Issue Comments

TD.PR.P Avoids Opening Day Debacle

Against all odds, the new TD issues, announced October 9, managed to make it through its first trading day without embarrassment. From the press release announcing closing, it does not appear that the underwriters’ greenshoe option was exercised.

It closed at 24.60-70, 7×10, on volume of 75,785 shares.

It may be compared with the other two recent new issues:

Recent New Issues
Issue Quote, 11/1 Pre-Tax
bid-YTW
Fair Value
TD.PR.P 24.60-70  5.36%  23.93
BNS.PR.N 24.55-57  5.39%  24.01
BMO.PR.K 24.25-29  5.46%  24.04

So I don’t get it. Comparing to the most recent (and much lower coupon) issues for each issuer:

Penultimate Issues
Issue Quote, 11/1 Pre-Tax
bid-YTW
Fair Value
TD.PR.O 22.30-35   5.47% 22.73 
BNS.PR.M 20.95-18   5.41% 21.42 
BMO.PR.J 20.75-85   5.43% 21.28 

Yields are basically comparable, although the TD issue looks expensive even on this basis. So:

  • If yields go up and prices go down, old & new will return about the same.
  • If yields are unchanged, old and new will return about the same.
  • If yields go down, the new issues will get called away just as things start to get fun, while the old issues will rack up big gains.

Doesn’t anybody do scenario analysis any more?

The issue has been added to the HIMIPref™ database with the securityCode A49008, replacing the preIssue code of P75006. A reorgDataEntry reflects the change.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : November, 2002

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2002-11-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,326.6 3 2.00 4.59% 16.3 140M 5.13%
FixedFloater 1,939.6 10 2.00 4.51% 15.7 102M 5.69%
Floater 1,483.4 5 1.80 4.18% 16.6 31M 4.29%
OpRet 1,582.7 29 1.24 4.03% 2.1 121M 5.58%
SplitShare 1,544.1 9 1.67 4.81% 4.0 58M 5.70%
Interest-Bearing 1,872.7 11 2.00 6.97% 1.9 129M 7.85%
Perpetual-Premium 1,198.5 9 1.33 5.44% 6.4 154M 5.84%
Perpetual-Discount 1,357.2 14 1.64 5.77% 14.1 157M 5.80%

Index Constitution, 2002-11-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2002-11-29, Post-rebalancing

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Rebalancing : October 31, 2007

The continued carnage in the Perpetual sector caused a lot of changes this month.

Of interest was the movement of the Falconbridge issues from “Scraps” to their various indices, due to the mid-month DBRS upgrade.

HIMI Index Changes, October 31, 2007
Issue From To Because
TCA.PR.X PerpetualDiscount PerpetualPremium Price
W.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.E PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.G PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
CM.PR.P PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
PWF.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
BNS.PR.J PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
POW.PR.C PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium PerpetualDiscount Price
FAL.PR.A Scraps Ratchet Credit
FAL.PR.B Scraps FixFloat Credit
FAL.PR.H Scraps PerpetualPremium Credit
PWF.PR.D Scraps OpRet Volume

Index performance is available elsewhere.

Index Construction / Reporting

HIMIPref™ Index Performance : October 2007

Performance of the HIMI Indices for October was:

Total Return, October 2007
Index Performance
Ratchet -1.48%
FixFloat +0.75%
Floater -0.52%
OpRet -0.07%
SplitShare -0.22%
Interest +1.96%
PerpetualPremium -1.27%
PerpetualDiscount -4.77%

Not the best month to be holding perpetuals – particularly of the Discount variety! The overall pattern was much like September’s, but the decline in perpetuals was greatly accentuated.

This post will be updated in due course with returns of other indices and funds. 

Update, 2007-11-02 I have uploaded a graph of yield curves, comparing the core rates for 2007-5-9, 9-28 and 10/31. Note that these curves are spot-yields for taxable accounts. The steepening of the yield curve in October is very noticable – this hurt perpetuals even more than they would have been hurt by a parallel upwards shift.

There is no really good reason for having chosen 2007-5-9 as a comparitive date: it’s simply that this particular date has been discussed recently.

