Synthetic ETFs a Threat to Financial Stability?

April 13th, 2011

The Bank for International Settlements has released a working paper by Srichander Ramaswamy titled Market structures and systemic risks of exchange-traded funds:

Crisis experience has shown that as the financial intermediation chain lengthens, it becomes complicated to assess the risks of financial products due to a lack of transparency as to how risks are managed at different levels of the intermediation chain. Exchange-traded funds, which have become popular among investors seeking exposure to a diversified portfolio of assets, share this characteristic, especially when their returns are replicated using derivative products. As the volume of such products grows, such replication strategies can lead to a build-up of systemic risks in the financial system. This article examines the operational frameworks of exchange-traded funds and identifies potential channels through which risks to financial stability can materialise.

The part I found most interesting was:

Some of the product innovation might also be driven by dealer incentives to seek alternative funding sources to comply with the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) standard under Basel III.2 For example, certain product structures might facilitate run-off rates on liabilities to be reduced despite keeping the maturity of liabilities short. As a result, ETFs have moved away from being a plain vanilla cost- and tax-efficient alternative to mutual funds to being a much more complex and diverse array of products and replication schemes (Russell Investments (2009)).

Liquidity regulation, such as the standards now proposed under Basel III, may also create incentives to use synthetic replication schemes. For example, under the proposed LCR standard, unsecured wholesale funding provided by many legal entity customers (banks, securities firms, insurance companies, fiduciaries, etc) as well as secured funding backed by lower credit quality collateral assets or equities maturing within 30 days will receive a 100% run-off rate in determining net cash outflows. By employing equities and lower credit quality assets to collateralise the swap transaction with the ETF sponsor that might typically have a maturity greater than one year, the bank engaging in this swap transaction will be able to reduce the run-off rate substantially on the collateral posted. Yet, the collateral substitution option allows banks to effectively keep the maturity of the funding short. The bank will still face a cash outflow run-off rate of 20% for valuation changes on the collateral posted,7 but this is far lower than the 100% run-off rate that it might otherwise face. When significant volumes of such transactions are done, this may result in a substantial improvement in the banks’ LCR, which would make compliance with the LCR standard less expensive.

Synthetic replication schemes, by contrast, transfer the underperformance risk to the swap counterparty. Within investment banking, the risk of underperformance or tracking error might be co-mingled with the rest of the trading book risk. This could potentially undermine the oversight function and compromise sound risk management. Moreover, the capacity of the swap counterparty to bear the tracking error risk while providing the market liquidity needed when there is sudden and large liquidation of ETFs is untested. Hedge funds often manage the liquidity risk through techniques such as “gating”, ie by restricting investor withdrawals

In Canada, there is the Horizons S&P/TSX 60™ Index ETF (HXT) that operates in this way. There may be others.

This may be just another instance of the regulators not thinking things through. Yes, the swap transaction may have a term of greater than one year. But if investors can redeem at any time, then it’s just another wholesale demand deposit, and should be treated accordingly.

April 12, 2011

April 13th, 2011

The US regulatory agencies are seeking comment on Swap Margin and Capital Requirements:

The amount of margin that would be required under the proposed rule would vary based on the relative risk of the counterparty and of the swap or security-based swap. A swap entity would not be required to collect margin from a commercial end user as long as its margin exposure is below an appropriate credit exposure limit established by the swap entity. A swap entity would also not be required to collect margin from low-risk financial end users as long as its margin exposure does not exceed a specific threshold. The proposed margin requirements would apply to new, non-cleared swaps or security-based swaps entered into after the proposed rule’s effective date. The proposal also seeks comment on several alternative approaches to establishing margin requirements.

The BoC did not adjust the overnight rate:

The Bank of Canada today announced that it is maintaining its target for the overnight rate at 1 per cent. The Bank Rate is correspondingly 1 1/4 per cent and the deposit rate is 3/4 per cent.

Overall, the Bank projects that the economy will expand by 2.9 per cent in 2011 and 2.6 per cent in 2012. Growth in 2013 is expected to equal that of potential output, at 2.1 per cent. The Bank expects that the economy will return to capacity in the middle of 2012, two quarters earlier than had been projected in the January MPR.

