CM: DBRS Changes Trend to Stable

June 16th, 2010

DBRS has announced that it has changed the ratings trend on CM from negative to stable. The so-called press release is not available to the public.

Investment Executive reports:

DBRS says that the move to a stable trend reflects its view that “actions taken so far by CIBC to reduce its exposures in the structured credit runoff business should help to limit the losses on both earnings and capital.” It says that it expects the bank to continue to proactively reduce its structured credit runoff portfolio exposures.

DBRS adds that the bank has also taken actions to improve risk management, including changing senior management, increasing the depth of its senior risk management team, and revamping the risk management process and procedures. It allows that while it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these changes, “so far earnings from core businesses remain within our expectations, given weak credit markets in Canada.”

“Nevertheless, any material weaknesses in risk management that affect the consistency or sustainability of earnings will have a negative impact on CIBC’s ratings,” it stresses

CM has a large number of preferred shares issues outstanding: CM.PR.A (OpRet); CM.PR.D, CM.PR.E, CM.PR.G, CM.PR.H, CM.PR.I, CM.PR.J (PerpetualDiscount); CM.PR.K, CM.PR.L, CM.PR.M (FixedReset); CM.PR.P (PerpetualDiscount) and CM.PR.R (OpRet).

The last general news about CM was the post on the preferred DRIP into discounted common. All CM preferred issues are tracked by HIMIPref™.

June 15, 2010

June 15th, 2010

Continuing trouble in Europe:

Bank bond sales slowed in May to the lowest since Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s failure in 2008 as the extra yield buyers demand to hold the securities over government debt soared to the highest this year. Firms are wary of lending to each other, depositing record funds with the European Central Bank.

The central bank is preventing a crisis by providing banks with unprecedented funding. In substituting long-term money with shorter-maturity ECB cash, policymakers are making it harder to wean banks off life support as well as the short-term financing that regulators blame for the credit crisis.

Risk aversion is helping to spur sales of covered bonds, securities that are guaranteed by the issuer and backed by mortgages and other loans, reducing risk for investors and interest payments for the issuer. Financial firms have sold 11.5 billion euros ($13.9 billion) of the bonds this month, three times the total for May, according to van Steenis. Frankfurt- based Commerzbank raised 1 billion euros in a June 9 offering.

BP is looking greasy:

BP Plc’s credit rating was cut six levels to two above “junk” by Fitch Ratings on concern over the potential cost of cleaning up the Gulf of Mexico oil spill and meeting future liabilities.

BP’s long-term issuer default and senior unsecured ratings were lowered to BBB from AA, Fitch said in a statement today. That follows a reduction from AA+ on June 3.

The yield premium investors demand to hold BP’s 750 million euros of 4.25 percent bonds due next year rather than similar- maturity government debt increased 143 basis points to 505 basis points, according to HSBC Holdings Plc prices on Bloomberg.

BP credit-default swaps surged 39 basis points after today’s ratings downgrade to 476.5, according to CMA DataVision.

Speaking of BP:

Exxon Mobil Corp., ConocoPhillips, Chevron Corp. and Royal Dutch Shell Plc are as ill-prepared as BP Plc to halt and clean up an offshore oil spill because they all use “carbon copy” disaster plans, lawmakers said.

Lawmakers faulted the four executives for disaster-response plans that would halt oil leaks at the sea floor using the same techniques that failed for BP at its Macondo well.

Naturally, anybody who does something different that – for whatever reason – doesn’t work is simultaneously criticized for not using best practices.

It will be a long time before the truth is known, but my instinct is to look first at common or garden complexity. Everything’s complicated nowadays, everything is invented and serviced by small teams of specialists and everybody parrots what they say to the best of their ability. Used to be, it was common for teenagers to buy old cars and fix them up – a virtually impossible task nowadays. How many people in the world can talk about, for instance, Toyota’s fly-by-wire accelleration system and really know what they’re talking about? A dozen?

It’s nice to see that there are still some adults left in the business:

Despite all the bad headlines — the accusations of fraud, the talk of a big settlement, the risk, however remote, of criminal charges — there’s an inconvenient truth that’s been largely ignored: Most of Goldman’s big customers are not bolting.

“We trust them,” Jeffrey R. Immelt, the chief executive of General Electric, told an audience at the 92nd Street Y in New York last month. “People need to tone down the rhetoric around financial services and stop the populism and be adults.”