Update #2, 2007-11-2 Claymore has published their final monthly numbers and I have derived the following table:

CPD Return, 1- & 3-month, to October 31
Date NAV Distribution Return for Sub-Period Monthly Return
July 31 18.95      
August 31 19.04   +0.47% +0.47%
September 25 18.76 0.2185 -0.32% -1.23%
September 28, 2007 18.59   -0.91%
October 31 18.19   -2.15% -2.15%
Quarterly Return -2.90%

 

Update, 2007-11-04:The DPS.UN NAV for October 31 has been published, so we can calculate the October-ish returns for it:

DPS.UN NAV Return, October-ish 2007
Date NAV Distribution Return for period
September 26, 2007 $21.93 $0.30  
October 31 $21.35 $0.00 -2.64%
Adjustment for September stub-period +0.80%
Estimated October Return -1.86%
CPD had a NAV of $18.74 on September 26 and $18.59 on September 28. The beginning-of-month stub period return for CPD was therefore -0.80%, which is added back to the DPS.UN total return in order to isolate the return due to October. 

Now, to see the DPS.UN quarterly NAV approximate return, we refer to the calculations for September and August to derive:

DPS.UN NAV Returns, three-month-ish to end-October-ish, 2007
August-ish +0.22%
September-ish -0.92%
October-ish -1.86%
Three-months-ish -2.55%

Update, 2007-11-5: Performance for the BMO Capital Markets 50 is:

BMOCM-50 Returns to October, 2007
One Month -2.35%
Three Months -3.12%
One Year -0.05%
Two Years (annualized) +1.52%
Three Years (annualized) +1.28%
Four Years (annualized) +2.34%
Five Years (annualized) +3.33%
Six Years (annualized) +3.36%
Interesting External Papers

Banks Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk

It has taken me far too long to find this reference! Therefore, I am re-posting under the Interesting External Papers classification the following (very slightly edited) comments from September 14!

Cushioning fear-driven liquidity shocks is the banks’ bread and butter:

This paper argues that banks have a unique ability to hedge against market-wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, one dimension of bank “specialness” is that banks can insure firms against systematic declines in market liquidity at lower cost than other financial institutions. We provide supporting empirical evidence from the commercial paper (CP) market. When market liquidity dries up and CP spreads increase, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet increased loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from pre-existing commercial paper backup lines, without running down their holdings of liquid assets. Using bank-level data, we provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains the funding flows.

From the same paper, incidentally:

Banks’ functioning as liquidity insurance providers originated early in the development of the commercial paper market. In 1970, Penn Central Transportation Company filed for bankruptcy with more than $80 million in commercial paper outstanding. As a result of their default, investors lost confidence in other large commercial paper issuers, making it difficult for some of these firms to refinance their paper as it matured. The Federal Reserve responded to the Penn Central crisis by lending aggressively to banks through the discount window and encouraging them, in turn, to provide liquidity to their large borrowers (Kane, 1974). In response to this difficulty, commercial paper issuers thereafter began purchasing backup lines of credit from banks to insure against future funding disruptions (Saidenberg and Strahan, 1999).

Issue Comments

Best & Worst Performing Issues : October 2007

These are total returns, with dividends presumed to have been reinvested at the bid price on the ex-date. The list has been restricted to issues in the HIMIPref™ indices.

Issue Index DBRS Rating Monthly Performance Notes (“Now” means “October 31”)
ELF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(low) -11.43% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.15% based on a bid of 21.70 and a limitMaturity.
 
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -9.77% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 19.95 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount Pfd-2(high) -9.55% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.72% based on a bid of 20.36 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -9.48% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 20.15 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount Pfd-1(low) -9.09% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare Pfd-2(low) +1.43% Assect coverage of 3.8+:1 as of July 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.65% based on a bid of 25.62 and a call 2008-10-31 at 25.25
PWF.PR.G PerpetualPremium Pfd-1(low) +1.43% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.58% based on a bid of 25.30 and a call 2011-8-16 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.C FixedFloater Pfd-2(low)    

Review Negative

+1.49%  
BAM.PR.H OpRet Pfd-2(low) +2.37% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.00% based on a bid of 25.90 and a softMaturity 2012-3-30 at 25.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing Pfd-2 +4.64% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.12% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.47 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00. Performance may have gotten a lift from the pending retraction feature; the capital units are trading fairly close to their NAV, but the NAV is after a $10 allowance on the preferreds.

The variance of returns was even more bizarre this month than it was in September!

Market Action

October 31, 2007

American GDP grew at an annualized rate of 3.9% in the third quarter, but economists were not impressed. On a positive note, ADP Employment data was stronger than expected, which implies that next Friday’s jobs number shouldn’t be disastrous, at any event.

In other words: we’re confused! So what else is new?

The Fed cut to 4.50% today, as expected. When the market is unanimous, the Fed usually listens. Accrued Interest looks to the future and sees the potential for future cuts measured in terms of bank rescue rather than broader inflation/economic concerns.

