MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : March 2023

Turnover plummetted to 5% in March, and was zero in the latter half of the month. With volatility and nervousness due to worries about financial stability, spreads were wide; in addition, high trading volumes in the past two months have left the portfolio in a highly optimized condition.

Sectoral distribution of the MAPF portfolio on March 31, 2023, were:

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2023-3-31
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0% N/A N/A
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualDiscount 6.2% 6.69% 12.98
Fixed-Reset Discount 75.5% 7.86% 11.93
Insurance – Straight 0% N/A N/A
FloatingReset 0% N/A N/A
FixedReset Premium 0% N/A N/A
FixedReset Bank non-NVCC 0% N/A N/A
FixedReset Insurance non-NVCC 4.2% 7.88% 12.43
Scraps – Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – FixedFloater 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – Floater 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – OpRet 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – SplitShare 1.0% 10.51% 1.59
Scraps – PerpPrem 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – PerpDisc 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – FR Discount 6.9% 9.29% 10.86
Scraps – Insurance Straight 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – FloatingReset 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – FR Premium 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – Bank non-NVCC 0% N/A N/A
Scraps – Ins non-NVCC 5.8% 7.94% 12.25
Cash +0.3% 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 7.89% 11.82
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Cash is included in totals with duration and yield both equal to zero.
The various “Scraps” indices include issues with a DBRS rating of Pfd-3(high) or lower and issues with an Average Trading Value (calculated with HIMIPref™ methodology, which is relatively complex) of less than $25,000. The issues considered “Scraps” are subdivided into indices which reflect those of the main indices.
DeemedRetractibles were comprised of all Straight Perpetuals (both PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium) issued by BMO, BNS, CM, ELF, GWO, HSB, IAG, MFC, NA, RY, SLF and TD, which are not exchangable into common at the option of the company or the regulator. These issues are analyzed as if their prospectuses included a requirement to redeem at par on or prior to 2022-1-31 in the case of banks or normally in the case of insurers and insurance holding companies, in addition to the call schedule explicitly defined. See the Deemed Retractible Review: September 2016 for the rationale behind this analysis and IAIS Says No To DeemedRetractions for the recent change in policy with respect to insurers.

Note that the estimate for the time this will become effective for insurers and insurance holding companies was extended by three years in April 2013, due to the delays in OSFI’s providing clarity on the issue and by a further five years in December, 2018; the estimate was eliminated in November. However, the distinctions are being kept because it is useful to distinguish insurance issues from others.

The name of this subindex has been changed to “Insurance Straight” as of November, 2020

Calculations of resettable instruments are performed assuming a constant GOC-5 rate of 2.93%, a constant 3-Month Bill rate of 4.44% and a constant Canada Prime Rate of 6.70%

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2023-3-31
DBRS Rating MAPF Weighting
Pfd-1 0
Pfd-1(low) 0
Pfd-2(high) 46.4%
Pfd-2 24.9%
Pfd-2(low) 20.5%
Pfd-3(high) 3.4%
Pfd-3 2.2%
Pfd-3(low) 1.2%
Pfd-4(high) 1.2%
Pfd-4 0%
Pfd-4(low) 0%
Pfd-5(high) 0%
Pfd-5 0%
Cash +0.3%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.
A position held in INE.PR.A is not rated by DBRS nor by S&P, but has been included as “Pfd-4(high)” in the above table on the basis of its last S&P rating of P-4(high) and its BB rating from Fitch. A “BB” rating would normally map to Pfd-3, but the company’s disdain for the two major preferred share agencies makes me nervous.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2023-3-31
Average Daily Trading MAPF Weighting
<$50,000 27.5%
$50,000 – $100,000 17.7%
$100,000 – $200,000 46.6%
$200,000 – $300,000 6.9%
>$300,000 1.0%
Cash +0.3%
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding.

The distribution of Issue Reset Spreads is:

Range MAPF Weight
<100bp 0%
100-149bp 10.0%
150-199bp 17.5%
200-249bp 60.0%
250-299bp 2.9%
300-349bp 2.0%
350-399bp 0%
400-449bp 0%
450-499bp 0%
500-549bp 0%
550-599bp 0%
>= 600bp 0%
Undefined 7.5%

Distribution of Floating Rate Start Dates is shown in the table below. This is the date of the next adjustment to the dividend rate, if the issue is currently paying a fixed rate for a limited time; which in practice is successive terms of 5 years. Issues that adjust quarterly are considered “Currently Floating”.

Range MAPF Weight
Currently Floating 0%
0-1 Year 0%
1-2 Years 58.6%
2-3 Years 20.5%
3-4 Years 10.4%
4-5 Years 3.0%
5-6 Years 0%
>6 Years 0%
Not Floating Rate 7.5%

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. The fund may be purchased directly from Hymas Investment Management. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but are not sold with a prospectus This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission). Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

Market Action

April 4, 2023

BIS has released a paper by Claudio Borio, Marco Jacopo Lombardi, James Yetman and Egon Zakrajšek titled The two-regime view of inflation:

Focus

The global surge of inflation that started in 2021 took most observers by surprise. While unforeseen shocks played a key role, the surprise also highlighted limitations of the analytical frameworks typically used to understand and forecast inflation.

Contribution

This study provides a new view of the inflation process. It characterises the process as two regimes – a low- and a high-inflation regime – with self-reinforcing transitions from the low- to the high-inflation one. The value added of this view is to highlight those elements that standard models downplay and to draw new implications for monetary policy.

Findings

First, inflation tends to be self-stabilising in a low-inflation regime but loses that property as it shifts to the high-inflation one. This reflects systematic differences in the co-movement of individual prices and in the behaviour of wage and price setters that determines them. As inflation increases above very low levels, it becomes a more focal point for workers and firms. This increases the likelihood of wage-price spirals.

Second, monetary policy has a smaller impact on inflation in a low-inflation regime, where individual price changes co-move little. It also operates through a quite narrow set of sectoral prices, typically in the services sectors that are more sensitive to economic activity.

As a result, when inflation has settled at a low level, monetary policy can afford to accept moderate, even if persistent, deviations from narrowly defined inflation targets. But it has to respond in a timely and forceful way when transitions to a high-inflation regime threaten.

Abstract

This study provides a view of the inflation process that is complementary to the one captured in standard models, such as those based on the Phillips curve. It characterises the process as two regimes – a low- and a high-inflation regime – with self-reinforcing transitions from the low- to the high-inflation one. The study documents the stylised facts describing the two regimes and the transitions between them based on disaggregated price dynamics and the joint behaviour of wages and prices. Two implications for monetary policy stand out. First, the desirability of conducting monetary policy in a flexible manner in a low-inflation regime, tolerating moderate, even if persistent, deviations from narrowly defined targets. Second, the importance of being pre-emptive when the risk of a transition to the high-inflation regime increases, even though assessing this transition in real time remains challenging.

BIS has also released a Committee on the Global Financial System paper from a Working Group co-chaired by Margarita Delgado (Banco de España) and Toni Gravelle (Bank of Canada) titled Central bank asset purchases in response to the Covid-19 crisis:

Large-scale asset purchases by central banks in response to the Covid-19 pandemic were broadly successful in addressing disruptions in monetary policy transmission and providing additional stimulus. In this report, the CGFS examines the experience of central banks in many small open and emerging market economies that conducted asset purchases for the first time during the Covid-19 crisis as well as in large advanced economies that expanded or reintroduced purchases.

