HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : December 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-12-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,360.5 1 2.00 4.10% 17.3 31M 4.10%
FixedFloater 2,361.2 7 2.00 3.61% 4.4 65M 4.78%
Floater 2,193.1 4 2.00 -23.56% 0.1 41M 4.59%
OpRet 1,942.4 17 1.36 2.50% 2.2 75M 4.66%
SplitShare 2,030.9 12 1.92 3.17% 2.7 86M 4.89%
Interest-Bearing 2,382.4 8 2.00 6.05% 2.7 56M 6.88%
Perpetual-Premium 1,554.5 55 1.34 4.23% 5.8 133M 5.00%
Perpetual-Discount 1,656.9 3 1.00 4.50% 16.4 585M 4.50%
HIMI Index Changes, December 29, 2006
Issue From To Because
BNA.PR.A SplitShare Scraps Volume
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
CGI.PR.C Scraps SplitShare Volume
CAC.PR.A SplitShare Scraps Volume
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.D OpRet Scraps Volume
PWF.PR.A Floater Scraps Volume
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
SXT.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during December 2006
Issue Action Index Because
RY.PR.D Add PerpetualPremium New Issue
FBS.PR.B Add SplitShare New Issue
FBS.PR.A Delete Scraps Redemption

Index Constitution, 2006-12-29, Post-rebalancing

Issue Comments

RF.PR.A Announces Normal Course Issuer Bid

Holy smokes, that didn’t take long!

RF.PR.A is a new issue that settled on February 22. The exercise of the greenshoe of 100,000 shares was announced March 20. Today’s closing quotation was 23.75-00, 2×3, on volume of 1,300 shares.

The company has announced:

that it intends to purchase up to 145,760 of the preference shares, series 1 of the Corporation (the “Shares”) for cancellation by way of a normal course issuer bid through the facilities of the Toronto Stock Exchange (the “TSX”). The 145,760 Shares represent approximately 10% of the public float of the Corporation. As of March 20, 2008, 1,540,000 Shares are issued and outstanding.

The purchases may commence on March 26, 2008 and will terminate on March 25, 2009, or on such earlier date as the Corporation may complete its purchase or provide notice of termination. Any such purchases will be made by the Corporation at the prevailing market price at the time of such purchases in accordance with the requirements of the TSX.

If Shares are offered on the TSX at prices that are less than or equal to $25.00, the Corporation may offer to purchase such Shares, if it determines that such purchases are in the best interests of shareholders, and subject to compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements and limitations.

The Corporation will not purchase in any 30 day period more than 30,800 Shares, being 2% of the issued and outstanding Shares as at the date of acceptance of the notice of the normal course issuer bid by the TSX.

Issue Comments

TCA.PR.X & TCA.PR.Y : What's Keeping Them Up?

I’m really surprised by the resiliency shown by the two TransCanada PipeLines issues – these are very similar perpetuals, with a $50 par value and pay $2.80 p.a. – a coupon of 5.6%. TCA.PR.X is redeemable at par commencing 2013-10-15, while the TCA.PR.Y is redeemable at par commencing 2014-3-5.

TCA.PR.X was issued in October 1998 as TRP.PR.X, while TCA.PR.Y began life 1999-3-5 as TRP.PR.Y. Four million shares of each series are outstanding so they’re a nice size for non-financial issues.

These issues are perennial favourites of mine. They were hard hit when TRP cut its common share dividend, with the low point being 2000-5-23: TRP.PR.Y had closing quote of 34.80-25 on volume of 6,180 shares. I made a fair bit of money on that – tough times do not lead inevitably to default.

There were some credit worries when they made a big investment in Dec 06, but these were taken care of by an equity issue.

More recently, their 5.6% coupon, far higher than most of their competition in recent years (other issues with similarly high coupons have been called) made them exemplars of the virtues of the PerpetualPremium class – when they yielded 4.10% to call, as they did about a year ago, the difference between this yield and the coupon implied a lot of interest-rate protection for investors.

They’ve weathered the storm of the past year beautifully – well down from the high of 55.71-10 on no volume, reached 2006-12-4 by TCA.PR.Y, but not nearly as badly hit as perpetuals without such high coupons … just chugging along, paying their coupon, and still trading above thier call price.

Which is my problem. Why are they still trading above their call price? The cycle has turned, and a coupon of 5.6% is not as extraordinary as it was a year ago – see the new issues of TD.PR.R, TD.PR.Q and BNS.PR.O all with similar coupons and a call date at par that is further away than the TCA calls (and it is unequivocally better for the call date to be further away, since the call won’t be exercised if you want it to be – and vice versa!).

Why are TCA.PR.X and TCA.PR.Y, both rated Pfd-2(low) by DBRS and P-2 by S&P, trading to yield less than the bank issues, rated Pfd-1 [DBRS] and P-1(low) [S&P]? One explanation may be scarcity value (many players are fully loaded on banks in general and these banks in particular) and another might be extreme sector aversion to financials. But it still doesn’t make a lot of sense to me.

I’ve uploaded some charts, comparing these two issues with others that have a 5.6% coupon…

Yield disparity, by the way, is the amount of yield that would have to be added or subtracted from the yield curve in order to achieve a calculated price equal to the market price – some players may know this as the “Z-Spread”. It is not unusual for an issue (such as TCA.PR.X over the past year) to be “always expensive” – this may mean that there is something about the issue that is not incorporated in the model (a restrictive covenant, perhaps, or scarcity value, or … something) but it is clear to see from the chart that TCA.PR.X (and TCA.PR.Y) have become more expensive than usual.

And I completely fail to understand why they’re trading through the banks.

Update, 2008-03-23: In response to prefhound‘s points in the comments, I have uploaded listings for PerpetualDiscount and PerpetualPremium yieldDisparities. Note that these yield disparities contain adjustments for Cumulative Dividends – which I believe to be an artefact, but will admit that I am unsure. The cumulativeDividend adjustment to curve price (and hence curve yield) is quite substantial – without it, TCA.PR.X would appear even more expensive than they do now.

