Miscellaneous News

Effective Fed Funds Rate: A Technical Explanation?

Assiduous Readers will remember the puzzle of the Effective Fed Funds Rate. Fed Funds were trading at 0.25% at a time when excess balances were earning 1.00% from the Fed, which appears to allow a risk-free arbitrage.

A recent Fed Press Release and its attachment may provide a piece of the answer. First, a little terminology gleaned from the attachment … a small bank does not need to satisfy its reserve requirements directly with the Fed. It can deposit the necessary funds in a (presumably bigger) bank’s Fed account, in which case the small bank is the “respondent” and the big bank with the Fed account is the “pass through correspondent”. Got it? OK:

As noted above, Regulation D currently deems the entire balance in a pass-through correspondent’s account at a Reserve Bank to be the exclusive property of the pass-through correspondent and to represent a liability of that Reserve Bank to the pass-through correspondent exclusively. Therefore, the pass-through correspondent must show the entire balance in its Reserve Bank account on its own balance sheet as an asset, even if the balance consists, in whole or in part, of amounts that are passed through on behalf of a respondent.

Accordingly, when a correspondent’s respondents want to earn interest on excess balances by leaving them with their correspondent (which in turn passes those balances through to the Reserve Bank), the correspondent has a larger balance at the Reserve Bank. As a result, the correspondent has more assets on its balance sheet and a lower leverage ratio for capital adequacy purposes.

In contrast, when the correspondent sells the respondent’s federal funds on the respondent’s behalf, the respondent directs its correspondent to transfer funds to the entity purchasing federal funds. This transaction is effected by a debit to the correspondent’s account at a Reserve Bank and a credit to the purchaser’s account at a Reserve Bank. On the correspondent’s balance sheet, all other things being equal, the correspondent’s assets decline (as does its liability to its respondent) because the correspondent’s account balance at the Reserve Bank is lower and therefore its regulatory leverage ratio would be higher.

Since the implementation of interest on excess balances through the October interim final rule, the actual federal funds rate has generally averaged significantly below the interest rate paid by the Reserve Banks on excess balances, although this spread narrowed significantly after the FOMC established a range for the federal funds rate of 0 to ¼ percent on December 16. When the market rate of interest on federal funds is below the rate paid by the Reserve Banks on excess balances, respondents have an incentive to shift the investment of their surplus funds away from sales of federal funds (through their correspondents acting as agents), and toward holding funds directly as excess balances with the Reserve Banks, potentially disrupting established correspondent-respondent relationships. A correspondent could offer to purchase federal funds directly from its respondents and hold those funds as excess balances at a Reserve Bank; however, such transactions could result in a significant reduction in regulatory leverage ratios for some correspondents. The Board believes that the disparity between the actual federal funds rate and the rate paid by Reserve Banks on excess balances may partly be caused by the leverage incentives imposed on correspondent institutions to sell excess balances into the federal funds market rather than maintaining those balances in an account at a Reserve Bank.

To address this problem, the Fed is proposing to establish a new account type, an “Excess Balance Account”.

These excess balance accounts (“EBAs”) would contain only the excess balances of the eligible institutions participating in such accounts, although the participating eligible institutions (“EBA Participants”) would authorize another institution (“EBA Agent”) to manage the EBA on their behalf. The authorization of EBAs is intended to allow eligible institutions to earn interest on their excess balances at the excess balance rate in an account relationship directly with the Federal Reserve Bank as counterparty without disrupting established business relationships with their correspondents. Continuing strains in financial markets and the configuration of interest rates support the implementation of EBAs; however, the Board will evaluate the continuing need for EBAs when more normal market functioning is restored.

EBA Balances will not gross up the pass-through correspondent’s balance sheet.

Update, 2009-2-2: Economic Policy Journal commented in early December on a December 1 speech by Bernanke in which he noted:

In practice, however, several factors have served to depress the market rate below the target. One such factor is the presence in the market of large suppliers of funds, notably the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are not eligible to receive interest on reserves and are thus willing to lend overnight federal funds at rates below the target.