While underlying inflation is subdued, a number of temporary factors will boost total CPI inflation to around 3 per cent in the second quarter of 2011 before total CPI inflation converges to the 2 per cent target by the middle of 2012. This short-term volatility reflects the impact of recent sharp increases in energy prices and the ongoing boost from changes in provincial indirect taxes. Core inflation has fallen further in recent months, in part due to temporary factors. It is expected to rise gradually to 2 per cent by the middle of 2012 as excess supply in the economy is slowly absorbed, labour compensation growth stays modest, productivity recovers and inflation expectations remain well-anchored.

The persistent strength of the Canadian dollar could create even greater headwinds for the Canadian economy, putting additional downward pressure on inflation through weaker-than-expected net exports and larger declines in import prices.

It was a mixed day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts losing 9bp, FixedResets gaining 11bp and DeemedRetractibles being smacked for a lossof 28bp. Still not too much volatility, with only three entries in the Performance Highlights table. Good volume featured total domination of the highlights table by FixedResets.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 2,408.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0000 % 3,622.1
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 41,531 21.56 4 0.0000 % 2,600.4
OpRet 4.92 % 3.47 % 56,552 2.09 8 0.0724 % 2,409.5
SplitShare 5.21 % -1.07 % 113,733 0.67 6 -0.2537 % 2,492.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0724 % 2,203.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.55 % 122,326 1.16 8 0.0497 % 2,050.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.58 % 132,385 14.40 16 -0.0945 % 2,120.4
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.45 % 202,911 2.95 57 0.1102 % 2,291.9
Deemed-Retractible 5.26 % 5.21 % 296,655 8.19 53 -0.2850 % 2,080.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
TDS.PR.C SplitShare -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 10.47
Bid-YTW : -1.07 %
IAG.PR.F Deemed-Retractible -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2019-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.22
Bid-YTW : 5.83 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.L FixedReset 53,700 Nesbitt crossed 10,000 at 27.51. RBC crossed blocks of 15,000 and 18,500, both at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.16 %
MFC.PR.D FixedReset 50,498 TD crossed 41,600 at 27.41.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.61 %
BMO.PR.Q FixedReset 40,803 Nesbitt crossed 20,000 at 24.90.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
HSE.PR.A FixedReset 38,301 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-04-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.51
Bid-YTW : 4.09 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 37,230 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.85
Bid-YTW : 3.50 %
BNS.PR.X FixedReset 36,332 TD crossed 30,000 at 27.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 3.36 %
There were 42 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
NA.PR.N FixedReset Quote: 26.81 – 28.94
Spot Rate : 2.1300
Average : 1.1542

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 2.05 %

NA.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 28.00 – 28.41
Spot Rate : 0.4100
Average : 0.2567

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 28.00
Bid-YTW : 2.21 %

BMO.PR.K Deemed-Retractible Quote: 25.08 – 25.48
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2495

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.08
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount Quote: 24.90 – 25.15
Spot Rate : 0.2500
Average : 0.1425

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-12
Maturity Price : 24.64
Evaluated at bid price : 24.90
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %

BNA.PR.E SplitShare Quote: 24.50 – 24.80
Spot Rate : 0.3000
Average : 0.1998

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2017-12-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.50
Bid-YTW : 5.33 %

GWO.PR.H Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.58 – 22.93
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2591

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.58
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %

NA Announces Tender Results, Extends Offer to April 26

April 12th, 2011

National Bank of Canada has announced:

all of the Preferred Shares validly deposited under the Offers and not withdrawn as of April 11, 2011 have been taken up and accepted for payment by the Bank. As a result, the Bank has taken up 4,372,089 Preferred Shares Series 21, 4,162,483 Preferred Shares Series 24 and 3,629,923 Preferred Shares Series 26 under the Offers for an aggregate consideration of $335,636,846.27.

