redemption.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 2.56 %
BAM.PF.B FixedReset 128,477 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 23.10
Evaluated at bid price : 24.80
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 102,683 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.31
Bid-YTW : 1.89 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset 101,265 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-02-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.23
Bid-YTW : 3.33 %
BNS.PR.R FixedReset 84,300 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-01-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.64
Bid-YTW : 3.31 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 23.31 – 23.80
Spot Rate : 0.4900
Average : 0.2981

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.31
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %

GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.71 – 23.10
Spot Rate : 0.3900
Average : 0.2793

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.71
Bid-YTW : 5.78 %

BAM.PR.X FixedReset Quote: 22.20 – 22.48
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1963

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 21.89
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 24.30 – 24.52
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1503

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 23.96
Evaluated at bid price : 24.30
Bid-YTW : 3.38 %

PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.26 – 23.49
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1610

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2044-05-27
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %

GWO.PR.F Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.48 – 25.68
Spot Rate : 0.2000
Average : 0.1354

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.48
Bid-YTW : -5.88 %