Banks have an incentive to borrow from the GSEs and then redeposit the funds at the Federal Reserve; as a result, banks earn a sure profit equal to the difference between the rate they pay the GSEs and the rate they receive on excess reserves. However, thus far, this type of arbitrage has not been occurring on a sufficient scale, perhaps because banks have not yet fully adjusted their reserve-management practices to take advantage of this opportunity.

I am happy to see my ‘bureaucracy explanation’ front and centre!

Miscellaneous News

CDS Analytics to go Open-Source

ISDA has announced:

that J.P. Morgan has transferred to ISDA its CDS Analytical Engine. The CDS analytical engine, originally developed by the Quantitative Research group at J.P. Morgan, is widely used in the industry to price CDS contracts. ISDA will make the analytical engine available as open source code, thereby increasing transparency around CDS pricing.

“J.P. Morgan has invested a lot of intellectual capital in this analytical engine. Its willingness to assign this to ISDA for us to make it available as open source to the entire industry demonstrates our collective commitment to the integrity of the CDS product,” said Robert Pickel, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, ISDA. “ISDA and its members are vigilant to public concerns around transparency. This is yet another measure of increased standardization in CDS.”

This is interesting, particularly given the politics that are swirling around the market. Making the code available to the public could be a first step towards listing some benchmark names on an exchange. As yet, though, the details of the open-source licence are not available.

Hat-tips: Alea via Dealbreaker.

Interesting External Papers

NYT Piece on Value at Risk

I read this a while ago … was looking for it in my “notes” (as I refer to the Interesting External Papers category of PrefBlog … and couldn’t find it!

Anyway, Joe Nocera of the New York Times wrote an excellent feature article on Value at Risk: Risk Mismanagement.

The major point to be understood is that management of Goldman Sachs used VaR in an intelligent manner:

in December 2006, Goldman’s various indicators, including VaR and other risk models, began suggesting that something was wrong. Not hugely wrong, mind you, but wrong enough to warrant a closer look.

“We look at the P.& L. of our businesses every day,” said Goldman Sachs’ chief financial officer, David Viniar, when I went to see him recently to hear the story for myself. (P.& L. stands for profit and loss.) “We have lots of models here that are important, but none are more important than the P.& L., and we check every day to make sure our P.& L. is consistent with where our risk models say it should be. In December our mortgage business lost money for 10 days in a row. It wasn’t a lot of money, but by the 10th day we thought that we should sit down and talk about it.”

So Goldman called a meeting of about 15 people, including several risk managers and the senior people on the various trading desks. They examined a thick report that included every trading position the firm held. For the next three hours, they pored over everything. They examined their VaR numbers and their other risk models. They talked about how the mortgage-backed securities market “felt.” “Our guys said that it felt like it was going to get worse before it got better,” Viniar recalled. “So we made a decision: let’s get closer to home.”

Various other elements of VaR and its critiques have been referenced in An Early Debate on Value at Risk.

The main problem as I see it is that VaR does not – and cannot – account for trends. If, for instance, you measure your daily VaR based on data from, say, an environment of steadily increasing real-estate prices, that tells you nothing – NOTHING! – about what happens when they decline. Especially if they decline suddenly and interact with factors not in your model, such as “jingle mail”.

And the other problem is – as Taleb appears to have made a career out of saying – fat tails and black swans.

Market Action

January 28, 2009

Pussycat, in a desperate attempt to sound tough, is putting What-Debt? on “probation”:

[Pussycat] said his party is prepared to “swallow hard” and support the Conservative government, provided they agree to table regular updates outlining how they are living up to their commitments outlined in the federal budget.

We have now officially forgotten the lesson of hitting the wall in 1994 – I confidently predict twenty years of deficits until we hit the wall again.

