Market Action

August 29, 2007

OK, everybody! The end of the world, previously scheduled for Friday, has been cancelled. You are encouraged to make plans for the long weekend.

Loyal readers will know that I’ve become sufficiently irritated by calls for increased regulation to write a post on the topic (well, it’s really just a commentary on another essay) and even to initiate a category for what promises to be a series of posts. I don’t think the issue is going to go away any time soon … the New York Times has published an article with many interesting statements:

“In a globalized economy with hedge funds, leveraged buyouts and all these investment funds, we have to ask the question about more transparency,” said Claude Bébéar, the chairman of the supervisory board of the insurance company AXA

I have some free advice for M. Bébéar: ask these questions before investing.

Washington and London rebuffed the German government earlier when it pushed for an international code of conduct for hedge funds. Now some economic advisers to the German government are going further, suggesting that rating agencies should be nationalized, that large-scale loans be registered publicly and that minimum standards be developed for complex debt securities.

Super. “We’re from the German Government and we’re here to help you”. Can’t wait for that. Trouble is, the US national debt, fiscal deficit and trade deficit are all in such lousy shape that the US is not in a strong position to tell its creditors where to stuff their nationalized credit rating agencies. We shall see!

Christian de Boissieu, president of the group and a member of the Committee for Credit and Investment Institutions, which helps regulate French banks, is calling for a global register of hedge funds. In addition, he said, complex securities should be scrutinized before being sold to bank portfolios.

Is M. de Boissieu claiming that complex securities were not scrutinized before being bought by bank portfolios? Quick, tell me which banks! I want to buy a lot of puts on such poorly run stocks … except … um … French banks are halfway nationalized already aren’t they? And thoroughly scrutinized by … um … M. de Boissieu?

“It’s not just the U.S. regulators that failed, though they did fail,” Mr. Rosner said. International regulators have “thrown the keys to the rating agencies,” which have been left in charge of the safety and soundness of bank capital, insurance and pension money.

The article did not specify where the regulators are alleged to have failed. Pension money? Sorry, Mr. Rosner. Responsibility for pension money rests with the pension fund board. If they’ve been sleeping there are lots and lots of regulations on the books about that already.

Oooh, all this jockeying for regulatory power and salaries makes me angry! I do want to stress again, however, that my defense of the ratings agencies does not have an origin in any thought that they’re perfect. They’re not: Credit Anticipation is a perfectly good fixed income management strategy, one that Deutsche Bank has done very well with recently, although maybe that’s just because they’re German and have good connections with the German Government Credit Ratings Analysis Department.

However … in the first place, they offer investment advice. See that word? I’ll bold it. advice. If you don’t trust their advice, don’t take it. If you think their advice is sort-of usually OK but not perfect, then listen to it while checking it and staying diversified. If you believe so completely in their advice that you’re willing to lever up 15:1 (with all your money, not just a small chunk of it as your ‘hedge fund flutter’), on the basis that not only is it perfect but that everybody else will also always believe it’s perfect … then go home and play with your dollies.

In the second place, they major agencies have extremely good track records. Better than virtually all of their critics are willing to disclose, anyway.

And in the third place, I have yet to see any actual evidence that they’ve made any mistakes other than, possibly, the defaults on some ABCP issues. This is a black eye, definitely, but are due to market convulsions rather than actual deterioration of the underlying; market convulsions are very hard to predict. Shall we fault them, for instance, for the fact that 100-year floaters (e.g. Royal Bank) are now almost impossible to sell at a decent price [CUSIP# 780087AK8. Indicated at $94.50]? If recovery is (eventually) 100% it’s not the worst catastrophe finance has ever seen.

So there.

Return to my usual boring drone about economics, there is renewed discussion of the efficiacy of the yield curve in predicting recessions. Some of the data looks a little dated already:

The spread has turned negative with the 10-year rate at 4.79 percent and the 3-month rate at 4.83 percent (both for the week ending August 10).