Miscellaneous News

Municipal Ratings Scale: Be Careful What You Wish for!

The municipal rating scale has been discussed often on PrefBlog – most recently in Moody’s to Assign Global Ratings to Municipals … after all, municipals in the States are cousins to preferreds in Canada in that they are logically included in taxable fixed income accounts – although there are major differences in credit and term exposure, of course! Liquidity can be similar though.

Moody’s and Fitch are knuckling under to the pressure:

Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings took steps to address calls by public officials from California to Congress to rate municipal bonds by the same standards as those for debt sold by companies and countries.

Moody’s started taking comments on its plan to give state and local governments the option to get a so-called global-scale rating, based on the criteria used to assess corporations, for tax-exempt bonds beginning in May. Fitch named Robert Grossman to lead efforts by its public finance unit to explore whether corporate and municipal ratings should be blended.

When California sold $250 million of bonds to fund stem- cell research in October, the state paid $46,200 for the municipal scale rating, $25,000 more for the global scale and $6,250 a year for the life of the bond, Dresslar said. Moody’s municipal rating on the bonds is A1, while the global scale rating is Aaa.

If California, the most-populous U.S. state, had top credit ratings, it might save more than $5 billion over the 30-year life of $61 billion in yet-to-be-sold, voter-approved debt, [California State Treasurer Bill] Lockyer has said.

Whoosh! Assuming that savings of … what? 20-30bp annually can be realized at the stroke of a pen is more than just a little hard to swallow, but we’ll get to that in a minute. As I mentioned on March 19 I had an exchange with Naked Capitalism on the topic of Municipal ratings, on the comments to a virtually unrelated thread. I think the exchange is too interesting to linger unread in the comments of an old thread, and I’m too lazy to recast my thoughts … so I’ll extract comments here.

First up was an anonymous Naked Capitalism reader who had read my March 3 report:

Don’t count on help from The Iceheads either:

http://www.prefblog.com/

Naked Capitalism does not explain why all fault lies with the Credit Rating Agencies and not with the issuers and investors; nor does he speculate why Moody’s, for instance, would choose to publish explanations of their municipal rating scale if it’s such a big secret.
There’s a thread on Financial Webring Forum discussing long-term equity premia. It is clear that the long term equity premium will vary, moving marginally up and down in response to transient mispricing – this was discussed in a paper by Campbell, Diamond & Shoven, presented to the (American) Social Security Advisory Board in August 2001 (quoted with a different author for each paragraph):

With a response from Naked Capitalism writer Yves Smith:

He almost always takes issue with what I write.

For the record, the official policy of the rating agencies has been for many many years that ratings are supposed to mean the same thing as regards default risk regardless of the type of asset rated.

They have drifted more and more from that policy but have not been terribly forthcoming (note that S&P in the Wall Street Journal yesterday attempted to maintain that the ratings were indeed consistent). Saying that someone is not forthcoming (as Rosner and Mason said in their extensively documented paper) is not the same as saying secret. They’ve chosen to say as little as they can publicly about the issue of the consistency of their ratings because they know their practices have shifted over time (while regs have been static) and they haven’t been candid.

More important, numerous regulations key off official ratings (“investment grade” being the most glaring). The very existence of those standards presupposes that the ratings standards are consistent. But a long-term drift from those standards has created a huge amount of damage, witness the behavior of AAA CDOs. And no AAA rated asset should be able to be cut in a single review by 12 or 16 grades, as has happened more than occasionally.

The rating agencies do not deserve to be defended, period. If it were possible to sue them, even under a standard that limited their liability, they would have gone out of business long ago. The embarrassment of what would be exposed in discovery would have led to a sharp curtailment of their role.

PrefBlog ought to know full well that the US muni market in particular is full of not-terribly-savvy investors who are ratings-dependent. The ratings are supposed to help solve the “caveat emptor” problem, not exacerbate it.

There were then twelve unrelated comments, after which I found the mention of PrefBlog while doing a vanity check and responded:

Yves Smith : PrefBlog ought to know full well that the US muni market in particular is full of not-terribly-savvy investors who are ratings-dependent.

As I understand it, this is precisely why a different scale has been used for the past 100 years. According to Moody’s: Compared to the corporate bond experience, rated municipal bond defaults have been much less common and recoveries in the event of default have been much higher. As a result, municipal investors have demanded, and rating agencies have provided, finer distinctions within a narrower band of potential credit losses than those provided for corporate bonds.

Like the bond markets themselves, Moody’s rating approach to municipal issuers has been quite distinct from its approach to corporate issuers. In order to satisfy the needs of highly risk averse municipal investors, Moody’s credit opinions about US municipalities have, since their inception in the early years of the past century, been expressed on the municipal bond rating scale, which is distinct from the corporate bond rating scale used for corporations, non-US governmental issuers, and structured finance securities.

Compared to Moody’s corporate rating practices, Moody’s rating system for municipal obligations places considerable weight on an overall assessment of financial strength within a very small band of creditworthiness. Municipal investors have historically demanded a ratings emphasis on issuer financial strength because they are generally risk averse, poorly diversified, concerned about the liquidity of their investments, and in the case of individuals, often dependent on debt service payments for income. Consequently, the municipal rating symbols have different meanings to meet different investor expectations and needs. The different meanings account for different default and loss experience between similarly rated bonds in the corporate and municipal sectors.

Moodys also reviewed their consultations with real live investors in their testimony to the House Financial Services Committee

Yves Smith:

James,

That is rating agency attempts at revisionist history, now that their practices are under the spotlight. Rating agencies have historically claimed that their rating were consistent across issuer and product; indeed, why would so many regulations (Basel I and II, pension fund and insurance), simply designate gross ratings limitations (AAA, investment grade, and so on) without specifying the grade per type of issuer if it was known that the ratings were NOT consistent as to risk? That defies all logic.

