PrefLetter

October Edition of PrefLetter Now in Preparation

The markets have closed and the October edition of PrefLetter is now being prepared.

PrefLetter is the monthly newsletter recommending individual issues of preferred shares to subscribers. There is at least one recommendation from every major type of preferred share with investment-grade constituents. The recommendations are taylored for “buy-and-hold” investors.

The October edition will contain an appendix examining correlations and the “Seniority Spread” between PerpetualDiscount issues and Long Term Corporate bonds.

Those taking an annual subscription to PrefLetter receive a discount on viewing of my seminars.

PrefLetter is available to residents of Ontario, Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba as well as Quebec residents registered with their securities commission.

The October issue will be eMailed to clients and available for single-issue purchase with immediate delivery prior to the opening bell on Tuesday. I will write another post on the weekend advising when the new issue has been uploaded to the server … so watch this space carefully if you intend to order “Next Issue” or “Previous Issue”! Until then, the “Next Issue” is the October issue.

Market Action

October 9, 2009

The transfer of wealth from the banking to the shadow-banking sector got a boost today when Citigroup sold Philbro to Occidental:

Oil producer Occidental Petrol Corp., based in Los Angeles, will pay “net asset value” for the unit, the companies said today. Occidental’s net investment in Phibro will be about $250 million. The sale won’t be material to Citigroup earnings, the New York-based bank said.

Phibro had become a flashpoint for critics of excessive compensation at banks receiving federal aid because its chief, 58-year-old Andrew J. Hall, was paid more than $100 million in 2008 and is set to earn about the same this year. Citigroup, the third-biggest U.S. bank by assets, received a $45 billion taxpayer-funded bailout last year.

Vikram Pandit, 52, Citigroup’s chief executive officer, is parting with one of his most consistently profitable businesses.

Phibro, based in Westport, Connecticut, has been profitable each fiscal year since 1997, with pretax earnings averaging $371 million during the past five years, Occidental said in its statement. Citigroup had a record $27.7 billion net loss last year as the financial crisis brought mortgage-trading losses and higher loan charge-offs.

Hall, who has a degree in chemistry from the University of Oxford, is paid under a contract that gave him a portion of the unit’s trading results, and he may be owed $100 million this year under the terms of his contract with Citigroup, according to people familiar with the matter.

In Canada, of course, we solve such problems by putting an army of accountants and lawyers on the case, finding a few minor transgressions and firing the bum who made the mistake of being too good at his job. I am glad to see that Citigroup executives have more personal integrity.

Government bonds got hammered today. Across the Curve articulates my thoughts on the matter:

I was in the insomniac zone last night and was up late writing. I wrote about the Bernanke speech. I thought that he broke no new ground. Absolutely none. But some of the headline writers have focused on the fact that he mentioned that the Federal Reserve will raise rates when the economy recovers. Well, I wonder who would have been so obtuse as to think otherwise?

Aided by the Canadian jobs number, the Canadian five-year got smacked for 23bp today, closing at 2.75%. It is interesting to speculate whether the implied narrowing in required reset spreads will bring a flood of FixedReset issuance next week … I trust all the newly indentured investment bankers will be working their telephones from their call-centres.

There could be an interesting ‘cram-down’ battle going on with Energy Future:

— Energy Future Holdings Corp.bondholders are forming a group to block the electricity provider’s offer to swap $6 billion of debt for $4 billion of new secured notes with less protection for investors, according to two people familiar with the matter.

Lenders owning as much as 50 percent of Energy Future’s bonds maturing in 2017 oppose the terms of the exchange, said an attorney familiar with the matter who declined to be identified because the discussions are private.

Dallas-based Energy Future, formerly TXU Corp., needs to reduce debt after KKR & Co. and TPG Inc. paid $43 billion for the company using a combination of high-yield, high-risk loans and bonds in October 2007. That was before gas prices fell, credit markets seized up and equity markets tumbled.