The more things change … in 1993, the US had the steepest yield curve since the Civil War, as the Fed was busy bailing out the banks’ profitability (this was in the aftermath to the S&L crisis, remember). Then, in 1994, the music suddenly stopped and Orange County, among others, couldn’t find a chair. It will be most interesting to see how this cycle unfolds!

Well, thank heavens that month’s over! There have been a huge variation of the returns in the HIMIPref™ indices over the past month and the fund was unfortunate enough to have identified a broad pricing discrepency just as the panic got started. Returns this month are not a complete disaster, I hasten to add, but will have underperformed the index.

Mind you, the yield on the fund’s holdings is now well above the index and credit quality is great … so the faster that things normalize, the happier I’ll be! Results should be published on Saturday November 3, or Sunday at the latest.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.96% 4.91% 404,090 15.52 1 0.0000% 1,049.2
Fixed-Floater 4.91% 4.82% 98,002 15.84 7 -0.0519% 1,041.1
Floater 4.52% 4.54% 65,688 16.27 3 -0.1234% 1,039.4
Op. Retract 4.87% 3.82% 79,227 3.44 15 +0.0956% 1,026.6
Split-Share 5.17% 4.99% 86,527 4.10 15 +0.3344% 1,043.3
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.22% 61,028 3.59 4 -0.1501% 1,062.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.71% 5.60% 104,069 8.73 17 +0.2043% 1,006.9
Perpetual-Discount 5.58% 5.62% 321,198 14.48 47 +0.2649% 905.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.5492% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 19.70 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.H PerpetualDiscount -1.0363% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 21.01 and a limitMaturity.
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0482% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.85% based on a bid of 24.10 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.0502% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.70% based on a bid of 22.13 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium (for now!) +1.0850% Ex-Dividend today. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.22% based on a bid of 24.94 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.H PerpetualDiscount +1.1759% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.62% based on a bid of 21.51 and a limitMaturity.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +1.1964% Asset coverage of just under 2.0:1 according to the Company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.93% based on a bid of 10.15 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.4602% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.66% based on a bid of 20.15 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare +1.6900% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.47% based on a bid of 21.06 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
NA.PR.K PerpetualPremium +1.7066% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.80% based on a bid of 25.03 and a call 2012-6-14 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.X OpRet 100,629 Desjardins crossed 30,000 at 26.61, then another 70,000 at 26.65. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.76% based on a bid of 26.50 and a softMaturity 2013-9-29 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 95,846 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 19.95 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 85,590 Desjardins crossed 25,000 at 20.00, then Scotia crossed 50,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.09% based on a bid of 19.70 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 82,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.57% based on a bid of 20.36 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 70,040 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 20.85 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Reader Initiated Comments

A Bear Checks In

After having given so much attention to the neighborhood bull, it seems only fair to allow some comments from the bears!

Hi James:

Here is the result of a little calculation I did with Royal Bank bond yields and pref yields.  It looks similar (today at least) for other banks, but I don’t have lots of historical bond data.

Comparing RY Bonds and Prefs
  11-May-07 26-Oct-07
Bond Yield (Dur = 5) 4.21% 5.14%
Discount Pref Yield 4.50% 5.49%
Disc Pref Duration 22.1 18.6
Spread 0.29% 0.35%
Yield Ratio 1.069 1.068

Although we seem to be comparing bond apples (duration 5) to pref oranges (duration 18-22), the arithmetic spread, and especially the yield ratio (which I like better for many things and many reasons) is basically the same today as it was 5 months ago.  I happen to have some data from May 11 for two RY bonds, but have no older data.

Perhaps you have access to more historical bond and pref data to investigate this further, but one conclusion I would draw is that pref yields are not currently out of line with bond yields.  Furthermore, a 5.14% bond yield is consistent with (perhaps slightly below) US bond yields.  If the corporate yields hold, then discount prefs will NOT recover, so investors today should only expect the yield component, and give up hoping for capital gains — and could suffer more losses if corporate yields increase.  I wish I knew more about this apparent relationship over the past couple of years of Pref purchasing!

I also note that the bond equivalent yield ratio (at least at this wildly different duration) is 1.07 in the market, rather than 1.40 for taxable investors.  No reason they should be the same because the buyers and sellers of prefs and bonds are quite different. You are welcome to use this with attribution, if you like. ******************************************

[Later] One minor glitch on this, the 1.07 Yield ratio is the inverse of the 1.40 bond equivalent yield, so for direct comparison should be more like 0.93.  Thus there is a 50% (1.40/0.93) after-tax yield advantage to pref shares compared with Duration = 5 bonds.