Consider this statement from a paper published last year by Joseph Mason and Joshua Rosner:

The value of ratings to investors is generally assumed to be a benchmark of comparability it offers investors in differentiating between securities. Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have long argued that the ratings scales they employed were consistent across assets and markets. Not long ago Moody’s stated “The need for a unified rating system is also reflected in the growing importance of modern portfolio management techniques, which require consistent quantitative inputs across a wide range of financial instruments, and the increased use of specific rating thresholds in financial market regulation, which are applied uniformly without regard to the bond market sector.”6 In a similar pronouncement in 2001 Standard & Poor’s stated their “approach, in both policy and practice, is intended to provide a consistent framework for risk assessment that builds reasonable ratings consistency within and across sectors and geographies”.7

You can read more, and the citations, starting on page 8.

I have also seen (but can’t recall where) quotations of statements from the agencies the early 1990s that were much firmer regarding the consistency of ratings

The paper linked by Mr. Smith has been reviewed on Prefblog. Me:

indeed, why would so many regulations (Basel I and II, pension fund and insurance), simply designate gross ratings limitations (AAA, investment grade, and so on) without specifying the grade per type of issuer if it was known that the ratings were NOT consistent as to risk?

The Basel Accords are not quite so mechanical as all that – there is considerable leeway given to national regulators to interpret the principles and apply them to local conditions.

It is my understanding that General Obligation Municipals are assigned by definition a risk-weight of 20% regardless of rating (this is the same bucket as AAA/AA long-term ratings) while Revenue obligations are assigned a 50% risk-weight (which is the same bucket as “A” long-term ratings).

All this is mere hair-splitting, however. An investor who takes free advice without even asking what the advice means would be better advised to find an advisor.

The ratings agencies do what they do because they want to do it. If anybody has a better idea, they’re welcome to compete. Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend!

Yves Smith:

James,

Competition is most certainly NOT open in the rating agency business. The SEC determines who is a “nationally recognized statistical rating organization.” It does not publish its criteria for how to become one. It took Egan-Jones, the most recent addition, eight to ten years to get the designation.

The Basel I rules made fairly strong use of ratings; Basel II permits more sophisticated organizations to use their own methodologies. But even the Fed’s discount window uses rating agency classifications to ascertain what is acceptable collateral and what hairicut to apply.

Their role is well enshrined in regulations. Per Wikipedia:

Ratings by NRSRO are used for a variety of regulatory purposes in the United States. In addition to net capital requirements (described in more detail below), the SEC permits certain bond issuers to use a shorter prospectus form when issuing bonds if the issuer is older, has issued bonds before, and has a credit rating above a certain level. SEC regulations also require that money market funds (mutual funds that mimick the safety and liquidity of a bank savings deposit, but without FDIC insurance) comprise only securities with a very high rating from an NRSRO. Likewise, insurance regulators use credit ratings from NRSROs to ascertain the strength of the reserves held by insurance companies.

The rating agencies are a protected oligopoly and as a result, are highly profitable. They are not charities

Me:

The most recently recognized US NRSRO is LACE Financial, registered 2008-2-11. Egan-Jones was 2007-12-21.

The big agencies are indeed quite profitable, irregardless of whether or not they’re a protected oligopoly. This is why they are currently under attack by the not-quite-so-profitable, not-quite-so-respected subscription agencies.
Rules for becoming a NRSRO were published in the Federal Register.

You do not need to be a NRSRO to get the “Rating Agency” exemption from Regulation FD, nor do you need to be an NRSRO to sell me a subscription to your your rating service.

You do, however, need to distribute your ratings freely to get the Regulation FD exemption; this is an aspect of the regulations I don’t like at all. It may be logical as far as it goes (the information will not be exploited for gain) but it means that investors cannot perform a fully independent check of the publicly available ratings.

As for the regulatory role of the NRSRO agencies … that’s the regulators’ problem, first and last. I can sympathize with the intent; and the implementation is a tip of the hat to the big agencies’ long and highly successful track record; but the agencies cannot be blamed if the regulators have decided to follow their advice blindly.

Yves Smith:

James,

I stand corrected on the criteria being available now, but note per above, the NRSRO designation was established in 1975, yet per your link, the guidelines for qualifying were not published till 2007. Egan Jones suffered repeated rejections of its application with no explanation.

In fact, if you had read the Wikipedia article, the SEC had published a “concept memo” in 2003 which set forth criteria that made new entry just about impossible:

The single most important factor in the Commission staff’s assessment of NRSRO status is whether the rating agency is “nationally recognized” in the United States as an issuer of credible and reliable ratings by the predominant users of securities ratings.

This as you can imagine is a massive chicken and egg problem. You have to be “nationally recognized” to be an NRSRO, yet who is going to take the risk of building up a sufficiently large operation when the approval barrier is high and ambiguous. This provision seemed intended to close the gate behind the current NRSROs.

Again per Wikipedia, the SEC provided guidelines only as a result of Congressional action:

In 2006, following criticism that the SEC’s “No Action letter” approach was simultaneously too opaque and provided the SEC with too little regulatory oversight of NRSROs, the U.S. Congress passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act. This law required the SEC to establish clear guidelines for determining which credit rating agencies qualify as NRSROs. It also gives the SEC the power to regulate NRSRO internal processes regarding record-keeping and how they guard against conflicts of interest, and makes the NRSRO determination subject to a Commission vote (rather than an SEC staff determination). Notably, however, the law specifically prohibits the SEC from regulating an NRSRO’s rating methodologies.

I never said that Egan Jones was the most recent rating agency; the Wikipedia link clearly shows LACE.