The impact of asset purchases and relative importance of various transmission channels differed across time and economies. The liquidity channel, whereby purchases improved financial market liquidity, was particularly important during the early weeks of the Covid-19 crisis, when markets were stressed.

The signalling channel, whereby purchases foreshadowed the future stance of monetary policy, was less important than the portfolio rebalancing channel, through which purchases altered the duration and credit risk in private investors’ portfolios. The signalling channel contributed more to the easing of financial conditions in countries where policy rates were near the effective lower bound.

In many countries a strong economic rebound and surge in inflation prompted central banks to stop asset purchases within a year or two and to start raising policy rates. The report notes that the relatively short time span of the purchases thereby reduced the risk of unintended side effects.

As functioning in markets continued to rapidly deteriorate throughout March 2020, for the first time in its history, the BoC unveiled a wide range of large-scale AP programmes across various government and non-government securities markets. Each programme had its own size and scope in order to address dysfunction in a specific market. Similar to other programmes, the government bond purchase programme (GBPP) was introduced with a focus on addressing severe market dysfunctions, but it was the only asset purchase programme to subsequently shift its primary objectives. As market functioning in the government of Canada bond market returned closer to normal levels, the primary objective of the GBPP shifted from supporting market functioning to monetary policy objectives. Specifically, with the BoC’s policy rate at its effective lower bound, the GBPP became a tool for implementing quantitative easing with dual objectives of supporting the economy and achieving the inflation target.

The elevated uncertainty surrounding the impact of the pandemic on economic activity created an enormous demand for liquidity from practically all sectors of the economy that could not readily be accommodated by the financial system. As a result, there was a significant deterioration in market functioning across many markets and a relatively large and rapid rise in risk premia. The AP programmes were rolled out to first address this broad deterioration in market functioning. Reflecting the broad market dysfunction in fixed income markets that are critical to the Canadian financial system and economy, AP programmes spanned government (federal and provincial), mortgage and corporate fixed income markets. Each AP programme had its own individual size and scope of assets purchased. Programmes with multiple eligible issuers were set with outright issuer limits, a target relative to some measure (such as each province’s share of Canada’s GDP), or both. AP programmes in the credit markets specified a relatively high minimum credit rating for eligible assets.

By their end, the BoC’s APs totalled 23.6% of Canada’s 2019 nominal GDP (CAD 1.814 trillion). These purchase programmes were novel for the BoC and the largest in its history – a reflection of the unprecedented nature of the Covid pandemic and crisis. The largest share of purchases consisted of high quality public sector debt and the majority of assets purchased had a relatively short term to maturity. Government of Canada bonds purchased through the GBPP accounted for the largest share of purchased assets (Graph A2).

When sequencing the exit from quantitative easing, the BoC began to tighten only after net purchases were halted, and balance sheet reduction then took place. The pace of purchases gradually reduced during 2021 until October, when the BoC announced an end to quantitative easing and a move into the reinvestment phase. Well into the reinvestment phase, in March 2022 the BoC lifted its policy rate from the ELB. In April 2022, the BoC announced the beginning of quantitative tightening, whereby maturing government of Canada bonds on the BoC’s balance sheet would no longer be replaced.

The decision to conduct QT passively was influenced by the duration of purchased assets. In the case of Canada, the assets purchased by the BoC had a relatively short average term to maturity and thus the expected relatively fast material decline in asset holdings was not viewed as requiring additional outright sales to achieve the desired balance sheet decline. As information on the holdings of the BoC was publicly available, the passive approach taken towards QT benefited from a predictable transparent tightening for all market participants, limiting unnecessary volatility in markets and complementing increases in the policy interest rate – the primary monetary policy instrument.

The IMF has published a piece by Markus Brunnermeier titled Rethinking Monetary Policy in a Changing World:

Following a lengthy period of low interest rates and low inflation, the global economy is entering a phase characterized by high inflation and high levels of both public and private debt. Fifteen years ago, central banks saw an urgent need to incorporate financial stability and deflation concerns into their traditional modeling of the economy and developed unconventional tools to deal with both.

Although financial stability remains an important concern, there are important differences between the current environment and the one that followed the global financial crisis:

  • Public debt is now high, so any interest rate increase to fend off inflation threats makes servicing the debt more expensive—with immediate and large adverse fiscal implications for the government. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis in early 2020, it is also evident that fiscal policy can be a significant driver of inflation.
  • Instead of deflationary pressures, most countries are experiencing excessive inflation. That means there is now a clear trade-off between a monetary policy that tries to reduce aggregate demand by raising interest rates and one that aims to ensure financial stability.
  • The nature and frequency of shocks have changed. Historically shocks were mostly from increases or decreases in demand—with the prominent exception of the supply shocks during the so-called stagflation of the 1970s. Now there are many shocks: demand vs. supply, specific risks vs. systemic risks, transitory vs. permanent. It is difficult to identify the true nature of these shocks in time to respond. Central bankers need to be more humble.

Bond market volatility has some portfolios changing parameterizations (“Look, Mummy, I got a spreadsheet!”):

But the Treasury market volatility of March 2023 could have lasting consequences as investors may demand higher premiums across the bond yield curve and across the asset spectrum – preferring lighter positions than they would have otherwise.

Investors will now have to factor into their future models a past event that nobody predicted, even though the likelihood of it repeating is equally minimal.

Pim van Vliet, head of quantitative equities at Robeco, notes that investors with shorter-term horizons measured in days, weeks or months will almost certainly see an increase in their risk metrics, such as “Value-at-Risk”, or VaR.

VaR measures the potential maximum loss on a portfolio of investments over a given period of time, and is calculated using historical returns, current market conditions, and measures of past and expected volatility.

Using data going back to the mid-1980s, markets research and advisory firm Exante Data calculates that the two-year yield’s slide on March 13 was a 6.1 standard deviation move, and the one-week fall on March 15 was a 7.3 standard deviation move.

The statistical probability of a 6 standard deviation, or 6-sigma event, is around one in a billion, and the chance of a 7-sigma event occurring in any given day is 0.000000000129%.

This level of risk would barely be acceptable for investors trading a penny stock, crypto token, or distressed emerging market currency, never mind the asset widely considered to be one of the least volatile in the world.

Canadians expect higher than policy inflation:

Business sentiment in Canada continues to worsen with companies expecting sales growth to slow over the coming year and inflation to remain elevated until at least 2025, according to the Bank of Canada’s quarterly business survey.

The average respondent to the business survey expects inflation to be 3.9 per cent in two years’ time. That’s nearly twice the Bank of Canada’s 2-per-cent target.

Consumers, meanwhile, think that inflation will still be running at 4.27 per cent in two years. Most respondents blamed supply chain disruptions for high inflation, the Bank of Canada said, although many also pointed to high government spending.

“Firms indicated that it has become easier to find the workers they need. They attribute this to less competition for labour and an improved labour supply,” the Bank of Canada said, pointing to increased immigration.

“For the first time in several quarters, businesses no longer expect labour costs to put upward pressure on their output price growth,” the bank added.

Even with less competition for workers, businesses still expect to raise wages quickly this year, by an average of 4.7 per cent. That’s down from a peak of 5.8 per cent in the second-quarter 2022 survey, but well above the prepandemic average of around 3 per cent.

The jobs market in the States is cooling, but still hot:

Demand for workers in the United States eased in February, a sign that the red-hot labor market continues to cool off somewhat.