I’ve done business with Goldman before and I’ll do business with Goldman again. Why? Not because they’re nice people. Not because they’re kind to small furry animals. But because they can source trades. If I go to Goldman and say ‘I want to take such and such a position’, they’ll come back to me with price. You know, just like, say, a broker. Or a used car salesman, for that matter.

The Canadian preferred share market just kept on keeping on today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 24bp and FixedResets gaining 14bp, on moderate volume. Again, there were no losers in the Performance Highlights table … now, if I were a real financial journalist, I’d be able to say something like “This is the first time since august 17 that there have been two successive days of no losers during months without an “R” in them” …. but I ain’t. PerpetualDiscounts dominated the volume tables, another relatively rare occurance.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.70 % 2.76 % 36,876 20.58 1 0.0000 % 2,092.7
FixedFloater 5.18 % 3.30 % 25,389 19.88 1 0.8157 % 3,092.2
Floater 2.41 % 2.78 % 80,471 20.29 3 0.5541 % 2,250.6
OpRet 4.88 % 3.62 % 90,468 0.93 11 0.3262 % 2,327.6
SplitShare 6.29 % 5.12 % 99,402 0.08 2 1.1633 % 2,204.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3262 % 2,128.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2373 % 1,897.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.97 % 6.03 % 205,997 13.84 77 0.2373 % 1,796.1
FixedReset 5.41 % 3.94 % 389,598 3.49 45 0.1414 % 2,186.8
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.J OpRet 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : 4.84 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 15.67
Evaluated at bid price : 15.67
Bid-YTW : 2.78 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 3.62 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.19 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 23.61
Evaluated at bid price : 23.78
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.72 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.01
Bid-YTW : 7.62 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 77,400 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 17.85. Scotia bought 16,400 from anonymous at 16,400.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 17.85
Evaluated at bid price : 17.85
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
PWF.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 65,950 RBC crossed two blocks of 30,000 each at 20.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 20.37
Evaluated at bid price : 20.37
Bid-YTW : 6.18 %
BNS.PR.Y FixedReset 39,346 Nesbitt crossed blocks of 13,100 and 10,000, both at 24.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 24.65
Evaluated at bid price : 24.70
Bid-YTW : 3.87 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 36,370 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 21.19
Evaluated at bid price : 21.19
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
CM.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 34,350 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 19.81
Evaluated at bid price : 19.81
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 23,650 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-15
Maturity Price : 19.63
Evaluated at bid price : 19.63
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
There were 25 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

YPG Issues 10-year Convertible Notes at 6.25%

June 15th, 2010

Yellow Pages Income Fund has announced:

that its subsidiary, Yellow Media Inc. (the “Issuer”), will be issuing $200 million aggregate principal amount of 6.25% convertible unsecured subordinated debentures (the “Convertible Debentures”) on a bought deal basis. The Convertible Debentures pay interest semi-annually on April 1 and October 1 of each year commencing October 1, 2010. The Convertible Debentures have a maturity date of October 1, 2017 and will be convertible, at the option of the holder, for trust units (“Units”) of the Fund at an exchange price of $8.00 per Unit.

The Issuer has also granted the underwriters the option to purchase up to $30 million principal amount of additional Convertible Debentures at a price of $1,000 per Convertible Debenture (plus accrued interest from the initial closing of the offering to the closing of the over-allotment option) to cover over-allotments, exercisable in whole or in part anytime up to 30 days following closing of the offering.

Net proceeds resulting from the sale of the Convertible Debentures of the Issuer shall be used by the Issuer to repay indebtedness, including under the Issuer’s commercial paper program and to fund the redemption of the Issuer’s outstanding 5.50% Exchangeable Unsecured Subordinated Debentures, and for general corporate purposes.

Pursuant to the Fund’s previously announced plan of arrangement under the Canada Business Corporations Act, the Fund’s income trust structure will be converted into a corporate structure. As a result, the Convertible Debentures will, without the requirement for the consent of any holders of Convertible Debentures, become debentures of the successor public corporation on the effective date of the arrangement having the same terms as the Convertible Debentures and will become convertible into common shares of the successor public corporation.

The Convertible Debentures will be offered for sale to the public in each of the provinces and territories of Canada pursuant to a short form prospectus of the Issuer to be filed with Canadian securities regulatory authorities in all Canadian jurisdictions.

The underwriting syndicate is led by RBC Capital Markets and TD Securities and Scotia Capital, acting as joint book-runners.

The offering is scheduled to close on or about July 8, 2010, subject to certain conditions, including conditions to be set forth in the underwriting agreement.