Energy Future has $44.5 billion of loans and bonds, including $22.5 billion coming due in 2014, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The company “is suffering under the weight of an untenable debt load created by an ill-timed leveraged buyout at the top of the market,” Carl Blake, a Washington-based analyst at Gimme Credit LLC, wrote in an Oct. 6 report.

We will see more of this as the smoke clears – we saw some yesterday with the BAM acquisition of BBI.

I mentioned the controversy regarding the Federal Housing Authority yesterday. Here’s a defense of their business practices from the chair of the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Maxine Waters:

It is a myth that FHA is the new subprime and has adopted lower underwriting standards and the other worst abuses of the subprime market. In fact, just the opposite is true. A recent Federal Reserve report indicates that over 60 percent of the increase in FHA purchase activity between 2007 and 2008 was to borrowers with prime-quality FICO scores. Additionally, the percentage of loans in FHA’s portfolio with loan-to-value ratios above 95 percent has fallen from 72 percent in 2007 to 67 percent in 2008. And unlike the subprime market, all of FHA’s mortgages require full documentation and verification of the borrower’s income and assets.

The preferred share market was down again today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 24bp and FixedResets giving up 7bp; as always, figures are given in terms of total return. The S&P/TSX Preferred Share Index was down 41bp, as opposed to no change yesterday; I have been asked about such differences and suspect that S&P uses the Close to price the index, rather than the Closing Bid used by HIMIPref™, although their published methodology does not make this absolutely explicit. Volume was good.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.4405 % 1,504.8
FixedFloater 5.82 % 4.06 % 45,009 18.51 1 -0.4797 % 2,636.5
Floater 2.59 % 3.00 % 101,127 19.76 3 0.4405 % 1,879.9
OpRet 4.91 % -0.55 % 133,179 0.14 15 -0.2134 % 2,276.3
SplitShare 6.44 % 6.48 % 646,605 3.98 2 0.2673 % 2,053.0
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 -0.2134 % 2,081.5
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.91 % 150,084 13.97 11 -0.0330 % 1,851.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.92 % 5.96 % 217,782 13.95 62 -0.2381 % 1,749.6
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.13 % 434,307 4.06 41 -0.0735 % 2,106.4
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.B Perpetual-Discount -2.32 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 21.51
Evaluated at bid price : 21.51
Bid-YTW : 6.26 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.94 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 20.74
Evaluated at bid price : 20.74
Bid-YTW : 6.17 %
GWO.PR.J FixedReset -1.78 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.47
Bid-YTW : 4.56 %
POW.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.43 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 23.14
Evaluated at bid price : 23.44
Bid-YTW : 6.21 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.27 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.38
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
PWF.PR.H Perpetual-Discount -1.22 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 23.20
Evaluated at bid price : 23.50
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
POW.PR.D Perpetual-Discount -1.20 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 20.65
Evaluated at bid price : 20.65
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
HSB.PR.C Perpetual-Discount -1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet -1.11 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.85
Bid-YTW : 3.54 %
BMO.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 20.26
Evaluated at bid price : 20.26
Bid-YTW : 5.64 %
TRI.PR.B Floater 1.05 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 19.20
Evaluated at bid price : 19.20
Bid-YTW : 2.06 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 1.57 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.69 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 21.65
Evaluated at bid price : 21.65
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount 278,790 RBC crossed 62,900 at 18.92; Nesbitt crossed three blocks, of 90,000 shares, 50,000 shares and 60,000 shares, at 18.85.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 18.75
Evaluated at bid price : 18.75
Bid-YTW : 6.06 %
CM.PR.A OpRet 224,400 RBC crossed 99,000 at 25.90; Nesbitt crossed blocks of 50,000 shares, 20,000 shares and 55,000 shares at 25.95.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-11-08
Maturity Price : 25.50
Evaluated at bid price : 25.90
Bid-YTW : -16.82 %
PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 149,780 New issue settled today.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 24.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %
TD.PR.O Perpetual-Discount 130,801 RBC crossed 111,000 at 21.43.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 21.44
Evaluated at bid price : 21.44
Bid-YTW : 5.67 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 69,450 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 20.10.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
TD.PR.P Perpetual-Discount 63,570 Nesbitt crossed 50,000 at 22.80.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 22.38
Evaluated at bid price : 22.51
Bid-YTW : 5.84 %
There were 43 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

