Issue Comments

IAG.PR.E Has Poor Opening

Industrial Alliance has announced:

the closing of its previously announced offering of 4,000,000 6% Non-Cumulative Class A Preferred Shares Series E (the “Series E Preferred Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per Series E Preferred Share, representing aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million.

The offering was underwritten, on a bought deal basis, by a syndicate of underwriters co-led by Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Dominion Securities Inc. and which includes National Bank Financial Inc., BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc., CIBC World Markets Inc., TD Securities Inc., Desjardins Securities Inc., Casgrain & Company Limited, Dundee Securities Corporation, HSBC Securities (Canada) Inc., Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. and Laurentian Bank Securities Inc. This offering was made under the terms of a prospectus supplement dated October 7, 2009 to the short form base shelf prospectus dated April 30, 2009. The prospectus supplement is available on the SEDAR website at www.sedar.com and on the Company’s website at www.inalco.com.

The Series E Preferred Shares yield 6.00% per annum, payable quarterly, as and when declared by the Board of Directors of the Company. The Series E Preferred Shares commence trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange today under the symbol IAG.PR.E. The net proceeds of the offering will be used for general corporate purposes.

The Series E Preferred Shares are not redeemable prior to December 31, 2014. Subject to regulatory approval, on or after December 31, 2014, Industrial Alliance may, on no less than 30 or more than 60 days’ notice, redeem the Series E Preferred Shares in whole or in part, at the Company’s option, by the payment in cash of $26.00 per Series E Preferred Share if redeemed prior to December 31, 2015, at $25.75 per Series E Preferred Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2015 but prior to December 31, 2016, at $25.50 per Series E Preferred Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2016 but prior to December 31, 2017, at $25.25 per Series E Preferred Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2017 but prior to December 31, 2018 and at $25.00 per Series E Preferred Share if redeemed on or after December 31, 2018, in each case together with all declared and unpaid dividends up to but excluding the date fixed for redemption.

The issue traded 170,412 shares in a range of 24.00-69 (!) before closing at 24.26-34, 4×10.

Vital statistics are:

IAG.PR.E Perpetual-Discount YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-15
Maturity Price : 24.07
Evaluated at bid price : 24.26
Bid-YTW : 6.22 %

The issue was announced on October 6 and has been hurt by the 1.8% decline in the PerpetualDiscount subindex 10/6 – 10/15, although that does not account for the entire loss.

The issue is tracked by HIMIPref™. It has been added to the PerpetualDiscount subindex.

Seminars

Seminar: Fixed Income & Preferred Shares

I just want to remind everyone about the seminar on Thursday October 15 in downtown Toronto at 6pm. This one is free, although I haven’t decided yet – decisions, decisions! – whether or not to charge for the video of the event.

In my paper Preferred Shares and GICs I introduced the concept that any fixed-income investment portfolio is a compromise between:

  • Security of Principal, and
  • Security of Income

Many investors emphasize the first attribute while ignoring the second to their ultimate discomfort.

Other commonly made errors are:

  • Paying too much for liquidity
  • Insufficient diversification
  • Overemphasis on current income
  • Insufficient attention to issuer options
  • Attempting to address all risks with one particular investment
  • Underemphasis on tax effects

In this seminar, I explain that "risk" cannot be thought of as a position on a number line: there are many different kinds of risk and portfolios must be constructed to account for all of them – no single investment can do it. I also explain how preferred shares can fit into a fixed income portfolio, bringing their own strengths to offset the weaknesses of other fixed-income investments.

There is no charge for attendance at this seminar; there will be opportunity after the session to discuss the material informally.

Note that the room at Day’s has changed: it will be the College Room, not the Rosedale Room

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) Rosedale College Room (see map).

Time: October 15, 2009, 6pm-9pm.

The seminar will be filmed for later distribution.

Advance registration may be performed on-line.

Market Action

October 14, 2009

US Municipal defaults are not at record levels, but still high:

Municipal bond defaults soared past $4 billion for the year through the end of September, driven partly by the bursting of the real estate bubble, according to the Distressed Debt Securities Newsletter.

There were 137 defaults totaling $4.2 billion in the period, including more than $1 billion in the third quarter, according to the Miami Lakes, Florida-based newsletter. The pace trails the 12-month record of 2008, when there were 150 defaults totaling $7.8 billion, including a $3.8 billion sewer bond issue by Jefferson County, Alabama, according to the newsletter.