Yellow Media (formerly YPG Holdings) has four issues of preferreds outstanding:

  • YPG.PR.A, OpRet, closed 6/14 at 24.60-73 to yeild 4.87-63%
  • YPG.PR.B, OpRet, 20.56-72 to yield 8.40-27%
  • YPG.PR.C, FixedReset, 24.10-30, 7.16-10%
  • YPG.PR.D, FixedReset, 24.20-60, 7.24-11%

Update: DBRS rates them at BBB.

Carney: Ban the Bond!

June 15th, 2010

Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada, gave a speech to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) meeting, Montreal, 10 June 2010. I was stunned by suggestion regarding contingent capital:

One promising avenue is to embed contingent capital features into debt and preferred shares issued by financial institutions. Contingent capital is a security that converts to capital when a financial institution is in serious trouble, thereby replenishing the capital of the institution without the use of taxpayer funds. Contingent conversions could be embedded in all future new issues of senior unsecured debt and subordinated securities to create a broader bail-in approach. Its presence would also serve as a useful disciplinary device on management since common shareholders would be incented to act prudently and avoid having their stake in the institution diluted away by the prospect of conversion.

New issues of senior unsecured debt???

Such an unprecendented proposal should be made only in the context of some very lengthy arguments in favour of the advisability of such an incredible change.

Contingent Capital may be a good thing, but it is not a bond! If I own a bond and you’re late paying me, I can put you in bankruptcy. If this is not true – as with CC – then it wasn’t a bond.

And Carney wants all senior unsecured debt to be contingent? To get an idea of the scope of this revolutionary idea, have a look at Table 54a of RY’s 2009 Annual Report: it shows that senior unsecured bonds outstanding amounted to $69.8-billion dollars. This compares to $39.6-billion in shareholders’ equity (including preferred shares).

In making such a suggestion without publishing a scrap of research into Canadian contingent capital; without making any qualifications; and without, in fact, doing much else at all, Mr. Carney has shown himself to be unfit to continue as Governor of the Bank of Canada.

Update: I have sent the following eMail to the BoC:

I refer to Mark Carney’s remarks to the IOSCO conference, published on your website at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2010/sp100610.html

Mr. Carney spoke approvingly of the potential for “all future new issues of senior unsecured debt” to become contingent capital.

I am not aware that anybody, anywhere, has made such a proposal. Has the Bank of Canada published any research whatsoever on the probable effects of such a revolutionary change in capital markets? Is the Bank of Canada aware of any such research?

June 14, 2010

June 14th, 2010

I have long taken the view that if sub-debt becomes contingent capital, then so will preferred shares; otherwise, issues’ seniority could leapfrog when an institution gets into trouble and that makes no sense. So I was gratified to hear this view echoed for the first time I’ve seen:

Canada is recommending that subordinated debt and preferred shares sold by banks be convertible to common shares to bolster capital in the event of a crisis. The conversion would be triggered if the banking regulator determines a troubled bank is about to fail, or if the government is forced to purchase shares in the bank.

It’s a shame that OSFI hasn’t actually published the proposal; or, indeed, done any work at all that I can see on the proposal.

An older paper on Contingent Capital is Rethinking Capital Regulation by Kashyap, Rajan & Stein, referenced but not previously linked in HM Treasury Discusses Contingent Capital.

Korea is imposing foreign exchange position limits:

Foreign banks will be required to cut currency derivatives holdings to 250 percent of equity capital and domestic banks to 50 percent, with three months to meet the new ceiling and two years to cover existing positions. The limit on derivatives to cover corporate settlements will be cut to 100 percent of the total, from 125 percent.

“We are not limiting portfolio investment,” said Kim Yi Tae, director at the finance ministry’s foreign exchange market division. “We’re not putting regulations on trade financing, only on bank lending in foreign currencies and on forwards.”

The new rules are to reduce systemic risks, which should serve as a safety net to avert a crisis, the government and central bank said in yesterday’s statement.

The ‘systemic risk’ rationale sounds a little thin to me. If that was the problem, they could simply impose higher risk-weights on FX positions. But prescriptive rules are always more attractive to politicians and bureaucrats than market-based solutions.

Call risk is hitting the Asian junk market:

The biggest junk bond market rally in more than a decade is increasing the risk investors in Asian high-yield debt will be roiled by early redemptions, according to Morgan Stanley and Credit Agricole CIB.

Cheaper funding alternatives such as loans make companies more likely to buy back callable notes, unsettling investors who may be forced to reinvest at lower rates or in more volatile assets. Thirty-five percent of liquid Asian junk bonds are callable — most this year — and about 20 percent are trading above or close to their call price, according to Morgan Stanley research.