Well! The first problem I see is with the data. I looked up the issue Royal Bank 4.53% May 7, 2012. This is a deposit note, the most senior bank debt issued (and thus, in terms of credit quality, as far as you can get from a preferred while remaining with the same issuer). It’s basically a liquid institutional GIC and there is $950-million outstanding. According to Bloomberg, the yield on 5/11 was 4.53%.

This is quite the discrepency! If we go to Canadian Bond Indices, we can look at a graph of short-term yields – for both corporates and Canadas. The quoted figure, 4.21%, looks more like a plausible yield for a Canada 5-year, while 4.53% looks like an entirely reasonable value for a 5-year Royal Bank DN.

I suggest it’s better to compare long indices with the PerpetualDiscount index; this reduces the duration mis-match and diversifies away the asystemic risk introduced by using a single corporate for a comparison. Using data from the Bank of Canada we see that the Scotia / PC-Bond / Dex long-term all-corporate index was yielding 5.42% on May 9; going back to Canadian Bond Indices, we can say it’s about 5.8% now; and construct the following table:

Comparing Corporate Bonds and Prefs
  27-Dec-2006 9-May-07 30-Oct-07
Bond Yield 5.18% 5.42% ~5.80%
Bond Duration ~11.7 ~11.6 ~11.3
Discount Pref Yield 4.51% 4.65% 5.64%
Disc Pref Duration 11.73 16.12 14.45
Disc Pref
Interest
Equivalent
6.31% 6.51% 7.90%
Interest-
Equivalent
Yield Ratio
(Prefs : Bonds)
1.22:1 1.20:1  1.36:1
Interest-
Equivalent
Yield Spread
(Prefs – Bonds)
113bp 109bp 210bp 

So, pending further discussion, it does not appear to me that a bearish argument based on yield spreads in the current year is very convincing!

Update: My correspondent was the commentator prefhound. The delay in attribution was due to my wanting to check how he wanted the attribution made.

Market Action

October 30, 2007

US Consumer confidence was reported to be way down today, while housing prices declined at an accellerating rate. Geez, this is sounding a lot like my September 25 post! Perhaps I should just keep a template full of gloomy news and copy-paste!

There was some very interesting news regarding the overall credit crunch today: it seems that Federal Home Loan Banks in the states are making massive loans to the marketplace, financing them by issuing their own paper:

Countrywide Financial Corp., Washington Mutual Inc., Hudson City Bancorp Inc. and hundreds of other lenders borrowed a record $163 billion from the 12 Federal Home Loan Banks in August and September as interest rates on asset-backed commercial paper rose as high as 5.6 percent. The government-sponsored companies were able to make loans at about 4.9 percent, saving the private banks about $1 billion in annual interest.

FHLBanks are kind of interesting. They are regulated not by the Fed, but by the Federal Housing Finance Board,

an independent agency within the executive branch of the federal government.

The Finance Board consists of a five-director board—one of whom is the Secretary of Housing & Urban Development (HUD) or the Secretary’s designee. The other four directors are appointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation. 

In other words, it’s all political. They trumpet their 4.41% Capital to Asset ratio, but there is no indication that I can find – even in the Annual Report for FHLB Atlanta – of how this may be expressed in standard Basel Agreement terms, like “Tier 1 Capital Ratio”. I don’t know. I don’t know very much about this aspect of the US Financial system … and I’m willing to listen carefully to those who do … but this seems to me to be another grossly under-capitalized source of moral hazard, in addition to the GSEs.

A summary article in Voxeu led me to a CEPR Policy Insight which in turn was based on a lecture given 2007-10-1. Recycling of all kinds is very fashionable nowadays! At any rate, Axel Leijonhufvud has joined the debate regarding whether the Fed (and central banks in general) should target inflation alone, or should also pay attention to (potential / perceived) asset bubbles. He argues that the absence of US inflation in the early part of this decade was due not so much to the availability of cheap Chinese labour as it was to the willingness of the Chinese (and others) to accumulate dollar reserves.

So the trouble with inflation targeting in present circumstances is that a constant inflation rate gives you absolutely no information about whether your monetary policy is right.

It is a simple observation that the experience of Japan shows that inflation targeting will not by itself protect you against financial instability. The present criticism goes a step further. Inflation targeting might mislead you into pursuing a policy that is actively damaging to financial stability.

He criticizes SIVs, but I find his arguments a little facile. He does not distinguish between liquidity risk and credit risk (he’s not alone there!) and claims that they circumvent the Basel rules. The well-informed readers of this blog will know that while they used to circumvent Basel in the States, liquidity guarantees are now charged against capital. There is, of course, continuing controversy over whether the liquidity guarantees are expensive enough; I suspect that they’re not; and I have good reason to believe that the issue is currently under intense scrutiny by regulators world-wide. But he doesn’t actually say this.