There were 9.9 million job openings, compared with 10.8 million on the last day of January, the Labor Department reported Tuesday in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, known as JOLTS.

A drop in open positions is a signal that the labor market is slowing down, but the report also showed that it remains healthy: Four million workers quit their jobs during the month, a slight increase relative to January, and the number of layoffs decreased slightly to 1.5 million.

There were 1.7 jobs open for every unemployed worker in February, compared with 1.9 in January, a measure the Federal Reserve has been paying close attention to as it looks to cool hiring, part of its effort to contain inflation.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0840 % 2,289.2
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0840 % 4,390.7
Floater 9.84 % 9.72 % 61,316 9.80 2 0.0840 % 2,530.4
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3743 % 3,354.0
SplitShare 5.01 % 7.15 % 47,040 2.66 7 0.3743 % 4,005.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3743 % 3,125.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0875 % 2,786.1
Perpetual-Discount 6.12 % 6.22 % 55,747 13.56 35 0.0875 % 3,038.1
FixedReset Disc 5.77 % 7.53 % 92,923 12.15 61 -0.2154 % 2,137.1
Insurance Straight 6.06 % 6.10 % 70,045 13.78 20 0.2234 % 2,966.1
FloatingReset 10.32 % 10.71 % 29,496 9.03 2 -1.2974 % 2,408.2
FixedReset Prem 6.64 % 6.42 % 273,975 13.01 2 -0.1990 % 2,327.4
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2154 % 2,184.5
FixedReset Ins Non 5.79 % 7.48 % 57,471 12.35 12 -0.0923 % 2,324.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc -5.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 14.57
Evaluated at bid price : 14.57
Bid-YTW : 10.21 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Disc -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 7.86 %
BN.PF.I FixedReset Disc -1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 8.18 %
PWF.PR.S Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.28 %
MFC.PR.F FixedReset Ins Non -1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 12.36
Evaluated at bid price : 12.36
Bid-YTW : 8.04 %
IAF.PR.B Insurance Straight -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.55
Evaluated at bid price : 19.55
Bid-YTW : 5.93 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 20.30
Evaluated at bid price : 20.30
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
BMO.PR.E FixedReset Disc -1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 20.38
Evaluated at bid price : 20.38
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
IFC.PR.F Insurance Straight 1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.88
Evaluated at bid price : 22.22
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset Ins Non 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.42
Evaluated at bid price : 16.42
Bid-YTW : 7.77 %
NA.PR.C FixedReset Prem 1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset Disc 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.30
Evaluated at bid price : 16.30
Bid-YTW : 8.40 %
CU.PR.I FixedReset Disc 1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 22.63
Evaluated at bid price : 23.25
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
GWO.PR.P Insurance Straight 1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.60
Bid-YTW : 6.29 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.43
Evaluated at bid price : 16.43
Bid-YTW : 8.53 %
PVS.PR.H SplitShare 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2027-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.10
Bid-YTW : 7.11 %
BIP.PR.F FixedReset Disc 1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.65
Evaluated at bid price : 19.65
Bid-YTW : 7.55 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset Disc 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.36
Evaluated at bid price : 16.36
Bid-YTW : 7.73 %
GWO.PR.M Insurance Straight 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.30
Evaluated at bid price : 23.58
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Disc 1.64 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 11.15
Evaluated at bid price : 11.15
Bid-YTW : 8.96 %
IFC.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.83 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.34
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
BIP.PR.B FixedReset Disc 2.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.90
Bid-YTW : 8.20 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 4.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PF.J FixedReset Disc 52,635 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 21.54
Evaluated at bid price : 21.54
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
NA.PR.C FixedReset Prem 36,617 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 23.29
Evaluated at bid price : 25.30
Bid-YTW : 6.42 %
BN.PF.B FixedReset Disc 26,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.43
Evaluated at bid price : 16.43
Bid-YTW : 8.53 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset Disc 15,022 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 7.55 %
CU.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 14,265 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
MFC.PR.Q FixedReset Ins Non 13,406 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.76
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
There were 5 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.97 – 23.72
Spot Rate : 3.7500
Average : 3.1897

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 19.97
Evaluated at bid price : 19.97
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %

CU.PR.C FixedReset Disc Quote: 18.00 – 19.45
Spot Rate : 1.4500
Average : 1.0547

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.00
Bid-YTW : 7.54 %

MFC.PR.C Insurance Straight Quote: 18.74 – 19.70
Spot Rate : 0.9600
Average : 0.5671

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.74
Evaluated at bid price : 18.74
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %

GWO.PR.Y Insurance Straight Quote: 18.60 – 19.50
Spot Rate : 0.9000
Average : 0.5867

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.65 – 19.27
Spot Rate : 1.6200
Average : 1.3267

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 17.65
Evaluated at bid price : 17.65
Bid-YTW : 7.64 %

MFC.PR.M FixedReset Ins Non Quote: 16.68 – 17.49
Spot Rate : 0.8100
Average : 0.5808

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-04
Maturity Price : 16.68
Evaluated at bid price : 16.68
Bid-YTW : 7.84 %

Market Action

April 3, 2023

BIS has released a working paper by Andrej Sokol, Michael Kumhof, Marco Pinchetti and Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul titled CBDC policies in open economies:

Focus
Central banks are currently considering issuing digital money to the general public, known as central bank digital currency (CBDC). Much attention so far has focused on the microeconomic benefits of CBDC, while the implications for macroeconomic and financial stability remain less well understood. What are the macroeconomic gains and risks associated with CBDC, particularly if it could be transferred across borders? And how should the central bank set its CBDC policy in the light of these potential benefits and costs?

Contribution
We study the macroeconomic and monetary policy implications of CBDC issuance in a rich quantitative framework. We introduce CBDC into a carefully calibrated and estimated two-country DSGE environment, featuring a realistic financial system, monetary policy (via the conventional policy interest rate and a separate CBDC policy) and fiscal policy. We use the model to examine: (i) the consequences of transitioning to a CBDC economy; (ii) the design of optimal simple rules for CBDC policy, in terms of interest rate or quantity; and (iii) the open economy effects of introducing CBDC.

Findings
Transitioning to a CBDC economy brings about substantial welfare gains, worth over 2% of steady state consumption in the long run. By counteracting financial shocks, CBDC policy would also help stabilise aggregate demand and inflation. For example, the optimised CBDC interest rule that responds systematically to the credit gap improves welfare by over 1% of steady-state consumption. Finally, when countries adopt optimal CBDC policies, they reduce volatilities of cross-border banking exposures and exchange rates by about a third.

Abstract
We study the consequences for business cycles and welfare of introducing an interest-bearing retail CBDC, competing with bank deposits as medium of exchange, into an estimated 2-country DSGE environment. According to our estimates, financial shocks account for around half of the variance of aggregate demand and inflation, and for the bulk of the variance of financial variables. CBDC issuance of 30% of GDP increases output and welfare by around 6% and 2%, respectively. An aggressive Taylor rule for the interest rate on reserves achieves welfare gains of 0.57% of steady state consumption, an optimized CBDC interest rate rule that responds to a credit gap achieves additional welfare gains of 0.44%, and further gains of 0.57% if accompanied by automatic fiscal stabilizers. A CBDC quantity rule, a response to an inflation gap, CBDC as generalized retail access to reserves, and especially a cash-like zero-interest CBDC, yield significantly smaller gains. CBDC policies can substantially reduce the volatilities of domestic and cross- border banking flows and of the exchange rate. Optimal policy requires a steady state quantity of CBDC of around 40% of annual GDP.