With luck, however, the German government will soon regulate yield curve slopes and then we’ll never have a recession again. Econbrowser notes that the Fed Funds market is starting to look almost normal again. Tomorrow the US Treasury will release statistics on Commercial Paper Outstandings, which should be quite interesting. RAMS is liquidating as well as Cheyne, to name but two.

The US mortgage market is tightening, with banks both having less money to lend AND not being able to securitize as efficiently as they used to. The mortgage curve is now inverted, which seems very strange. All the short money has been sucked up by distressed ABCP issuers. Bernanke has opined that US Agencies should stick to securitization and not increase their leverage for the time being, which probably disappoints many.

US Equities roared back from the horror of yesterday and were accompanied by their Canadian cousins. Three-Month US T-Bills continued their wild ride (this is really strange, by the way) even as Treasury notes got whacked. Canadas were hurt as well, in what may be dubbed a Flight to Equity.

There has as yet been no comment from the German Government concerning the correct level of bond yields.

It took nine straight days of gains, but the PerpetualDiscount index is now up on the month, albeit marginally. Only floaters and splitShares are still under water.

 

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.83% 4.85% 22,739 15.86 1 +0.0358% 1,044.5
Fixed-Floater 4.97% 4.79% 113,942 15.87 8 +0.2634% 1,025.7
Floater 4.93% -0.41% 74,627 7.93 4 -0.0913% 1,037.1
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.00% 81,200 3.05 15 +0.2936% 1,025.5
Split-Share 5.07% 4.87% 94,994 3.85 15 +0.1115% 1,044.3
Interest Bearing 6.21% 6.59% 67,257 4.61 3 +0.6483% 1,044.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.52% 5.10% 93,750 5.67 24 +0.1590% 1,026.6
Perpetual-Discount 5.11% 5.14% 268,800 15.27 39 +0.2064% 973.7
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -1.4961% These BNA issues all have massive asset coverage; the constraint on their rating is simply that their sole holding is BAM.A, and therefore their credit ceiling is equal to the BAM preferreds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.21% based on a bid of 25.02 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium +1.1594% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.07% based on a bid of 25.84 and a call 2008-1-30 at 25.75.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +1.2228% Asset coverage of just over 2.0:1 as of August 15 according to Quadravest. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.83% based on a bid of 10.20 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
RY.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.2545% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.60 and a limitMaturity.
IAG.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.2582% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.85 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.2826% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 22.90 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.7989% Asset coverage of just under 1.8:1 as of August 24, according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.92% (mainly as interest) based on a bid of 9.47 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00
IGM.PR.A OpRet +2.5221% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.52% based on a bid of 26.85 and a call 2009-7-30 at 26.00. Even with an equivalency factor of 1.4, why wouldn’t you just buy a bond?
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
TOC.PR.B Floater 88,100 Desjardins crossed 73,600 at 25.24.
BCE.PR.A FixFloat 61,100 RBC crossed 50,000 at 24.50.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount 45,775 National Bank crossed 30,800 at 24.74. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.35% based on a bid of 24.75 and a limitMaturity.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount 39,738 Nesbitt crossed 35,500 at 24.00. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.19% based on a bid of 24.06 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 33,900 Scotia crossed 30,000 at 24.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.

There were eleven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : June 30, 2000

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-06-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,434.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,869.5 9 1.88 6.57% 12.6 269M 5.58%
Floater 1,350.5 2 2.00 -0.07% 0.08 135M 7.30%
OpRet 1,370.6 32 1.22 5.35% 3.9 75M 6.10%
SplitShare 1,378.3 3 1.66 6.14% 6.1 65M 5.79%
Interest-Bearing 1,497.5 7 2.00 8.24% 10.5 190M 8.35%
Perpetual-Premium 1,066.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,092.2 12 1.58 6.15% 13.7 140M 6.28%

Index Constitution, 2000-06-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-06-30, Post-rebalancing

Regulation

To Arms! The Regulators are Coming!