He also claims that the “SIVs were, like hedge funds, highly-leveraged” … I don’t know exactly what he means by this; he may be considering only the very bottom tranche as equity and ignoring the tranching effects of mezzanine notes; it’s not clear. He speaks very highly of NN Taleb and the Black Swan phenomenon, feeling that the concept is not adequately reflected in risk management at large financial institutions. His final conclusion is that the fact that no big exogenous shock caused the current crunch shows that the world financial system is not well understood … which is comforting indeed to those of us employed by it!

In Canada, the most economically illiterate government since Trudeau elected to cut the GST to 5% and reduce the national debt by a mere $22-billion over the next five years while reducing other taxes as well. Perhaps the boomers will all die off without having ever paid for their government services! Interest on public debt is forecast to remain in excess of $30-billion annually; it’s currently 14% of federal revenue.

I have not yet seen any indication on whether there are any implications for interest-equivalency of dividends in the tax changes. Probably not, since it hasn’t been trumpetted.

It was a good day for preferreds today – good volume and the PerpetualDiscount index was actually up 0.1759% on the day, its third up day this month. Before breaking out the champagne, note that today’s gain is less than yesterday’s loss, so the index is still down on the week.

The spread between BAM.PR.M and BAM.PR.N widened some more, on good volume.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.95% 4.89% 420,804 15.55 1 0.0000% 1,049.2
Fixed-Floater 4.91% 4.81% 98,670 15.85 7 +0.2466% 1,041.6
Floater 4.51% 3.87% 67,223 10.68 3 -0.0547% 1,040.7
Op. Retract 4.88% 3.74% 78,975 3.55 15 +0.0060% 1,025.6
Split-Share 5.19% 5.06% 85,959 3.86 15 +0.1884% 1,039.8
Interest Bearing 6.22% 4.96% 61,424 2.17 4 +0.5346% 1,063.6
Perpetual-Premium 5.72% 5.61% 103,634 9.30 17 +0.3911% 1,004.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.59% 5.64% 321,035 14.45 47 +0.1759% 902.58
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
W.PR.J PerpetualDiscount -2.2941% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 23.85 and a limitMaturity.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare -1.2795% Asset coverage of just under 2.0:1 as of October 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.20% based on a bid of 10.03 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount +1.0960% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.22% based on a bid of 19.37 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 19.37-48, 1×5 on volume of 37,230, while its pair, BAM.PR.N, was down on the day, closing at 18.18-29, 1×1, on volume of 50,670. Such silliness.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat +1.1712%  
CM.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +1.2048% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.63% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.2048% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 21.00 and a limitMaturity.
DFN.PR.A SplitShare +1.2859% Asset coverage of just over 2.7:1 according to Quadravest. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.87% based on a bid of 10.24 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
CM.PR.D PerpetualPremium +1.4056% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 25.25 and a call 2012-5-30 at 25.00.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.4286% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.59 and a limitMaturity.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing +1.6113% Asset coverage of 2.3+:1 according to Faircourt. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 1.33% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 10.09 and a call 2007-11-29 at 10.00.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualPremium (for now!) +1.9389% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.2065% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 23.16 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount +2.4653% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.71% based on a bid of 19.95 (still distressed!) and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +2.8792% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.99% based on a bid of 20.01 and a limitMaturity.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 75,800 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.56% based on a bid of 20.37 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 75,404 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.47% based on a bid of 20.60 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.L PerpetualDiscount 71,450 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.42% based on a bid of 20.88 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount 64,747 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.48% based on a bid of 20.59 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.J PerpetualPremium (for now!) 54,000 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.25% based on a bid of 24.71 and a limitMaturity.

There were thirty-two other index-included $25.00-equivalent issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

 

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : October 2002

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2002-10-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,345.0 3 2.00 4.55% 16.4 171M 4.97%
FixedFloater 1,937.2 8 2.00 4.29% 16.0 141M 5.75%
Floater 1,497.8 5 1.80 4.12% 17.1 30M 4.23%
OpRet 1,579.2 30 1.23 3.73% 2.0 75M 5.64%
SplitShare 1,541.7 8 1.62 4.87% 4.9 65M 5.57%
Interest-Bearing 1,871.0 11 2.00 6.91% 2.0 132M 7.85%
Perpetual-Premium 1,196.3 12 1.50 5.61% 6.4 148M 5.79%
Perpetual-Discount 1,370.0 11 1.53 5.65% 14.3 182M 5.78%

Index Constitution, 2002-10-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2002-10-31, Post-rebalancing