PWF.PR.O Dives on Opening; Still Expensive

Power Financial Corporation has announced:

the successful completion and closing of an offering of 6,000,000 Non-Cumulative First Preferred Shares, Series O (the “Series O Shares”), priced at $25.00 per share to raise gross proceeds of $150 million.

The issue was bought by an underwriting group led by BMO Capital Markets, Scotia Capital Inc. and RBC Capital Markets.

The Series O Shares will be listed and posted for trading on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “PWF.PR.O”. Proceeds from the issue will be used to supplement Power Financial’s financial resources and for general corporate purposes.

This 5.80% Straight was announced last week.

PWF.PR.O traded 149,780 shares in a range of 25.35-50 before closing at 24.35-39.

Vital statistics are:

PWF.PR.O Perpetual-Discount YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-09
Maturity Price : 24.15
Evaluated at bid price : 24.35
Bid-YTW : 5.99 %

PWF.PR.O is tracked by HIMIPref™. It has been assigned to the PerpetualDiscount index.

It’s interesting to look at the comparators:

PWF.PR.O and its Comparators
Ticker Dividend Quote
10/9
Yield
10/9
PWF.PR.K 1.2375 20.43-62 6.08-01%
PWF.PR.L 1.275 20.74-99 6.17-08%
PWF.PR.F 1.3125 21.60-68 6.10-07%
PWF.PR.E 1.375 23.01-48 5.96-81%
PWF.PR.H 1.4375 23.50-77 6.12-04%
PWF.PR.O 1.45 24.35-39 5.99-98%
PWF.PR.G 1.475 24.30-40 6.07-02%
PWF.PR.I 1.50 24.80-85 6.05-04%
Issue Comments

SBN.PR.A: Warrants to be Offered to Capital Unitholders

S Split Corp has announced:

that it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of Class A Shares of the Fund. Each Class A sharholder of record on the record date will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held. Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price. The record date and the subscription price will be determined at the time the Fund files its final prospectus for the offering. The Fund has applied to list the Warrants and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Fund invests in a portfolio of common shares of The Bank of Nova Scotia. To generate additional returns above the distributions earned on its securities, the Fund may, from time to time, write covered call options in respect of some or all of the securities in its portfolio. The Fund may also, from time to time, write cash-covered put options in respect of securities in which the Fund is permitted to invest. The Fund’s investment portfolio is managed by its investment manager, Mulvihill Capital Management Inc.

The preliminary prospectus does not yet appear to be available.

SBN.PR.A is scheduled to be wound-up 2014-12-1. It seems too early to be looking for a term extension; perhaps the prospectus, when available, will clarify the matter. SBN.PR.A has an Asset Coverage of 2.1-:1 as of September 30.

SBN.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog when it was downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS. SBN.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but has been relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Issue Comments

WFS.PR.A: Warrants to be Offered to Capital Unitholders

World Financial Split Corp. has announced:

that it has filed a preliminary short form prospectus relating to an offering of Warrants to holders of Class A Shares of the Fund. Each Class A shareholder of record on the record date will receive one Warrant for each Class A Share held. Each Warrant will entitle its holder to acquire one Class A Share and one Preferred Share upon payment of the subscription price. The record date and the subscription price will be determined at the time the Fund files its final prospectus for the offering. The Fund has applied to list the Warrants and the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares issuable upon the exercise thereof on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The exercise of Warrants by holders will provide the Fund with additional capital that can be used to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities and is also expected to increase the trading liquidity of the Class A Shares and the Preferred Shares and to reduce the management expense ratio of the Fund.