We adopt the calibrated and estimated parameters of the pre-CBDC model in a post-CBDC model that is mostly identical, except for the presence of CBDC. We show that the introduction of CBDC equal to 30% of GDP by a single economy is highly beneficial, yielding long run output gains in that economy of just under 6% and long run welfare gains of around 2%. This is because the introduction of CBDC into a large economy like the US can lower real interest rates due to a reduction in the stock of defaultable debt combined with the funding cost advantage of CBDC over defaultable debt, lower distortionary tax rates due to the budgetary space created by lower real interest rates, and lower monetary frictions due to a reduction in tax-like monetary wedges that represent a move of the economy towards the ideal of the Friedman (1969) rule. Bank balance sheets grow significantly in the long run, while banks’ average cost of funding remains approximately constant, countering the notion that introducing a CBDC inevitably leads to bank disintermediation.

2. In a contractionary episode the CBDC interest rate should, ceteris paribus, increase rather than decrease. The reason is that increasing the CBDC interest rate relative to the rate on reserves lowers the opportunity cost of holding CBDC. This increases the overall quantity of money and thereby stimulates the economy.

3. A countercyclical CBDC interest rate rule can partly share the burden of a countercyclical Taylor rule for the interest rate on reserves in stabilizing inflation and output, while also stabilizing financial variables. The reason is that the CBDC interest rate works through a money supply channel that complements the intertemporal substitution channel of the interest rate on reserves.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -3.2913 % 2,287.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -3.2913 % 4,387.0
Floater 9.85 % 9.73 % 63,789 9.79 2 -3.2913 % 2,528.2
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1783 % 3,341.5
SplitShare 5.03 % 7.25 % 48,785 2.66 7 0.1783 % 3,990.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1783 % 3,113.5
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0849 % 2,783.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.13 % 6.20 % 56,216 13.57 35 0.0849 % 3,035.5
FixedReset Disc 5.76 % 7.50 % 92,564 12.20 61 0.1159 % 2,141.7
Insurance Straight 6.07 % 6.11 % 69,760 13.78 20 -0.1935 % 2,959.5
FloatingReset 10.19 % 10.67 % 29,231 9.07 2 1.5884 % 2,439.8
FixedReset Prem 6.63 % 6.51 % 260,498 12.71 2 0.0797 % 2,332.1
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1159 % 2,189.2
FixedReset Ins Non 5.78 % 7.45 % 57,312 12.31 12 -0.0130 % 2,326.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BN.PR.K Floater -6.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 11.60
Evaluated at bid price : 11.60
Bid-YTW : 10.24 %
TRP.PR.C FixedReset Disc -2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 10.97
Evaluated at bid price : 10.97
Bid-YTW : 9.09 %
GWO.PR.R Insurance Straight -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 19.67
Evaluated at bid price : 19.67
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
BN.PR.Z FixedReset Disc -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 19.75
Evaluated at bid price : 19.75
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %
CU.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
GWO.PR.Y Insurance Straight -1.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
MFC.PR.L FixedReset Ins Non -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 7.85 %
BIK.PR.A FixedReset Disc -1.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 7.70 %
GWO.PR.I Insurance Straight -1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.57
Evaluated at bid price : 18.57
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
TRP.PR.B FixedReset Disc -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 10.53
Evaluated at bid price : 10.53
Bid-YTW : 9.17 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.15
Evaluated at bid price : 18.15
Bid-YTW : 7.24 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc -1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.90
Evaluated at bid price : 18.90
Bid-YTW : 7.85 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 16.72
Evaluated at bid price : 16.72
Bid-YTW : 8.03 %
RY.PR.S FixedReset Disc 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 20.25
Evaluated at bid price : 20.25
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
PVS.PR.K SplitShare 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2029-05-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.98 %
GWO.PR.T Insurance Straight 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.20
Evaluated at bid price : 21.20
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.22
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 6.62 %
BMO.PR.F FixedReset Disc 1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
IAF.PR.B Insurance Straight 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 19.77
Evaluated at bid price : 19.77
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 13.65
Evaluated at bid price : 13.65
Bid-YTW : 8.75 %
BN.PF.J FixedReset Disc 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.25
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 20.04
Evaluated at bid price : 20.04
Bid-YTW : 6.20 %
BIP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 9.13 %
GWO.PR.N FixedReset Ins Non 1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 12.16
Evaluated at bid price : 12.16
Bid-YTW : 7.88 %
CU.PR.I FixedReset Disc 2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 22.45
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 6.93 %
MIC.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 3.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.00
Bid-YTW : 6.48 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset 3.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 14.90
Evaluated at bid price : 14.90
Bid-YTW : 9.98 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc 145,145 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %
CM.PR.O FixedReset Disc 103,628 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 17.10
Evaluated at bid price : 17.10
Bid-YTW : 7.55 %
CM.PR.Q FixedReset Disc 67,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.03
Evaluated at bid price : 18.03
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %
RY.PR.J FixedReset Disc 61,796 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 18.05
Evaluated at bid price : 18.05
Bid-YTW : 7.53 %
TRP.PR.D FixedReset Disc 52,008 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 15.40
Evaluated at bid price : 15.40
Bid-YTW : 8.59 %
BMO.PR.T FixedReset Disc 49,400 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 16.91
Evaluated at bid price : 16.91
Bid-YTW : 7.63 %
There were 10 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 20.11 – 23.72
Spot Rate : 3.6100
Average : 2.5753

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 20.11
Evaluated at bid price : 20.11
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %

PWF.PR.T FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.60 – 19.27
Spot Rate : 1.6700
Average : 1.0050

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 7.66 %

BN.PF.H FixedReset Disc Quote: 21.95 – 23.50
Spot Rate : 1.5500
Average : 0.9411

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.95
Bid-YTW : 7.74 %

BN.PR.K Floater Quote: 11.60 – 12.60
Spot Rate : 1.0000
Average : 0.5956

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 11.60
Evaluated at bid price : 11.60
Bid-YTW : 10.24 %

TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc Quote: 13.65 – 14.69
Spot Rate : 1.0400
Average : 0.7330

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 13.65
Evaluated at bid price : 13.65
Bid-YTW : 8.75 %

RY.PR.M FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.60 – 18.65
Spot Rate : 1.0500
Average : 0.9032

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-04-03
Maturity Price : 17.60
Evaluated at bid price : 17.60
Bid-YTW : 7.40 %

Issue Comments

AX.PR.I To Reset At 6.993%

Artis Real Estate Investment Trust has announced:

that it does not intend to exercise its right to redeem all or any part of the currently outstanding Preferred Units, Series I (“Series I Units”) (AX.PR.I) on April 30, 2023.

As a result, and subject to certain conditions set forth in the certificate of preferred units terms relating to the Series I Units effective January 31, 2018 (the “Certificate of Series I Unit Terms”), the holders of Series I Units have the right to elect to reclassify all or any of their Series I Units into Preferred Units, Series J (“Series J Units”) of Artis on the basis of one Series J Unit for each Series I Unit on May 1, 2023 (being the first business day after April 30, 2023).