It is not hard to imagine that those two additions, which brings the list to nine, was in response to the recent criticism of the incumbents.

Me:

Do you have any problems with the manner in which NRSRO certification is awarded now, or is this yesterday’s battle?

I remain a little unclear on the link between NRSRO certification and the rating scale used for municipalities – can you clarify?

Additionally, it seems to me that, should municipalities be rated on the corporate scale, then they’ll be basically split between AAA and AA, with a few outliers. Will this truly improve the utility of the ratings to Joe Lunchbucket? It seems to me that – given a rational response to a lemons problem, and in the absence of independent analysis – issuers with greater financial strength will achieve no benefit, and end up paying more for funding. Have you seen any commentary on this?

Me again:

said…
I’ve had one other thought about the possible effects of a two-grade rating scale. The prior comment referred to the intra-grade effect on ratings, but there may well be an inter-grade effect as well.

If our good friend Joe Lunchbucket is presented with a list of, say, 100 offerings and their (current) ratings, he sees half a dozen or so categories – he also sees that a recognizable name like California is not in the highest rank.

This multiplicity of grades serves to emphasize the idea that the ratings represent graduated scales. I suspect that if the same list is presented to him with only two significantly populated rating classes, he might consider these to be indications of “good” and “bad” … or, perhaps, pass/fail.

Thus, it is entirely possible that spreads between municipals in the (corporate scale) AAA & AA classes will widen from historical norms – which will cost the lower-grade issuers a lot of money – unless, of course, they purchase evil bond insurance.

After all, municipal bonds are not in much competition with corporates for Joe Lunchbucket’s investment – they’re in competition with each other.

I recognize that it is currently so fashionable to blame the ratings agencies for all the world’s ills that little consideration will have been given to the probable effects of changing a 100-year-old system, let alone any actual work. But if you come across any informed research that addresses the above possibility, I would be very interested to see it.

I don’t know what the answer is. It does seem to me that introducing a two-grade rating scale will lead to problems and overall higher coupons payable by issuers, due to both intra-grade and inter-grade effects … but I am not so arrogant as to assume I know that for sure! I will go so far as to say that California Treasurer Bill Lockyer is dreaming in technicolour if he truly believes that California’s interest cost on bond issues will become the equal to what AAA (municipal) bonds are yielding now (there’s only so much investment money to go around) … but I would go so far as to say he probably knows better and is just grandstanding for his adoring voters.

If anybody can find some good discussion on this matter – behavioural finance is not what I do, and neither is US municipals! – please let me know.

Miscellaneous News

Software Upgrade: Search Function Works Again!

I noted on March 18 that the “search” function was on the blink.

I needed to upgrade the version of WordPress that runs this site anyway … so, after carefully backing up the site’s contents, checking that I had everything, saying a little prayer and closing my eyes … I upgraded and everything seems to be working again.

Please let me know of any problems, or abnormally stupid-looking changes that you think might be accidental.

Market Action

March 20, 2008

Another implosion in the US today, as CIT Group drew on bank credit to pay short-term debt:

“Protracted disruption” in capital markets and downgrades of its credit ratings prompted the company to borrow from backup lines, Chief Executive Officer Jeffrey Peek said in a statement today. Proceeds will be used to repay debt maturing this year, including commercial paper, New York-based CIT said.

Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s cut the company’s credit ratings this week, restricting its ability to finance itself in the commercial paper market, where it has $2.8 billion in debt outstanding, John Guarnera, an analyst at Bank of America Corp., said. CIT, which leases airplanes and trains and provides financing to companies, follows Countrywide Financial Corp. in seeking bank financing after struggling to access traditional means of funding.

Quite frankly, I don’t understand this at all. I’ve been looking at CIT, and agree – they have problems! But their book value of $34 looks entirely reasonable, financing requirements don’t (didn’t!) seem to be horribly lumpy, lots of cash on the balance sheet. The worry is their 10:1 debt:equity ratio … but it’s a leasing company! That’s what they do! It seemed to me that while the common share holders were probably not going to be happy campers for the duration of crunch (higher financing costs grinding away at profit) and sometime thereafter (while the financing runs off the books), it seems to me the credit was fine. And now…

Credit-default swaps tied to CIT’s bonds traded at 27 percent upfront and 5 percent a year today, according to broker Phoenix Partners Group in New York, meaning it cost $2.7 million initially and $500,000 a year to protect the company’s bonds from default for five years. That’s up from 23 percent upfront and 5 percent a year yesterday.

Wow. At any rate, I suspect CIT is ripe for a take-over … market cap of $1.4-billion makes it a nice little tuck-in for a bank that wants a leasing business. But we shall see! My macro-calls are no better than any other idiot’s. One thing that may be affecting matters is extraordinary volatility in the stock markets:

The U.S. stock market is the most volatile in 70 years, according to a Standard & Poor’s study of daily price swings in the S&P 500.

The benchmark for American equities has advanced or declined 1 percent or more on 28 days this year. That’s 52 percent of the trading sessions so far, which is the highest proportion since 1938, said Howard Silverblatt, S&P’s senior index analyst. The S&P 500 lost 12 percent in 2008 through yesterday following $195 billion in bank losses related to subprime mortgages.

Increased stock volatility can lead to increased CDS spreads via variants of the Merton structural model.

And according to Citigroup’s analysis:

While Citigroup apparently does not invoke the underlying theory, they see a massive deleveraging in process and tell investors to get out of the way. Via Marketwatch:

The Great Unwind has begun, Citigroup Inc. strategists warned on Wednesday.

As markets and economies de-leverage across the globe, investors should avoid companies and countries that have grown to rely too much on borrowed money, they said.

That means favoring public-equity markets over hedge funds, private-equity and real estate, while leaning toward emerging market countries and away from developed nations like the U.S., the bank’s global equity strategy team advised.

Within equity markets, the financial-services should be avoided because it’s still over-leveraged, while other companies have stronger balance sheets, the strategists said….