Rubin has spoken out against fair-value accounting:

“I spent my whole life at Goldman Sachs believing in mark- to-market accounting, and having said that, if you look at the experience from the last two years, I think mark-to-market accounting has led to terrible vicious cycles in asset prices,” Rubin, the former U.S. Treasury secretary, said during a discussion at the 92nd St. YMCA late yesterday.

Companies including Citigroup and American International Group Inc. say mark-to-market, also known as fair-value accounting, doesn’t work when few buyers are willing to trade assets like subprime mortgages. Proponents such as the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board say the rule adds to transparency and gives investors information about companies.

Under reserve accounting, assets like loans are carried at cost, offset by reserves for potential losses.

I have stated many times that the regulatory regime should differentiate between banks and investment firms. Fair value accounting is appropriate for investment firms, at which the default assumption is that they hold assets for a short period, then sell them. Reserve accounting is often (though not always) more appropriate for banks, at which the default assumption is that they hold assets until maturity.

The FOMC released its monetary policy statement today – no real surprises.

The BoC has released an analysis of bond auction formats by Olivier Armantier and Nourredine Lafhel, examining the methods by which bonds can be auctioned. Three systems are considered:

  • discriminatory auctions: the highest bids are filled at the price bid until supply is exhausted
  • at uniform-price auctions, bidders pay the stop-out price for all units they requested at prices exceeding the stop-out price.
  • At Spanish auctions, bidders pay the average price of the bids for all their bids above the average and their bid price if it below the accepted average

it appears that the ranking of the two auction formats may only be established on a case-by-case basis.3 As demonstrated by A&S (2005), the presence of asymmetries across participants is an important factor in ranking auction formats in terms of the revenues they generate. Indeed, A&S show that risk averse and/or less-informed bidders may become relatively more aggressive at uniform-price auctions, since they do not have to pay their bids.

Table 7 also indicates that, had the Canadian government conducted the 100 auctions in our sample under the Spanish format instead of the discriminatory format, it would have significantly increased its revenues by an average of 2:34%; or close to 52:71 million dollars, per auction. Furthermore, we can see in Table 8 that, given the assumptions underlying the model, Canadian government revenues would have been higher in roughly 62% of the auctions if it had conducted them under the Spanish format. Observe also that the Spanish format dominates in an additional dimension. Indeed, we can see in Table 7 that the standard deviation of the revenues generated across the 100 auctions is the smallest under the Spanish format. In other words, the stream of revenues generated by the Canadian government from one auction to the next would have been more stable than under the current pricing rule. Finally, Table 7 indicates that the additional revenues the Canadian government would generate by switching from the discriminatory to the Spanish format, would be almost equally spread across maturities. Indeed, we are unable to detect any clear pattern in the additional revenues generated at auctions for 30, 10, 5 or 2 years bonds.

In other words, as found by Armantier and Sbaï (2006), the Spanish format appears to provide an appropriate compromise between asking bidders to pay up to their bids, and promoting aggressive behaviour by o¤ering participants the guarantee that they will not have to pay more than the average winning bid.

SplitShares did well today, presumably on hopes that the bad-bank bailout plan will lead to a world of smiling bankers and bonuses for everybody. Well … I wouldn’t want to say it’s a completely insane hope. I’ll just say that every effort yet to persuade banks to sell their so-called toxic assets in bulk and at a politically acceptable price has failed. I think that Caballero’s plan has a better chance of success.