One is tempted to call this a good day, with PerpetualDiscounts losing only 7bp, while FixedResets lost 11bp! Volume was very good, with over 50 issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares and seven issues trading in excess of 100,000 shares – only four of them FixedResets. Some good volatility as well, with a fair number of names in the performance highlights.

PerpetualDiscounts closed yielding 6.01%, equivalent to 8.41% interest at the standard equivalency factor of 1.4x. Long Corporates are close as dammit to 6.0% so the pre-tax interest-equivalent spread is now about 240bp, a slight increase from the 235bp recorded October 7.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2441 % 1,483.3
FixedFloater 5.96 % 4.10 % 44,524 18.73 1 -2.6133 % 2,616.0
Floater 2.63 % 3.04 % 109,730 19.63 3 -0.2441 % 1,853.1
OpRet 4.90 % -3.98 % 126,357 0.09 15 0.0360 % 2,280.3
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.50 % 626,833 3.97 2 0.0222 % 2,054.8
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.0360 % 2,085.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.91 % 5.93 % 147,438 13.95 11 0.1178 % 1,848.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.93 % 6.01 % 222,950 13.94 62 -0.0737 % 1,746.5
FixedReset 5.52 % 4.20 % 462,475 4.03 41 -0.1126 % 2,105.2
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -2.61 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.26
Bid-YTW : 4.10 %
CM.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 22.13
Evaluated at bid price : 22.27
Bid-YTW : 6.08 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 17.90
Evaluated at bid price : 17.90
Bid-YTW : 6.68 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.70 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 18.52
Evaluated at bid price : 18.52
Bid-YTW : 6.14 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -1.52 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 21.33
Evaluated at bid price : 21.33
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
NA.PR.O FixedReset -1.35 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.13
Bid-YTW : 4.39 %
NA.PR.P FixedReset -1.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-17
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.15
Bid-YTW : 4.38 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 21.56
Evaluated at bid price : 21.56
Bid-YTW : 6.11 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.04 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-11-13
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.22
Bid-YTW : -42.48 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 1.17 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 19.88
Evaluated at bid price : 19.88
Bid-YTW : 6.03 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 21.37
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 5.82 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 20.82
Evaluated at bid price : 20.82
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 1.44 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TD.PR.G FixedReset 423,315 TD crossed two blocks of 200,000 each at 27.33.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.31
Bid-YTW : 4.05 %
BAM.PR.K Floater 219,700 RBC crossed 200,000 at 13.05.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 12.95
Evaluated at bid price : 12.95
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %
RY.PR.R FixedReset 212,866 Nesbitt crossed 200,000 at 27.75.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.64
Bid-YTW : 3.89 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount 172,766 National crossed 100,000 at 21.15, then RBC crossed 67,000 at 21.18.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-14
Maturity Price : 21.10
Evaluated at bid price : 21.10
Bid-YTW : 6.07 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 114,305 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.24
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
PWF.PR.I Perpetual-Premium 109,916 National crossed 100,000 at 25.00.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2012-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 24.95
Bid-YTW : 6.01 %
PWF.PR.M FixedReset 100,900 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-02
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.80
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
There were 50 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

STW.PR.A: Exchange Offer on Maturity

Middlefield has announced:

Investors may elect to receive units of COMPASS, valued as at November 30, 2009, in lieu of receiving cash in satisfaction of all or a portion of the amount they would otherwise receive from STRATA upon its termination on December 14, 2009.

COMPASS is a Toronto Stock Exchange (“TSX”) listed closed-end investment fund that invests in a diversified portfolio comprised primarily of high yielding equity securities of issuers operating in various industries and geographical regions. COMPASS’ annualized return since inception is 9.8% and its year-to-date total return to October 8, 2009 is 18.1%. COMPASS offers an annual redemption on November 30 at net asset value less costs. COMPASS trades on the TSX under the symbol CMZ.UN.

The value of COMPASS units issued to capital unitholders will be equivalent to a pro rata share of the net assets of STRATA remaining after payment or accrual of all debts and liabilities and liquidation expenses of STRATA. The capital units will be paid out in cash or in COMPASS units, or a combination thereof, at the capital unitholders’ option, on December 14, 2009.

The value of COMPASS units issued to preferred securityholders will be equivalent to the repayment price on the November 30, 2009 maturity date of the preferred securities. The repayment price will amount to $10.0994565 per preferred security on November 30, 2009 and will be paid in cash on November 30, 2009 or in COMPASS units on December 14, 2009, or a combination thereof, at the securityholders’ option.