I can see that there is going to be a lot of debate over the next year (until the day after the US Presidential elections, anyway) about regulation, so I’ve started a new category in this blog for it.

Anyway … the forces of regulation are gathering and the issues need to be understood.

Menzie Chinn at Econbrowser abandons her usual highly technical approach to state:

While I haven’t drawn a particular conclusion regarding the right direction to move, one insight prompted by current commentary is that — if the Fed were to opt for looser monetary policy — greater regulation of the financial sector would make a lot of sense.

I don’t know. To me, that if-then logic looks like a complete non-sequiter, but I can’t really comment too much until there is something to comment about. Let’s hear some proposals – I’ll consider them!

Mark Thoma has written a piece titled Fed Intervention and Moral Hazard which, really, simply explains the concept of moral hazard in home-spun tones, but declares himself “in substantive agreement” with what must be deemed a polemic by Robert Reich, Stop the Hedge Fund Casinos:

Yet there’s precedent: in September 1998, despite growing evidence of inflation, the Fed lowered interest rates in order to forestall a global credit crisis after Russia defaulted on its loans (many had been underwritten, foolishly, by several large Wall Street investment banks).

No substantiation is offered for the word “foolishly”. Additionally, there is no acknowledgement of any role played by investors, as opposed to underwriters, in the process.

Oddly, private credit-rating agencies judged these “sub-prime” loans to be relatively good risks.

Mr. Reich does not substantiate his use of the word “Oddly”. Additionally, there is no indication of an awareness of a risk/return trade-off.

Meanwhile, hedge funds created what can only be described as giant betting pools — huge amalgamations of money from pension funds, university endowments, rich individuals, and corporations — whose assumptions about risk were derived from the assumed low risks of the home loans (hence the term “derivatives”).

This is a novel derivation of the word “derivatives”! One can, I suppose, characterize hedge funds as giant betting pools – but only to the extent that any investment that has ever been made in the history of the earth has been a bet.

Investors in these hedge funds had little or no understanding of what they were buying, because hedge funds don’t have to disclose much of anything.

No substantiation is offered for this rather surprising smear. In the first place, the fact that hedge funds don’t have to disclose much of anything to regulators doesn’t mean they don’t disclose anything to investors. It is up to investors to demand whatever they want to demand from those who want discretionary authority over their money – Mr. Reich does not make any sort of case that further disclosure to regulators is necessary.

An investor can do whatever he wants with his own money. If, however, someone is acting as a fiduciary (as will be the case with pension funds and university endowments) there is a standard of care required. There may well be cases in which the Prudent Man Rule has been violated – well, nail ’em to the wall, I say, and I’ll ask Mr. Reich to pass me the hammer; that is not only a separate issue, but it’s already regulated.

That doesn’t mean, though, that the irresponsibilities now so clearly revealed in American financial markets should be excused or forgotten.

Mr. Reich forgets that he has not, in fact, discussed even a single instance of irresponsibility.

Credit-rating agencies have cut corners or averted their eyes, unwilling to require the proof they need.

This is the first mention of credit-rating agencies in the entire essay. No supporting evidence or argument is brought forward to support this charge.

They’ve [the credit rating agencies] been too eager to make money off underwriting the new loans and other financial gimmicks on which they’re supposed to be objective judges.

I am not aware that any credit rating agency anywhere has acted as underwriter. I’m not even aware of any credit rating agency having a license to underwrite. Let’s have a few more details, Mr. Reich!

Banks and other mortgage lenders have been allowed to strong-arm people into taking on financial obligations they have no business taking on.

Strong arm? Let’s have some evidence, or some argument at the very least. I suspect that any wrong-doing of this nature is already regulated.

For the financial market to work well — to ensure fair dealing and to prevent speculative excess — government must oversee it.