Junk? Greece is junk says Moody’s:

Greece’s credit rating was cut four steps to non-investment grade, or junk, by Moody’s Investors Service, which cited the country’s economic “risks.”

The rating was lowered to Ba1 from A3, Moody’s said in a statement today from London. The outlook is stable, it said. Greece is already rated junk by Standard & Poor’s.

S&P cut Greece’s credit rating to non-investment grade on April 27, the first time a euro member lost its investment-grade since the euro’s 1999 debut. S&P warned that bondholders could recover as little as 30 percent of their initial investment if the country restructures its debt.

Fannie & Freddie continue to demonstrate that no matter what degree of incompetence at which we assess Wall Street, it will always be out-done by the politicians:

The cost of fixing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that last year bought or guaranteed three-quarters of all U.S. home loans, will be at least $160 billion and could grow to as much as $1 trillion after the biggest bailout in American history.

Quick! Trump up another charge against Goldman Sachs!

It was another very good day for Canadian preferred shares, with PerpetualDiscounts up 22bp and FixedResets gaining 29bp, on slightly elevated volume. There were no losers on the Performance Highlights table!

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.69 % 2.76 % 37,144 20.60 1 -0.0470 % 2,092.7
FixedFloater 5.22 % 3.33 % 26,438 19.84 1 0.0000 % 3,067.2
Floater 2.42 % 2.80 % 81,737 20.24 3 -0.0422 % 2,238.2
OpRet 4.89 % 3.84 % 94,219 0.93 11 0.0177 % 2,320.0
SplitShare 6.37 % 4.88 % 99,830 0.08 2 0.3524 % 2,178.7
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0177 % 2,121.4
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2237 % 1,893.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.99 % 6.04 % 203,270 13.82 77 0.2237 % 1,791.8
FixedReset 5.42 % 3.97 % 390,680 3.49 45 0.2928 % 2,183.7
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 20.97
Evaluated at bid price : 20.97
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.08 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 22.73
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 5.95 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.16 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 5.81 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.37 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 22.47
Evaluated at bid price : 23.01
Bid-YTW : 5.79 %
IAG.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.42 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 23.34
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 6.30 %
BAM.PR.M Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 17.67
Evaluated at bid price : 17.67
Bid-YTW : 6.75 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 1.76 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.25
Bid-YTW : 3.63 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 64,050 Desjardins crossed blocks of 25,000 and 17,000, both at 19.84.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 19.80
Evaluated at bid price : 19.80
Bid-YTW : 6.02 %
BMO.PR.P FixedReset 49,125 Scotia crossed 25,000 at 26.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-03-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.60
Bid-YTW : 3.99 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 41,308 RBC crossed blocks of 10,100 and 12,000, both at 20.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 20.55
Evaluated at bid price : 20.55
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 33,710 Desjardins bought 15,000 from Scotia at 24.45.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 24.24
Evaluated at bid price : 24.44
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
MFC.PR.E FixedReset 32,350 RBC crossed 25,000 at 26.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-19
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.70
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
SLF.PR.G FixedReset 31,375 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-14
Maturity Price : 24.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.86
Bid-YTW : 4.27 %
There were 33 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

June Edition of PrefLetter Released!

June 14th, 2010

The June, 2010, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The June edition contains an appendix discussing yield approximations and reviewing the implications of errors in yield calculation on FixedReset pricing.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the June 2010, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the July, 2010, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close July 9 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on July 12.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: The PrefLetter website has a Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository – there are some hints in the post Sympatico Spam Filters out of Control. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.

June Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation!

June 11th, 2010

The markets have closed and the June edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The June edition will contain an appendix discussing closed-form approximations to precise yield calculations and review the method the market is apparently using to value FixedResets.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The June issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Monday. I will write another post when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the June issue.

June 11, 2010

June 11th, 2010

European banks are in serious trouble:

Investors have already pushed down financial stocks enough to imply the “erosion” in book value that may result from losses tied to a sovereign debt restructuring, said Dirk Hoffmann-Becking, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein in London. A Bloomberg index of European financial firms dropped as much as 22 percent since April 15 to the lowest level since July.

Writedowns stemming from a Greek default would total almost $200 billion, estimates Jon Peace, an analyst at Nomura Holdings Inc. in London. Banks globally could lose as much as $900 billion in a worst-case scenario where Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain all have to restructure their debt, Nomura estimates.