The Fund invests in a portfolio that includes common equity securities selected from the ten largest financial services companies by market capitalization in each of Canada, the United States and the rest of the world (the “Portfolio Universe”). In addition, up to 20% of the NAV of the Fund may be invested in common equity securities of financial services companies that are not in the Portfolio Universe but meet certain market capitalization and credit rating thresholds. To generate additional returns above the distributions earned on its securities, the Fund may, from time to time, write covered call options in respect of some or all of the securities in its portfolio. The Fund may also, from time to time, write cash-covered put options in respect of securities in which the Fund is permitted to invest. The Fund’s investment portfolio is managed by its investment manager, Mulvihill Capital Management Inc.

The preliminary prospectus does not yet appear to be available.

WFS.PR.A has an Asset Coverage of 1.4-:1 as of September 30 and is scheduled to be wound-up 2011-6-30; I suspect that a term extension is in the works.

WFS.PR.A was last mentioned on PrefBlog with the reminder that the Capital Unit dividend was still suspended – it cannot be paid unless Asset Coverage of the preferreds is greater than 1.5:1. WFS.PR.A is tracked by HIMIPref™, but is relegated to the Scraps index on credit concerns.

Seminars

Reminder: Seminar, Thursday October 15, Fixed Income and Preferred Shares

I just want to remind everyone about the seminar on Thursday October 15 in downtown Toronto at 6pm. This one is free, although I haven’t decided yet – decisions, decisions! – whether or not to charge for the video of the event.

In my paper Preferred Shares and GICs I introduced the concept that any fixed-income investment portfolio is a compromise between:

  • Security of Principal, and
  • Security of Income

Many investors emphasize the first attribute while ignoring the second to their ultimate discomfort.

Other commonly made errors are:

  • Paying too much for liquidity
  • Insufficient diversification
  • Overemphasis on current income
  • Insufficient attention to issuer options
  • Attempting to address all risks with one particular investment
  • Underemphasis on tax effects

In this seminar, I explain that "risk" cannot be thought of as a position on a number line: there are many different kinds of risk and portfolios must be constructed to account for all of them – no single investment can do it. I also explain how preferred shares can fit into a fixed income portfolio, bringing their own strengths to offset the weaknesses of other fixed-income investments.

There is no charge for attendance at this seminar; there will be opportunity after the session to discuss the material informally.

Location: Days Hotel & Conference Center, (at Carlton & College, downtown Toronto) Rosedale Room (see map).

Time: October 15, 2009, 6pm-9pm.

The seminar will be filmed for later distribution.

Advance registration may be performed on-line.

Interesting External Papers

Stock / Bond Correlation and Financial Stress

Just a quick note here … the Kansas City Fed published a paper by Craig S. Hakkio and William R. Keeton titled Financial Stress: What Is It, How Can It Be Measured and Why Does It Matter?.

One of the coefficients is the stock/bond correlation.

Correlation between returns on stocks and Treasury bonds. In normal times, the returns on stocks and government bonds are either unrelated or move together in response to changes in the risk-free discount rate. In times of financial stress, however, investors may view stocks as much riskier than government bonds. If so, they will shift out of stocks into bonds, causing the returns on the two assets to move in opposite directions. A number of studies, some for the United States and some for other countries, confirm that the correlation between stock returns and government bond returns tends to turn negative during financial crises (Andersson and others; Baur and Lucey; Connolly and others; Gonzalo and Olmo). Thus, the stock-bond correlation provides an additional measure of the flight to quality during periods of financial stress. This correlation is computed over rolling three month periods using the S&P 500 and a 2-year Treasury bond index. Also, the negative value of the correlation is used in the KCFSI, so that increases in the measure correspond to increases in financial stress.

The authors are somewhat critical of the Bank of Canada Stress Index:

It includes some variables, such as exchange rate volatility, that are more important for a small open economy like Canada’s than for the United States. It includes the slope of the yield curve, which likely reveals more about the stance of monetary policy than financial stress. And it fails to include any measures of investor uncertainty about bank stock prices.