Fixed-Resets were down again today while PerpetualDiscounts were up, in a continuing fine reversal of their standard form in 2008. Volume continued high. The new RY Fixed-Reset 6.25%+450 will commence trading tomorrow with the symbol RY.PR.R.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.90 % 7.68 % 23,690 13.50 2 0.5777 % 849.4
FixedFloater 7.47 % 6.97 % 162,003 13.83 8 0.8968 % 1,385.2
Floater 5.36 % 4.51 % 33,519 16.39 4 0.1534 % 980.5
OpRet 5.31 % 4.86 % 160,988 4.04 15 0.0167 % 2,022.8
SplitShare 6.19 % 10.12 % 76,556 4.10 15 1.5794 % 1,799.9
Interest-Bearing 7.09 % 7.93 % 36,657 0.88 2 -0.9748 % 1,994.3
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3495 % 1,558.3
Perpetual-Discount 6.88 % 6.93 % 228,524 12.67 71 0.3495 % 1,435.2
FixedReset 6.09 % 5.38 % 743,735 14.37 22 -0.1856 % 1,779.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BNS.PR.P FixedReset -2.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 21.93
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.72 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing -2.63 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 19, based on Capital Units NAV of 1.55 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.41
Bid-YTW : 12.85 %
TD.PR.C FixedReset -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 22.96
Evaluated at bid price : 23.00
Bid-YTW : 5.30 %
TD.PR.A FixedReset -2.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 22.01
Evaluated at bid price : 22.05
Bid-YTW : 4.68 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.79 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 14.25
Evaluated at bid price : 14.25
Bid-YTW : 8.45 %
BAM.PR.J OpRet -1.51 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2018-03-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.63
Bid-YTW : 10.66 %
TD.PR.Y FixedReset -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
RY.PR.I FixedReset -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 22.02
Evaluated at bid price : 22.06
Bid-YTW : 4.79 %
CU.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -1.23 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 22.36
Evaluated at bid price : 22.54
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
BCE.PR.I FixedFloater -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.84
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
CM.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 16.79
Evaluated at bid price : 16.79
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 20.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.00
Bid-YTW : 6.61 %
TCA.PR.X Perpetual-Discount 1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 43.98
Evaluated at bid price : 45.01
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 44.25
Evaluated at bid price : 45.50
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 18.86
Evaluated at bid price : 18.86
Bid-YTW : 7.02 %
CM.PR.K FixedReset 1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 21.82
Evaluated at bid price : 22.30
Bid-YTW : 4.95 %
SBC.PR.A SplitShare 1.14 % Asset coverage of 1.3-:1 as of January 22, according to Brompton Group.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.00
Bid-YTW : 12.06 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 19.32
Evaluated at bid price : 19.32
Bid-YTW : 7.34 %
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 1.21 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 19.22
Evaluated at bid price : 19.22
Bid-YTW : 7.04 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 17.01
Evaluated at bid price : 17.01
Bid-YTW : 6.76 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.46 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 20.80
Evaluated at bid price : 20.80
Bid-YTW : 6.97 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 1.60 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.10
Bid-YTW : 7.21 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 6.85 %
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 1.64 % Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.50
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
DF.PR.A SplitShare 1.64 % Asset coverage of 1.4-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.87
Bid-YTW : 7.74 %
BCE.PR.R FixedFloater 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.78
Bid-YTW : 6.88 %
BMO.PR.H Perpetual-Discount 1.87 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 6.52 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.88 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.80
Bid-YTW : 10.12 %
FBS.PR.B SplitShare 2.01 % Asset coverage of 1.0-:1 as of January 22 according to TD Securities.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-12-15
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.61
Bid-YTW : 15.75 %
WFS.PR.A SplitShare 2.11 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of January 22 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-06-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.70
Bid-YTW : 11.87 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 2.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.91 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 2.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 20.89
Evaluated at bid price : 20.89
Bid-YTW : 6.78 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 2.69 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of January 22 according to Mulvihill.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.15
Bid-YTW : 7.12 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 2.75 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 11.57
Bid-YTW : 15.20 %
NA.PR.N FixedReset 3.02 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 22.15
Evaluated at bid price : 22.20
Bid-YTW : 4.78 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare 3.13 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.91
Bid-YTW : 8.35 %
FFN.PR.A SplitShare 3.48 % Asset coverage of 1.1+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.51
Bid-YTW : 11.27 %
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater 8.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.21
Bid-YTW : 7.18 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
LFE.PR.A SplitShare 153,337 Asset coverage of 1.5-:1 as of January 15 according to the company. Desjardins crossed 150,000 at 9.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.50
Bid-YTW : 6.77 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 121,757 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.05
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 108,010 Desjardins crossed two blocks of 50,000 each, both at 24.72.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.48
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
SLF.PR.B Perpetual-Discount 91,650 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 16.78.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 16.64
Evaluated at bid price : 16.64
Bid-YTW : 7.32 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 83,368 Nesbitt crossed 75,000 at 16.60.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-28
Maturity Price : 16.63
Evaluated at bid price : 16.63
Bid-YTW : 7.25 %
TD.PR.M OpRet 77,700 Scotia crossed 74,000 at 25.79.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.86
Bid-YTW : 3.92 %
There were 46 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Interesting External Papers