German financial companies including Deutsche Bank agreed in May to refinance maturing Greek debt and maintain existing credit lines to Greece and its lenders for the next three years. French banks made a similar pledge.

A majority of European banks haven’t tendered their Greek sovereign debt to the European Central Bank, according to an informal survey by Morgan Stanley analysts. One reason may be that some banks bought their Greek bonds when they were trading at 20 percent above par, meaning a sale to the ECB would prompt a loss, Morgan Stanley’s London-based analyst Huw van Steenis said in a note to clients on June 9.

Corporate eMail is not secret!

“Just between us,” it may be “stupid” to use certain words in e-mail to “discuss” the “big trouble” you might face if you’re ever investigated for financial wrongdoing or a subsequent cover-up.

Those are some of the terms that examiner Anton R. Valukas searched for in 34 million pages of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. e-mails and reports, to find out who knew what about the risks that drove the fourth-largest securities firm into bankruptcy, according to his 2,200-page study on the collapse.

I don’t understand why people don’t know this already. When I’m composing an eMail, I imagine an angry regulator looking over my shoulder – a regulator who feels no compunction about publishing irrelevancies for the mere joy of embarrassing me.

The Canadian preferred share market rally kept on rallying today, with PerpetualDiscounts gaining 21bp while FixedResets were up 8bp. Some might be interested in the fact that volume was rather light today, and that there is considerable volatility shown in the Performance highlights table. Of course, today was the exDate for a great many issues, so perhaps a little volatility was to have been expected anyway.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.69 % 2.74 % 37,075 20.62 1 0.0000 % 2,093.6
FixedFloater 5.22 % 3.33 % 27,536 19.86 1 0.3854 % 3,067.2
Floater 2.42 % 2.79 % 85,230 20.29 3 -0.2987 % 2,239.1
OpRet 4.89 % 3.85 % 94,179 0.94 11 0.1351 % 2,319.6
SplitShare 6.39 % 5.61 % 100,755 0.08 2 0.3537 % 2,171.1
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1351 % 2,121.1
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.2102 % 1,888.7
Perpetual-Discount 6.00 % 6.06 % 202,906 13.83 77 0.2102 % 1,787.8
FixedReset 5.43 % 4.06 % 396,770 3.50 45 0.0765 % 2,177.3
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.K Floater -2.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 15.41
Evaluated at bid price : 15.41
Bid-YTW : 2.83 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 19.48
Evaluated at bid price : 19.48
Bid-YTW : 6.94 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.60
Bid-YTW : 5.01 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset -1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.41
Bid-YTW : 4.07 %
IGM.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 23.68
Evaluated at bid price : 23.86
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.04
Bid-YTW : 4.87 %
MFC.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 18.82
Evaluated at bid price : 18.82
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.28 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
BAM.PR.I OpRet 1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.45
Bid-YTW : 4.50 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.34
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.68
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 55,550 Scotia crossed 49,500 at 22.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 22.22
Evaluated at bid price : 22.50
Bid-YTW : 6.33 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 37,750 Scotia crossed 34,000 at 48.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 45.65
Evaluated at bid price : 47.78
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 25,140 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 19.57
Evaluated at bid price : 19.57
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset 22,250 TD crossed 15,000 at 26.04.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2013-09-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.99
Bid-YTW : 3.76 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 21,235 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.40
Bid-YTW : 4.18 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 20,730 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-11
Maturity Price : 19.50
Evaluated at bid price : 19.50
Bid-YTW : 5.86 %
There were 17 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.

EMA Subsidiary NSPI Issues 30-Year Notes at 5.61%

June 11th, 2010

DBRS has announced that it:

has today assigned a rating of A (low) with a Stable trend to the prospective issue by Nova Scotia Power Inc. (NSPI) of $300 million, 5.61% medium-term notes, maturing June 15, 2040 (the Notes). The offering is expected to settle on June 15, 2010.

The Notes rank equally with all other unsecured obligations of NSPI and are being issued pursuant to the Short Form Base Shelf Prospectus dated May 21, 2010, as supplemented by the Prospectus Supplement dated June 9, 2010. Proceeds from this issue are expected to be used to repay short-term debt and for general corporate purposes.

NSPI is a wholly owned subsidiary of EMA.

It will be recalled that EMA recently issued EMA.PR.A, a FixedReset paying 4.40%+184.

Direct comparisons between the credits these issues are difficult; NSPI is a subsidiary of EMA, together with the difference in seniority.