There are no arguments, no details and no evidence in this essay to make this assertion even worthy of consideration.

This mess occurred because nobody was watching.

Nonsense. There ain’t nuthin’, anywhere on earth, watched as carefully as the financial markets. Investors, traders and Mr. Reich’s beloved regulators watch it very carefully indeed.

Credit-rating agencies must not have any relationship with underwriters.

What? They shouldn’t even accept details of the issue so they can assign a provisional rating prior to its sale to investors? Mr. Reich betrays complete ignorance of the credit rating process with this slogan.

Finance is too important to be left to the speculators.

I’m … speechless.

Market Action

August 28, 2007

Whoosh!

Just when you thought you were safe …

I was most impressed today by the DG.UN suspension of redemptions, a made-in-Canada $1.4-billion whoopsee, when in comes news of S&P’s downgrade of Cheyne, a $6-billion oopsy-daisy. According to S&P’s actual release (emphasis added):

Cheyne Finance is a SIV structure managed by Cheyne Capital Management Ltd. who has responsibility for purchasing assets, managing the portfolio, and overseeing the issuance of CP and medium-term notes.
 
Current pressure on market prices and the associated recent deterioration in the net asset value (NAV) of this vehicle have reached a level where the ratings have come under pressure.

The portfolio is predominantly invested in real estate securitizations, and we note that the portfolio has not suffered any downgrades to these underlying assets.
 
We have been notified today that the vehicle breached its major capital loss
test and so an enforcement event has occurred. In accordance with the program documents, the portfolio manager upon consultation with the security trustee may begin an orderly liquidation of assets and by Aug. 30 it will estimate the expected proceeds from future liquidations.

Both the “Issuer Credit Rating” and the rating on the Senior Notes has been downgraded from AAA to A-[Watch Negative]. Those of you who are in furious disagreement with my defense of the ratings agencies and eager to see me with egg all over my face (which I know is practically all of you, you’re not fooling anybody) will be most pleased!

What makes this event notable is the bolded disclosure above that this event results from a decline in market prices of the underlying security, not simply an inability to roll the paper at sensible prices. I eagerly await more information regarding Euromoney’s Best CDO Manager of 2006.

The good part about these events with Cheyne is that some actual liquidation of the underlying portfolio will take place. This will lead to at least some delevering of the financial system – this calling on bank lines stuff merely transfers debt. Some equity guys will be wiped out, but that’s what equity guys are for.

There’s more ghoulish news about liquidity exposures, this time from the Times:

State Street, the American bank, has been identified as having $22 billion (£10.9 billion) of exposure to asset-backed commercial paper conduits, the off-balance sheet vehicles that have caused severe problems for rivals in recent weeks amid turmoil in credit markets.

According to regulatory filings, the Boston-based bank has credit lines to at least six conduits, which account for 17 per cent of its total assets. That proportion makes State Street the most highly exposed bank to conduits among its European and American peers.

17% of assets is a very lot. On a positive note, their most recent 10-Q filing discloses that the bank had a Tier 1 Capital ratio of 12%, which is quite good, equal to TD Bank’s ratio as of last year-end, which was the best of the big 5. Even if we divide their 12% by 1.17 to get a ballpark idea of capital adequacy in the event all their lines get called on, we’re still in excess of 10%, which is still quite reasonable. But holy smokes, that’s a lot of lines!

Meanwhile, credit card delinquencies are rising while housing prices are falling, not a great combination.

The Fed’s trying to help! More banks got an exemption allowing them to lend discount money to their broker subsidiaries and I think we can count on this sort of thing being earnestly debated at this weekend’s Jackson Hole conference.

However, I can now provide links to another panic: the Panic of ’07 (not this ’07, the last one), brought to my attention by the WSJ Economics blog, which has some interesting-sounding links to papers I haven’t yet read. If I do read them and they’re good, I’ll post again. Panics, panics panics! Collect them all at PrefBlog!