The Preferred Shares taken up under the Offers represent approximately (i) 54.31% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 21, (ii) 61.21% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 24, and (iii) 62.58% of the outstanding Preferred Shares Series 26.

The Bank also announced that it is extending the expiry date of the Offers to 5:00 p.m. (Montréal Time) on April 26, 2011 (the “Expiration Time”) to allow more holders of the Preferred Shares (the “Shareholders”) who desire to deposit their Preferred Shares to do so, unless the Offers are otherwise extended or withdrawn by the Bank. Aside from the above-described extension, the terms and conditions set forth in the Offers and issuer bid circular dated March 4, 2011 remain unchanged. A formal notice of extension will be mailed promptly to Shareholders of the Bank. The notice of extension will also be available at www.sedar.com.

If, by the Expiration Time or within 120 days after the date of the issuer bid circular, whichever occurs first, an Offer has been accepted by the holders of not less than 90 per cent of the Preferred Shares of any series to which such Offer relates, the Bank currently intends to acquire the Preferred Shares held by those Shareholders who have not accepted such Offer either by extending the relevant Offer or pursuant to the compulsory acquisition provisions of Sections 283 to 293 of the Bank Act (Canada) on the same terms and at the same price for which the Preferred Shares were acquired under the relevant Offer (a “Compulsory Acquisition”). For greater certainty, in the event that less than 90 per cent of any of the Preferred Shares of any series is taken up, then a Compulsory Acquisition would only apply to the series of Preferred Shares of which 90 per cent or more were taken up and paid for under the Offer.

If the Bank acquires less than 90 per cent of the Preferred Shares of any series under the Offers, the Bank currently intends to redeem all outstanding Preferred Shares held by those Shareholders who have not accepted the Offers, and which have not been taken up and paid for by the Bank, in accordance with the redemption right attached to such Preferred Shares on the first date at which such Preferred Shares may be redeemed by the Bank at a price equal to $25.00 per share (together with all declared and unpaid dividends thereon up to the date set for redemption).

I strongly recommend that holders tender their shares or sell on the market. It will be remembered that tendering has important tax implications as the premium paid above par is a deemed dividend for tax purposes.

The three issue tickers are NA.PR.N, NA.PR.O, NA.PR.P

April 11, 2011

April 12th, 2011

Asset Management via mass-customization is attracting attention in the States:

The next thundering herd on Wall Street may be the ranks of low-cost portfolio managers such as MarketRiders and Folio Investing, which cater to self-directed investors like Cohen. Sites that sell prepackaged portfolios have attracted more than $3 billion in assets over the last three years as more investors leave their full-service brokers.

“Individual investors have started to realize they can actually do some things as self-directed investors reasonably well, if they’re given a platform that allows them to invest more intelligently,” said Steven Wallman, chief executive officer of Folio Investing, where investors can purchase predesigned and customized index portfolios for $29 a month.

Some of the firms, such as Flat Fee Portfolios, are too new to have any performance history. MarketRiders can’t track the actual performance of its customers’ accounts, since it doesn’t have custody of their assets. Covestor and Wealthfront Inc., which give users access to third-party investors, publish performance history for the managers they work with on their sites.

Of course, the big problem with mass-customization is that the decision makers won’t play golf with you:

“Who are the people that are advising me when I’m going to a faceless website?” said Chris Walters, head of wealth management for Pasadena, California-based CitizensTrust. He said investors should be concerned by the lack of performance history available from some of the firms.

But we’ll cut Mr. Walters some slack, as a reward for mentioning the word “performance”. Of course, I don’t see a prominent link to “Performance” on his website.

So much fuss over the leaders’ election debate! It’s a disgrace – the boys have a place to debate each other all the time if they want to … it’s called parliament. But I guess they’re too busy playing thumpy-thumpy on their wickle desks.