For example, there are reports and speculation that Bear Stearns’ problems are feeding into commodities:

When confidence in the brokerage firm was waning last week, many hedge fund clients working with the firm’s prime brokerage division pulled back and tried to quickly move accounts to rival brokers, according to hedge fund investors, prime brokers and other experts in the business.

One executive at a smaller prime brokerage firm said he was bombarded by calls on Friday from hedge funds wanting to move from Bear. His firm has gained about 10 new clients from Bear during the past 10 days, he added. Another executive at one of the largest prime brokers said his firm has also been picking up new clients as a result of Bear’s problems. They both spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Leverage is being closely watched,” said Josh Galper, managing principal of Vodia Group, which advises hedge funds on borrowing strategies. “That does not mean that hedge funds from Bear are being told specifically that they may not put on as much leverage as Bear had let them, but rather that the amount of leverage being utilized is being reviewed much more carefully than it has been in the past, for obvious reasons.”

The price of commodities including energy, metals and grains slumped for a second day on Thursday amid speculation that some hedge funds are selling leveraged positions to either meet margin calls or lock in profits and shift to other assets.

In a measure of how ridiculous things are getting, the Fed reports that the March 18 yield on 3-month bills was 0.91% — ninety-one beeps. Bloomberg reports a rate of 0.40% — FORTY beeps — today.      

Credit Suisse traders have been naughty:

What is particularly troubling is that the bank’s’ loss at least in part stemmed from inadequate controls. The bank found intentional mispricings by a small number of traders who have since been sacked. The Bloomberg story notes:

The Swiss bank hasn’t disclosed the names of the traders responsible for the incorrect pricing of residential mortgage- backed bonds and collateralized debt obligations. Credit Suisse said it reassigned trading responsibility for the CDO business and took measures to improve controls to prevent and detect misconduct, which were “not effective” previously

In a bright ray of sunshine to interupt all this gloom, BMO has announced:

that all four swap counterparties in Apex/Sitka Trusts and certain investors in the Trusts have signed agreements to restructure the Trusts.

The term of the notes will be extended to maturities ranging from approximately 5 to 8 years to better match the term of the positions in the Trusts.

Holders of Canadian ABCP will be watching very carefully, I’m sure, to see what prices those 5-8 year notes fetch in the market! In an investor presentation that explains the trusts, BMO discloses that the terms of the settlement will reduce their Tier 1 Capital ratio by about 25bp. In their 1Q08 Supplementary Information they disclose Basel II measures of 9.48% Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 11.26% Total Capital Ratio.

Bear Stearns – a company that will live forever in the textbooks, if nowhere else – brings us another example of voting power / economic interest decoupling:

JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chairman Jamie Dimon sought to win support for his takeover of Bear Stearns Cos., offering cash and stock to executives of the crippled firm as its largest shareholder resisted the deal.

Dimon made the proposal to several hundred Bear Stearns senior managing directors at a meeting yesterday evening in the securities firm’s Manhattan headquarters, according to two people who attended. He said members of the group who are asked to stay after the acquisition is complete will get additional JPMorgan shares, according to the attendees, who asked not to be identified because the meeting was private.

Bear Stearns employees own about a third of its stock, with a large concentration in the hands of senior managing directors. Their support may help JPMorgan counter opposition from billionaire Joseph Lewis, who owns 8.4 percent of Bear Stearns and said yesterday he may seek an alternative to the bank’s proposed purchase.

“He’s basically bribing them for their votes,” said Richard Bove, an analyst at Punk Ziegel & Co., referring to Dimon’s presentation. “In this environment, there are no jobs on Wall Street, so he can bribe them by letting them keep their jobs and they’ll vote for him.”

Another quiet day on the preferred market, with the market as a whole drifting listlessly upwards.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.43% 5.46% 34,778 14.72 2 +0.3089% 1,087.8
Fixed-Floater 4.77% 5.51% 62,380 14.84 8 +0.3142% 1,040.7
Floater 4.77% 4.77% 77,150 15.93 2 -0.1036% 871.3
Op. Retract 4.85% 3.82% 75,620 2.91 15 +0.0707% 1,045.6
Split-Share 5.42% 6.15% 94,322 4.13 14 +0.2893% 1,017.4
Interest Bearing 6.22% 6.69% 66,864 4.23 3 +0.1709% 1,084.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.79% 5.64% 256,919 10.19 17 +0.0045% 1,019.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.56% 5.61% 299,593 14.47 52 +0.0698% 929.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount -2.0000% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 20.58 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.8913% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 20.75 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount -1.8605% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.41% based on a bid of 21.10 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.4793% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 23.31 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare -1.0769% Asset coverage of 2.8+:1 as of Februay 29, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.54% based on a bid of 19.29 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.97% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.25% to 2016-3-25).
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.0134% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 21.93 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0204% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 19.80 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0638% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 23.75 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.G FixFloat +1.1423%  
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.2588% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.95% based on a bid of 20.11 and a limitMaturity.
FFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.5723% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of March 14, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 9.69 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
PIC.PR.A SplitShare +1.6484% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of March 13, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.69% based on a bid of 14.80 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.6792% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 23.01 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount 120,985 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 24.90 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 58,630 Scotia crossed 50,000 at 21.15. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.39% based on a bid of 21.12 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 22,601 Nesbitt crossed 21,100 in two tranches at 22.36. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 22.44 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium 18,430 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.64% based on a bid of 25.16 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 17,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 21.27 and a limitMaturity.