There appears to be some predictive value in the index:

As shown in the accompanying box, high values of the KCFSI have tended to either coincide with or precede tighter credit standards over the last 20 years. This evidence suggests that changes in credit standards provide an additional channel through which financial stress may affect economic activity.

Regretably, the authors do not dicuss whether these changes in credit standards can be better predicted by other methodologies. I have the same problem with their analysis of the predictive power of the KCFSI on the value of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index.

The authors suggest that the KCFSI could be used to help time the Fed’s exit strategy for the current crisis, but are, frankly, rather unconvincing.

Anyway, the index is down again for September, after a huge decline from the October 2008 peak, but still above July 2007.

Market Action

October 8, 2009

This is way, way, way WAY off topic, but I grew up with Vivien Leigh telling the Beatrix Potter stories (on 45s – if anybody remembers what those were) and have been looking for re-releases for years. Found ’em! The best is Peter Rabbit.

Yet another major US housing subsidizer is in trouble:

The Federal Housing Administration, which insures mortgages with low down payments, may require a U.S. bailout because of $54 billion more in losses than it can withstand, a former Fannie Mae executive said.

“It appears destined for a taxpayer bailout in the next 24 to 36 months,” consultant Edward Pinto said in testimony prepared for a House committee hearing in Washington today.

The FHA program’s volumes have quadrupled since 2006 as private lenders and insurers pulled back amid the U.S. housing slump, Pinto said. The jump has left the agency backing risky loans and exposed to fraud in a “market where prices have yet to stabilize,” he said.

Representative Scott Garrett, a New Jersey Republican, introduced legislation this month to boost the FHA’s minimum down payment to 5 percent from 3.5 percent to help shore up the agency’s insurance fund, a move that could add to the housing market’s burdens as it struggles to recover.

Falling prices will push the FHA’s single-family fund’s reserves below a 2 percent cushion required by Congress, Commissioner David H. Stevens, who will also speak today, said last month. “Under no circumstances will a taxpayer bailout be needed” because the shortfall will be cured over time, he said.

The idea the FHA needs a rescue is “just plain wrong,” Stevens said in an Oct. 6 letter to the Wall Street Journal. That’s in part because the FHA’s accounting method mean its reserves are enough to cover more than 30 years of projected losses, assuming no revenue from new business, he said.

FHA’s total reserves exceed $30 billion, or more than 4.4 percent of its insurance, according to Stevens. The loan- insurance ratio, which compares the reserves with the loans insured, was 6.4 percent a year ago, government data shows.

Official figures on FHA’s reserves as of Sept. 30 won’t show a shortfall when released because “the assumptions used will be overly optimistic relative to loss mitigation resulting from both loan modifications and recent and expected underwriting changes,” Pinto said.

In the early days of MLEC (remember MLEC? It was going to save the world from a possible credit crunch) I argued that the only way it could work would be if it had the plan of buying wonderful assets from distressed SIVs. Now that PPIP is the acronym of the day, it looks like I was right:

Starwood Capital Group LLC and TPG’s agreement to buy $4.5 billion of Corus Bankshares Inc.’s real estate assets shows investors are ready to bet on distressed property — as long as the U.S. helps finance the deals.

The private-equity firms led a group that won the auction for loans and properties of the failed Chicago lender, offering $554 million, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. said Oct. 6. They will take a 40 percent stake and manage the portfolio, while the FDIC keeps 60 percent and lends the buyers as much as $2.39 billion to complete the sale.

The investors, who are paying about 60 cents on the dollar, beat out seven other bidders.

Some may quibble over my equating these distressed mortgages with “wonderful assets” … but with vendor financing of over 80% of the price on a non-recourse basis … well, it works just like that extra glass of beer in a pick-up bar near closing time, you know?