With respect to any Series I Units that remain outstanding after May 1, 2023, holders thereof will be entitled to receive distributions, if, as and when declared by the Board of Trustees of Artis, in an annual amount per Series I Unit determined by multiplying the annual fixed distribution rate for such subsequent fixed rate period by $25.00, and shall be payable quarterly on the last business day of each of January, April, July and October in each year during such subsequent fixed rate period. For the initial subsequent fixed rate period commencing on May 1, 2023, the annual fixed distribution rate is 6.993% per annum.

With respect to any Series J Units that may be issued on May 1, 2023, holders thereof will be entitled to receive distributions, if, as and when declared by the Board of Trustees of Artis, in an amount per Series J Unit determined by multiplying the floating quarterly distribution rate (calculated on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed in such quarterly floating rate period, divided by 365) by $25.00, which shall be payable quarterly on the last business day of such quarterly floating rate period. For the initial quarterly floating rate period commencing May 1, 2023, the floating quarterly distribution rate is 8.337% per annum.

Holders of Series I Units are not required to elect to reclassify all or any part of their Series I Units into Series J Units.

As provided in the Certificate of Series I Unit Terms: (i) if Artis determines that there would remain outstanding on May 1, 2023 less than 500,000 Series I Units, all remaining Series I Units shall be reclassified automatically into Series J Units on a one-for-one basis, effective May 1, 2023; or (ii) if Artis determines that less than 500,000 Series J Units would be issued based upon the elections of holders, then holders of Series I Units shall not be entitled to reclassify their Series I Units into Series J Units. As at the date hereof, there are an aggregate of 4,871,140 Series I Units issued and outstanding.

The Series I Units are issued in “book entry only” form and must be purchased or transferred through a participant in the CDS depository service (each, a “CDS Participant”). All rights of holders of Series I Units must be exercised through CDS or the CDS Participant through which the Series I Units are held. The deadline for the registered holder of Series I Units to provide notice of exercise of the right to reclassify Series I Units into Series J Units is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on April 17, 2023. Any notices received after this deadline will not be valid. As such, holders of Series I Units who wish to exercise their right to reclassify their Series I Units into Series J Units should contact their broker or intermediary for more information and it is recommended that this be done well in advance of the deadline in order to provide the broker or other intermediary with time to complete the necessary steps.

If Artis does not receive an election notice in due form from a holder of Series I Units during the time fixed therefor, then the Series I Units shall be deemed not to have been reclassified (other than pursuant to an automatic reclassification). Holders of Series I Units and Series J Units will have the opportunity to reclassify their units again on May 1, 2028 (being the first business day after April 30, 2028), and every five years after April 30, 2028 as long as such units remain outstanding.

The Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) has conditionally approved the listing of the Series J Units effective upon reclassification. Listing of the Series J Units is subject to Artis fulfilling all the listing requirements of the TSX.

AX.PR.I is a FixedReset, 6.00%+393M600, ROC issue that commenced trading 2018-1-31 after being announced 2018-01-22. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ but will be relegated to the Scraps subindex on credit qualit concerns.

Issue Comments

TD.PF.J To Reset At 5.747%

The Toronto-Dominion Bank has announced:

the applicable dividend rates for its Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 18 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 18 Shares”) and Non-Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series 19 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 19 Shares”).

With respect to any Series 18 Shares that remain outstanding after May 1, 2023 (being the first business day following the conversion date of April 30, 2023, which falls on a Sunday), holders of the Series 18 Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly fixed non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, subject to the provisions of the Bank Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the 5-year period from and including April 30, 2023 to but excluding April 30, 2028 will be 5.747%, being equal to the 5-Year Government of Canada bond yield determined as at March 31, 2023 plus 2.70%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Series 18 Shares.

With respect to any Series 19 Shares that may be issued on May 1, 2023, holders of the Series 19 Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends, calculated on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed in such quarterly period divided by 365, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of TD, subject to the provisions of the Bank Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the floating rate period from and including April 30, 2023 to but excluding July 31, 2023, will be 7.107%, being equal to the 90-day Government of Canada Treasury Bill yield determined as of March 31, 2023 plus 2.70%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Series 19 Shares.

Beneficial owners of Series 18 Shares who wish to exercise their conversion right should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee to obtain instructions for exercising such right on or prior to the deadline for exercise, which is 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on April 17, 2023.

Inquiries should be directed to TD’s Registrar and Transfer Agent, TSX Trust Company, at 1-800-387-0825 (or in Toronto 416-682-3860).

TD.PF.J was issued as a FixedReset, 4.70%+270, that commenced trading 2018-3-14 after being announced 2018-3-5. An extension was announced in March, 2023. The issue has been tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset (Discount) sub-index.

Market Action

March 31, 2023

The BoC has released a Staff Working Paper by Carola Conces Binder, Rodrigo Sekkel titled Central Bank Forecasting: A Survey:

Central banks’ forecasts are important monetary policy inputs and tools for central bank communication. We survey the literature on forecasting at the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of England and Bank of Canada, focusing especially on recent developments. After describing these central banks’ forecasting frameworks, we discuss the literature on central bank forecast evaluation and new tests of unbiasedness and efficiency. We also discuss evidence of central banks’ informational advantage over private sector forecasters—which appears to have weakened over time—and how central bank forecasts may affect private sector expectations even in the absence of an informational advantage. We discuss how the Great Recession led central banks to evaluate their forecasting frameworks and how the COVID-19 pandemic has further challenged central bank forecasting. Finally, we consider directions for future research.

A seminal paper by Romer and Romer (2000) shows that Federal Reserve staff forecasts of inflation in the Greenbook are more accurate than private sector forecasts from Blue Chip, Data Resources, Inc., and the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), and that access to Greenbook forecasts could have helped commercial forecasters improve forecasts. Indeed, “someone with access to both the Federal Reserve and commercial forecasts should not just put positive weight on the Federal Reserve forecast, but put little weight on the commercial one” (Romer and Romer, 2000, p. 438). Correspondingly, the mean squared errors of the Greenbook forecasts are around 25% lower than those of commercial forecasters at most horizons. For real GNP growth, the Fed’s informational advantage is most prominent at short horizons but varies at longer horizons.

To demonstrate the implications of the informational advantage they document, Romer and Romer (2000) show that the Fed’s monetary policy actions reveal some of their private information about the economic outlook. Thus, when the Fed raises the federal funds rate, forecasters revise their inflation expectations upward, which can help explain why interest rates at long horizons respond to monetary policy. Subsequent research has continued to probe the informational advantage of central banks and to examine how central bank expectations influence private sector expectations, even in the absence of a clear informational advantage.

And Central Bankers are examined again in an IMF article by RAGHURAM RAJAN titled More focused, less interventionist central banks would likely deliver better outcomes:

Central bankers of industrialized countries have fallen tremendously in the public’s estimation. Not long ago they were heroes, supporting feeble growth with unconventional monetary policies, promoting the hiring of minorities by allowing the labor market to run a little hot, and even trying to hold back climate change, all the while berating paralyzed legislatures for not doing more. Now they stand accused of botching their most basic task, keeping inflation low and stable. Politicians, sniffing blood and mistrustful of unelected power, want to reexamine central bank mandates.

Did central banks get it all wrong? If so, what should they do?

Yet stopping the postmortem at this point is probably overly generous to central banks. After all, their past actions reduced their room to maneuver, and not only for the reasons just outlined. Take the emergence of both fiscal dominance (whereby the central bank acts to accommodate the government’s fiscal spending) and financial dominance (whereby the central bank acquiesces to the imperatives of the market). They clearly are not unrelated to central bank actions of the past few years.