Another unpleasant day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts down 25bp, FixedResets losing 6bp and DeemedRetractibles hit for 14bp. Volatility remained low, with only three entries on the performance highlights table. Volume was a little below average.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0238 % 2,408.3
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0238 % 3,622.1
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 41,892 21.56 4 0.0238 % 2,600.4
OpRet 4.93 % 3.57 % 57,051 2.09 8 -0.2024 % 2,407.8
SplitShare 5.19 % -2.90 % 117,563 0.67 6 0.0980 % 2,498.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2024 % 2,201.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.80 % 5.69 % 126,420 1.16 8 -0.1043 % 2,049.1
Perpetual-Discount 5.58 % 5.56 % 133,537 14.44 16 -0.2468 % 2,122.4
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.46 % 203,735 2.95 57 -0.0611 % 2,289.4
Deemed-Retractible 5.24 % 5.16 % 321,075 8.19 53 -0.1384 % 2,086.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-11
Maturity Price : 23.54
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.58
Bid-YTW : 5.36 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.N FixedReset 80,501 RBC crossed blocks of 50,000 and 25,000, both at 24.59.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.55
Bid-YTW : 4.11 %
RY.PR.L FixedReset 57,903 Nesbitt crossed two blocks of 25,000 each at 27.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.90
Bid-YTW : 3.15 %
CM.PR.J Deemed-Retractible 56,681 Scotia crossed two blocks of 25,000 each, both at 23.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.71
Bid-YTW : 5.13 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 52,264 TD crossed 30,000 at 23.86.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.16 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Premium 49,000 TD crossed 45,500 at 25.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-07-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 39,920 TD crossed 35.500 at 24.19.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-11
Maturity Price : 23.93
Evaluated at bid price : 24.19
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
There were 27 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
FTS.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 26.30 – 26.75
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.2892

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-10-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.30
Bid-YTW : 3.27 %

SLF.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 25.25 – 25.60
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2440

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %

W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount Quote: 23.83 – 24.12
Spot Rate : 0.2900
Average : 0.1982

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-11
Maturity Price : 23.54
Evaluated at bid price : 23.83
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %

TD.PR.G FixedReset Quote: 27.00 – 27.24
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1510

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.00
Bid-YTW : 3.52 %

IAG.PR.C FixedReset Quote: 26.80 – 27.15
Spot Rate : 0.3500
Average : 0.2698

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 3.56 %

MFC.PR.B Deemed-Retractible Quote: 21.33 – 21.55
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1466

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %

April PrefLetter Released!

April 11th, 2011

The April, 2011, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The April edition contains an appendix discussing annuities, and presents a spreadsheet analyzing the sustainability of retirement withdrawals with annuities included as an investment option – not just the usual stocks and bonds.

PrefLetter may now be purchased by all Canadian residents.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the April, 2011, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the May, 2011, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close May 13 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on May 16.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: My verbosity has grown by such leaps and bounds that it is no longer possible to deliver PrefLetter as an eMail attachment – it’s just too big for my software! Instead, I have sent passwords – click on the link in your eMail and your copy will download.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter eMails sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

Note: There have been other scattered complaints that double-clicking on the links in the “PrefLetter Download” email results in a message that the password has already been used. I have been able to reproduce this problem in my own eMail software … the problem is double-clicking. What happens is the first click opens the link and the second click finds that the password has already been used and refuses to work properly. So the moral of the story is: Don’t be a dick! Single Click!

DF.PR.A Annual Report

April 10th, 2011

Dividend 15 Split Corp. II has released its Annual Report to November 30, 2010.

DF / DF.PR.A Performance
Instrument One
Year
Three
Years
Since
Inception
Whole Unit +12.20% -2.34% -0.29%
DF.PR.A +5.38% +5.38% +5.38%
DF +23.41% -8.89% -5.24%
S&P/TSX 60 Index +11.88% +0.31% +3.98%

Using the S&P TSX 60 index rather than “Dividend Aristocrats” seems a little odd to me – but we’ll let them choose their benchmark!

Figures of interest are:

MER: 1.23% of the whole unit value

Average Net Assets: We need this to calculate portfolio yield. No change in Number of Units Outstanding, so the Net Assets figure for the whole corporation can be used: $84.2-million

Underlying Portfolio Yield: Dividends received (net of withholding) of 3,239,572 divided by average net assets of 84.2-million is 3.85%

Income Coverage: Net Investment Income of 2,210,176 divided by Preferred Share Distributions of 2,655,975 is 83%.

April PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

April 9th, 2011

The markets have closed and the April edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The April edition will contain an appendix discussing annuities and their use in retirement planning.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is now available to all residents of Canada.

The April issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the April issue.

April 8, 2011

April 8th, 2011

It looks like the Australians are just as frightened of competition as we are:

Australian Treasurer Wayne Swan rejected Singapore Exchange Ltd. (SGX)’s bid for ASX Ltd. (ASX), saying the deal was not in his nation’s interest and would have left the local bourse operator as a junior partner.

“It was a no brainer that this deal was not in Australia’s national interest,” Swan told reporters today in Canberra, three days after the nation’s Foreign Investment Review Board advised the government to reject it. “At the end of the day this takeover was more about growing Singapore’s financial sector than Australia’s. I am open to the right deal for Australia if it comes along.”

“Let’s be clear here: this is not a merger,” Swan said today. “It’s a takeover that would see Australia’s financial sector become a subsidiary to a competitor in Asia.”

The Boston Fed has released a Public Policy Discussion Paper by Kevin Foster, Erik Meijer, Scott Schuh, and Michael A. Zabek titled The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice:

This paper presents results of the 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC), along with revised 2008 SCPC data. In 2009, the average U.S. consumer held 5.0 of the nine payment instruments available, including cash, and used 3.8 of them during a typical month. Between the 2008 and 2009 surveys, a period that includes the trough of the latest recession, consumers significantly increased their use of cash and close substitutes for cash, such as money orders and prepaid cards. At the same time, consumers reduced their use of credit cards and (to a lesser extent) debit cards, as well as payments made using a bank account number. Weaker economic conditions, new government regulations, and bank pricing of payment card services all likely contributed to the shift back toward cash. However, it is difficult to determine how much each of these factors contributed, and whether the shift is transitory or permanent, without more data and research on consumer payment choice. In 2009, one in three consumers had a prepaid card and nearly as many had a nonbank payment account online, while 3 percent made a mobile payment. By focusing on payments by consumers only, the SCPC complements the recent 2010 Federal Reserve Payment Study, which describes the entire noncash payments economy.

The New York Fed has published a defence of QE2 by Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack titled Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?.

Based on this evidence, we conclude that the Federal Reserve’s LSAP programs did lower longer term private borrowing rates, which should stimulate economic activity. While the effects are especially noticeable in the mortgage market, they appear to be widespread, extending, for example, to the markets for Treasury securities, corporate bonds, and interest rate swaps. That conclusion is promising, as it means that monetary policy remains potent even after the zero bound is reached. To be sure, achieving this further stimulus was not without its challenges, as it required a sizable expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, and the purchase of such a large volume of securities in a relatively short time frame required the surmounting of operational hurdles. However, by restoring functioning to the mortgage market and lowering the term premium, the programs provided considerable benefits.

Portugal’s government fell because the opposition didn’t like the austerity plan. They may have shot themselves in the foot:

Europe’s rich countries pushed Portugal to make deeper-than-planned budget cuts in the heat of an election campaign in exchange for an emergency aid package estimated at 80 billion euros ($115 billion).

In an unprecedented intervention in national politics, euro-area finance ministers said an offer of relief would hinge on Portugal’s feuding leaders making cuts that go beyond measures that failed to pass parliament in March and triggered early elections.

But I’m sure that Portuguese politics is no different in substance from Canadian politics. The politicians don’t care if what they say makes any sense, or whether what they do actually improves things: they’ve said something popular and hope to increase their vote.