IMF Releases Global Financial Stability Report Update

The International Monetary Fund has released its January 28 Update to the October Global Financial Stability Report:

Financial markets worldwide reflect ongoing deleveraging pressures amidst a deepening economic downturn. In spite of extensive policies, the global financial system remains under intense stress. Moreover, worsening economic conditions are producing new, large writedowns for financial institutions. In response, balance sheets are being cut back through asset sales and the retiring of maturing credits. These actions have increased downward pressure on asset prices and reduced credit availability. Restoring financial sector functionality and confidence are necessary elements of economic recovery. However, more aggressive actions by both policymakers and market participants are needed to ensure that the necessary deleveraging process is less disorderly. A broad three-pronged approach—including liquidity provision, capital injections, and disposal of problem assets—should be implemented fully and quickly so as to encourage balance sheet cleansing. At the same time, international cooperation will be required to ensure the policy coherence and consistency needed to re-establish financial stability.

They suggest:

International cooperation on a common framework for financial policies should receive high priority. The application of substantially different conditions when supporting financial institutions should be avoided in order to prevent unintended consequences that may arise from competitive distortions and regulatory arbitrage. International coordination is also needed to avoid excessive “national bias,” whereby domestic institutions are favored or local credit provision is encouraged, to the detriment of other countries. A more consistent insolvency framework for financial institutions would also help.

Market Action

January 27, 2009

There will be a chance to see a milestone in the recovery of the credit market this week – commercial paper held by the Fed will mature:

About $245 billion of 90-day commercial paper that companies sold to the Federal Reserve starting in October will mature this week and next, central bank data show. As much as $50 billion to $70 billion of the debt may be rolled over and bought by investors, according to Barclays Capital in New York.

Rates on AA ranked financial commercial paper due in 90 days fell to a record low of 0.28 percent on Jan. 8, or 21 basis points more than the U.S. borrowing rate, Fed data show. They have since jumped to 1.04 percent, or 94 basis points more than the government yield on 90-day Treasury bills, as investors prepared to absorb at least $486 billion of overall paper coming due this week, according to Fed data. The gap peaked at 374 basis points on Oct. 15.

The Fed demands 2.24 percent to own unsecured debt, including a one percentage point fee, under its Commercial Paper Funding Facility.

Fed purchases declined in the first two weeks of the year as investors picked up the slack, reducing government buying to $179 million. First-tier commercial paper assets in prime money- market funds increased 26 percent to $790.6 billion as of Jan. 13, iMoneyNet data show.

Purchases jumped last week to $15.7 billion, the most since November, as some companies remained unable to sell 90-day commercial paper to investors at rates below the cost of issuing to the Fed.

Policy makers also may force companies to wean themselves from federal help by making it “increasingly expensive” to use the CPFF, said Louis Crandall, the chief economist at Jersey City, New Jersey-based Wrightson ICAP, a research unit of ICAP Plc, the world’s largest inter-dealer broker.