Long periods of low interest rates and high liquidity prompt an increase in asset prices and associated leveraging. And both the government and the private sector leveraged up. Of course, the pandemic and Putin’s war pushed up government spending. But so did ultralow long-term interest rates and a bond market anesthetized by central bank actions such as quantitative easing. Indeed, there was a case for targeted government spending financed by issuing long-term debt. Yet sensible economists making the case for spending did not caveat their recommendations enough, and fractured politics ensured that the only spending that could be legislated had something for everyone. Politicians, as always, drew on unsound but convenient theories (think modern monetary theory) that gave them license for unbridled spending.

Central banks compounded the problem by buying government debt financed by overnight reserves, thus shortening the maturity of the financing of the government and central bank’s consolidated balance sheets. This means that as interest rates rise, government finances—especially for slow-growing countries with significant debt—are likely to become more problematic. Fiscal considerations already weigh on the policies of some central banks—for instance, the European Central Bank worries about the effect of its monetary actions on “fragmentation,” the yields of fiscally weaker countries’ debt blowing out relative to those of stronger countries. At the very least, perhaps central banks should have recognized the changing nature of politics that made unbridled spending more likely in response to shocks, even if they did not anticipate the shocks. This may have made them more concerned about suppressing long rates and espousing low-for-long policy rates.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency released the OCC Mortgage Metrics Report for 22Q4:

  • • As of December 31, 2022, the reporting banks serviced approximately 12 million first-lien residential mortgage loans with $2.7 trillion in unpaid principal balances (see figures 1 and 2). This $2.7 trillion was 22 percent of all residential mortgage debt outstanding in the United States.2
  • • Overall mortgage performance this quarter improved from the fourth quarter of 2021. The percentage of mortgages that were current and performing at the end of the fourth quarter of 2022 was 97.1 percent compared with 96.4 percent at the end of the fourth quarter of 2021 (see figure 6). The CARES Act, signed into law on March 27, 2020, and extended on February 18, 2022, allows for loan forbearance that can extend up to 360 days and is reflected in the mortgage performance data.
  • • Servicers initiated 9,166 new foreclosures in the fourth quarter of 2022, a decrease from the prior quarter, but a higher volume than a year earlier (see figure 7). The new foreclosure volume in the fourth quarter of 2022 is lower than pre-COVID-19 pandemic foreclosure volumes. Home forfeiture actions during the fourth quarter of 2022—completed foreclosure sales, short sales, and deed-in-lieu-of-foreclosure actions—increased 42.8 percent from a year earlier to 2,525 (see figure 8). Events associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, including foreclosure moratoriums that began March 18, 2020, and were extended to July 31, 2021, have significantly affected these metrics.

It doesn’t look like we’re in a recession. Not yet, anyway!

The Canadian economy has picked up momentum in the early stages of 2023 and avoided slipping into a recession, despite the highest interest rates in more than 15 years.

Real gross domestic product rose 0.5 per cent in January from the previous month, Statistics Canada reported on Friday. In a preliminary estimate, the agency said the economy grew by a further 0.3 per cent in February.

On an annualized basis, growth is trending toward 2.5 per cent in the first quarter – far stronger than the 0.5 per cent pace that the Bank of Canada had projected. This also marked a rebound from no growth in the fourth quarter, a result that was largely owing to a sharp pullback in inventory investments.

The BoC has released a Staff Working Paper by Serdar Kabaca and Kerem Tuzcuoglu titled Supply Drivers of the US Inflation Since the Pandemic:

This paper examines the contribution of several supply factors to US headline inflation since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. We identify six supply shocks using a structural VAR model: labor supply, labor productivity, global supply chain, oil price, price mark-up and wage mark-up shocks. Our shock identification relies mainly on sign restrictions. But for the global supply chain shock, we propose a new identification scheme combining sign, narrative and variance decomposition restrictions. Historical decomposition results suggest that global supply chain and oil price shocks are the biggest supply contributors to the US inflation during the pandemic. In contrast, labor shortages only mildly contribute to inflation, but their impact on output is larger in that period. Additionally, price and wage mark-up shocks start to significantly contribute to inflation only towards the middle of 2022. Finally, our analysis, which also allows the identification of monetary policy and aggregate demand shocks, suggests that demand and supply factors are almost equally responsible for the movements in the inflation rate during the pandemic.

On the demand side, some scholars attribute a considerable portion of the rise in inflation to monetary and fiscal policy mistakes. Reis (2022) and Summers (2022) emphasize the cost of a delayed monetary policy response to increases in inflation. Jord`a et al. (2022), Jord`a and Nechio (2022) and Summers (2021) underline the role of fiscal expansions in the sharp increase in inflation. Our results highlight that monetary policy significantly contributes to inflation, especially in 2021 during which authorities use the “transitory” language in their guidance. We also find the aggregate demand increasingly contributes to the rise in inflation following the month when the second fiscal stimulus is announced under the Biden administration in 2021. Overall, in our framework, demand factors including monetary policy shocks are found to contribute to half of the rise in US inflation

The BoC has released a Staff Discussion Paper by Sarah Miller and Patrick Sabourin titled What consistent responses on future inflation by consumers can reveal:

Inflation expectations play a vital role in determining inflation. Central bankers need to understand their intricacies and the information they can reveal. We look at the consistency of consumers’ answers to questions on inflation expectations in the Bank of Canada’s Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations. We analyze factors that may explain consistencies among individuals and overall. We also compare the inflation forecasts of consumers with consistent responses with those of professional forecasters and consumers with varying responses.

Consumers aged 30 years and over with income above $100,000 and a post-secondary degree are more likely to provide consistent answers. The most important characteristic for consistency is age. For instance, respondents aged 55 years and over are almost twice as likely to provide consistent answers than respondents under 30 years old. We also find that women are less likely to be consistent than men—their point predictions exceed their subjective distributions more often. Indigenous people are less likely than non-Indigenous people to respond consistently. Similar to the gap between consumers’ perceptions of inflation and actual inflation, the likelihood that consumers provide consistent responses may also vary by their shopping patterns.5 For instance, they may be influenced by the prices of goods they purchase frequently, such as food and gasoline. Several factors may influence why certain demographic groups are more likely than others to provide consistent responses. These factors include:

  •  a propensity for overpredicting because it is less costly than underpredicting (or vice versa). This is known as asymmetric loss and may cause a consumer to report a point forecast that is outside the interval from their subjective probabilities (for more details, see Patton and Timmermann 2007).
  •  a tendency to round probabilities, although Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2009) tested and rejected this hypothesis
  •  the possibility that youth, with less experience of high inflation, update their inflation expectations more strongly in response to surprise inflation than older people do (proposed by Malmendier and Nagel 2016)
  •  other unobserved personal characteristics such as patience and maturity


To determine whether the inflation expectations of consumers with consistent responses are more informative of actual CPI inflation than those of other consumers, we look at perceived inflation (i.e., inflation over the past 12 months) separately for these two groups. Chart 7 reveals striking differences. Perceived inflation averaged across consumers with consistent responses is close to actual CPI, but well above actual CPI for consumers with inconsistent responses. Instead, the pattern of perceived inflation averaged across the inconsistent group is closer to CPI inflation for gasoline.