The latest joke out of the US is the JOINT STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF MANDATING ALGORITHMIC DESCRIPTIONS FOR DERIVATIVES:

Section 719(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC and the CFTC (collectively the “Commissions”) jointly to study (the “Study”) the “the feasibility of requiring the derivatives industry to adopt standardized computer-readable algorithmic descriptions which may be used to describe complex and standardized financial derivatives,” and the extent to which such algorithmic descriptions, together with standardized legal definitions, “may serve as the binding legal definition of derivative contracts.”1 The statute also requires us to examine the “logistics of possible implementations of standardized algorithmic descriptions for derivatives contracts.” Thus, the Study presents two key questions. First, is computer technology capable of representing derivatives with sufficient precision and detail to facilitate collection, reporting, and analysis of risk exposures, including calculation of net exposures, as well as to function as part or all of a binding legal contract? Second, if the technological capability exists, in consideration of the logistics of possible implementation, should these standardized, computer-readable descriptions be required for all derivatives?

Seeing as how a large proportion of deriviatives (by number, not by traded value) are designed to allow pseudo-managers with a bond mandate to get non-bond exposure, that might be a little difficult! Anyway:

Based on the public input and its own analysis, the staff conclude, with respect to the first question, that current technology is capable of representing derivatives using a common set of computer-readable descriptions. These descriptions are precise enough to use both for the calculation of net exposures and to serve as part or all of a binding legal contract.

As to question two, the staff conclude that before mandating the use of standardized descriptions for all derivatives, the following are needed: a universal entity identifier and product or instrument identifiers, a further analysis of the costs and benefits of having all aspects of legal documents related to derivatives represented electronically, and a uniform way to represent financial terms not covered by existing definitions.

Plain vanilla! Plain vanilla for everyone!

It was a bad day for the Canadian preferred share market, with PerpetualDiscounts getting whacked for 30bp, FixedResets off 7bp and DeemedRetractibles down 17bp. For all that, there wasn’t much volatility, with only one entry in the Performance Highlights table. Volume was very light.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1070 % 2,407.8
FixedFloater 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.1070 % 3,621.2
Floater 2.50 % 2.27 % 41,861 21.56 4 -0.1070 % 2,599.7
OpRet 4.92 % 3.45 % 57,793 2.10 8 0.0916 % 2,412.7
SplitShare 5.20 % -2.86 % 121,850 0.68 6 0.0166 % 2,496.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0916 % 2,206.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.79 % 5.36 % 128,120 1.17 8 0.0944 % 2,051.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.56 % 5.56 % 134,135 14.43 16 -0.3043 % 2,127.7
FixedReset 5.17 % 3.42 % 206,337 2.96 57 -0.0696 % 2,290.8
Deemed-Retractible 5.24 % 5.14 % 325,616 8.22 53 -0.1733 % 2,089.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-08
Maturity Price : 22.58
Evaluated at bid price : 22.77
Bid-YTW : 5.44 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
CM.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 52,001 Desjardins bought 14,700 from anonymous at 25.21. Then RBC crossed 10,000 at 25.25 and Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 25.25.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 4.80 %
HSB.PR.E FixedReset 41,539 Desjardins crossed 34,000 at 27.46.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.45
Bid-YTW : 3.58 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 35,709 Desjardins bought 32,000 from anonymous at 23.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2041-04-08
Maturity Price : 23.03
Evaluated at bid price : 23.24
Bid-YTW : 5.49 %
RY.PR.E Deemed-Retractible 35,083 Desjardins bought 30,000 from anonymous at 23.87.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 5.15 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 31,700 RBC crossed 30,000 at 25.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.65
Bid-YTW : -1.46 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 28,466 Desjardins crossed 15,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.51
Bid-YTW : 3.07 %
There were 20 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Wide Spread Highlights
Issue Index Quote Data and Yield Notes
RY.PR.L FixedReset Quote: 26.71 – 27.16
Spot Rate : 0.4500
Average : 0.3181

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.71
Bid-YTW : 3.40 %

HSB.PR.C Deemed-Retractible Quote: 24.29 – 24.69
Spot Rate : 0.4000
Average : 0.2810

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.29
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %

SLF.PR.F FixedReset Quote: 26.81 – 27.13
Spot Rate : 0.3200
Average : 0.2237

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.81
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %

SLF.PR.A Deemed-Retractible Quote: 22.57 – 22.79
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1455

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2022-01-31
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 22.57
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %

PWF.PR.P FixedReset Quote: 25.25 – 25.47
Spot Rate : 0.2200
Average : 0.1457

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2016-03-01
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.25
Bid-YTW : 4.13 %

BMO.PR.O FixedReset Quote: 27.81 – 28.05
Spot Rate : 0.2400
Average : 0.1733

YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-06-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.81
Bid-YTW : 3.14 %

TXPR Rebalancing: April 2011

April 8th, 2011

Standard & Poor’s has announced the current revision to the S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index, reflecting their updated methodology:

These changes will be effective at the open on Monday, April 18, 2011:

TXPR Revision 2010/7
Additions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
BMO.PR.Q  
BAF.PR.A  
BAM.PR.X  
BPO.PR.J  
DC.PR.A  
FTS.PR.C  
GMP.PR.B  
HSE.PR.A  
MFC.PR.F  
REI.PR.A  
RON.PR.A  
TD.PR.N  
TCA.PR.X  
TCA.PR.Y  

TXPR Revision 2011/1
Deletions
Ticker HIMIPref™
SubIndex
DBRS
Rating
Last
Index
Action
None

I regret that I do not have time at the moment to fill in all of the empty boxes or to make any comments – but I will! Someday.

DGS.PR.A Merger (with BE.PR.A) and Term Extension Approved

April 8th, 2011

Brompton Group has announced:

At special meetings of Preferred and Class A shareholders of Brompton Equity Split Corp. (“BE”) and Dividend Growth Split Corp. (“DGS”) held today, shareholders approved special resolutions to amalgamate BE and DGS to form a new fund to be named Dividend Growth Split Corp. (“New DGS”). The effective date of the merger is expected to be May 18, 2011, subject to applicable regulatory approvals. The merger is expected to be implemented on a tax deferred basis to shareholders of BE and DGS, subject to the assumptions and qualifications outlined in the joint management information circular for the meetings.

At the meeting, the extension of the term for New DGS for up to 5 years beyond the scheduled termination date for DGS of November 30, 2014 and thereafter for successive terms of up to 5 years as determined by the New DGS Board of Directors was approved. Shareholders will be able to redeem either their Preferred Shares or Class A Shares of New DGS at Net Asset Value per Share prior to any such extension and New DGS will provide at least 60 days’ notice to Shareholders of the extended retraction date by way of press release.

In addition, as a result of the approval of the special resolutions, shareholders of BE will have the opportunity to redeem their shares of BE prior to the merger if they do not wish to participate in the merger. Shareholders wishing to redeem their BE shares may surrender such BE shares to Computershare Investor Services Inc. up until 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on April 15, 2011. Shares are held on behalf of beneficial holders through CDS Participants who may have earlier cut off times.

New DGS will have the same investment objectives, strategies and restrictions as DGS as well as substantially the same preferred share and class A share attributes. DGS invests on an equally weighted basis in a portfolio of 20 large capitalization Canadian equities that have among the highest dividend growth rates on the TSX.

Under the merger proposal, each issued and outstanding preferred share of BE will become one preferred share of DGS. Each issued and outstanding class A share of BE will become the number of class A shares of DGS determined by dividing the net asset value per class A share of BE by the net asset value per class A share of DGS, each calculated on April 28, 2011. In order to maintain the same number of DGS class A and preferred shares outstanding following the merger, class A shares or preferred shares of BE may be redeemed by BE on a pro-rata basis prior to the merger as outlined in the joint management information circular.

The plan was reported on PrefBlog in the post BE.PR.A and DGS.PR.A to Merge?. BE.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™. DGS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™ but is assigned to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

DBRS comments:

If the 1:1 ratio of preferred shares to class A shares outstanding is maintained, the merger will not result in a decrease in downside protection for existing DGS Preferred Shareholders. As a result, provided BE exercises its right to restore the 1:1 ratio, DBRS expects that the New DGS Preferred Shares will be assigned the same rating as the DGS Preferred Shares.