There were seven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : November 2006

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2006-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,344.2 1 2.00 4.27% 16.9 39M 4.27%
FixedFloater 2,341.5 7 2.00 3.93% 3.7 65M 4.80%
Floater 2,198.0 5 1.80 -21.01% 0.1 42M 4.46%
OpRet 1,941.8 18 1.34 2.24% 2.3 70M 4.65%
SplitShare 2,020.0 11 1.91 3.33% 2.8 86M 5.09%
Interest-Bearing 2,368.3 8 2.00 5.55% 2.6 55M 6.84%
Perpetual-Premium 1,549.4 50 1.34 4.08% 5.2 125M 5.03%
Perpetual-Discount 1,640.1 7 1.29 4.55% 16.3 452M 4.57%
HIMI Index Changes, November 30, 2006
Issue From To Because
CGI.PR.C SplitShare Scraps Volume
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
WN.PR.E PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
FIG.PR.A Scraps InterestBearing Volume

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during November 2006
Issue Action Index Because
RY.PR.C Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
FAL.PR.F Delete Scraps Redemption
FAL.PR.G Delete Scraps Redemption
CM.PR.I Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
BAM.PR.M Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
RY.PR.O Delete PerpetualPremium Redemption

Index Constitution, 2006-11-30, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

March 19, 2008

Two articles today brought into sharp relief the issue of individuals’ compensation within the financial services industry. Naked Capitalism republishes an article from the Financial Times which brings up the old chestnut about an investment strategy that returns 10% in nine of ten years and -100% one time in ten:

We can identify two huge problems to be solved. First, many investment strategies have the characteristics of a “Taleb distribution”, after Nicholas Taleb, author of Fooled by Randomness. At its simplest, a Taleb distribution has a high probability of a modest gain and a low probability of huge losses in any period.

Second, the systems of reward fail to align the interests of managers with those of investors. As a result, the former have an incentive to exploit such distributions for their own benefit.

Further, it is claimed that:

Professors Foster and Young argue that it is extremely hard to resolve these difficulties. It is particularly difficult to know whether a manager is skilful rather than lucky.

Well, says I, no more difficult than with anything else. You have to actually look at an investment; looking at returns – whether actual or backtested – is only half the story. If we look, for instance, at the just-reported blow-up of Endeavor Capital, we see:

Endeavour Capital LLP, the London- based hedge-fund firm founded by former Salomon Smith Barney Inc. traders, has fallen about 28 percent this month because of “extreme volatility and vast moves” in Japanese bonds, according to two investors.

The $2.88 billion Endeavour Fund sold “substantially all” of its Japanese government debt this week, Chief Executive Officer Paul Matthews said today in an interview. He declined to comment on the March decline.

Endeavour seeks to profit from discrepancies in the prices of various fixed-income securities and currencies, a strategy known as relative-value trading. The fund lost money as the spread, or difference, between yields on Japanese 7- and 20-year bonds widened to 1.44 percentage points on March 17, the most in almost nine years. Investors bought shorter-term debt as the benchmark Nikkei 225 stock index fell 13 percent in March.

Let’s think about this. They lost money because the spread between 7s and 20s widened … so presumably they were long 20s and short 7s. Since they are calling themselves “relative value” investors, we will assume (assume!) that the position was duration neutral and in that case their position was most likely long cash, short 7s, long 20s in such a way that parallel shifts in the yield curve would not – to a first approximation anyway, for smaller small parallel moves – harm them. Note that the assumptions leading to this conclusion are entirely reasonable, but are still assumptions. Anybody who knows better – feel free to tell me. Anyway .. long cash / short 7s / long 20s is a coherent strategy, at the very least.

But “relative value”? Well – I don’t know what the proponents themselves called it when pitching clients for money. And, at a stretch, “relative value” can cover a lot of ground … if you feel that the value on stocks is cheap relative to cash, you can justify levering 20:1 on a stock portfolio and call it a “relative value” play.

I certainly wouldn’t call it a “relative value” play. The position I’ve described – long cash, short 7s, long 20s – is a “flattener”. It will make all kinds of money if the overall yield curve flattens, and lose all kinds of money if the overall yield curve steepens … and it appears that the Japanese government curve has just done that latter. It’s not a “relative value” play at all – it’s a macro-market call, subject to all the chaos and market risk of any other macro market call.

If they want to go long 5s, short 7s, long 10s … then maybe they can talk to me a little bit more about their “relative value” plays. Maybe. But that’s the outside limit, and too much leverage takes it out of consideration.

In a similar vein, Guido Tabellini of Bocconi University asks in VoxEU Why did bank supervision fail?:

On the other hand, there were systematic incentive distortions. First, the “originate and distribute” model entails obvious moral hazard problems. Second, credit rating agencies face a conflict of interest. Third, management compensation schemes reward myopic risk taking behaviour; it is rational for me to under-insure against the occurrence of rare disruptive events, if my bonus only depends on short-term performance indicators.

These are bare assertions – Prof. Tabellini may well have good reason to believe they are true, but they are incidental to the main point of his article, which I will not discuss.

What I find interesting is the renewed focus on short-term compensation; it’s reminiscent of the handwringing of the 1980’s – remember? When the ceaseless pressure on American corporations to post quarterly returns was blamed for all that was wrong with the world and predictions that the long-term oriented Japanese would end up owning the world? This was before the Japanese property bubble collapsed and sent them into a 15-year recession, of course.

I’ve said it before, but I never get tired of seeing my own words on screen: there are problems, sure, but most of these will be self-correcting. It’s going to be awfully difficult to sell originate-and-distribute product any more without better disclosure and accountability … the pendulum has, if anything, swung over too far on that one, at least for now. And bank supervision – via the Basel accords – needs to provide a brighter line between the (protected and regulated) banking system and the (unprotected and unregulated) shadow-banking system.

Compensation structures for individuals can always be improved – but there is always a lot competition for talent:

As more than 14,000 Bear Stearns Cos. employees watch the value of their stock sink and brace for firings, some of the company’s 550 brokers who handle individual investors’ accounts are receiving job offers from competitors promising windfalls of $2 million or more.

