Market Action

October 16, 2013

The GSE debate is resurfacing, just like all the other Hallowe’en zombies:

President Barack Obama and lawmakers from both parties have called for the two mortgage-finance companies to be replaced by a new U.S. housing system. While the official position hasn’t changed, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators writing legislation is grappling with how to ensure that changes to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac don’t disrupt the recovering housing market.

Some Democrats said they are leery of engineering a switch that would liquidate the government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs, leaving it to private entities to risk their own capital on home loans.

Since they nearly collapsed during the 2008 credit crisis, the two companies have drawn $187.5 billion from taxpayers and have been considered too politically toxic to be preserved. While the U.S. holds controlling stakes, the outcome will affect private investors including hedge funds Perry Capital and Paulson and Co., which have accumulated preferred shares and have spent months lobbying for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to be recapitalized.

Driving investor hopes and the change in tone are the record profits Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (FMCC) have been posting as the housing market rebounds from the worst recession since the 1930s. The companies are required to send almost all of those profits back to the Treasury. So far, they’ve remitted about $146 billion, which under terms of the bailout counts as a return on the U.S. investment rather than a repayment.

Shareholders including Perry Capital and Fairholme Funds Inc. have sued the U.S., charging that Treasury is expropriating the value of its investors’ preferred shares in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those suits are adding urgency to lawmakers’ efforts.

James Hamilton of Econbrowser commented in August:

I have not seen the details of the specific proposals favored by Senators Corker and Warner or President Obama. If the suggestion is to return Fannie and Freddie to the status of supposedly non-governmental entities, insisting that this time the government really, truly would not bail them out if they get into trouble, I would not support the plan. We tried that idea, and it’s just not operational. The notion that a truly private company could plausibly earn its profit by guaranteeing trillions of dollars in mortgages is on its face implausible, because there is no private strategy that could truly diversify or hedge away the risk associated with major aggregate disruptions. What Fannie or Freddie really did was “guarantee” the loans as long as times were good, and count on federal assistance when times were bad.

If instead the proposal is to keep Fannie and Freddie in government receivership, and with that authority gradually slow and eventually stop the GSEs’ issuance of new debt and guarantees, then I am all on board.

The Tea Party is in a tizzy about China:

The U.S. must “shoulder its responsibility” as the world’s biggest economy and holder of the main reserve currency and “take concrete measures before Oct. 17 to avoid a default,” Deputy Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said at a briefing with reporters yesterday in Beijing in which he referred to “the attitude of the Tea Party.”

Lawmakers tied to the Tea Party didn’t appreciate the advice, even from a nation that holds almost a quarter of foreign-owned Treasuries — $1.28 trillion as of July.

“They need to stay out of our politics,” Representative Blake Farenthold, a Tea Party-backed Texas Republican, said in an interview. China’s criticism “almost sounds like a threat,” said Representative Ted Yoho, a Florida Republican. “For them to say something derogatory about the Tea Party, I take offense to that.”

It would appear that the Tea Party needs remedial education about the relationship between “paying the piper” and “calling the tune”. But they may have actually gone too far this time:

But some of them had to be queasy when they saw an NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll last week: Only 24 percent of Americans had a favorable view of the Republican Party, the lowest ever. By eight points, the public said it preferred a Congress controlled by the Democrats over one in Republican hands. Positive feelings toward the Tea Party fell to an all-time low.

Meanwhile, fear is taking its toll:

Investors pulled $41.6 billion from U.S. money-market mutual funds in the past week, or 1.6 percent of total assets, as concern grew over lawmakers’ inability to strike a budget deal that would avert a default on Treasury securities.

The exodus in the seven days through yesterday was punctuated by the withdrawal of $21.6 billion on Oct. 11, according to research firm Crane Data LLC in Westborough, Massachusetts. Investors pulled $15.7 billion in the preceeding seven days.

While the spike appeared connected to the approaching debt ceiling, it was exacerbated by companies moving cash to make bi-monthly payroll and meet a quarterly tax payment deadline on the next business day, Peter Crane, president of Crane Data, said in an interview.

The capitalist folk hero has commented on US bank regulation:

Billionaire investor Warren Buffett said JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon will withstand litigation and legal probes that led his bank to take a $7.2 billion charge in the third quarter.

“If a cop follows you for 500 miles (800 kilometers), you’re going to get a ticket,” Buffett, the chairman and CEO of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/A), said today in an interview on CNBC. “And believe me, you’ve had a lot of cops that have been following a long time, and they’re going to write some tickets.”

Banks rely on so many licenses that the threat of criminal charges can undermine their business, Buffett said. The billionaire served as interim chairman and CEO of Salomon Inc. in 1991 and 1992 as the company sought to recover from involvement in a Treasury debt auction scandal.

“A large financial institution just can’t take that,” he said. “You are in a terrible negotiating position, and I’ve been in that position. If they want to take a pound of flesh, they can take a pound of flesh. But if they want to take a ton of flesh, they can take that, too.”

The Feds have succeeded in driving away foreign capital:

Egyptian telecom investor Naguib Sawiris vows to never again consider investing in Canada after the federal government’s decision to block a $520-million bid for Manitoba Telecom Services Inc.’s Allstream division, according to a published report.

“I am finished with Canada, I tell you,” Mr. Sawiris is quoted in a lengthy article in Ahram Online, the English-language website of Egyptian news organization Al-Ahram.

I was very pleased to learn of a proposal to mitigate the effects of the dairy monopoly:

The Canadian government has struck a tentative trade deal with the European Union but is now seeking the consent of all the provinces before agreeing to the accord, sources say.

The development comes after a breakthrough in long-running talks where Ottawa agreed to more than double the amount of European cheese that can enter this country without facing steep protectionist tariffs.