In other news, some brave Australians are putting together a $1.9-billion LBO, Brad Setser discusses a claim that sub-prime was dumped on the Chinese, jumbo mortgages have become much less available, which is hitting Californial real-estate where the average house needs a jumbo loan and European politicians are planning to do some credit-crunch grandstanding.

Given the gloomy tone of today’s post, nobody will be surprised that US Equities got hammered, mainly financials. Canadian equities got pasted as well, but here it was mainly commodity-related stocks. Treasuries steepened on a banner day with more of the same for Canadas.

Preferreds had quite a good day, ignoring the stock market and the credit concerns. But it’s always the way! No sooner do I point out what a lousy month the splitShares are having than they have a great day and make up half the difference between their returns and OpRet’s. It’s nice to see, but maybe I should just keep my mouth shut from now on.

BAM.PR.N had very high volume today, courtesy of two large blocks crossed by Scotia. I have no idea whether that’s cleaned out their inventory or not, but it’s about time we saw some big-time crosses! Volume in general picked up, which is good to see … equity refugees?

BMO.PR.G has been removed from the OpRet index because it no longer exists. It’s the end of an era … the world was different at the time of its first month-end in the index, February, 1998.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.80% 4.84% 22,933 15.82 1 +0.0410% 1,044.1
Fixed-Floater 4.98% 4.81% 112,352 15.85 8 +0.2382% 1,023.0
Floater 4.93% -0.46% 75,222 7.95 4 +0.0918% 1,038.1
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.12% 81,061 3.53 15 -0.0446% 1,022.5
Split-Share 5.07% 4.87% 96,148 3.85 15 +0.5090% 1,043.2
Interest Bearing 6.22% 6.72% 67,002 4.58 3 -0.2351% 1,037.3
Perpetual-Premium 5.53% 5.19% 93,897 6.20 24 +0.1018% 1,025.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.11% 5.15% 271,118 15.24 39 +0.1515% 971.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
IGM.PR.A OpRet -1.0440% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.75% based on a bid of 26.54 and a softMaturity 2013-6-29 at 25.00.
FIG.PR.A InterestBearing -1.0050% There go most of yesterday’s gains! Asset coverage of just over 2.3:1 as of August 27 according to Faircourt. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.73% (almost all as interest) based on a bid of 9.85 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00.
PWF.PR.K PerpetualDiscount +1.1859% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.23% based on a bid of 23.89 and a limitMaturity.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare +2.3346% Makes up for yesterday’s loss and then some! Asset coverage of just over 2.6:1 as of August 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.23% based on a bid of 10.52 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 257,600 Scotia crossed 150,000 at 20.00, then another 100,000 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.05% based on a bid of 20.00 and a limitMaturity. There was a good bid at the close, too, closing at 20.00-13, 33×10; the almost-identical, very very slightly inferior BAM.PR.M closed at 20.23-35, 2×11.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 114,700 Nesbitt was working the ‘phones today, obviously, crossing 30,000, then 50,000, then 30,000, all at 24.61. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.97% based on a bid of 24.61 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet 45,151 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.07% based on a bid of 25.75 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.C FixFloat 40,125  
ALB.PR.A SplitShare 30,937 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.38% based on a bid of 24.90 and a hardMaturity 2011-2-28 at 25.00.

There were fifteen other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Preferred Indices : May 31, 2000

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-05-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,437.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,860.4 8 1.87 6.39% 12.8 253M 5.48%
Floater 1,353.6 2 2.00 0.00% 0.08 165M 7.29%
OpRet 1,351.0 33 1.24 5.58% 4.1 90M 6.21%
SplitShare 1,371.4 3 1.66 6.17% 6.2 65M 5.80%
Interest-Bearing 1,454.0 7 2.00 8.37% 10.5 202M 8.45%
Perpetual-Premium 1,037.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,061.7 12 1.57 6.29% 13.5 131M 6.40%

Index Constitution, 2000-05-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-05-31, Post-rebalancing

Index Construction / Reporting

Split-Share Spread Widening

I briefly mentioned yesterday that split-shares were getting hit this month relative to Operating Retractible issues, so I’ll just post a few things to substantiate that claim.