The Fed should indeed be increasing its spread to get the banks inter alia to pick up the slack. This would be an important step in removing the Fed from routine intermediation and shrinking the balance sheet. Across the Curve, however, cites some street chatter to the effect that the rollover will be a non-event. But … that’s what we like. Non-events. Aren’t they lovely?

There is an encouraging sign! $150-billion in 84-day TAF money attracted only $136-billion bids and went at 0.25%. This follows a bid-to-cover of 0.72 on January 12, 0.69 on Dec 29, 0.42 on Dec 15 and 0.44 on Dec 2. So this is good. Unfortunately, the Fed is having to purchase agencies in size so don’t celebrate too soon! On the other hand – any more hands and I’ll become an economist – today’s $40-billion 2-Year auction went well and lit up the Treasury market.

I will admit though, that I am becoming a little concerned. Across the Curve contains several ecstatic references to positive carry today – for example, here and here. I heard a lot of remarks about positive carry in 1993 … and we all know what happened in 1994, don’t we?

Carney gave a speech on deflation:

It is worth noting that our lower overnight rates have largely been passed through at shorter maturities. Since the easing cycle began in December 2007, we have lowered the overnight rate by 350 basis points. The prime rate has fallen by 325 basis points, Bankers Acceptance rates (key short-term financing instruments for corporations) have fallen by about 380 basis points, and variable rate mortgages by about 185 basis points.

At longer maturities, the declines have been more modest. In part, this reflects the typical pattern, as long-term rates tend to be less volatile than short-term rates over the business cycle. For example, five-year fixed-rate mortgages have fallen by just over one and a half percentage points. Corporate bond yields have been virtually flat, as a substantial increase in the risk premium charged by investors has offset the decline in government bond yields. While the widening of spreads at longer maturities is larger than usual, this partly reflects the fact that these spreads were unusually narrow to begin with.

The Bank has taken into consideration the higher risk premiums demanded in today’s markets in setting its overnight rate. As well, it has taken into account the effect on future Canadian inflation of the lower level of foreign demand that has resulted, in part, from financial difficulties in other countries. The policy rate is lower than it otherwise would be in the absence of these difficulties.

To conclude, let me say that the inflation target that has served Canada so well when inflation was above the 1 to 3 per cent control range, will also serve it well when inflation falls temporarily below that range. So let me leave no doubt, no uncertainty about the Bank’s commitment. Our focus is clear, our actions consistent, and our objective explicit: 2 per cent CPI inflation.

And the Bank published another working paper, What Accounts for the U.S.-Canada Education-Premium Difference?:

This paper analyzes the differences in wage ratios of university graduates to less than university graduates, the education premium, in Canada and the United States from 1980 to 2000. Both countries experienced a similar increase in the fraction of university graduates and a similar increase in skill biased technological change based on capital-embodied technological progress, but only the United States had a large increase in the education premium. Using a calibrated Krussel et al. (2000) model, the paper finds that the cross country difference is in equal proportion due to the effective stock of capital equipment, the growth in skilled labor supply relative to unskilled labor and the relative abundance of skilled population in 1980. Growth in the working age population is unimportant for the difference.

In other words, we don’t really need a lot more graduates; what we need is money to buy equipment for existing graduates to put their skills to use. I confidently predict that this nuance will be ignored in all future political debates.

Spend-Every-Penny introduced his pre-election budget today. There are some good things … some bad things. In summary:

After taking into account the cost of the measures proposed in Budget 2009 to support the economy, the Government is projecting deficits of $1.1 billion in 2008–09, $33.7 billion in 2009–10, $29.8 billion in 2010–11, $13.0 billion in 2011–12, $7.3 billion in 2012–13 and a surplus of $0.7 billion in 2013–14.

It will take many years of $0.7-billion surpluses to pay for the planned spending, but it didn’t stop him from cutting taxes, just like Mr. Bush:

Taxpayers will begin to benefit from the proposed personal income tax reductions as soon as the Canada Revenue Agency revises its tax withholding tables, in spring 2009.