Getting unanimous provincial consent sounds like a job and a half, but perhaps somebody will convince Marois that Muslims don’t eat dairy products. Regrettably:

NDP Leader Thomas Mulcair signalled he’s girding to fight the deal on the grounds it would allow in more than 13,500 additional tonnes of European cheese each year, a development that threatens to crowd out Canadian product.

I have sent the following eMail to my NDP MP:

I was very disappointed to learn ([LINK]) that the NDP intends to oppose an increase in the amount of European cheese that can enter this country without facing steep protectionist tariffs.

Why does the NDP favour charging single mums and kids extortionate rates for their dairy products in order to prop up a grossly inefficient industry that has as its main purpose the subsidization of bucolic lifestyles for the favoured few?

Why are you making it more difficult for working Canadians to provide nutritious food to their families?

But don’t worry, Big Government fans! There are plenty of little piggies waiting for their turn at the trough:

Newspaper publisher turned wannabe oilman David Black says he’s looking for $8-billion in loan guarantees from Ottawa to help cover the costs of his planned $26-billion oil refinery project. Mr. Black argues the undertaking is crucial to the country’s economy, and could even help build the energy partnership between Alberta and British Columbia.

It’s a black day for the professionalism of the Canadian investment management industry, such as it is. It looks like the OTPP’s foray into politics (sneered at on October 7) comes straight from the top:

Ontario’s proposal to create a voluntary disclosure rule to boost women on boards is unlikely to cause much improvement and will likely have to be turned into a quota, warns the head of Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan.

Speaking at a public forum Wednesday hosted by the Ontario Securities Commission, Jim Leech said Canada has a smaller proportion of women on corporate boards than countries like Turkey and Poland. He said voluntary disclosure rules can be tried for three or four years, but will probably end up being rejected as inadequate.

“Let’s skip this intermediate step we don’t think is going to work,” Mr. Leech proposed.

Teachers has urged regulators to instead require all public company boards to have at least three women directors.

Maybe Leech is sucking political arse in hopes of a position with the proposed Ontario Pension Plan.

Ottawa’s busy with another idiotic throne speech:

“Our government will introduce balanced-budget legislation,” the speech, read by Governor-General David Johnston Wednesday, said.

There are loopholes in the balanced-budget legislation if the economic turns sour. “It will require balanced budgets during normal economic times and [set] concrete timelines for returning to balance in the event of an economic crisis,” the Throne Speech said.

Balanced-budget legislation has been criticized as gimmicky because a future government could simply pass a bill repealing it.

So Spend-Every-Penny is up to his usual tricks – claiming that a balanced budget is a major accomplishment, while doing absolutely nothing to run a surplus in good times.

There’s an interesting trend on Wall Street:

Inside One Equity Partners are as many as eight Olympians and even more of their world- or Olympic gold medals, said managing partner Dick Cashin, who competed internationally as a rower and now hires former college athletes while recommending others do the same.

“Everybody thinks sports is about winning,” says the 60-year-old Cashin, who didn’t earn a medal as a member of the 1972 U.S. Olympic team. “For me, it’s more about losing and then figuring out a way to win. It’s those things that make working with athletes and hiring former athletes a reasonable thing to consider.”

I don’t have the experience to endorse the idea – and, more importantly, I don’t have the experience for you guys to accept any endorsement of mine as meaning anything – but there is a similarity to my favouring of science grads. Science grads make great analytical employees because they have the attitude that for every question, there is exactly one right answer. We can’t get there, but we can get close, and the closer your answer is to the Platonic ideal, the better it is. An athlete’s win/loss mentality is similar. Leave second place to the Arts students.

DBRS has confirmed LB.PR.E (PerpetualDiscount) and LB.PR.F (FixedReset) at Pfd-3(low) with a Positive Trend:

Laurentian’s improved earnings profile has contributed to its ability to sustain profitability from core businesses, despite a slowing Québec economy. Segment and geographic diversification continues to improve with the growth of B2B Bank (organically and through acquisitions). Notwithstanding, geographic concentration continues to be a challenge, with 62% of the loans based in Québec at the end of Q3 2013. The Bank has been able to generate consistently respectable levels of profitability in the face of maintaining conservative credit and financial risk profiles. There have been some gains made in Laurentian’s expense ratio from 2012 to the first nine months of 2013, but the cost structure remains high.

DBRS has confirmed CWB.PR.A at Pfd-3(high) [Stable]:

CWB’s most important strengths are its strong asset quality as evidenced by its very long history of low write-off rates, its proven niche strategy using relationship-based lending, its low cost base (partially due to business mix) and its strong internal capital generation. Additionally, funding diversification has improved over the past several years. CWB recently recorded its 101st consecutive profitable quarter.

Challenges remain, including concentration in the loan book, both geographically (Alberta and British Columbia) and by industry (commercial, construction and real estate lending), although the secured nature of the loan book and low write-off rates suggest this issue has been well managed throughout the Bank’s history.

It was a mildly negative day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts off 2bp, FixedResets losing 17bp and DeemedRetractibles down 3bp. Given such lack of movement the Performance Highlights table is surprisingly lengthy, featuring losing FixedResets. Volume was above average.

Update: US uncertainty resolved… for a while:

The U.S. Congress voted to halt the 16-day government shutdown and raise the U.S. debt limit, ending the nation’s fiscal impasse.

The House of Representatives voted 285-144 to clear a measure that now heads to President Barack Obama for his signature. The House vote was less than three hours after the Senate passed the bill, 81-18.

The agreement negotiated by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and Minority Leader Mitch McConnell will fund the government at Republican-backed spending levels through Jan. 15, 2014, and suspend the debt limit through Feb. 7, setting up another round of confrontations then.

All of the votes against the proposal in the Senate were from Republicans. One senator, Republican James Inhofe of Oklahoma, was absent.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0633 % 2,444.4
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.58 % 28,972 18.26 1 0.0000 % 3,888.9
Floater 2.77 % 2.98 % 63,588 19.78 5 0.0633 % 2,639.3
OpRet 4.62 % 2.77 % 63,971 0.45 3 -0.0769 % 2,642.5
SplitShare 4.76 % 5.10 % 64,290 3.99 6 0.0540 % 2,948.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0769 % 2,416.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.83 % 3.96 % 108,961 0.08 7 0.0725 % 2,280.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.61 % 159,522 14.44 30 -0.0204 % 2,332.7
FixedReset 4.98 % 3.77 % 230,721 3.41 85 -0.1669 % 2,441.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.42 % 191,828 6.85 43 -0.0345 % 2,372.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -2.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 21.28
Evaluated at bid price : 21.56
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 21.67
Evaluated at bid price : 22.11
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.05
Bid-YTW : 4.34 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.39
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 23.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.61
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %
CGI.PR.D SplitShare 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2023-06-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 4.43 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset 1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.34
Evaluated at bid price : 19.34
Bid-YTW : 4.36 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 4.64 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 102,522 RBC crossed 100,000 at 26.17.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 2.59 %
BAM.PF.C Perpetual-Discount 50,267 TD crossed 17,000 at 19.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
GWO.PR.I Deemed-Retractible 30,513 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.18
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 29,113 RBC crossed 15,100 at 24.64.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.59
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 27,075 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 25,444 TD crossed 25,000 at 25.97.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.96
Bid-YTW : 3.45 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
PWF.PR.A Floater Quote: 22.31 – 23.29
Spot Rate : 0.9800
Average : 0.6621

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 22.08
Evaluated at bid price : 22.31
Bid-YTW : 2.35 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 19.75 – 20.49
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.6263

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 2.67 %

MFC.PR.K FixedReset Quote: 23.39 – 23.70
Spot Rate : 0.3100
Average : 0.1971

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.39
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.41 – 22.89
Spot Rate : 0.4800
Average : 0.3750

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 22.10
Evaluated at bid price : 22.41
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %

BAM.PR.G FixedFloater Quote: 22.01 – 22.53
Spot Rate : 0.5200
Average : 0.4284

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 22.42
Evaluated at bid price : 22.01
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 20.16 – 20.49
Spot Rate : 0.3300
Average : 0.2540

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-16
Maturity Price : 20.16
Evaluated at bid price : 20.16
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %

Issue Comments

BNS.PR.Q / BNS.PR.B Conversion Results Announced

The Bank of Nova Scotia has announced:

that 5,960,732 of its 14,000,000 Non-cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares Series 20 of Scotiabank (the “Preferred Shares Series 20”) have been elected for conversion on October 26, 2013, on a one-for-one basis, into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares Series 21 of Scotiabank (the “Preferred Shares Series 21”). Consequently, on October 26, 2013, Scotiabank will have 8,039,268 Preferred Shares Series 20 and 5,960,732 Preferred Shares Series 21 issued and outstanding. The Preferred Shares Series 20 and Preferred Shares Series 21 will be listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbols BNS.PR.Q and BNS.PR.B, respectively.

I had previously recommended conversion of BNS.PR.Q to BNS.PR.B.

Market Action

October 15, 2013

There’s an interesting comment in the BoC’s 2014–15 Debt Management Strategy Consultations:

Non-residents now hold about 28 per cent of Government of Canada marketable debt securities, approximately double the average for the five years preceding the financial crisis. Increased demand for Government of Canada securities by non-residents helps to diversify the investor base. At the same time, some market participants suggest that the growing share of securities held by foreign institutional investors, in particular, central banks and sovereign wealth funds, may be affecting the liquidity of certain sectors of the Government of Canada securities market, since some of these investors may not actively lend their securities in the repo market. Anecdotal evidence gathered by the Bank of Canada suggests that large increases in foreign official Canadian-dollar holdings have coincided with the more frequent “specials” in the Canadian debt markets. [Footnote] More research is necessary, however, to determine to what extent this relationship is causal and not explained by other factors.

Footnote reads: A security that is “on special” is an asset that is subject to elevated demand in the repo market. This causes securities borrowers in the repo market to compete for the asset by offering to lend cash below prevailing interest rates.

Specials are a wonderful opportunity for alert active portfolio managers to outperform, since the price of ‘special’ securities will rise as the shorts frantically try to square their positions. Regrettably, this may be exploited only from a ‘long-only’ perspective: shorting the temporarily expensive security carries a very high probability that all your profits from price movements will be eaten up by the cost of borrowing the security.

There is also an acknowledgment of the regulatory aspect of financial repression:

Demand for Government of Canada securities is being affected by several other important factors. Regulatory initiatives are increasing the need for high-quality collateral, which in Canada is reflected in greater demand for treasury bills and short-term bonds. In addition, the federal government and a number of provincial governments, as well as some corporations have put in place new prudential liquidity and contingency measures that have large, stable allocations to Government of Canada securities, especially treasury bills and short-term bonds. Structural changes, such as Canada’s new central counterparty for the fixed-income market and, in particular, the introduction of central clearing for blind repo trades for interdealer brokers, may also be influencing dynamics in the repo market.

One of the questions is of great interest:

In the Debt Management Strategy for 2013–14, the government announced the continuation of the temporary increase in the issuance of 10- and 30-year bonds and signalled that it would be assessing the potential benefits of issuing bonds with a maturity of 40 years or longer.

How would you characterize the demand for long-term bonds since yields began rising in May 2013 and how do you see it evolving?

All together, folks! WE WANT FORTIES! WE WANT FORTIES!

Many readers will find the following section fascinating:

Fixed-income products in Canada are typically traded over the counter (OTC), whereas equities are traded on public exchanges. Many financial institutions, institutional investors and wealth managers participate in electronic marketplaces to facilitate the trading of fixed-income securities. However, for retail investors, acquiring a position in fixed-income securities often involves buying money market and bond mutual funds or exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Wealth managers offer another avenue for retail investors to acquire fixed-income securities by leveraging institutional buying of fixed-income securities. Retail investors that prefer not to pay the asset-management fees associated with mutual funds, ETFs
and wealth managers can buy and sell fixed-income securities through an online or discount brokerage account. However, the relative opaqueness of the OTC market has led to criticism of broker compensation, transaction fees and the cost of trading from one’s own broker account. Changes implemented by the Canadian Securities Administrators to National Instrument 31-103 Registration Requirements, Exemptions and Ongoing Registrant Obligations seek to enhance registrants’ relationships with their clients (retail investors) through an expansion of cost and registrant compensation disclosure, as well as the introduction of performance reporting.

16. Of those retail investors with an online or discount brokerage account, what proportion use their account to buy fixed-income securities in general and Government of Canada securities specifically?

17. What are your views on the impact of the additional fee, commission and cost transparency required under National Instrument 31-103 for dealer and broker activities? Will these changes help to promote greater price transparency for retail investors?

18. What measures could the Government of Canada take to facilitate easier retail investor access to its debt securities?

I would be very pleased to see a Canadian programme run along the lines of Treasury Direct. On the other hand, retail is grossly over-invested in Canadas – they’re paying an enormous liquidity premium that they will never, ever need, and a smaller, but still large, regulatory premium that is simply not applicable.

Market-Timers are busily retiming the timing of their timing:

Incredibly, retail investors are now moving back into bonds. September U.S. mutual fund flow data is now out, and last month three of the four highest net inflows went into bond and credit funds, according to Morningstar. Non-traditional bonds led the way, then high yield bonds, then short-term bonds. Institutional clients don’t seem so scared either, considered how they plowed money into the Verizon Communication’s record debt offering.

Given all this data, there’s a growing counter-theory, one that hails the ‘not-so-great rotation.’ Last year Bank of America Merrill Lynch put out a report that called “The Bond Era Ends.” Morgan Stanley’s pushing back with its own report, titled “Great Rotation? Probably not.”

On the other hand, market timers are also winning the Nobel Prize, so take your pick:

Fama helped revolutionize the practice of investing by showing it was difficult to predict individual stock prices in the short run. That led to the emergence of index funds as a common investment.

Shiller showed that there’s more predictability in stock and bond markets in the long run. That encouraged the creation of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, that take bets on market trends.

In the late 1990s, Shiller said the stock market was overvalued “and lo and behold he was proven right” when the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, said Nobel committee secretary Peter Englund.

“He also predicted for a long time that the housing market was overvalued and again he was proven right,” Englund said. The U.S. property market suffered a crash in 2007 that helped fuel the global financial crisis.

Englund said he believes the three laureates agree on the findings for which they were awarded. However, Fama and Shiller have different “interpretations of the real world,” he added.

“It’s no secret that for Eugene Fama the sort of null hypothesis is that markets work well and he is willing to believe that until he is proven otherwise whereas for Robert Shiller, I think his null hypothesis is that there are periods of excessive optimism and pessimism,” Englund said.

Swiss Re may join the exodus from US life insurance:

Swiss Re Ltd. (SREN) is considering selling Aurora National Life Assurance Co. as it retreats from the U.S. life and health insurance market, people familiar with the matter said.

The world’s second-largest reinsurer is working with Barclays Plc to find buyers for Aurora National and some other U.S. assets, two people said, asking not to be identified because the matter isn’t public. The sale could fetch more than $400 million, one person said.
The deal would include about $5 billion in insurance assets, including corporate-owned and other life-insurance policies and annuities, said one person.

Corporate bond trading is entering a new era and nobody knows (or cares) where it will end:

A record share of U.S. corporate-bond trading has moved to computers as buyers who traditionally transacted over the phone seek faster ways to buy and sell in a market where Wall Street’s human traders are retreating.

Investment-grade volumes on MarketAxess Holdings Inc.’s electronic system are on pace to exceed $400 billion in 2013 after surging 45 percent to $44 billion in September from a year earlier, according to data from the company, which estimates it captures about 90 percent of electronic trades among the dollar-denominated notes. That’s equal to 14.3 percent of all market activity, including business done over the phone, up from 12.2 percent a year earlier.

While the dollar-denominated investment-grade bond market has increased 71 percent since 2008 to about $4.3 trillion, the size of each transaction declined to about $565,000 in the three months ended June 30, compared with about $970,000 in the first three months of 2007, according to Trace, Finra’s bond-price reporting system, which tracks both electronic transactions and those negotiated over the phone. The average investment-grade trade on MarketAxess’ system was $600,000, according to Rick McVey, the company’s chief executive officer.

“Dealers do not have the balance-sheet capacity to warehouse large block trades from investors the way they used to, so investors are breaking trades down into smaller sizes,” he said in a telephone interview.

The biggest U.S. banks’ fixed-income trading revenue probably fell 20 percent in the third quarter from a year earlier on lower volumes, Richard Staite, an analyst at Atlantic Equities LLP, said in a Sept. 23 report.

“It’s a reasonable-size business in terms of revenues for them, but they don’t have the balance sheet capacity to be the backstop for the market,” said Roger Rudisuli, a partner in McKinsey’s corporate and investment banking practice, speaking about dealers generally. “They cannot play this role anymore.”