Merrill Lynch & Co., Morgan Stanley, UBS AG and Citigroup Inc.’s Smith Barney unit are offering Bear Stearns brokers packages that include signing bonuses of two times the revenue they bring in annually, said Mindy Diamond, president of Diamond Consultants LLC, a Chester, New Jersey-based executive search company. Someone generating $1 million in commissions and fees could receive $1.5 million up front and the rest over three years, she said.

Note that in highlighting this example, I am using the word “talent” to denote “ability to bring money in the door”.

Back to economics, Econbrowser‘s James Hamilton opines on yesterdays massive Fed easing:

suppose you believe that oil over $100 a barrel is a destabilizing influence– and I do— and that the Fed’s recent decisions on the fed funds rate are the primary reason that oil is over $100– and I do— and that further reductions in the Tbill rate have limited capacity to stimulate demand– and I do. Suppose you also saw a risk that the inflation, financial uncertainty, and slide of the dollar could precipitate a run from the dollar, introducing an international currency crisis dimension to our current headaches.

I think the Fed missed an opportunity here. A 25 or a 50 basis point cut would have sent commodity prices crashing. Even the mildly hawkish surprise of “only” a 75 basis point cut may have some effects in that direction. If the Fed did convince the commodity speculators that their path leads only to ruin– and I believe the Fed could easily have done just that– that would leave Bernanke with a lot more maneuvering room to cope with what comes next.

I agree with him, as I agreed with his recently expressed view on limits to monetary policy. It seems to me that as far as the overall economy is concerned, the Fed should be waiting to see what its cuts – now 300bp cumulative since August – do to the economy. At the moment, the problem is land-mines of illiquidity blowing up unexpectedly, and the TSLF, together with the occasional spectacular display of force are the best defense against that.

In other words, I’m worried about the collateral damage from such an unfocused tool as the Fed Funds rate. I will note that Accrued Interest is of the view that the (assumed) objective of deleveraging is being (somewhat) achieved by the spanking given to Bear Stearns:

Deleveraging continues. All the big brokers know that the surest way to avoid a Bear Stearns problem is to make sure they aren’t over exposed to hedge funds. Supposedly there have been several commodities-oriented funds which are selling today. Gold getting crushed. Haven’t heard anything about equity-oriented funds but that might be part of what’s going on today as well.

Speaking of Bear Stearns, the SEC has released some FAQs, one of which supports Bear Stearns’ story of sudden and unforseeable liquidity collapse:

Why was Bear Stearns’ loss of credit so critical to its ongoing viability?

In accordance with customary industry practice, Bear Stearns relied day-to-day on its ability to obtain short-term financing through borrowing on a secured basis. Although Bear Stearns continued to have high quality collateral to provide as security for borrowings, as concerns grew late in the week, market counterparties became less willing to enter into collateralized funding arrangements with Bear Stearns.

Late Monday, March 10, rumors spread about liquidity problems at Bear Stearns, which eroded investor confidence in the firm. Bear Stearns’ counterparties became concerned, and a crisis of confidence occurred late in the week. In particular, counterparties to Bear Stearns were unwilling to make secured funding available to Bear Stearns on customary terms.

This unwillingness to fund on a secured basis placed stress on the liquidity of the firm. On Tuesday, March 11, the holding company liquidity pool declined from $18.1 billion to $11.5 billion. On Wednesday, March 12, Bear Stearns’ liquidity pool actually increased by $900 million to a total of $12.4 billion. On Thursday, March 13, however, Bear Stearns’ liquidity pool fell sharply, and continued to fall on Friday.

Joe Lewis is opposing the JPM / BSC deal:

Lewis, a former currencies trader born in an apartment above a pub in London’s East End, will take “whatever action” he deems necessary to protect his $1.26 billion investment in New York-based Bear Stearns, he said in a filing today with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. He said he may “encourage” the firm and “third parties to consider other strategic transactions.

“If he gets others to vote with him he may be able to get some token increase in the price,” said John Coffee, a securities law professor at Columbia University in New York, referring to Lewis. “He’s not going to get a significantly higher bid because no one else can get the Fed’s support and the Fed’s financing.”

Lewis paid an average of $103.89 apiece for his 12.14 million Bear Stearns shares, according to today’s filing. He started accumulating most of his shares last July and has lost about $1.19 billion on the investment, or almost half his wealth, which Forbes magazine estimated at $2.5 billion in its 2007 survey.

The SEC filing today showed that Lewis purchased 1.04 million Bear Stearns shares during February and March, raising his total stake 8.35 percent of common shares outstanding. His price per share ranged from $55.13 to $86.31. He said he may dispose of his holdings entirely or bet that the stock will drop further.

Naked Capitalism highlights some rumours about European banks, which brings to mind Accrued Interest‘s prescient emphasis on the effect of rumours in a bear (Bear?) market reported here March 12

And in the regular trickle of news about LBOs in general and how the market is affecting the chances for Teachers / BCE, there is a snippet about current conditions on Bloomberg:

U.S. banks have whittled their holdings of leveraged buyout loans to $129 billion from $163 billion at the beginning of the year by offering the debt at discounts, according to Bank of America Corp. analysts led by Jeffrey Rosenberg.

Goldman reduced its backlog of loans by $20 billion in the past quarter from $43 billion, chief financial officer David Viniar said on an investor call yesterday. The New York-based firm, which booked a loss of $1 billion on the loans, also added $4 billion of new commitments during the period.

Lehman, the fourth-biggest U.S. securities firm, booked losses of $500 million on leveraged loans last quarter, CFO Erin Callan said on a conference call with investors yesterday.

Morgan Stanley, the second-biggest U.S. securities firm, reduced its leveraged finance pipeline to $16 billion from $20 billion during the first quarter, CFO Colm Kelleher said in an interview today after the company reported first-quarter profit fell 42 percent.

Make of it what you will!