We know that consumers with consistent views are better than other consumers at forecasting inflation. But how does their forecasting compare with that of professional forecasters? Before the pandemic, the one-year-ahead inflation expectations of consumers with consistent views were systematically above actual inflation four quarters later (Chart 8). Forecasting errors for these consumers were larger than those of professional forecasters in Canada surveyed by Consensus Economics.10 Since the pandemic started, forecasting performance has deteriorated for both groups. However, the one-year-ahead inflation expectations of consistent consumers have been closer to actual inflation than those of professional forecasters. This suggests that, when assessing risks around inflation, we should seriously consider the survey results from these consumers. Their expectations represent an upside risk to the inflation outlook presented in the January 2023 Monetary Policy Report.

However, like Braitsch and Mitchell (2022), we think targeted and additional forms of communication may be needed to reach consumers with inconsistent responses to encourage them to moderate their inflation expectations. The Bank’s The Economy, Plain and Simple series and the Bank of Canada Museum’s education programs are steps in that direction.

And the BoC has released (boy, they were busy today!) a Staff Discussion Paper by Lin Chen and Stephanie Houle titled Turning Words into Numbers: Measuring News Media Coverage of Shortages:

We generate high-frequency and up-to-date indicators to monitor news media coverage of supply (raw, intermediate and final goods) and labour shortages in Canada. We use natural language processing to construct two news-based indicators and time-varying topic narratives to track Canadian media coverage of these shortages from 2000 to 2022. This makes our indicators an insightful alternative monitoring tool for policy. Notably, our indicators track well with monthly price indexes and measures from the Bank of Canada’s Business Outlook Survey, and they are highly correlated with commonly tracked indicators of supply constraint. Moreover, the news-based indicators reflect the attention of the public on pressing issues.

We use the Cision news media database to build a corpus (a collection of written texts) of Canadian English economic and management news articles published between January 1, 2000, and July 4, 2022. We extract sentences containing the keyword “shortage” and collect them into daily documents. Then, we use unsupervised natural language processing (NLP) to decompose the news corpus into different shortage topics. These topics reflect media attention on, among others, the supply and labour shortages that affected Canada’s economy from the early 2000s to the 2020–22 period of the COVID-19 pandemic.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 7.0000 % 2,365.1
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 7.0000 % 4,536.3
Floater 9.53 % 9.54 % 49,161 9.93 2 7.0000 % 2,614.3
OpRet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3888 % 3,335.5
SplitShare 5.04 % 7.24 % 49,204 2.67 7 0.3888 % 3,983.3
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3888 % 3,107.9
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0644 % 2,781.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.13 % 6.22 % 56,845 13.57 35 0.0644 % 3,032.9
FixedReset Disc 5.76 % 7.41 % 91,964 12.30 61 0.4576 % 2,139.2
Insurance Straight 6.06 % 6.06 % 70,674 13.83 20 -0.3418 % 2,965.2
FloatingReset 10.32 % 10.57 % 28,186 9.12 2 -1.7270 % 2,401.7
FixedReset Prem 6.64 % 6.44 % 250,460 12.77 2 -0.0796 % 2,330.2
FixedReset Bank Non 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4576 % 2,186.7
FixedReset Ins Non 5.76 % 7.08 % 73,682 12.40 13 0.5004 % 2,326.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.P Insurance Straight -3.62 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %
SLF.PR.J FloatingReset -3.49 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 14.38
Evaluated at bid price : 14.38
Bid-YTW : 10.28 %
IAF.PR.B Insurance Straight -2.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 5.94 %
CU.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.99 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.70
Evaluated at bid price : 19.70
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
GWO.PR.T Insurance Straight -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BMO.PR.W FixedReset Disc 1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 16.95
Evaluated at bid price : 16.95
Bid-YTW : 7.50 %
FTS.PR.K FixedReset Disc 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 16.00
Evaluated at bid price : 16.00
Bid-YTW : 7.81 %
MFC.PR.K FixedReset Ins Non 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 18.35
Evaluated at bid price : 18.35
Bid-YTW : 7.08 %
PVS.PR.H SplitShare 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2027-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 7.53 %
CM.PR.P FixedReset Disc 1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 16.90
Evaluated at bid price : 16.90
Bid-YTW : 7.41 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.48
Evaluated at bid price : 23.75
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
BN.PF.A FixedReset Disc 1.33 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.10
Evaluated at bid price : 19.10
Bid-YTW : 7.68 %
BMO.PR.S FixedReset Disc 1.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 7.31 %
CCS.PR.C Insurance Straight 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.99
Evaluated at bid price : 19.99
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
FTS.PR.M FixedReset Disc 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 16.89
Evaluated at bid price : 16.89
Bid-YTW : 7.87 %
IFC.PR.A FixedReset Ins Non 1.53 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 17.29
Evaluated at bid price : 17.29
Bid-YTW : 6.86 %
NA.PR.G FixedReset Disc 1.73 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.60
Evaluated at bid price : 20.60
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
IFC.PR.G FixedReset Ins Non 1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.10
Evaluated at bid price : 20.10
Bid-YTW : 6.87 %
BN.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.81 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 18.60
Evaluated at bid price : 18.60
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
BN.PR.Z FixedReset Disc 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.07
Evaluated at bid price : 20.07
Bid-YTW : 7.48 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset Disc 2.59 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 13.47
Evaluated at bid price : 13.47
Bid-YTW : 8.76 %
TRP.PR.G FixedReset Disc 2.85 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 16.25
Evaluated at bid price : 16.25
Bid-YTW : 8.35 %
BN.PR.B Floater 16.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 12.20
Evaluated at bid price : 12.20
Bid-YTW : 9.71 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 56,900 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 20.40
Evaluated at bid price : 20.40
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
MFC.PR.I FixedReset Ins Non 40,106 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.85
Bid-YTW : 6.43 %
CU.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 37,144 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 18.80
Evaluated at bid price : 18.80
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
TD.PF.J FixedReset Disc 32,153 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.45
Evaluated at bid price : 21.45
Bid-YTW : 6.70 %
NA.PR.C FixedReset Prem 30,047 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 23.35
Evaluated at bid price : 25.50
Bid-YTW : 6.44 %
GWO.PR.G Insurance Straight 29,142 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.42
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
There were 9 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
CU.PR.E Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.96 – 22.45
Spot Rate : 2.4900
Average : 1.4408

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.96
Evaluated at bid price : 19.96
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %

GWO.PR.P Insurance Straight Quote: 21.30 – 22.35
Spot Rate : 1.0500
Average : 0.6148

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 21.30
Evaluated at bid price : 21.30
Bid-YTW : 6.39 %

RY.PR.M FixedReset Disc Quote: 17.51 – 18.65
Spot Rate : 1.1400
Average : 0.7423

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 17.51
Evaluated at bid price : 17.51
Bid-YTW : 7.37 %

CU.PR.J Perpetual-Discount Quote: 19.51 – 22.00
Spot Rate : 2.4900
Average : 2.1673

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 19.51
Evaluated at bid price : 19.51
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %

PWF.PF.A Perpetual-Discount Quote: 18.92 – 20.80
Spot Rate : 1.8800
Average : 1.5621

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 18.92
Evaluated at bid price : 18.92
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %

TD.PF.L FixedReset Disc Quote: 23.46 – 24.35
Spot Rate : 0.8900
Average : 0.5868

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2053-03-31
Maturity Price : 22.93
Evaluated at bid price : 23.46
Bid-YTW : 6.64 %

Issue Comments

BIP.PR.E : No Conversion to FloatingReset

Brookfield Infrastructure has announced:

that after having taken into account all election notices received by the March 16, 2023 deadline for the reclassification of its Cumulative Class A Preferred Limited Partnership Units, Series 9 (the “Series 9 Units”) (TSX: BIP.PR.E) into Cumulative Class A Preferred Limited Partnership Units, Series 10 (the “Series 10 Units”), it has determined that there will be no reclassification of Series 9 Units into Series 10 Units, and holders of Series 9 Units will retain their Series 9 Units.