Fitch placed the US on Watch-Negative:

The prolonged negotiations over raising the debt ceiling (following the episode in August 2011) risks undermining confidence in the role of the U.S. dollar as the preeminent global reserve currency, by casting doubt over the full faith and credit of the U.S. This “faith” is a key reason why the U.S. ‘AAA’ rating can tolerate a substantially higher level of public debt than other ‘AAA’ sovereigns.

The repeated brinkmanship over raising the debt ceiling also dents confidence in the effectiveness of the U.S. government and political institutions, and in the coherence and credibility of economic policy. It will also have some detrimental effect on the U.S. economy.

In the event of a deal to raise the debt ceiling and to resolve the government shutdown, which Fitch expects, the outcome of a subsequent review of the ratings would take into account the manner and duration of the agreement and the perceived risk of a similar episode occurring in the future. It would also reflect Fitch’s assessment of the following main factors:

– The impact of the debt ceiling brinkmanship and government shutdown on our assessment of the effectiveness of government and political institutions, the coherence and credibility of economic policy, the potential long-term impact on the U.S. sovereign’s cost of funding and cost of capital for the economy as a whole, and the implications for long-term growth.

– Our assessment of the prospects for further deficit-reduction measures in future years necessary to contain government deficits in the face of long-term spending pressures and place public debt on a downward path over the medium to long term.

There’s some interesting data on fast-food wage scales:

Data from the U.S. Census Bureau and public benefit programs show 52 per cent of fast-food cooks, cashiers and other “front-line” staff had relied on at least one form of public assistance, such as Medicaid, food stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit program, between 2007 and 2011, researchers at the University of California-Berkeley and the University of Illinois said.

In a concurrent report, the pro-labor National Employment Law Project found that the 10 largest fast-food companies in the United States cost taxpayers more than $3.8 billion each year in public assistance because the workers do not make enough to pay for basic necessities themselves.

The Employment Policies Institute, which has opposed calls for higher fast-food wages in the past, said in a statement that the reports “ignore economic evidence that dramatic wage hikes would make fast food workers worse off” when employers “replace employees with less-costly automated alternatives.”

Replace order-takers? That’s what’s happening in Europe:

McDonalds recently went on a hiring binge in the U.S., adding 62,000 employees to its roster. The hiring picture doesn’t look quite so rosy for Europe, where the fast food chain is drafting 7,000 touch-screen kiosks to handle cashiering duties.

The move is designed to boost efficiency and make ordering more convenient for customers. In an interview with the Financial Times, McDonald’s Europe President Steve Easterbrook notes that the new system will also open up a goldmine of data. McDonald’s could potentially track every Big Mac, McNugget, and large shake you order. A calorie account tally at the end of the year could be a real shocker.

The touch screens will only accept debit or credit cards, adding to the slow death knell of cash and coins.

So we have the slightly unusual situation of Europe being ahead in automation because of low US labour costs. I suggest that this, rather than any bleeding-heartedness, is a good reason to raise the minimum wage. The burger flippers will then, perforce, find something more useful to do.

Everybody’s preparing for a US default:

A default may not disrupt markets as long as the U.S. alerted traders the night before a payment was due that it was probably going to default, giving the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire, an electronic service that transfers securities and payments, enough time to adjust its programs and allow the defaulted debt to be “transferable,” according to JPMorgan Chase & Co. That would allow them to continue to be used as collateral in repo markets.

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, or Sifma, in a statement this month said if the Treasury were to delay payments on debt it would extend the payment date of the securities one day at a time. The Treasury Market Practice Group, an industry organization sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York that advises on transactions in U.S. securities, said last month contingency planning developed since the 2011 debt-limit crisis would mitigate yet not eliminate the operational risk posed by government-debt payment delays.

Some clearing firms are preparing for a default, with Citigroup Inc. and State Street Corp. discussing ways to limit the use of short-term Treasury bills as collateral in coming weeks, the Wall Street Journal reported on its website yesterday, citing people familiar with the matter. Citigroup told some clients it would prefer not to take U.S. government debt maturing Oct. 24 or Oct. 31 as security for transactions, the newspaper reported.

Norway has a very good Sovereign Wealth Fund policy – but even they have a problem involving politicians on one hand and a large pot of money on the other:

The Labor government, which resigned yesterday, presented what it called a “cautious” budget, saying it would use 135 billion kroner ($22 billion) of Norway’s oil wealth to plug deficits next year, equal to 5.5 percent of mainland gross domestic product. That leaves Solberg’s administration with 54 billion kroner to spend before it breaches the nation’s fiscal policy rule.

Solberg and her coalition partner, the Progress Party, have until early November to adjust the spending plan put forward by the outgoing administration. While she has promised to stick to the fiscal rule, which caps expenditure of Norway’s oil income at 4 percent of its wealth fund, the two parties have signaled they want to spend more on infrastructure, education and health care. Those measures will come on top of planned tax cuts.

DBRS has published its Quarterly Split Share Market Report:

DBRS has today published its quarterly surveillance report covering the Canadian split share market for Q3 2013. The report provides insight into recent market activity and summarizes the performance of split share funds rated by DBRS. Three main areas are covered in the report: equity performance, existing fund activity and new fund market activity. The appendix provides details on all of the preferred shares and securities rated by DBRS, including current ratings and recent downside protection levels.

A copy of this commentary is available by contacting us at info@dbrs.com.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 7bp, FixedResets off 2bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. The Performance Highlights table is longer than one might expect given these quiet figures, but Floaters continued to plunge. Volume was low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.0948 % 2,442.9
FixedFloater 4.32 % 3.58 % 29,284 18.26 1 -0.6321 % 3,888.9
Floater 2.77 % 2.99 % 64,564 19.76 5 -1.0948 % 2,637.6
OpRet 4.62 % 2.16 % 63,641 0.45 3 -0.0897 % 2,644.6
SplitShare 4.76 % 4.99 % 63,575 4.00 6 0.1353 % 2,946.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0897 % 2,418.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 0.44 % 109,920 0.08 8 0.0399 % 2,279.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.60 % 159,991 14.44 30 0.0663 % 2,333.1
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.75 % 236,380 3.59 85 -0.0239 % 2,445.0
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.40 % 192,480 3.70 43 0.0067 % 2,373.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -2.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 2.66 %
CIU.PR.C FixedReset -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 19.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.53 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 22.20
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 17.50
Evaluated at bid price : 17.50
Bid-YTW : 3.02 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset 1.71 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.36
Bid-YTW : 4.19 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.D FixedReset 182,975 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 100,000 and 30,000, both at 25.02, and bought 10,000 from TD at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 86,910 RBC crossed 75,000 at 26.21.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-02-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.13
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount 72,150 TD crossed 58,000 at 22.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.49
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %
TD.PR.R Deemed-Retractible 51,280 RBC crossed 50,000 at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.75
Evaluated at bid price : 25.95
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BNS.PR.N Deemed-Retractible 44,450 Nesbitt crossed 15,000 at 25.70; RBC crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.69
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset 38,689 Scotia bought 11,900 from Nesbitt at 25.19, then crossed 25,000 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.19
Bid-YTW : 1.68 %
There were 22 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
HSE.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 22.65 – 23.39
Spot Rate : 0.7400
Average : 0.4209

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 22.28
Evaluated at bid price : 22.65
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %

TRI.PR.B Floater Quote: 19.81 – 20.49
Spot Rate : 0.6800
Average : 0.5015

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 2.66 %

GWO.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 21.76 – 22.29
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.3768

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.76
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %

MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 22.36 – 23.08
Spot Rate : 0.7200
Average : 0.5749

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.36
Bid-YTW : 4.82 %

CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.40 – 23.83
Spot Rate : 0.4300
Average : 0.2899

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-15
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %

BNS.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.02 – 25.25
Spot Rate : 0.2300
Average : 0.1449

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-04-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.02
Bid-YTW : 4.23 %

PrefLetter

October PrefLetter Released!

The October, 2013, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The regular appendices reporting on DeemedRetractibles and FixedResets are included.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the October, 2013, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the November, 2013, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close November 8 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on November 11.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

Issue Comments

CGI: 13H1 Semi-Annual Report

Canadian General Investments Limited has released its Semi-Annual Report to June 30, 2013.

Figures of interest are:

MER: The MER per unit of the Fund, excluding the cost of leverage, was 1.76% as at June 30, 2013.

Average Net Assets: We need this figure to calculate portfolio yield. [(456.1-million (NAV, beginning of period) + 443.9-million (NAV, end of period)] / 2 = about $450.0-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Total income of 7.340-million times two (semi-annual) divided by average net assets of 450.0-million is 3.26%

Income Coverage: Total Investment Income of 7.340-million divided by Expenses and Preferred Share Distributions of 7.224-million is 102%.

Unit Value: To use the Split Share Credit Quality Model, we need a unit value, but the company does not keep the number of capital units equal to the number of preferred shares. However, shareholders’ equity is 442.1-million, compared to preferred shares outstanding of 150-million, so we can say that the Unit Value is 3.95x the preferred share value, so call it (equivalent to) 98.68.

Capital Unit Dividends: Dividends of 2.503-million were paid to capital unitholders in 13H1; this was 34% of total investment income, which we determined above was 3.26% of total assets. Therefore 1.11% of total assets were paid as capital unit dividends. Total assets can be modelled as 25.00 (preferred) + 98.68 (capital units) = 123.68 and 1.11% of that is $1.37.

CGI has two series of preferred shares outstanding: CGI.PR.C and CGI.PR.D.

Issue Comments

DGS.PR.A: 13H1 Semi-Annual Report

Dividend Growth Split Corp. has released its Semi-Annual Report to June 30, 2013.

Figures of interest are:

MER: The MER per unit of the Fund, excluding the cost of leverage, was 1.03% as at June 30, 2013.

Average Net Assets: We need this figure to calculate portfolio yield. [(106.7-million (NAV, beginning of period) + 108.9-million (NAV, end of period)] / 2 = about $108-million.

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Total income of 2,347,802 times two (semi-annual) divided by average net assets of 108-million is 4.35%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 1,789,415 divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 1,653,042 is 108%.

Market Action

October 11, 2013

The witch-hunt against traders continues:

The U.S. Justice Department has opened a criminal investigation of possible manipulation of the $5.3 trillion-a-day foreign exchange market, a person familiar with the matter said.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is also looking into alleged rigging of interest rates associated with the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, is in the early stages of its currency market probe, said the person, who asked not to be identified because the inquiry is confidential.

The U.S. investigation comes as the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority said in June it was reviewing potential manipulation of exchange rates. That month, allegations that dealers at banks pooled information through instant messages and used client orders to move benchmark currency rates were reported by Bloomberg News. Regulators are probing the alleged abuse of financial benchmarks used in markets from oil to interest rate swaps by the firms that play a central role in setting them.

Readers will remember that the shocking allegations are that traders would position their inventories to meet known pending client orders.

You can like or dislike Obama but he’s got one thing right:

President Barack Obama knows who is the boss: the bond market.

“Ultimately, what matters is: What do the people who are buying Treasury bills think?” the president told reporters this week, when discussing measures he could take to end the threat of a historic default on the nation’s debt.

Coming up next: courses on how to cheat on personality tests:

They can drive cars, win Jeopardy and find your soon-to-be favorite song. Machines are also learning to decipher the most human qualities about you — and help businesses predict your potential to be their next star employee.

A handful of technology companies from Knack.it Corp. to Evolv Inc. are doing just that, developing video games and online questionnaires that measure personality attributes in a job applicant. Based on patterns of how a company’s best performers responded in these assessments, the software estimates a candidate’s suitability to be everything from a warehouse worker to an investment bank analyst.

Once in my twenties, when I was so desperate for work I would apply for jobs at banks and undergo the ordeal of speaking to stupid people, I was required to take a personality test. Multiple choice. Page one of the test was how you thought of yourself with respect to various attributes. Page two – cunningly designed so you couldn’t see your answsrs to page 1 when filling in page 2 – was how you thought other people perceived you with respect to those same attributes. Fortunately, I’d heard of this ridiculous piece of HR ass-covering, and knew that what you said didn’t matter much – they were interested in how closely page 1 and 2 matched. So I made the responses almost identical.

In many ways, it must be nice to be American. A constitution that actually means something, a culture that supports it and an independent judiciary that enforces it:

New York’s ban on outdoor smoking in state parks was blocked by a judge after a smokers’-rights group argued that the Office of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preservation exceeded its authority.

Supreme Court Justice George B. Ceresia Jr. in Troy, in a ruling dated Oct. 8 and made public today, permanently blocked the office from implementing or enforcing the ban and ordered it to remove any signs referring to it.

The office “extended its reach beyond interstitial rule-making and into the realm of legislating,” Ceresia wrote in his ruling, saying state law doesn’t give the parks office the right to promulgate rules “regulating conduct bearing any tenuous relationship to park patrons’ health or welfare.”

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts up 9bp, FixedResets off 3bp and DeemedRetractibles gaining 1bp. No particular patterns are observable on the moderately sized Performance Highlights table. Volume was very low.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.6320 % 2,469.9
FixedFloater 4.29 % 3.55 % 30,410 18.32 1 1.0032 % 3,913.6
Floater 2.74 % 2.97 % 62,086 19.82 5 -0.6320 % 2,666.8
OpRet 4.61 % 1.70 % 64,511 0.46 3 0.1154 % 2,647.0
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.04 % 64,312 4.01 6 0.0745 % 2,942.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1154 % 2,420.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 0.65 % 105,015 0.10 8 0.0924 % 2,278.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.59 % 5.58 % 165,538 14.47 30 0.0948 % 2,331.6
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.73 % 229,984 3.42 85 -0.0311 % 2,445.6
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.41 % 184,660 6.86 43 0.0115 % 2,373.0
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 20.41
Evaluated at bid price : 20.41
Bid-YTW : 2.58 %
HSB.PR.D Deemed-Retractible -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.76
Bid-YTW : 5.20 %
PWF.PR.A Floater -1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 22.21
Evaluated at bid price : 22.48
Bid-YTW : 2.32 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset -1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 4.58 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 22.52
Evaluated at bid price : 22.15
Bid-YTW : 3.55 %
SLF.PR.H FixedReset 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount 1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 229,500 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 150,000 and 75,000, both at 23.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.45
Bid-YTW : 5.28 %
SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible 70,782 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 21.85; Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 20,000 each, both at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.84
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
PWF.PR.R Perpetual-Discount 68,910 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 20,000 and 40,000, both at 24.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 24.28
Evaluated at bid price : 24.69
Bid-YTW : 5.56 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 60,344 Nesbitt crossed 35,000 at 25.61; TD crossed 17,500 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : 3.17 %
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 54,955 TD crossed 51,600 at 23.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 23.09
Evaluated at bid price : 23.40
Bid-YTW : 5.29 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 41,300 Will reset at 3.5595%.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.53
Bid-YTW : 3.86 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 22.47 – 23.06
Spot Rate : 0.5900
Average : 0.4159

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.47
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %

GWO.PR.P Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.31 – 24.67
Spot Rate : 0.3600
Average : 0.2505

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.31
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %

IAG.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.39 – 22.79
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2912

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.39
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %

TRP.PR.B FixedReset Quote: 20.18 – 20.47
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1824

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 20.18
Evaluated at bid price : 20.18
Bid-YTW : 4.04 %

PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.17 – 22.49
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2177

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 21.83
Evaluated at bid price : 22.17
Bid-YTW : 5.58 %

ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount Quote: 21.10 – 21.45
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2503

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-11
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 5.66 %

Issue Comments

AQN.PR.A Upgraded to P-3(high) from P-3 by S&P

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

  • We are raising our long-term corporate credit rating on Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp. (APUC) and subsidiaries Algonquin Power Co. (APCO) and Liberty Utilities Co. to ‘BBB’ from ‘BBB-‘.
  • We are also raising our senior unsecured debt rating on APCO to ‘BBB’ from ‘BBB-‘.
  • In addition, we are raising our global scale and Canada scale preferred stock ratings on APUC to ‘BB+’ and ‘P-3 (High)’ from ‘BB’ and ‘P-3’, respectively.
  • We base the upgrade on the increase in regulated cash flow, which is currently at 40%-45% of consolidated cash flow and which we forecast will continue to increase in the medium term.
  • The stable outlook reflects our assessment of relatively stable cash flows supported by regulated cash flow from Liberty’s regulated utility business and APCO’s largely contracted power asset portfolio.


The stable outlook reflects our assessment of relatively stable cash flows, supported by regulated cash flow from Liberty’s regulated utility business, and APCO’s largely contracted power asset portfolio.

We could take a negative rating action if APUC fails to execute its development projects and acquisitions with financing arrangements that allow it to maintain its key financial measures. We expect APUC to achieve AFFO-to-total debt of greater than 15% within the next 12 to 24 months, with at least 45% of its consolidated cash flows supported by regulated cash flows from Liberty. Failure to achieve this expectation could also result in a negative rating action.

We could raise the rating if APUC achieves sustained AFFO-to-debt of greater than 25%, with a higher proportion of cash flow contributions from Liberty, all else being equal.

Indices and ETFs

TXPR / TXPL Index Revision

Standard & Poor’s has announced:

the following index changes as a result of the quarterly S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index and S&P/TSX Venture Select Index Reviews. These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, October 21, 2013.

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index

ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
BMO.PR.R BANK OF MONTREAL FLTG RATE CL ‘B’ PR SER 17 063671 77 0
BNS.PR.O BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA (THE) PR SERIES ’17’ 064149 75 0
FTS.PR.K FORTIS INC. 1ST PR SERIES ‘K’ 349553 78 4
L.PR.A LOBLAW COMPANIES LIMITED 2ND PR SERIES ‘A’ 539481 60 6
PPL.PR.A PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 1 706327 20 2
POW.PR.D POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA 5.00% SER ‘D’ PR 739239 86 1
POW.PR.A POWER CORPORATION OF CANADA 5.60% SER ‘A’ PR 739239 88 7
RY.PR.G ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 1ST PR NON-CUM SER ‘AG’ 780102 55 4
TD.PR.T TORONTO-DOMINION BANK(THE) FLTG RT PR SER T 891145 72 4
W.PR.H WESTCOAST ENERGY INC. 5.50% 1ST PR SERIES ‘7’ 95751D 88 8
DELETIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
CIU.PR.B CU INC. CUMULATIVE PR SERIES ‘2’ 22944C 30 4

S&P/TSX Preferred Share Laddered Index

ADDITIONS
Symbol Issue Name CUSIP
PPL.PR.A PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION CL ‘A’ PR SER 1 706327 20 2
Market Action

October 10, 2013

Maneuvering continues on the US debt limit:

The White House endorsed a short debt-limit increase with no policy conditions attached, signaling potential support for House Republicans’ plan for a month-long reprieve from a default.

The idea, proposed today by House Speaker John Boehner, wouldn’t end the 10-day old partial shutdown of the federal government. The plan would push the lapse of U.S. borrowing authority to Nov. 22 from Oct. 17.

It was a rather strangely mixed day on the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts and DeemedRetractibles both flat, while FixedResets were down 23bp. BAM issues were notable losers on the Performance Highlights table. Volume was quite high.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2583 % 2,485.6
FixedFloater 4.33 % 3.59 % 30,899 18.24 1 -0.1914 % 3,874.7
Floater 2.72 % 2.97 % 61,485 19.81 5 -0.2583 % 2,683.8
OpRet 4.62 % 3.18 % 61,408 0.63 3 0.2829 % 2,643.9
SplitShare 4.77 % 5.08 % 65,038 4.01 6 0.1491 % 2,940.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2829 % 2,417.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 1.42 % 108,513 0.10 8 -0.0948 % 2,276.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.59 % 5.56 % 160,692 14.45 30 -0.0015 % 2,329.4
FixedReset 4.97 % 3.74 % 235,995 3.60 85 -0.2346 % 2,446.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.15 % 4.46 % 187,539 6.87 43 0.0000 % 2,372.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PF.D Perpetual-Discount -1.74 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.25 %
BAM.PR.T FixedReset -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.33
Bid-YTW : 4.52 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset -1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.29 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 17.57
Evaluated at bid price : 17.57
Bid-YTW : 3.00 %
BAM.PR.X FixedReset -1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.96
Evaluated at bid price : 22.37
Bid-YTW : 4.29 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.42
Bid-YTW : 4.76 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset -1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.40
Evaluated at bid price : 22.80
Bid-YTW : 3.82 %
BAM.PR.B Floater -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 17.74
Evaluated at bid price : 17.74
Bid-YTW : 2.97 %
ENB.PR.H FixedReset -1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.43
Evaluated at bid price : 23.26
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.40 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 2.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.49
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 2.30 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
MFC.PR.A OpRet 304,000 TD crossed blocks of 199,500 and 50,000 at 25.55. RBC crossed 49,400 at the same price.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-19
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.43
Bid-YTW : 3.39 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset 109,600 RBC crossed two blocks of 49,400 each, both at 25.48.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-09-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.46
Bid-YTW : 3.98 %
MFC.PR.H FixedReset 60,270 TD crossed 49,000 at 25.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2017-03-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.75
Bid-YTW : 3.77 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset 57,075 Maple (who?) bought 19,300 from Hampton (who?) at 19,300.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.77
Bid-YTW : 3.70 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 54,779 Nesbitt crossed 30,000 at 21.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 44,800 RBC crossed 35,000 at 21.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 5.42 %
There were 49 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Quote: 24.15 – 24.52
Spot Rate : 0.3700
Average : 0.2250

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2025-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %

TD.PR.S FixedReset Quote: 24.48 – 24.78
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1785

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 3.69 %

IFC.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 25.51 – 25.79
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1674

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 3.53 %

TD.PR.I FixedReset Quote: 25.62 – 25.90
Spot Rate : 0.2800
Average : 0.1774

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.62
Bid-YTW : 2.70 %

CIU.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 19.36 – 20.15
Spot Rate : 0.7900
Average : 0.6938

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 19.36
Evaluated at bid price : 19.36
Bid-YTW : 4.31 %

FTS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 22.45 – 22.98
Spot Rate : 0.5300
Average : 0.4366

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2043-10-10
Maturity Price : 22.16
Evaluated at bid price : 22.45
Bid-YTW : 5.34 %