It is estimated that, together, these measures will cost $470 million in 2008–09, $1,885 million in 2009–10 and $1,950 million in 2010–11.

There is funding for new infrastructure, but no indication that recipients must have a credible plan to pay for maintenance. The word “dividend” does not appear in the document, so I will assume that implications for preferred share investment are minor.

I will reserve special scorn for the “Extraordinary Financing Framework”, partially because it is doomed to be ignored by most. Essentially, the government will provide up to $200-billion worth of intermediation, taking assets onto its books financed by sale of Canada bonds. There’s nothing wrong with that, in principle. However:

To help manage the EFF, the Government will form the Advisory Committee on Financing. This committee will include users and suppliers of financing, along with other experts. The committee will advise on financing conditions and the design, scope and scale of initiatives under the EFF.

There’s already a competent body to administer the programme: it’s called the Bank of Canada. What-Debt’s politicization of monetary policy is absurd – but, after all, he’s the guy who went out of his way to politicize nuclear power regulation.

PerpetualDiscounts managed to eke out a marginal gain today, while FixedResets continued their recent decline.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 6.93 % 7.75 % 43,115 13.35 2 -0.4618 % 844.5
FixedFloater 7.46 % 7.02 % 161,551 13.73 8 -1.6067 % 1,372.9
Floater 5.37 % 4.51 % 34,065 16.39 4 3.7676 % 979.0
OpRet 5.31 % 4.82 % 151,949 4.04 15 -0.0446 % 2,022.5
SplitShare 6.28 % 10.44 % 77,090 4.11 15 0.6697 % 1,772.0
Interest-Bearing 7.02 % 8.25 % 36,212 0.89 2 1.6910 % 2,014.0
Perpetual-Premium 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0337 % 1,552.9
Perpetual-Discount 6.90 % 6.95 % 231,245 12.61 71 0.0337 % 1,430.2
FixedReset 6.08 % 5.40 % 774,565 14.34 22 -0.4492 % 1,782.6
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.G FixedFloater -12.44 % Not as bad as it looks! Closed at 14.01-16.20 (!) 13×13 after trading 7,700 shares in a range of 16.00-20.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 14.01
Bid-YTW : 7.83 %
IAG.PR.C FixedReset -3.32 % Still struggling with the implications of the abortive Inventory Blow-out Sale.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 22.06
Evaluated at bid price : 22.10
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -2.76 % Asset coverage of 1.2+:1 as of January 22 according to Brompton Group.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2013-11-29
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.11
Bid-YTW : 10.44 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.84 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 18.65
Evaluated at bid price : 18.65
Bid-YTW : 7.10 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.41 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 20.95
Evaluated at bid price : 20.95
Bid-YTW : 6.73 %
BMO.PR.M FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 21.95
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 4.44 %
W.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 7.42 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.25 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 16.56
Evaluated at bid price : 16.56
Bid-YTW : 7.28 %
BNA.PR.B SplitShare -1.16 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2016-03-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 21.26
Bid-YTW : 7.91 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.13 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 21.06
Evaluated at bid price : 21.06
Bid-YTW : 7.06 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 20.50
Evaluated at bid price : 20.50
Bid-YTW : 7.07 %
CIU.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 16.81
Evaluated at bid price : 16.81
Bid-YTW : 6.99 %
RY.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 17.24
Evaluated at bid price : 17.24
Bid-YTW : 6.47 %
TCA.PR.Y Perpetual-Discount 1.12 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 43.94
Evaluated at bid price : 45.00
Bid-YTW : 6.24 %
BNA.PR.A SplitShare 1.13 % Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of December 31 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2010-09-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 23.36
Bid-YTW : 11.34 %
SBN.PR.A SplitShare 1.14 % Asset coverage of 1.6-:1 as of January 22 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.91
Bid-YTW : 7.67 %
SBC.PR.A SplitShare 1.15 % Asset coverage of 1.3-:1 as of January 22 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-11-30
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.91
Bid-YTW : 12.40 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 19.08