Comparitive Performance, Month to August 27
Index Value
2007-07-31
Value
2007-08-27
Change
OpRet 1,020.3 1,023.0 +0.26%
SplitShare 1,046.5 1,037.9 -0.83%

… which seems clear enough.

Additionally, I have uploaded:

Enjoy!

Sub-Prime!

Sub-Prime! DG.UN Suspends Redemptions

Sorry about all this sub-prime stuff in a blog that usually sticks pretty close to its knitting, but this is a lot of fun!

Global Diversified Investment Grade Income Trust (TSX: DG.UN) (“Global DIGIT”) has announced:

that, considering the liquidity problems of MMAI-I Trust (“MMAI”) due to its inability to roll its maturing commercial paper in the present state of the Canadian asset-backed commercial paper market, it will not have sufficient financial resources to allow for the payment of the redemption price for the redemption of Units and consequently must announce the suspension, until further notice, of the August 31st, 2007 annual and quarterly redemptions of Units.

This is a fascinating investment scheme. What they have done, according to their financials is (with lots of rounding by me):

– taken $89-million of unitholders equity

– borrowed about $1,400-million, mostly as commercial paper

– put all this money into term deposits in banks, at the Bankers’ Acceptance rate plus a spread.

– written Credit Default Swaps against a portfolio of mainly mortgage backed securities and pledged the term deposits as security (note that writing a CDS gives you exposure and, hopefully, yield basically equivalent to what you wrote the CDS on)

The point? It’s discussed:

The Trust’s objective (save for any loss exceeding the first loss amount) is to provide a return on investment of 5.94% per annum to Unitholders up to September 7, 2009 and thereafter a floating distribution equal to the rate of bankers acceptance plus 2%.

Units cost $10.00 at issue in September 2004, of which sixty-five cents went to start-up costs. The provide a handy computation of their returns since inception, using a starting point of $9.35 net … they’ve made about 5.5% annualized.

It seems to me like a helluva complicated & (term-mismatch-) risky & very highly-leveraged way to go after BAs+200, but I should have said that three years ago if I wanted to be taken seriously.

And now they’re having a little difficulty rolling their CP, have suspended redemptions and I see that DG.UN is now quoted at $2.90-99 on the TSX, compared with a NAVPU of $9.17 reported as of 2007-6-30.

Y’know, the underlying doesn’t look all that terrible to me … having looked at it very, very briefly and with no intent of investing or recommending. The big question is how much of the lolly the CP holders are going to grab and, frankly, I’m not going to rip apart the prospectuses trying to find out. I’m not going to pay for any expensive legal opinions, either! But it does seem to me that this very, very distressed security that has enormous liquidity problems would be worth looking at … although, until we know more about what the CP guys are going to take, it’s a wild speculation and, what’s worse, blind.

Too bad the damn thing’s $1.4-billion … that’s getting into serious money that will be hard to finance in this environment … which, I imagine, is part of the problem. If it were smaller, it would be (I think) attractive to the hedge fund crowd. If any of my readers has $1.4-billion they want to put into a nice floating rate note with a term of nine years, call me and maybe we can help these guys out a little … after looking at this stuff a whole lot more closely, of course!

Hat tip : Financial Webring Forum.

Sub-Prime!

More Sub-Prime!

Gee, the last one was so much fun I think I’ll do another! Let’s look at “Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust 2005-1”.