THUMP! The preferred share market got whacked again today, with PerpetualDiscounts down 43bp and FixedResets losing 16bp on good volume. I am pleased to see a lot of volatility evidenced in the composition of the performance table: there were fifteen index included issues losing more than a point (total return), but five gained more than this. Increasing volatility means more trading chances!

The new PWF 5.80% Straight starts trading tomorrow … that should be fun.

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices
These values reflect the December 2008 revision of the HIMIPref™ Indices

Values are provisional and are finalized monthly
Index Mean
Current
Yield
(at bid)
Median
YTW
Median
Average
Trading
Value
Median
Mod Dur
(YTW)
Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.3093 % 1,498.2
FixedFloater 5.80 % 4.03 % 44,820 18.54 1 -1.2632 % 2,649.2
Floater 2.60 % 3.00 % 100,050 19.76 3 0.3093 % 1,871.6
OpRet 4.90 % -3.61 % 123,455 0.09 15 0.1365 % 2,281.2
SplitShare 6.46 % 6.57 % 673,106 3.98 2 -0.7735 % 2,047.5
Interest-Bearing 0.00 % 0.00 % 0 0.00 0 0.1365 % 2,085.9
Perpetual-Premium 5.90 % 5.88 % 151,903 14.02 11 -0.3619 % 1,852.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.90 % 5.93 % 217,479 14.01 61 -0.4254 % 1,753.8
FixedReset 5.51 % 4.07 % 448,719 4.06 41 -0.1641 % 2,107.9
Performance Highlights
Issue Index Change Notes
GWO.PR.G Perpetual-Discount -2.34 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.29
Evaluated at bid price : 21.29
Bid-YTW : 6.16 %
BNS.PR.J Perpetual-Discount -2.06 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.20
Evaluated at bid price : 22.78
Bid-YTW : 5.75 %
PWF.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.15
Evaluated at bid price : 21.15
Bid-YTW : 6.05 %
GWO.PR.I Perpetual-Discount -1.86 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 18.46
Evaluated at bid price : 18.46
Bid-YTW : 6.15 %
BNS.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.67
Evaluated at bid price : 19.67
Bid-YTW : 5.74 %
NA.PR.L Perpetual-Discount -1.65 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.90
Evaluated at bid price : 20.90
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
PWF.PR.G Perpetual-Premium -1.63 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.90
Evaluated at bid price : 24.20
Bid-YTW : 6.10 %
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.55 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Hard Maturity
Maturity Date : 2019-01-10
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 19.00
Bid-YTW : 8.20 %
CM.PR.P Perpetual-Discount -1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.39
Evaluated at bid price : 22.95
Bid-YTW : 5.98 %
BNS.PR.O Perpetual-Premium -1.31 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.95
Evaluated at bid price : 24.15
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
POW.PR.A Perpetual-Discount -1.30 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 22.44
Evaluated at bid price : 22.70
Bid-YTW : 6.19 %
BAM.PR.G FixedFloater -1.26 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 18.76
Bid-YTW : 4.03 %
TD.PR.Q Perpetual-Discount -1.14 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 24.06
Evaluated at bid price : 24.27
Bid-YTW : 5.77 %
PWF.PR.F Perpetual-Discount -1.10 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.52
Evaluated at bid price : 21.52
Bid-YTW : 6.12 %
BNS.PR.K Perpetual-Discount -1.00 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.75
Evaluated at bid price : 20.75
Bid-YTW : 5.80 %
W.PR.J Perpetual-Discount 1.15 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 23.58
Evaluated at bid price : 23.85
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
ELF.PR.G Perpetual-Discount 1.38 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 18.41
Evaluated at bid price : 18.41
Bid-YTW : 6.49 %
IGM.PR.A OpRet 1.47 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2009-11-07
Maturity Price : 26.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.99
Bid-YTW : -35.03 %
MFC.PR.A OpRet 1.48 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Soft Maturity
Maturity Date : 2015-12-18
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 26.14
Bid-YTW : 3.34 %
HSB.PR.D Perpetual-Discount 1.90 % YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 21.41
Evaluated at bid price : 21.41
Bid-YTW : 5.89 %
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Shares
Traded
Notes
TRP.PR.A FixedReset 94,105 Recent new issue.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2020-01-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 25.20
Bid-YTW : 4.46 %
TD.PR.I FixedReset 68,850 Nesbitt crossed 28,200 at 27.30.
YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-08-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.30
Bid-YTW : 4.12 %
BNS.PR.T FixedReset 44,111 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-25
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.42
Bid-YTW : 3.91 %
SLF.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 36,408 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 19.67
Evaluated at bid price : 19.67
Bid-YTW : 6.09 %
TD.PR.E FixedReset 35,306 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Call
Maturity Date : 2014-05-30
Maturity Price : 25.00
Evaluated at bid price : 27.33
Bid-YTW : 4.00 %
RY.PR.A Perpetual-Discount 30,100 YTW SCENARIO
Maturity Type : Limit Maturity
Maturity Date : 2039-10-08
Maturity Price : 20.06
Evaluated at bid price : 20.06
Bid-YTW : 5.63 %
There were 39 other index-included issues trading in excess of 10,000 shares.
Issue Comments