There were 18,000 Series 9 Units tendered for reclassification, which is less than the 1,000,000 units required to give effect to reclassifications of Series 9 Units into Series 10 Units.

BIP.PR.E was issued as a FixedReset, 5.00%+300M500, ROC, that commenced trading 2018-1-23 after being announced 2018-1-15. The issue will reset to 6.642% effective 2023-4-1. It is tracked by HIMIPref™ and has been assigned to the FixedResets (Discount) subindex on the basis of its P-2(low) rating from S&P (it is not rated by DBRS).

Issue Comments

MFC.PR.J: No Conversion To FloatingReset

Manulife Financial Corporation has announced (on 2023-3-7):

that after having taken into account all election notices received by the March 6, 2023 deadline for conversion of its currently outstanding 8,000,000 Non-cumulative Rate Reset Class 1 Shares Series 11 (the “Series 11 Preferred Shares”) (TSX: MFC.PR.J) into Non-cumulative Floating Rate Class 1 Shares Series 12 of Manulife (the “Series 12 Preferred Shares”), the holders of Series 11 Preferred Shares are not entitled to convert their Series 11 Preferred Shares into Series 12 Preferred Shares. There were 117,415 Series 11 Preferred Shares elected for conversion, which is less than the minimum one million shares required to give effect to conversions into Series 12 Preferred Shares.

As announced by Manulife on February 21, 2023, after March 19, 2023, holders of Series 11 Preferred Shares will be entitled to receive fixed rate non-cumulative preferential cash dividends on a quarterly basis, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of Manulife and subject to the provisions of the Insurance Companies Act (Canada). The dividend rate for the five-year period commencing on March 20, 2023, and ending on March 19, 2028, will be 6.15900% per annum or $0.384938 per share per quarter, being equal to the sum of the five-year Government of Canada bond yield as of February 21, 2023, plus 2.61%, as determined in accordance with the terms of the Series 11 Preferred Shares.

Subject to certain conditions described in the prospectus supplement dated November 27, 2012 relating to the issuance of the Series 11 Preferred Shares, Manulife may redeem the Series 11 Preferred Shares, in whole or in part, on March 19, 2028 and on September 19 every five years thereafter.

MFC.PR.J was issued as a FixedReset, 4.00%+261 that commenced trading 2012-12-4 after being announced 2012-11-27. After the 2018 notice of extension it reset to 4.731%; I recommended against conversion; and there was no conversion. Notice of extension was provided in 2023 and the issue reset to 6.159%. The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the Insurance FixedReset (Discount) sub-index.

Issue Comments

TD.PF.J To Be Extended

The Toronto-Dominion Bank has announced (on 2023-3-29):

that it does not intend to exercise its right to redeem all or any part of the currently outstanding 14 million Non-Cumulative 5-Year Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 18 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 18 Shares”) of TD on April 30, 2023. As a result and subject to certain conditions set out in the prospectus supplement dated March 7, 2018 relating to the issuance of the Series 18 Shares, the holders of the Series 18 Shares have the right to convert all or part of their Series 18 Shares, on a one-for-one basis, into Non-Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series 19 (Non-Viability Contingent Capital (NVCC)) (the “Series 19 Shares”) of TD on May 1, 2023 (being the first business day following the conversion date of April 30, 2023, which falls on a Sunday). Holders who do not exercise their right to convert their Series 18 Shares into Series 19 Shares on such date will continue to hold their Series 18 Shares, subject to the conditions described below.

The foregoing conversion right is subject to the conditions that: (i) if TD determines that there would be less than 1,000,000 Series 19 Shares outstanding after taking into account all shares tendered for conversion on May 1, 2023, then holders of Series 18 Shares will not be entitled to convert their shares into Series 19 Shares, and (ii) alternatively, if TD determines that there would remain outstanding less than 1,000,000 Series 18 Shares after taking into account all shares tendered for conversion on May 1, 2023, then all remaining Series 18 Shares will automatically be converted into Series 19 Shares on a one-for-one basis on May 1, 2023. In either case, TD will give written notice to that effect to holders of Series 18 Shares no later than April 24, 2023 (being the first business day following the notice date of April 23, 2023, which falls on a Sunday).

The dividend rate applicable to the Series 18 Shares for the 5-year period from and including April 30, 2023 to but excluding April 30, 2028, and the dividend rate applicable to the Series 19 Shares for the 3-month period from and including April 30, 2023 to but excluding July 31, 2023, will be determined and announced by way of a press release on March 31, 2023.

Beneficial owners of Series 18 Shares who wish to exercise their conversion right should communicate as soon as possible with their broker or other nominee to obtain instructions for exercising such right during the conversion period, which runs from March 31, 2023 until 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on April 17, 2023.

Inquiries should be directed to TD’s Registrar and Transfer Agent, TSX Trust Company, at 1-800-387-0825 (or in Toronto 416-682-3860).

TD.PF.J was issued as a FixedReset, 4.70%+270, that commenced trading 2018-3-14 after being announced 2018-3-5. It has been tracked by HIMIPref™ and is assigned to the FixedReset (Discount) sub-index.

Issue Comments

OSP.PR.A Suffers 14% Retraction

Brompton Group has announced (on 2023-3-27):

Brompton Oil Split Corp. (the “Fund”) announces its intention to effect a consolidation of its Class A shares. As a result of the special non-concurrent retraction (the “Special Retraction”) granted in connection with the extension of the maturity date of the Fund to March 28, 2024 there will be 950,914 Class A shares and 822,414 Preferred shares outstanding. In order to restore an equal number of outstanding shares of each class following the Special Retraction, the Fund intends to consolidate its Class A shares such that each holder of a Class A share will receive approximately 0.864866854 Class A shares for each Class A share held (the “Share Consolidation”). It is expected that the Class A shares will trade on a post-consolidation basis at the opening of trading on April 11, 2023. The Share Consolidation is subject to approval by the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”). The value of the Class A shareholders’ holdings will remain the same and as a result, the net asset value (“NAV”) per Class A share, following the Share Consolidation, will increase on a proportionate basis. As at March 24, 2023, the pro forma NAV per Class A share after giving effect to the Share Consolidation would be $2.38 ($2.06 pre consolidation) and the asset coverage ratio for the Preferred shares would increase from 14% to 19%.

The Share Consolidation will allow Class A shareholders to maintain their current investment in the Fund and continue to have enhanced exposure to the Fund’s portfolio. The Fund invests in a portfolio of equity securities of large capitalization North American oil and gas issuers, primarily focused on those with significant exposure to oil. Brompton Funds Limited, the manager of the Fund, believes that the Fund’s investment strategy is well positioned to participate in opportunities that are expected to continue in the energy sector.

No fractional Class A shares will be issued and the number of Class A shares each holder shall receive will be rounded down to the nearest whole number. The Share Consolidation is a non-taxable event.

OSP.PR.A recently recently reset to 8.00% for a one year term and I suppose the fat coupon persuaded many holders to hang on despite the poor credit quality of the issue and the short term until the next reset.