Standard & Poor’s rates EMA’s preferreds at BBB- on the global scale and NSPI’s notes at BBB+; as a rough explanation, we can say that there is one notch for the holdco/sub relationship and one for the preferred/senior note relationship (which is much less than would be applied to a bank of the same credit quality).

It will be noticed that TCA recently issued long notes at 6.10% and TRP’s two FixedReset issues, TRP.PR.A and TRP.PR.B, closed last night yielding 4.12% (to call) and 3.95% (to perpetuity) respectively, while TCA’s two PerpetualDiscounts (TCA.PR.X and TCA.PR.Y) yield about 5.90%, down about 17bp from issue time. Make of it what you will!

June 10, 2010

June 10th, 2010

Different crimes for different times!

Sergio Natera and Anna McElaney are scheduled to be sentenced in Hartford’s federal court in August after pleading guilty to fraud. Their crime involved persuading lenders to approve the sale of homes for less than the balance owed –known as a short sale — without disclosing that there were better offers. They then flipped the houses for a profit.

A prevalent scam involves a practice called “flopping,” [special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program Neil] Barofsky said. In that scheme, investors or home buyers hire brokers to assess a home for less than its market value and convince banks to accept a sale at that level. The buyer conceals from the lender that he has lined up a higher offer and then quickly resells the property for a profit, as in the Connecticut case.

In the Connecticut case, Regions Bank in April 2008 agreed to a short sale of a Bridgeport house for $102,375, unaware that Natera and McElaney had a bidder willing to pay $132,500, according to the plea agreements. Eight weeks after the bank sold for a loss, the pair resold the house for a $30,125 gain.

The SEC wants to make competition illegal:

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro said the agency may regulate the speed of stock orders in response to a surge in electronic trading and the May 6 plunge that wiped out $862 billion of market value in 20 minutes.

The SEC needs “to explore whether bids and orders should be regulated on speed so there is less incentive to engage in this microsecond arms race that might undermine long-term investors and the market’s capital-formation function,” she said at a conference in Montreal. “The markets have to serve that function for companies to raise money, create jobs and allow the economy to grow.”

The basic trouble is that old,school, comfortable, well connected, incompetent portfolio managers are having their lunch eaten by High Frequency Traders – which are often brokerage firms, hedge funds, and individuals with, say $10-million to play with. Since they can’t compete on results, they’ll compete on regulation.

The pace of the rally in the Canadian preferred share market continued at a slower pace today, with PerpetualDiscounts up 18bp and FixedResets up 12bp.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 2.68 % 2.74 % 38,588 20.63 1 0.0000 % 2,093.6
FixedFloater 5.24 % 3.34 % 27,850 19.85 1 -1.1429 % 3,055.4
Floater 2.40 % 2.78 % 86,306 20.21 3 0.5893 % 2,245.8
OpRet 4.88 % 3.86 % 93,375 0.94 11 -0.0565 % 2,316.5
SplitShare 6.41 % 5.38 % 101,084 0.08 2 0.2437 % 2,163.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.0565 % 2,118.2
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1810 % 1,884.8
Perpetual-Discount 6.01 % 6.06 % 202,662 13.82 77 0.1810 % 1,784.1
FixedReset 5.43 % 4.03 % 401,304 3.51 45 0.1169 % 2,175.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.77 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 23.59
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.45 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 21.14
Evaluated at bid price : 21.14
Bid-YTW : 6.31 %
PWF.PR.J OpRet -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2011-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.25
Evaluated at bid price : 25.54
Bid-YTW : 4.01 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.76
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.01 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 24.14
Evaluated at bid price : 24.51
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 22.71
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 1.88 %
PWF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.24 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 22.83
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 23.81
Evaluated at bid price : 24.00
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 19.85
Evaluated at bid price : 19.85
Bid-YTW : 6.81 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
SLF.PR.F FixedReset 77,600 TD crossed 75,000 at 24.93.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-07-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.91
Bid-YTW : 3.94 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 55,700 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 27.13.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.12
Bid-YTW : 3.97 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 55,345 RBC crossed 25,000 at 19.61.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 19.56
Evaluated at bid price : 19.56
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 49,905 RBC crossed two blocks of 20,000 shares each at 21.09.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 21.05
Evaluated at bid price : 21.05
Bid-YTW : 5.85 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 48,100 National crossed 25,000 at 20.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2040-06-10
Maturity Price : 20.58
Evaluated at bid price : 20.58
Bid-YTW : 5.92 %
CM.PR.M FixedReset 41,195 Desjardins crossed 14,800 at 27.53.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.50
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
There were 30 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.