BAM Makes Major Acquisition

Brookfield Asset Management and Brookfield Infrastructure Partners has announced:

that they have signed an agreement with Babcock & Brown Infrastructure (ASX: BBI) (“BBI”) to sponsor a comprehensive restructuring and recapitalization (“Recapitalization”). BBI has a diverse portfolio of transportation and utility assets located in Australia, the U.S., the UK, continental Europe, New Zealand and China.

Under the agreement with BBI, Brookfield Asset Management and Brookfield Infrastructure (collectively, “Brookfield”) have jointly and severally subscribed for a proposed investment in stapled securities and assets of BBI of approximately US$1.1 billion. The proposed investment is comprised of the purchase of approximately A$625 million to A$713 million (~US$555 million to $635 million) of stapled securities for a 35% to 40% interest in the restructured BBI and A$295 million (~US$265 million) for the direct purchase2 from BBI of a 49.9% economic interest in Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal (“DBCT”), in Queensland, Australia, and 100% of PD Ports, a leading ports business in northeast England. Immediately following the purchase of PD Ports, Brookfield will repay £100 million (~US$160 million) of debt at PD Ports.

Brookfield’s Investor Presentation includes the following graphic:


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DBRS comments:

DBRS views this plan as neutral to Brookfield’s ratings providing it (i) is not required to acquire any additional portion of the investment that BIP does not acquire and (ii) maintains sufficient liquidity at the corporate level while supporting the BBI restructuring program. At the end of Q2 2009, Brookfield had over $800 million in cash and financial assets on hand as well as bank lines at the corporate level, plus access to ongoing cash flow and other forms of liquidity within the Brookfield group. DBRS would view negatively a combination of this plan along with any other acquisitions that together puts pressure on Brookfield’s liquidity at the corporate level.

The following BAM preferred shares are tracked by HIMIPref™: BAM.PR.B, BAM.PR.E, BAM.PR.G, BAM.PR.H, BAM.PR.I, BAM.PR.J, BAM.PR.K, BAM.PR.M, BAM.PR.N, BAM.PR.O and BAM.PR.P.