Evaluated at bid price : 19.08
Bid-YTW : 6.34 %
GWO.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 21.70
Evaluated at bid price : 22.00
Bid-YTW : 6.79 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 7.60
Evaluated at bid price : 7.60
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
BMO.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.50 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 19.60
Evaluated at bid price : 19.60
Bid-YTW : 6.84 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.54 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 20.38
Evaluated at bid price : 20.38
Bid-YTW : 6.95 %
PPL.PR.A SplitShare 1.64 % Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2012-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 8.68
Bid-YTW : 9.26 %
ALB.PR.A SplitShare 1.66 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 22 according to Scotia.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2011-02-28
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 20.23
Bid-YTW : 15.80 %
NA.PR.K Perpetual-Discount 1.67 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 20.72
Evaluated at bid price : 20.72
Bid-YTW : 7.09 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount 1.75 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 12.22
Evaluated at bid price : 12.22
Bid-YTW : 9.91 %
FTN.PR.A SplitShare 2.08 % Asset coverage of 1.3+:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.86
Bid-YTW : 9.77 %
ELF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount 2.36 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 15.60
Evaluated at bid price : 15.60
Bid-YTW : 8.61 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 3.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 11.75
Evaluated at bid price : 11.75
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
FIG.PR.A Interest-Bearing 3.96 % Asset coverage of 1.1-:1 as of January 19, based on Capital Units NAV of 1.42 and 0.53 Capital Units per preferred.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-31
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 7.61
Bid-YTW : 12.25 %
DFN.PR.A SplitShare 4.05 % Asset coverage of 1.7-:1 as of January 15 according to the company.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2014-12-01
Maturity Price : 10.00
Evaluated at bid price : 9.00
Bid-YTW : 7.53 %
PWF.PR.A Floater 8.60 % The bid came back after taking yesterday off. Closed at 12.00-99, 7×2, after trading 800 shares in one trade at 12.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 12.00
Evaluated at bid price : 12.00
Bid-YTW : 4.37 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRI.PR.B Floater 171,000 Nesbitt crossed 169,500 at 11.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 11.75
Evaluated at bid price : 11.75
Bid-YTW : 4.51 %
BCE.PR.A FixedFloater 153,500 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 17.00, then another 50,000 at 16.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 17.06
Bid-YTW : 6.65 %
BCE.PR.F FixedFloater 153,000 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 16.00, then another 50,000 at 15.99.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 15.62
Bid-YTW : 6.36 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 147,615 Nesbitt crossed 140,000 at 7.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 7.60
Evaluated at bid price : 7.60
Bid-YTW : 7.01 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 131,115 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 24.94
Evaluated at bid price : 24.99
Bid-YTW : 6.27 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 116,833 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 101,791 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-01-27
Maturity Price : 24.96
Evaluated at bid price : 25.01
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
There were 34 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

BMO.PR.J vs. CIU.PR.A: Credit or Cumulativity?

I have had occasion recently to look carefully at BMO.PR.J and CIU.PR.A and thought I’d pass along some of the data.

They’re very similar issues: both came out during the issuance rush of early 2007 (BMO.PR.J at the beginning, CIU.PR.A at the end … BMO.PR.J pays $1.125 p.a., while CIU.PR.A pays $1.15.

The major differences between them are:

  • Credit: BMO is Pfd-1; CIU is Pfd-2(high)
  • Cumulativity: BMO.PR.J is non-cumulative; CIU.PR.A is cumulative.
  • Volume: BMO.PR.J has an average daily trading volume worth $511M; CIU’s is only $95M

CIU.PR.A should be analyzed as junior to the series second showing on their books.

I have previously compared BMO.PR.J with BMO.PR.H.

Both issues were added to TXPR in July 2007.

Anyway, with no further comment, here are some graphs: