Issue Comments

RPQ.PR.A Downgraded by S&P

Connor Clark & Lunn ROC Pref Corp has announced:

that Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) lowered its rating on the preferred shares of the Company today by one notch from P-1 (low) to P-2 (high) and removed the preferred shares from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they were placed on March 14, 2008. The move comes as the result of recent downgrades in the Reference Portfolio as well as the removal of Residential Capital Corp. and its replacement with Tribune Corp., which had a lower rating at the time of the replacement. There have been no defaults in the Reference Portfolio since its launch in February 2006.

The rating on the preferred shares reflects the rating on the C$95,040,000 fixed-rate managed credit linked note (the “CLN”) issued by the Bank of Nova Scotia which was also lowered by S&P from A- to BBB+. The return on the CLN, and thus on the preferred shares, is linked to the credit performance of a portfolio of 127 companies (the “Reference Portfolio”). The Reference Portfolio is actively managed by Connor, Clark & Lunn Investment Management Ltd. The CLN benefits from subordination of 2.82% of the Reference Portfolio as well as a trading reserve account which would currently buy an additional 0.07% of subordination. As a result, if there are less than seven defaults in the next three and a quarter years, investors will continue to receive scheduled quarterly distributions as well as the full $25 par value at maturity.

CC&L ROC Pref Corp. matures in June 2011. The S&P rating speaks to the product’s ability to pay all of its dividends and to return the full $25 par value at maturity. CC&L remains confident that CC&L ROC Pref Corp. will meet its investment objectives.

This follows an earlier announcement of the review. RPQ.PR.A is not tracked by HIMIPref™.

Market Action

May 5, 2008

Sorry, folks! Words of wisdom are in short supply today, so I’m just going to supply the links.

What are Corporate Bonds Worth in a RecessionAccrued Interest, excellent!

Yahoo! offer abandoned – Bloomberg

Credit Crunch Hitting Main Street – Bloomberg

Target monetizing its credit card receivables – Bloomberg

Bank of America affirms committment to Countrywide – Bloomberg

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.08% 5.10% 41,678 15.30 1 -0.0797% 1,094.2
Fixed-Floater 4.74% 4.84% 62,382 15.73 7 -0.0888% 1,053.4
Floater 4.43% 4.48% 60,947 16.44 2 +0.3749% 850.7
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.31% 84,754 2.62 15 +0.1139% 1,052.6
Split-Share 5.32% 5.73% 74,631 4.17 13 -0.4936% 1,042.0
Interest Bearing 6.15% 6.19% 57,985 3.84 3 +0.2713% 1,102.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.89% 5.30% 151,237 3.81 9 +0.0089% 1,021.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.68% 5.72% 327,345 14.20 63 +0.1815% 921.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -2.4331% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.82% based on a bid of 20.05 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.1696% Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of May 1, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.05% based on a bid of 10.14 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
HSB.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +1.0733% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 22.60 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.P PerpetualDiscount +1.2526% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 24.25 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.3645% Ex-Dividend today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 25.08 and a call 2012-3-31 at 25.00.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.3907% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 23.33 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5423% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 20.41 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +2.4697% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.76% based on a bid of 21.16 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
FAL.PR.H PerpetualPremium 187,300 Desjardins crossed 100,000 at 25.25, then another 86,500 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.13% based on a bid of 25.20 and a call 2008-6-4 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 106,080 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.44% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
ENB.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 69,850 Nesbitt crossed 63,600 at 24.75. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 24.76 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 65,065 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.90% based on a bid of 24.87 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.I OpRet 52,300 “Anonymous” bought two 20,000 share lots from Nesbitt at 25.05 … not necessarily the same “anonymous” for each lot! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.43% based on a bid of 25.00 and a call 2008-6-4 at 25.00.

There were fifteen other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Interesting External Papers

Bank of England Financial Stability Report: April 2008

The Bank of England has released its April, 2008, Financial Stability Report and it’s excellent. There’s way too much good stuff in it to make a series of extracts of managable size, but I will point out that they have highlighted the folly of relying on market prices to estimate ultimate credit losses:

But credit losses from the turmoil are unlikely to ever rise to levels implied by current market prices unless there is a significant deterioration in fundamentals, well beyond the slowdown currently anticipated. That is because prices are likely to reflect substantial discounts for illiquidity and uncertainty that have emerged as markets have adjusted but which should ease over time. While market-based estimates and the write-downs announced by firms may be unduly pessimistic, if such concerns persist there is a risk they could become self-fulfilling.

This suggests that spreads on senior tranches of structured credit products have been dominated by illiquidity and uncertainty premia and a large relative fall in demand for AAA tranches rather than credit risk over the recent period. This is consistent with the analysis in Box 1, which suggests that the largest gap between mark-to-market and cash-flow based estimates of losses on sub-prime securities is in the AAA tranches.

If this were the case, long-term and unleveraged investors could potentially profit by holding these AAA tranches to maturity. But Chart 1.22 shows that, until very recently when AAA tranches have risen in price, an investor following this strategy would have suffered a string of negative month-on-month returns over the past year. And as discussed in Section 3, many long-term investors often face implicit short-term performance targets and increasingly have to mark their portfolios to market, even when they have no intention of selling securities.

The BoE contention that market prices – especially marks implied by such things as the ABX indices – are stupid is something that I’ve been saying for quite some time (in my review of the estimates by Greenlaw, et al. and in the seemingly very closely related IMF report). These reservations were echoed by BoC Governor Carney in remarks reported May 1.

Update, 2008-5-12: Willem Buiter doesn’t believe the Bank’s analysis:

But why oh why did the FSR use American subprime mortgages to make the point that marked-to-market estimates of credit losses may well exaggerate the likely eventual magnitude of these losses? I will quote the Bank’s reasoning at length, so as to be sure I don’t misrepresent it:

“Future credit losses can be estimated by extrapolating forward delinquency rates. In particular, it is assumed that serious delinquency rates of US sub-prime mortgages of different issuance ‘vintages’ continue to rise at their average rates to date until the mortgages are four years old, at which point the rate is assumed to plateau. This is a stylised representation of the way that serious delinquency rates of older sub-prime mortgages have evolved. This method results in peak delinquency rates of 34% for mortgages issued before 2006 H1, rising to 42% for mortgages issued in 2007 H2. Upon becoming seriously delinquent, mortgages are assumed to default with at least 75% probability after one year, and to have a loss given default (LGD) rate of 50%. Chart A (not shown, WHB) shows the resulting projection, in which credit losses eventually reach around US$170 billion. AAA-rated securities do not incur losses in this projection. But there is sufficient uncertainty that even these top-rated securities could conceivably bear some losses.”

This Bank estimate is then contrasted with marked-to-market estimate (or rather marked-to-model estimates using some market inputs from ABX markets to obtain estimates of credit risk on home equity loan asset-backed securities) of US$380bn. Other estimates from the wilder reaches of Wall Street (think of a number and double it) get up to US$500bn or close to US$1 trillion.

The Bank’s analysis, quoted above, is nevertheless likely to turn out to be complete bollocks because it uses assumed delinquency rates that are based on a “stylised representation of the way that serious delinquency rates of older sub-prime mortgages have evolved.” The burst of subprime lending and borrowing between 2003 and early 2007 was, however, unlikely anything ever seen before. A whole new population of subprime borrowers entered the market for the first time. Mortgage borrowers with these characteristics were not in the older subprime population.

So as far as I am concerned, we have no reliable information on which to base an estimate of the value of the subprime mortgages issued since 2003.

Well … I fully agree with that last line taken from Dr. Buiter’s analysis! But investors (and policy makers) have to come up with something.

All in all, I am much more favourably disposed to the Bank’s “bottom-up” methodology of taking observed delinquency rates and extrapolating them than to the IMF’s “top-down” approach of marking-to-ABX-market. One just has to remember it’s a forecast … no better and no worse than any other forecast of financial markets or the weather.

Update #2, 2008-5-12: Research Recap has extracted one of the charts of interest:

The Economist has acknowledged the report but warns:

The report also suggests that market valuations of losses on America’s subprime mortgages—to which British and European as well as American banks are exposed—may prove exaggerated. Eventual losses could turn out to be around $170 billion (£86 billion) rather than the market-based figure of $380 billion.

Another reason for greater confidence is that British banks are making more realistic assessments of their bad debts and raising capital. RBS led the way on April 22nd with a writedown of almost £6 billion and tapped shareholders for £12 billion. A week later HBOS announced a rights issue of £4 billion.

Yet even if the report is right in suggesting that the self-inflicted financial wounds may gradually be starting to heal, the worry now is the damage that has already been done to the economy. The bigger that turns out to be, the greater the potential for a second round of financial pain through defaults arising from a slowdown or recession.

More extracts with light commentary are provided by FTAlphaville.

Issue Comments

Best and Worst Performers: April 2008

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “April 30”)
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -4.78% The Westcoast issues are quite volatile. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 22.50 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(high) -4.52% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 21.77 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.Y PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -3.41% Weak Pair” with TCA.PR.X, below. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.78% based on a bid of 48.20 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -3.39% Weak Pair” with BAM.PR.M. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.72% based on a bid of 17.93 and a limitMaturity.
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -3.27% Weak Pair” with TCA.PR.Y, above. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.77% based on a bid of 48.27 and a limitMaturity.
BCE.PR.Z FixFloat Pfd-2(low)
[Under Review – Negative]
+3.93%  
BMO.PR.K PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1 +4.44% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 22.91 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.B SplitShare Pfd-2(low) +5.85% Asset coverage of just under 3.2:1 as of April 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.04% based on a bid of 20.80 and a hardMaturity 2016-3-25 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.C (below) and BNA.PR.A (6.35% TO 2010-9-30).
BNA.PR.C SplitShare Pfd-2(low) +7.36% Asset coverage of just under 3.2:1 as of April 30 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.75% based on a bid of 20.71 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00. Compare with BNA.PR.B (above) and BNA.PR.A (6.35% to 2010-9-30).
FTU.PR.A Split Share (now moved to Scraps) Pfd-3 +8.03% Asset coverage of just under 1.6:1 as of April 30, according to the company. Downgraded to Pfd-3 by DBRS and removed from the HIMIPref™ indices. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.49% based on a bid of 9.16% and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
MAPF

MAPF Performance: April, 2008

The fund had a good month in April, with substantial outperformance against its benchmark.

Returns to April, 2008
Period MAPF Index
One Month +0.73% +0.07%
Three Months -0.38% -1.09%
One Year +0.40% -5.61%
Two Years (annualized) +3.49% -0.83%
Three Years (annualized) +4.45% +0.57%
Four Years (annualized) +5.75% +1.84%
Five Years (annualized) +9.40% +2.72%
Six Years (annualized) +8.10% +3.26%
Seven Years (annualized) +9.22% +2.92%
The Index is the BMO-CM “50”

Returns assume reinvestment of dividends, and are shown after expenses but before fees. Past performance is not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund or any other fund. For more information, see the fund’s main page.

The yields available on high quality preferred shares remain elevated, which is reflected in the current estimate of sustainable income. The figures for YTW and Leverage Divisor were disclosed in the discussion of the April month-end portfolio composition.

Calculation of MAPF Sustainable Income Per Unit
Month NAVPU Portfolio
Average
YTW
Leverage
Divisor
Securities
Average
YTW
Sustainable
Income
June, 2007 9.3114 5.16% 1.03 5.01% 0.4665
September 9.1489 5.35% 0.98 5.46% 0.4995
December, 2007 9.0070 5.53% 0.942 5.87% 0.5288
March, 2008 8.8512 6.17% 1.047 5.89% 0.5216
April, 2008 8.9156 6.09% 1.034 5.89% 0.5251
NAVPU is shown after quarterly distributions.
“Portfolio YTW” includes cash (or margin borrowing), with an assumed interest rate of 0.00%
“Securities YTW” divides “Portfolio YTW” by the “Leverage Divisor” to show the average YTW on the securities held

It is noteworthy – well, I consider it noteworthy – that the “Securities YTW” remained constant during the month despite the increase in portfolio credit quality during the period. The intent (insofar as a purely quantitative system can be said to have an intent) is to sell that quality back to the market as soon as it is not quite so cheap.

The slight increase in “Sustainable Income” is largely due to the accumulation of one month’s worth of dividends, which have been received by the fund but not yet paid to unitholders.

I will post more discussion later.

Market Action

May 2, 2008

Finally, there is a good crop of links today!

James Hamilton of Econbrowser remarks on a WSJ article about prime no-doc loans, which arose through a Countrywide “Fast and Easy” programme which generated no-doc / low-doc loans which were then sold to Fannie Mae, which has classified them as “Prime”. He has been taken to task in the comments (there are claims that this is not only not news, but isn’t even interesting, since the borrowers were approved due to high credit scores and low loan-to-value). Regardless of whether the story is simply an example of media hysteria, I am as concerned as he is about the big issue:

From page 102 of Fannie’s 2007 Annual Report, as of the end of 2007, the enterprise had leveraged $44 B in stockholders’ equity with $796 B in short- and long-term debt to acquire $761 B in mortgages either held outright or intended for resale or trading. I read that as an equity cushion against a 5.8% loss on the mortgages held directly (44/761 = 0.058). But in addition (page 1), Fannie has guaranteed $2.1 trillion in separate mortgage-backed securities it has sold to outside investors, for a ratio of core capital to total book of business of 1.6%.

From the beginning, my conception of a really big financial meltdown would be one that pulls one of the GSEs into insolvency. Please tell me why it can’t happen.

The GSEs have to start being regulated like banks; there’s no question in my mind about that.

Congress pressured the Fed to rescue the moribund Student Loans securitization market:

A month after the Federal Reserve rescued Bear Stearns Cos. from bankruptcy, Chairman Ben S. Bernanke got an S.O.S. from Congress.

There is “a potential crisis in the student-loan market” requiring “similar bold action,” Chairman Christopher Dodd of Connecticut and six other Democrats wrote Bernanke. They want the Fed to swap Treasury notes for bonds backed by student loans. In a separate letter, Pennsylvania Democratic Representative Paul Kanjorski and 31 House members said they want Bernanke to channel money directly to education-finance firms.

… and, somewhat surprisingly, the Fed responded:

The Federal Reserve announced today an increase in the amounts auctioned to eligible depository institutions under its biweekly Term Auction Facility (TAF) from $50 billion to $75 billion, beginning with the auction on May 5. This increase will bring the amounts outstanding under the TAF to $150 billion.

In addition, the Federal Open Market Committee authorized an expansion of the collateral that can be pledged in the Federal Reserve’s Schedule 2 Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) auctions.

The wider pool of collateral should promote improved financing conditions in a broader range of financial markets.

Bloomberg points out that securitized Student Loans are now eligible:

Fed officials also expanded the collateral they accept under the Term Securities Lending Facility to include AAA rated asset-backed investments. About 95 percent of outstanding student-loan securities are AAA, according to the American Securitization Forum.

In other political news, there are rumblings of tweaking capital requirements for brokerages, which is being puffed up as a major change.

Meanwhile, in deeply upsetting news, I have been advised that the Hershey’s January price increase has percolated through the system to the point where “Mr. Big” chocolate bars are having their price yanked from $1.25 to $1.35. This implies that my total cost of living has increased by 4%; PrefBlog’s future quality may be adversely affected due to malnutrition.

The Globe reports that a decision on ABCP will be delayed:

The judge overseeing the $32-billion restructuring of the seized-up market for asset-backed commercial paper wants to put off a ruling on the plan’s fairness until mid-May, saying he needs more time to review the complex case.

Ontario Superior Court Justice Colin Campbell, who was originally scheduled to rule on the fairness on Friday, said he would like to hold the so-called “sanction” hearing on May 12 and May 13, but could do it sooner in a pinch.

To give more time, the judge asked that a key standstill agreement with banks that prevents a meltdown in the market be extended. The current standstill expires May 9.

“I can’t think possibly how I can get a decision out by May 9,” the judge said.

The deal, however, includes a controversial clause that would give all the players in the market immunity from lawsuits, something that has angered many holders and led to challenges in court that the judge wants more time to consider.

The lawsuits, if allowed, could run into many hundreds of millions, according to court documents filed Thursday. Aeroports de Montreal, Air Transat A.T. Inc., Cinar Corp., Labopharm Inc. and dozens of other companies laid out the claims they believe they have, which total at least $700-million.

As indicated by Assiduous Reader madequota in the comments to May 1, today was a pretty good day for prefs … but volume was lacklustre. Banks still need to raise cash and we haven’t seen an insurer come to market for quite some time … so there is considerable room for carping regarding the market’s ability to absorb new issues and bad news. Long corporates now yield a hair less than 6.00% so the dividend of 5.72% on PerpetualDiscounts (= 8.01% Interest Equivalent) represents a spread of 200bp … within the range of the last six months.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.11% 5.13% 41,301 15.30 1 +0.0000% 1,095.0
Fixed-Floater 4.73% 4.86% 63,350 15.72 7 -0.1899% 1,054.4
Floater 4.45% 4.49% 61,404 16.42 2 +0.5689% 847.6
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.57% 84,967 3.26 15 +0.0080% 1,051.4
Split-Share 5.29% 5.61% 74,820 4.18 13 +0.1931% 1,047.2
Interest Bearing 6.17% 6.25% 59,161 3.84 3 -0.1012% 1,099.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.87% 5.24% 151,657 4.96 9 +0.1060% 1,021.5
Perpetual-Discount 5.69% 5.72% 331,476 14.31 63 +0.3936% 919.5
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BCE.PR.R FixFloat -1.8182%  
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -1.2556% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.75% based on a bid of 22.02 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -1.0478% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 23.61 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.0020% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.53% based on a bid of 20.16 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.0060% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 20.08 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.0226% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.94% based on a bid of 23.71 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.1080% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 21.90 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1569% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.61% based on a bid of 20.11 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.B Floater +1.1860%  
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount +1.3234% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 49.00 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount +1.3292% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.33% based on a bid of 22.87 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +1.5842% Asset coverage of 2.2+:1 as of May 1, according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.79% based on a bid of 10.26 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
W.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.6343% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 23.01 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.C PerpetualDiscount +2.0603% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 20.31 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +2.6474% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 20.55 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 29,100 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.62% based on a bid of 18.21 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 27,455 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 20.08 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.H PerpetualDiscount 27,003 Recent new issue. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 24.78 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 26,455 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.89% based on a bid of 24.90 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 24,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.60% based on a bid of 20.26 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

MAPF

MAPF Portfolio Composition : April, 2008

Trading slowed down somewhat in April to about 35% of portfolio value. “Slow” is a relative term! Trades were, as ever, triggered by a desire to exploit transient mispricing in the preferred share market (which may the thought of as “selling liquidity”), rather than any particular view being taken on market direction, sectoral performance or credit anticipation.

MAPF Sectoral Analysis 2008-4-30
HIMI Indices Sector Weighting YTW ModDur
Ratchet 0% N/A N/A
FixFloat 0% N/A N/A
Floater 0% N/A N/A
OpRet 0% N/A N/A
SplitShare 0.9% (-2.2) 4.79% 4.97
Interest Rearing 0% N/A N/A
PerpetualPremium 0.3% (-0.1) 5.35% 2.51
PerpetualDiscount 102.1% (+0.9) 5.89% 14.11
Scraps 0% N/A N/A
Cash -3.4% (+1.3) 0.00% 0.00
Total 100% 6.09% 14.48
Totals and changes will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end.

The “total” reflects the un-leveraged total portfolio (i.e., cash is included in the portfolio calculations and is deemed to have a duration and yield of 0.00.). MAPF will often have relatively large cash balances, both credit and debit, to facilitate trading. Figures presented in the table have been rounded to the indicated precision.

Credit distribution is:

MAPF Credit Analysis 2008-4-30
DBRS Rating Weighting
Pfd-1 76.8% (+23.6)
Pfd-1(low) 11.3% (-9.2)
Pfd-2(high) 4.3% (-7.4)
Pfd-2 0.4% (-2.0)
Pfd-2(low) 10.5% (-6.5)
Cash -3.4% (+1.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end.

The fund does not set any targets for overall credit quality; trades are executed one by one. Variances in overall credit will be constant as opportunistic trades are executed.

Liquidity Distribution is:

MAPF Liquidity Analysis 2008-4-30
Average Daily Trading Weighting
<$50,000 0.8% (-11.6)
$50,000 – $100,000 9.3% (+5.9)
$100,000 – $200,000 18.9% (+18.9)
$200,000 – $300,000 27.3% (+1.2)
>$300,000 47.0% (-15.9)
Cash -3.4% (+1.3)
Totals will not add precisely due to rounding. Bracketted figures represent change from March month-end.

MAPF is, of course, Malachite Aggressive Preferred Fund, a “unit trust” managed by Hymas Investment Management Inc. Further information and links to performance, audited financials and subscription information are available the fund’s web page. A “unit trust” is like a regular mutual fund, but is sold by offering memorandum rather than prospectus. This is cheaper, but means subscription is restricted to “accredited investors” (as defined by the Ontario Securities Commission) and those who subscribe for $150,000+. Fund past performances are not a guarantee of future performance. You can lose money investing in MAPF or any other fund.

And, here’s an example of a trade sequence that worked marvellously. As always, note that the data in the table has been aggregated and approximated; the prices shown are a fair approximation of the detailed figures, but do not necessarily represent actual execution prices. Trade detail is made public periodically via the fund web page, but details for 2008 trades have not yet been released.

Simplified Trading Sequence
Issue RY.PR.D CIU.PR.A HSB.PR.D
January Sold
$21.65
Bought
$21.15
About half of
total held
 
April
Trade
  Sold
$21.57
Bought
$21.86
April
Month-end
Bid
$19.89 $21.01 $21.99
Relevant
Dividend
Information
Jan. & Apr, 2×0.28125 Feb $0.2875 None
Change
From
January to
April M/E
-5.53% +3.35%  
Change
From
April Trade
to
Month End
  -2.60% +0.59%

April performance will be published on the weekend.

Market Action

May 1, 2008

Today’s Workers’ Day, so I’m not doing much. Geez, if I get any lazier, I’m gonna have to become an investor advocate!

But I can’t resist commenting on US Pension Bonds:

Pension bonds are making a comeback, as states and cities from Alaska to Philadelphia bet they can use the proceeds to help fill deficits in their retirement funds and still generate a higher return than what they pay in interest.

Officials may sell a record $35 billion of the securities this year after offerings declined since 2003, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Connecticut issued $2.2 billion of pension debt last month, paying an average rate of 5.88 percent on money state officials project will earn 8.5 percent when invested.

Hmmm … leveraging up a pension account to hell-‘n’-gone … I have to agree with Jon Corzine:

“It’s the dumbest idea I ever heard,” said New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine, the Democrat and former chairman of investment bank Goldman, Sachs & Co.

Naked Capitalism republishes a Financial Times commentary on the CDS basis:

“In cash bonds, companies [that wish to borrow money] provide an offset to investors [who wish to lend]. This allows an equilibrium between supply and demand to form. In CDS, the lack of supply side creates a major imbalance, which increases volatility.”

The problem is that complex investments known as synthetic collateralised debt obligations previously acted as big buyers of credit risk. But these products have withered and left the CDS market dominated by people who want to sell credit risk (go short, or buy protection) when things look bad, or switch to buying back credit risk to cover their shorts when the outlook improves.

“Until the synthetic CDO market re-emerges, the CDS market might be doomed to heightened volatility, moving above cash levels in bear runs (everyone buying protection) and below in bull runs (everyone covering shorts), while volatility of cash spreads will be tamed by supply/demand forces.”

We need more people trading the basis, that’s what we need! Unfortunately, shorting cash bonds is fraught with peril and expense on the borrowing front, so straightforward arbitrage will not happen … what needs to happen is more real-money bond investors willing to write covered CDS as a synthetic bond. As has been noted, though, there are counterparty and convergence problems with such a process so, if it ever happens, it will be the province of big, big shops who can afford to set up a specialty unit.

Avinash Persaud writes in VoxEU on a topic close to my heart: The Inappropriateness of Financial Regulation. He argues that the root of the problem is:

A good bank is one that lends to a borrower that other banks would not lend to because of their superior knowledge of the borrower or one that would not lend to a borrower to which everyone lends because of their superior knowledge of the borrower. Modern regulators believe this is too quaint, and, to be fair, many banks were not any good at it. But instead of removing banking licenses from these banks, regulators decided to do away with relationship banking altogether and promoted a switch away from bank finance to market finance where loans are securitised, given public ratings, sold to many investors including other banks, and assessed using approved risk tools that are sensitive to publicly available prices. Now, bankers lend to borrowers that everyone else is lending to, the outcome of a process where the public price of risk is compared with its historic average and a control is applied based on public ratings.

… but cautions that …

Almost every economic model will tell you that if all the players have the same tastes (reduce capital adequacy requirements) and have the same information (public ratings, approved risk-models using market prices) that the system will sooner or later send the herd off the cliff edge (Persaud 2000). And no degree of greater sophistication in the modelling of the price of risk will get around this fact.

Instead he suggests that:

  • Capital charges (when computing regulatory ratios of financial strength) should be contra-cyclical (rising when credit risk is cheap and vice versa)
  • regulation should be based on asset-liability mismatches, not bank/non-bank.
  • “requiring banks to pay an insurance premium to tax payers against the risk that the tax payer will be required to bail them out.”

The first item sounds great, but might be a little difficult to apply in practice. Who decides whether risk is cheap or expensive? The weakness of the current system is also its strength: it provides a rules-based framework.

I disagree with the second item. Shadow banks are wonderful and the sector should be encouraged, to ensure the banks don’t get too fat on the fruits of regulation: insurance, central bank access and cheap financing.

The third item sounds like an attempt to intervene in the current UK debate on deposit insurance. The principle is great … let deposit insurance premia vary according to financial strength, as measured by standard capital ratios. I believe – although I’m not sure, and frankly, today I’m too damn lazy to check – that CDIC premia in Canada do vary, at least to some extent.

“Gummy” has announced a new spreadsheet that allows intraday updating of home-made indices. But watch out for dividend ex-dates!

There’s some fairly unclear reporting about BoC Governor Carney’s Senate appearance today. Bloomberg says:

The central bank would be hard-pressed to rescue financial institutions as the U.S. Federal Reserve did with Bear Stearns Cos. earlier this year, Carney hinted.

“People bear the cost of their decisions,” he said. “In the case of financial institutions which would have taken excessive risk, the people who bear the consequences of that are the shareholders and the senior management. There should never have been any doubt about that.”

The Bloomberg story also says, by the way:

Carney said potential losses from the global credit crisis are hard to gauge, because financial institutions have used derivatives to estimate the value of some assets that are difficult to trade. The derivatives have “implied default probabilities” that are “substantially higher” than history would indicate and thus may be overstated, he said.

… which is just what I’ve said about the IMF report. The Bloomberg story was picked up essentially unchanged by the Financial Post. As far as I can tell, the Globe doesn’t mention the Bear Stearns speculation, even in the story about acceptable collateral. The Canadian Press story says:

Mark Carney says the central bank won’t be bailing out Canadian financial institutions like the U.S. government did when the Bear Stearns brokerage, one of the giants of Wall Street, ran afoul of the subprime mortgage mess.

“If you cannot make a judgment (on the value of an asset), you should not own the security,” Carney told a Senate committee Thursday.

“There is very high value if a situation came about to ensuring the shareholders and senior managers bear the full consequences of their actions,” Carney said.

“The Bank of Canada has a role to become lender of last resort, but we would do that on the advice of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions that the institution is solvent, not because the institution needed money.”

Carney said the central bank would come to the rescue of a chartered bank in the case of a temporary liquidity problem, if the institution had sufficient capital to be considered viable.

But he added if investors and managers thought there would always be a safety net, they would be encouraged to take inordinate risks in order to maximize profits.

What got me interested in this was the implied criticism of the Fed in the first quoted sentence, Mark Carney says the central bank won’t be bailing out Canadian financial institutions like the U.S. government did when the Bear Stearns brokerage, one of the giants of Wall Street, ran afoul of the subprime mortgage mess.

So … did he actually mention BSC or is this merely reporter’s interpretation? Further, he’s saying that they’ll be the lender of last resort to solvent institutions … but BSC was solvent at the time according to all the information I have (which is confirmed by the SEC, which serves the same role that OSFI would serve in such a case) … so there’s no real contradiction there, in the remarks which are directly quoted. The rest is all standard Central Banker Talk and doesn’t need further interpretation.

A good, solid, positive day for the preferred share market. Volume was a little unusual – there were six issues trading in excess of 100,000 shares, but volume breadth was down.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 5.14% 5.16% 40,609 15.20 1 +0.0399% 1,095.0
Fixed-Floater 4.72% 4.86% 64,296 15.71 7 -0.2001% 1,056.4
Floater 4.47% 4.52% 59,875 16.37 2 +0.0808% 842.8
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.49% 86,233 3.11 15 +0.0780% 1,051.4
Split-Share 5.30% 5.66% 75,056 4.18 13 +0.3150% 1,045.2
Interest Bearing 6.16% 6.22% 60,276 3.85 3 +0.0684% 1,100.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.88% 5.26% 154,986 3.81 9 -0.0518% 1,020.4
Perpetual-Discount 5.71% 5.75% 337,445 14.28 63 +0.2140% 915.9
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount -3.5181% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.81% based on a bid of 20.02 and a limitMaturity.
FBS.PR.A SplitShare +1.0246% Asset coverage of just under 1.7:1 as of April 24 according to TD Securities. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 9.86 and a hardMaturity 2011-12-15 at 10.00.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.0565% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.73% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount +1.0879% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.1017% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 23.86 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.1029% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.49% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.2948% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 23.47 and a limitMaturity.
HSB.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.4097% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.67% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.6162% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 20.12 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.9324% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 21.10 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
SLF.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 256,084 CIBC crossed 100,000 at 22.05, then sold 50,000 to Nesbitt at 22.10. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.52% based on a bid of 22.00 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 231,610 Scotia crossed 180,000 at 22.60, then another 49,900 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.00% based on a bid of 22.65 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 156,910 Nesbitt bought 48,200 in two tranches from CIBC at 22.55. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 22.57 and a limitMaturity.
WN.PR.B Scraps (would be OpRet but there are credit concerns) 147,350 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.10, then RBC crossed 40,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 25.06 and a softMaturity 2009-6-30 at 25.00.
SLF.PR.A PerpetualDiscount 106,600 CIBC crossed 51,800 at 22.05, then bought 50,000 from Nesbitt at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 21.91 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 106,150 Desjardins crossed 100,000 for cash at 21.60. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.43% based on a bid of 21.66 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.W PerpetualDiscount 104,860 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 22.18. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.50% based on a bid of 22.30 and a limitMaturity.

There were ten other index-included $25-pv-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing: April, 2008

HIMI Index Changes, April 30, 2008
Issue From To Because
BAM.PR.G FixFloat Scraps Volume
BNS.PR.O PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
PWF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
BCE.PR.Y Ratchet Scraps Volume
TD.PR.Q PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
FTU.PR.A SplitShares Scraps Credit
PIC.PR.A SplitShare Scraps Credit
HPF.PR.A Scraps SplitShare Volume

There were the following intra-month changes:

HIMI Index Changes during April 2008
Issue Action Index Because
BMO.PR.L Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
NA.PR.M Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
RY.PR.H Add PerpetualDiscount New Issue
Better Communication, Please!

W.PR.J's Big Price Move

An Assiduous Reader has sent me the following question:

I noticed that this preferred has dropped in price relative to its peers. Would you know whether there is any material change that has happened with it (has it stopped paying its dividend)?

The question was presumably prompted by the 5%+ decline in W.PR.J yesterday.

Information on these issues is harder to come by than it really needs to be, something I have complained about in the past.

DBRS rates the issues as Pfd-2(low). Both issues are cumulative.

As non-financial perpetuals without a particularly large float, these issues can be somewhat volatile – they both made the January 08 Best Performers’ List, while W.PR.H made December 07’s Worst. W.PR.H was transfered to the PerpetualDiscount index in the October 07 Rebalancing.

There’s something odd about the notes for these issues in Duke Energy’s 10-K:

In connection with the Westcoast acquisition in 2002, Spectra Energy assumed preferred and preference shares at Westcoast and Union Gas. These preferred and preference shares at Westcoast and Union Gas totaled $225 million at both December 31, 2007 and 2006. Since these preferred and preference shares are redeemable at the option of holder, as well as Westcoast and Union Gas, these preferred and preference shares do not meet the definition of a mandatorily redeemable instrument under SFAS No. 150 “Accounting for Certain Financial Instruments with Characteristics of both Liabilities and Equity”. As such, these preferred and preference shares are considered contingently redeemable shares and are included in Minority Interests on the Consolidated Balance Sheets.

According to me, W.PR.H and W.PR.J are issues of 6-million shares each, total $300-million, and are perpetual – this is confirmed by the Westcoast Energy Annual Report available on SEDAR. I have sent the following message to Spectra’s Investor Relations Department:

I write regarding the preferred shares trading as W.PR.H and W.PR.J on the Toronto Stock Exchange. It is my understanding that Spectra pays the dividends on these shares via Westcoast.

(i) You do not appear to be publishing dividend information for these shares on your website – publication of record and payment dates would be very useful. Do you intend to publish this information in the future?

(ii) In your financials, I can find reference only to some preferred shares held to be “redeemable at the option of holder” to the amount of $225-million, whereas these two issues are perpetual and have a total book value of CAD 300-million. How are these obligations reported in your financials?

I have uploaded a couple of charts:

Yesterday’s price action appears to be within normal bounds. I had considered W.PR.J to be quite expensive … I now consider it to be a little bit cheap.