The press release is not yet on the relevant web-page, but I am sure they would wish me to emphasize that this is not actually a regulatory requirement.

STW.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when a Normal-Course Issuer Bid was announced. STW.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on volume concerns.

Contingent Capital

Dudley of FRBNY Supports Contingent Capital

The British government indicated interest in a debt security that would convert to capital in times of stress, as discussed in the post HM Treasury Responds to Turner Report.

Such an instrument is of interest to preferred share investors since preferred shares are the natural basis for the first wave of such instruments. For example, a preferred share issued at a time when the bank’s common equity was trading at $50 might have a provision that, should the common price fall below $25 for a specific period of time (say, the Volume Weighted Average Price for any given period of twenty consecutive trading days), then the preferred would automatically convert into common, receiving its full face value of common valued at $25 per share.

Now William C Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, has delivered a speech titled Some Lessons from the Financial Crisis indicating support for the general idea:

the introduction of a contingent capital instrument seems likely to hold real promise. Relative to simply raising capital requirements, contingent capital has the potential to be more efficient because the capital arrives as equity only in the bad states of the world when it is needed. It also has the benefit of improving incentives by creating two-way risk for bank managements and shareholders. If the bank encounters difficulties, triggering conversion, shareholders would be automatically and immediately diluted. This would create strong incentives for bank managements to manage not only for good outcomes on the upside of the boom, but also against bad outcomes on the downside.

Conceptually, contingent capital instruments would be debt instruments in “good” states of the world, but would convert into common equity at pre-specified trigger levels in “bad” states of the world. In principle, these triggers could be tied to deterioration in the condition of the specific banking institution and/or to the banking system as a whole.

There are many issues that would need to be worked out regarding how best to design such instruments, including how to determine their share of total capital as well as how to configure and publicly disclose the conversion terms and trigger. But, in my view, allowing firms to issue contingent capital instruments that could be used to augment their common equity capital during a downturn may be a more straightforward and efficient way to achieve a countercyclical regulatory capital regime compared to trying to structure minimum regulatory capital requirements (or capital buffers above those requirements) that decline as conditions in the financial sector worsen.

So what might such a contingent capital instrument look like? One possibility is a debt instrument that is convertible into common shares if and only if the performance of the bank deteriorates sharply. While, in principal, this could be tied solely to regulatory measures of capital, it might work better tied to market-based measures because market-based measures tend to lead regulatory-based measures. Also, if tied to market-based measures, there would be greater scope for adjustment of the conversion terms in a way to make the instruments more attractive to investors and, hence, lower cost capital instruments to the issuer. The conversion terms could be generous to the holder of the contingent capital instrument. For example, one might want to set the conversion terms so that the debt holders could expect to get out at or close to whole – at par value. This is important because it would reduce the cost of the contingent instrument, making it a considerably cheaper form of capital than common equity.

Consider the advantages that such an instrument would have had during this crisis. Rather than banks clumsily evaluating whether to cut dividends, raise common equity and/or conduct exchanges of common equity for preferred shares and market participants uncertain about the willingness and ability of firms to complete such transactions and successfully raise new capital, contingent capital would have been converted automatically into common equity when market triggers were hit.

He also had some things to say about dividends:

In times of stress, banks may have incentives to continue to pay dividends to show they are strong even when they are not. This behavior depletes the bank’s capital and makes the bank weaker. To correct this shortcoming in our system, we should craft policies that either incent or require weak and vulnerable firms to cut dividends quickly in order to conserve capital. This would introduce a dampening mechanism into our system.

I don’t know about this. It gives a lot of discretion to the regulators – or requires the imposition of rules that will of necessity be so complex as to be useless during the next crisis – and the regulators have shown they are not up to the task.

Now that the moment has passed, they are getting tough on banks that are already mostly nationalized, but throughout the crisis they have routinely approved the redemption of sub-debt, which is particularly galling since the sub-debt was virtually all resetting to yields less than that required to issue new senior debt.

It would have been the easiest thing in the world for regulators to have announced that the required approval for subordinated debt redemption would be withheld in cases where this would have reduced the total capital ratio below – say – 12%. Such an announcement would have been transparent, recognized as being arguably justified and not to be considered a regulatory judgement on the soundness of any particular bank.

But they muffed it, rubber-stamped their approvals and blew their credibility.

Market Action

October 13, 2009

Econbrowser has a guest-post touting the Wisconsin Foreclosure and Unemployment Relief Plan:

The WI-FUR plan (here for details) specifies that all unemployed receiving UI benefits also receive a housing voucher that can be used to pay the mortgage. The housing voucher would be computed such that, on average in each state, homeowners pay 30% of their UI benefits on their mortgage — the voucher would cover the balance. In Wisconsin, for example, we advocate for an average voucher of about $764. This would make up for the shortfall in a $1,200 mortgage payment if households pay 30% of their UI benefit ($436 = 0.30 × $1,452) towards their mortgage.

The supporting argument is good, but I would be more inclined to support the idea if the government was getting something for its largesse: say, a chunk of equity in the house – maybe even computed against the price of the house when the mortgage was taken out. So, for instance, if Joe Unemployed uses twelve vouchers for $1,000 each in order to maintain ownership of his $400,000 house, the government then owns 3% of the house as equity, to be recovered when the house is next sold, at latest.

In another part of the post, they reference Lehman’s ‘Housing Meltdown Scenario’ which has been … er … somewhat overtaken by events and has been discussed on PrefBlog.

Accrued Interest writes an interesting post that is almost evenly divided between debt monetization via Fed Agency buy-backs and the low level of American political debate:

I don’t have a problem with claims that the Fed is conducting de facto monetization through its QE efforts. I don’t agree. I think Quantitative Easing is a legitimate monetary policy tool. But I readily admit that the distance between QE and monetization is no more than three meters wide. I think the Fed is still on the correct side of that line, but it is a perfectly legitimate and important public policy debate. I’m open minded to the possibility that the Fed could cross that line at some point. I welcome rational and objective discussion aimed at convincing me and others that the line has already been crossed.

To be fair, I don’t read Zero Hedge, so I am loathe to generalize about the opinions held on that site. However its obvious that the author is of the opinion that the Fed has crossed the line. Fine. Let’s hear the case. But instead, Zero Hedge tries to link this particular buy back with debt monetization, when I’ve clearly shown above that this particular buy back doesn’t indicate anything either way. Zero Hedge is presenting non-evidence as evidence.

So one of two things must be going on. Either Zero Hedge is ignorant of all the above facts, or he’s intentionally ignoring the facts to make his argument more sensationalist.

He has a follow-up today answering complaints from those who feel quantitative easing is the same thing as monetization. And it is; it’s simply a question of the environment. Right now the former appellation is appropriate because there is a demonstrable risk of disinflation, if not full deflation. If they keep it up for long enough, then yes, it will be monetization.

Looks like Central Bankers are are moving towards a new world reserve currency:

Policy makers boosted foreign currency holdings by $413 billion last quarter, the most since at least 2003, to $7.3 trillion, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Nations reporting currency breakdowns put 63 percent of the new cash into euros and yen in April, May and June, the latest Barclays Capital data show. That’s the highest percentage in any quarter with more than an $80 billion increase.

Reuters claims that the CIT restructuring is in trouble:

CIT Group Inc is seeing little interest from bondholders in a debt exchange offer aimed at repairing its fragile balance sheet, making bankruptcy increasingly likely, sources familiar with the matter said.

CIT is now more likely to try a prepackaged bankruptcy, two people familiar with the matter said. They declined to be identified because the exchange offer is ongoing and information about its progress is private.

… and they’re losing their CEO:

Jeffrey M. Peek has informed the Board of Directors that he plans to resign as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer from CIT effective December 31, 2009. The Board is forming a Search Committee to oversee the recruitment process and ensure a smooth leadership transition at the Company.

“CIT’s recently launched restructuring plan is designed to enhance its capital levels, bolster liquidity and return the Company to profitability,” said Mr. Peek. “By strengthening CIT’s financial position, the Company will advance its bank-centric model and invigorate its market-leading franchises which support the small business and middle market sectors of the economy. Now is the appropriate time to focus on a transition of leadership, and I look forward to working closely with our Board during that process.”

Another down-day for PerpetualDiscounts, which lost 11bp on the day, in distinction to FixedResets, which gained 5bp. The day was enlivened by a new issue from EPP, which was downgraded by DBRS, thus simultaneously confirming three trends and predictions:

  • New FixedResets from relatively low-quality companies
  • New FixedResets following the jump in Canadian 5-year yields last Friday
  • Downgrade of EPP

RBC did some nice crosses on the day, dominating the board.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -1.1842 % 1,486.9
FixedFloater 5.80 % 3.96 % 44,800 18.91 1 1.8847 % 2,686.2
Floater 2.62 % 3.02 % 101,403 19.69 3 -1.1842 % 1,857.6
OpRet 4.90 % -0.58 % 131,295 0.13 15 0.1391 % 2,279.5
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.49 % 636,831 3.97 2 0.0666 % 2,054.4
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1391 % 2,084.4
Perpetual-Premium 5.92 % 5.94 % 148,419 13.97 11 -0.2826 % 1,846.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.97 % 217,229 13.96 62 -0.1070 % 1,747.7
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.17 % 454,928 4.03 41 0.0536 % 2,107.5
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
CM.PR.E Perpetual-Discount -2.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 22.55
Evaluated at bid price : 22.75
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.89 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 12.95
Evaluated at bid price : 12.95
Bid-YTW : 3.06 %
BAM.PR.N Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 17.88
Evaluated at bid price : 17.88
Bid-YTW : 6.72 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount 1.07 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 21.46
Evaluated at bid price : 21.75
Bid-YTW : 5.90 %
SLF.PR.E Perpetual-Discount 1.09 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 18.55
Evaluated at bid price : 18.55
Bid-YTW : 6.13 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater 1.88 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-13
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 3.96 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
RY.PR.T FixedReset 248,835 RBC crossed 40,000 at 27.65; 40,000 at 27.70; 118,800 at 27.70; and finally another 40,000 at 27.70.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-09-23
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.58
Bid-YTW : 4.17 %
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 86,176 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2015-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.21
Bid-YTW : 4.48 %
RY.PR.Y FixedReset 70,042 RBC crossed 25,000 at 27.60, then another 39,700 at 27.55.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-12-24
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.55
Bid-YTW : 4.14 %
CM.PR.L FixedReset 67,541 RBC crossed 40,000 at 27.35.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.26
Bid-YTW : 4.32 %
BAM.PR.P FixedReset 54,550 RBC crossed 42,000 at 26.65.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-10-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.76
Bid-YTW : 5.50 %
RY.PR.P FixedReset 53,796 RBC crossed 40,000 at 27.50.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-03-26
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.49
Bid-YTW : 4.02 %
There were 40 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

EPP.PR.A & New Issue: DBRS Downgrades to Pfd-3

I speculated last week that EPP.PR.A was at risk for a downgrade, and today DBRS downgraded EPP.PR.A to Pfd-3:

DBRS has today downgraded the rating of EPCOR Power Equity Ltd.’s (Power Equity) Cumulative Redeemable Preferred Shares, Series 1 (Series 1 Preferreds), to Pfd-3 from Pfd-3 (high). The trend remains Negative. This action follows Power Equity’s announcement that it has sold, via a bought deal arrangement, $100 million of Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 2 (Series 2 Preferreds), to which DBRS has assigned a rating of Pfd-3 with a Negative trend.

Power Equity is a wholly-owned subsidiary of EPCOR Power L.P. (Power LP), with Power LP guaranteeing, on a subordinated basis, certain amounts relating to Power Equity’s Series 1 Preferreds and Series 2 Preferreds (including payment of dividends, as and when declared). As such, the preferred share ratings of Power Equity continue to be based on the credit profile of Power LP. Following the sale of the Series 2 Preferreds, Power LP’s capitalization will include an amount of preferred equity (totalling approximately $220 million) that is large compared with the amount of the Partners’ equity on the balance sheet ($564 million as of June 30, 2009). The rating on the Series 1 Preferreds has been downgraded by one notch to Pfd-3 (with the same rating assigned to the Series 2 Preferreds) to reflect the now-significant amount of preferred equity Power LP carries in relation to its level of Partners’ equity.

Not the same reasons that triggered my speculation! That’s forecasting for you! DBRS continues:

The change in Power Equity’s preferred rating has no impact on the ratings of Power LP, which stand at: Senior Unsecured Debt & Medium-Term Notes of BBB (high) with a Negative trend, and a stability rating of STA-2 (low). See the DBRS press releases dated April 29, 2009, and June 8, 2009, for additional details on recent rating actions and the Negative trends. Since the change in trend from Stable to Negative in April, there have been two developments viewed as positive for Power LP’s credit profile: 1) a reduction in unit distributions, expected to conserve approximately $40 million in cash flow per year; and 2) the proceeds from the sale of the Series 2 Preferreds will be applied to debt reduction. Both of these developments should help Power LP avoid moving closer to its 65% debt-to-capitalization covenant. However, the trends will remain Negative until DBRS views Power LP’s capitalization as stable on a sustainable basis, and expected levels of cash flow are maintained.

Power LP recently stated that it was modestly reducing its financial expectations for 2009, largely as a result of low operating margins at its two North Carolina facilities. DBRS does not view this as a material change, as a reduced level of contributions from these facilities has already been factored into our analysis.

New Issues

New Issue: EPP FixedReset 7.00%+418

EPCOR Power Equity has announced:

that EPCOR Power Equity Ltd. will issue 4,000,000 Cumulative Rate Reset Preferred Shares, Series 2 (the “Series 2 Shares”) at a price of $25.00 per share, for aggregate gross proceeds of $100 million (the “Offering”) on a bought deal agreement basis to a syndicate of underwriters in Canada led by CIBC World Markets Inc. and Scotia Capital Inc.

The Series 2 Shares will pay fixed cumulative dividends of $1.75 per share per annum, yielding 7.0% per annum, payable on the last business day of March, June, September and December of each year, as and when declared by the board of directors of the Corporation, for the initial five-year period ending December 31, 2014. The first quarterly dividend of $0.28288 per share is expected to be paid on December 31, 2009. The dividend rate will reset on December 31, 2014 and every five years thereafter at a rate equal to the sum of the then five-year Government of Canada bond yield and 4.18%. The Series 2 Shares are redeemable by the Corporation on December 31, 2014 and on December 31 every five years thereafter.

The holders of Series 2 Shares will have the right to convert their shares into Cumulative Floating Rate Preferred Shares, Series 3 (the “Series 3 Shares”) of the Corporation, subject to certain conditions, on December 31, 2014 and on December 31 of every fifth year thereafter. The holders of Series 3 Shares will be entitled to receive quarterly floating rate cumulative dividends, as and when declared by the board of directors of the Corporation, at a rate equal to the sum of the then 90-day Government of Canada treasury bill rate and 4.18%.

The Partnership will fully and unconditionally guarantee the payment of dividends, as and when declared, the amounts payable on a redemption of the Series 2 Shares or Series 3 Shares for cash and the amounts payable in the event of the liquidation, dissolution and winding up of the Issuer.

The offering is expected to close on or about November 2, 2009, subject to certain conditions, including conditions set forth in the underwriting agreement. The net proceeds will be used to repay outstanding bank indebtedness.

The first coupon is scheduled for payment 12/31, for $0.28288, assuming closing 2009-11-2

Update: The PerpetualDiscount EPP.PR.A closed today at 16.55b to yield 7.42% at the bid price. Therefore, according to the BERS Calculator (and, of course, the assumptions embedded therein), the Break-Even Rate Shock is 0.62%.

PrefLetter

October Edition of PrefLetter Released!

The October, 2009, edition of PrefLetter has been released and is now available for purchase as the “Previous edition”. Those who subscribe for a full year receive the “Previous edition” as a bonus.

The October edition contains an appendix examining correlations between PerpetualDiscounts and other components of the spread to five-year Canadas, with notes on the implications for Market Timing.

As previously announced, PrefLetter is now available to residents of Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, as well as Ontario and to entities registered with the Quebec Securities Commission.

Until further notice, the “Previous Edition” will refer to the October, 2009, issue, while the “Next Edition” will be the November, 2009, issue, scheduled to be prepared as of the close November 13 and eMailed to subscribers prior to market-opening on November 16.

PrefLetter is intended for long term investors seeking issues to buy-and-hold. At least one recommendation from each of the major preferred share sectors is included and discussed.

Note: A recent enhancement to the PrefLetter website is the Subscriber Download Feature. If you have not received your copy, try it!

Note: PrefLetter, being delivered to clients as a large attachment by eMail, sometimes runs afoul of spam filters. If you have not received your copy within fifteen minutes of a release notice such as this one, please double check your (company’s) spam filtering policy and your spam repository. If it’s not there, contact me and I’ll get you your copy … somehow!

Note: There have been scattered complaints regarding inability to open PrefLetter in Acrobat Reader, despite my practice of including myself on the subscription list and immediately checking the copy received. I have had the occasional difficulty reading US Government documents, which I was able to resolve by downloading and installing the latest version of Adobe Reader. Also, note that so far, all complaints have been from users of Yahoo Mail. Try saving it to disk first, before attempting to open it.