In other jolly news, DBRS has announced that it:

has today withdrawn the ratings of the below-listed Affected Trusts under the Montréal Accord. This action has been taken at the request of the Affected Trusts.

Well, I guess the court appointed monitor didn’t want to pay rating bills for trusts that were under CCCA protection anyway! Speaking of ratings, by the way, I am participating in an exchange with Naked Capitalism in the comments to an almost unrelated post.

The pref market eased downward today on modest volume, enlivened by some sharp declines among financial-based splitShare corporations.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.46% 5.49% 33,376 14.68 2 -0.5081% 1,084.5
Fixed-Floater 4.79% 5.54% 63,204 14.80 8 +0.1124% 1,037.5
Floater 4.77% 4.77% 78,590 15.94 2 -0.1294% 872.2
Op. Retract 4.85% 3.84% 76,295 3.20 15 +0.1968% 1,044.8
Split-Share 5.43% 6.29% 94,470 4.14 14 -0.2585% 1,014.4
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.71% 67,573 4.23 3 -0.2041% 1,082.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.79% 5.53% 262,010 10.81 17 -0.1244% 1,019.3
Perpetual-Discount 5.56% 5.62% 301,837 14.46 52 -0.0516% 928.3
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
PIC.PR.A SplitShare -1.6880% Asset coverage of 1.4+:1 as of March 13, according to Mulvihill. Under Review-Developing by DBRS. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.38% based on a bid of 14.56 and a hardMaturity 2010-11-1 at 15.00.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1,6746% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 24.66 and a limitMaturity
FFN.PR.A SplitShare -1.6495% Asset coverage of 1.8+:1 as of March 14, according to the company. Under Review-Developing by DBRS. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.19% based on a bid of 9.54 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00. 
FTU.PR.A SplitShare -1.5730% Asset coverage of just under 1.4:1 as of March 14 according to the company. Under Review-Developing by DBRS. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.64% based on a bid of 8.76 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
CM.PR.P PerpetualDiscount -1.5231% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.16% based on a bid of 22.63 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount -1.4376% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 23.31 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium (for now!) -1.3861% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.87% based on a bid of 24.90 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount -1.2922% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.02% based on a bid of 19.86 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2609% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 22.71 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.1261% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 21.95 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.B Ratchet -1.0309%  
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0213% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 23.26 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.J OpRet -1.0054% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.35% based on a bid of 25.60 and a softMaturity 2013-7-30 at 25.00.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.0363% Asset coverage of 3.3+:1 as of January 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.40% based on a bid of 19.50 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.A (6.98% to 2010-9-30) and BNA.PR.B (8.30% to 2016-3-25).
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.2054% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 20.15 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.3066% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.59% based on a bid of 21.71 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.I OpRet +1.3137% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.13% based on a bid of 25.45 and a sofMaturity 2009-7-30 at 25.00. Compare with BAM.PR.H (5.24% to 2012-3-30) and BAM.PR.J (5.26% to 2018-3-30).
PWF.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.5015% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 23.66 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.A FixFloat 125,000 CIBC crossed 124,900 at 24.10.
TD.PR.R PerpetualDiscount 122,290 National Bank crossed 40,000 at 24.90. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 24.87 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 109,250 Desjardins crossed 50,000 at 21.00, then CIBC crossed the same number at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 20,450 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 21.95 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 19,860 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.02% based on a bid of 19.86 and a limitMaturity.

There were fourteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Issue Comments

HPF.PR.A & HPF.PR.B To Suspend Dividends

High Income Preferred Shares Corporation has announced:

that given the erosion in the value of the Managed Portfolio since inception, two recent ratings downgrades by DBRS and based on advice received from the Manager, it believes it would be prudent to revise the distribution policy. Consequently, distributions to Series 1 (TSX:HPF.pr.a) and Series 2 (TSX:HPF.pr.b) Shareholders will be suspended following the previously announced distribution that is payable on March 31st, 2008.

Maintenance of the current distribution policy without causing further erosion to the Managed Portfolio requires HI PREFS to generate an annual return in excess of 20%. As such, based on the advice of the Manager, the Board believes the decision to suspend further distributions is in the best interests of shareholders in the current market environment.

The Board will continue to review the distribution policy on a regular basis. Unpaid distributions to Series 1 and Series 2 Shareholders are cumulative and will be paid on the scheduled termination of HI PREFS on June 29, 2012. On termination, unpaid distributions to Series 1 and Series 2 Shareholders will be paid out of available net assets after the principal repayment to Series 1 Shareholders, but in priority to the principal repayment to Series 2 Shareholders.

Since inception, Series 1 Shareholders have received $8.33 per Series 1 Share in distributions and Series 2 Shareholders have received $6.07 per Series 2 Share in distributions in accordance with their terms.

HI PREFS Preferred Repayment Forward Agreement remains in place with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. This will provide Series 1 Shareholders with a payment of $25.00 per share on June 29, 2012. HI PREFS Series 2 Shareholders will be entitled to the proceeds of the Managed Portfolio up to $14.70, after making provisions for the Company’s liabilities, if any, and after payment of any cumulative unpaid distributions to both Series 1 and Series 2 Shareholders on a pro rata basis. As of Friday, March 14, 2008, the Managed Portfolio had a Net Asset Value of $17.30 per Unit and the Series 2 Shares had a Net Asset Value of $13.14 per share. The Equity Shares, which are entirely held by the Manager and rank below the Series 2 Shares in priority for capital repayment, will receive no proceeds of the Managed Portfolio on termination unless Series 1 Shares are repaid their original investment amount of $25.00 per Series 1 Share, Series 1 and Series 2 Shareholders receive all cumulative unpaid distributions and the Series 2 Shareholders have been repaid their original investment amount of $14.70 per Series 2 Share.

The DBRS January 16 downgrade of these issues was reported by PrefBlog at the time.