Interesting External Papers

Boston Fed Releases TIPS Discussion Paper

The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston has released a Public Policy Discussion Paper by Michelle L. Barnes, Zvi Bodie, Robert K. Triest, and J. Christina Wang titled A TIPS Scorecard: Are TIPS Accomplishing What They Were Supposed to Accomplish? Can They Be Improved?:

In September 1997, the U.S. Treasury developed the TIPS market in order to achieve three important policy objectives: (1) to provide consumers with a class of assets that allows for hedging against real interest rate risk, (2) to provide holders of nominal contracts a means of hedging against inflation risk, and (3) to provide everyone with a reliable indicator of the term structure of expected inflation. This paper evaluates progress toward the achievement of these objectives and analyzes prospective ways to better meet these objectives in the future, by, for example, extending the maturity of TIPS and/or the use of inflation indexes suited to particular geographic regions or demographics. We conclude by arguing that while it is tempting to consider completing markets by introducing more TIPS‐like securities indexed to inflation rates more tailored to particular demographics, our analysis suggests that TIPS indexed to CPI do, in fact, facilitate good synthetic hedges against unexpected changes in inflation for many different investors, since the various inflation measures are very highly correlated. We do, however, argue for extending the maturity of TIPS.

The authors do not assess the cost/benefit profile of TIPS issuance to Treasury as was discussed by, for instance, FRBNY CEO William Dudley earlier this year. The organization of the paper is:

Section II describes TIPS in more detail, emphasizing how they are designed to act as protection against changes in inflation, the tax implications for investors, the demographics of holders of TIPS, and other considerations relating to whether or not TIPS should yield measures of break‐even inflation rates comparable with survey measures of consumers’ inflation expectations or future realized rates of inflation. Section III outlines and evaluates the criticisms of the CPI and speaks to whether its potential mismeasurement is relevant to the efficacy of TIPS as a hedging instrument to guarantee the real return. It also discusses whether the CPI is a good measure for everyone, and whether there might be more appropriate measures for certain heterogeneous groups, along with the costs and benefits of issuing such securities. Section IV demonstrates the efficacy of TIPS as a hedge against various ex ante and ex post inflation measures, as well as the efficacy of TIPS as a short‐term versus a long‐term hedge. The final section concludes with implications for the design of the TIPS market.

There’s rather a neat section on inflation forecasting:

All of the expected inflation measures are largely backward‐looking, moving with recent actual rates of inflation and often deviating substantially from the actual inflation rates that would be experienced over the subsequent 10 years. This is not surprising: although there was concern about the effect of an overheated economy on short‐term inflation rates during the 1960s, it would have been essentially impossible at that time to forecast the oil shocks of the 1970s, or the response of the fiscal and monetary authorities to those shocks. Moreover, the notion of a vertical long‐run Phillips curve was still controversial among economists during the late 1960s and 1970s. Even if professional forecasters had foreseen the oil shocks and policy responses, they likely would have underestimated the extent of the resulting increase in inflation.


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As a result of the unforeseen shocks, and most likely also because of errors in forecasting the response of inflation to the shocks, the actual 10‐year forward CPI growth rates were much larger than 10‐year‐forward expected inflation, starting in the mid‐1960s. Figure 11 shows the difference between the FRB/US 10‐year expected inflation variable and the actual 10‐yearforward average CPU inflation rate. Forecasts of 10‐year ahead average inflation rates increasingly underpredicted the subsequent actual experienced CPI inflation during the 1960s and early 1970s, with the underprediction of the average annual inflation rate exceeding 5 percentage points by 1972.


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The authors conclude, in part:

Finally, we draw some implications for the design of the TIPS market and related financial institutions issues. We conclude that, as is, the TIPS market provides a good hedge against inflation risk and that from a cost/benefit perspective there seems little to be gained from indexing to other inflation measures—be they broader, such as the PCE deflator, or narrower, such as regional inflation measures of the CPI‐E for the elderly. A “ladder” of TIPS, with maturities linked to when money is needed for expenses, would help investors in or near retirement hedge against their nominal expenses over time. TIPS have the potential to be the backbone asset underlying inflation‐indexed annuities, but to facilitate these annuities, the maximum duration of TIPS would need to be extended. With respect to housing as an investment as opposed to a consumption good, there is room for alternative hedging instruments and they are currently available in the form of futures contracts on S&P/Case‐Shiller Metro Home Price Indexes, or forward contracts on the Residential Property Index 25‐MSA Composite (RPX).