On August 24, S&P released the following:

Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services today lowered its ratings on seven classes from Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust’s series 2001-3, 2005-1, 2005-2 and 2005-3 transactions (see list).
     The lowered ratings reflect pool performance that has caused actual and projected credit support for the affected classes to decline considerably. All four transactions have experienced losses that have eroded overcollateralization (O/C) to levels that are significantly below their targets. Furthermore, delinquencies have escalated over the past six months. For series 2001-3, losses have, on average over the past six months, been approximately 2.10x monthly excess interest. For series 2005-1, losses have, on average over the past six months, been approximately 3.73x monthly excess interest. Severe delinquencies (90-plus days, foreclosures, and REOs) for the transactions, as a percentage of the current pool balances, range between
approximately 17.09% (series 2005-1) and 13.40% (series 2001-3). Realized losses for the transactions, as a percentage of the original pool balances, range between approximately 9.20% (series 2001-3) and 1.33% (series 2005-3).
     These performance trends have caused projected credit support for the transactions to fall well below the required levels. Standard & Poor’s will continue to closely monitor the performance of these transactions. If the transactions incur further losses and delinquencies continue to erode projected credit support, we will take further negative rating actions.
     Subordination, excess interest, and O/C provide credit support for the two transactions. The underlying collateral backing the certificates consists of both fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgage loans.

RATINGS LOWERED
  
Bear Stearns Asset Backed Securities Trust
Residential mortgage-backed certificates
                               Rating
Series      Class       To              From
2001-3      M-2         BB              A
2001-3      B           B               BBB
2005-1      M-6         BB              BBB-
2005-1      M-7         CCC             BB
2005-2      M-7         B               BB
2005-3      M-6         B               BBB-
2005-3      M-7         CCC             BB

… which looks pretty horrific. But now let’s look at ALL of BSABST 2005-1:

 

 US$395 million asset-backed certificates, series 2005-1 
Class  Maturity Date   Rating  Rating Date    
 
A  Mar 25, 2035  AAA  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-1  Mar 25, 2035  AA  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-2  Mar 25, 2035  A  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-3  Mar 25, 2035  A-  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-4  Mar 25, 2035  BBB+  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-5  Mar 25, 2035  BBB  Feb 24, 2005    
 
M-6  Mar 25, 2035  BB  Aug 24, 2007    
 
M-7  Mar 25, 2035  CCC  Aug 24, 2007    
 
R-I  Mar 25, 2035  NR  Feb 24, 2005    
 
R-II  Mar 25, 2035  NR  Feb 24, 2005    
 
B-IO  Mar 25, 2035  NR  Feb 24, 2005 
 

The SEC ID for this trust is 333-113636, for those who wish to see all the gory detail. Tranche sizes, from the prospectus on SEC / EDGAR are (this is SEC document 0000911420-05-000084.txt : 20050216) are:

Class A : $313,746,000 (pays LIBOR + 0.35% before optional termination / +0.70% afterwards)

Class M-1: $37,689,000 (+0.70% / +1.05%)

Class M-2: $18,549,000 (+1.40% / +2.10%)

Class M-3: $4,341,000 (+1.60% / +2.40%)

Class M-4: $3,946,000 (+2.20% / +3.30%)

Class M-5: $2,960,000 (+3.00% / +4.50%)

Class M-6: $4,538,000 (+3.50% / +5.25%)

Class M-7 was not offered in the prospectus. R-I and R-II are “residual interests in the real estate mortgage investment conduits established by the trust”, and were also not offered. B-IO gets all the Excess Spread. None of these last three classes had a stated principal value; I’m not going to tear apart the prospectus analyzing them because I don’t really care a lot how they work … I’m just after the principal values here!

The “optional termination” becomes effective “when the stated principal balance of the mortgage loans and any foreclosed real estate owned by the trust fund has declined to or below 10% of the stated principal balance of the mortgage loans as of the cut-off date”. At this point EMC Mortgage corporation could purchase all the assets.

At any rate, it should be clear that – while downgrades are always bad, and to be deplored by all right-thinking people – the downgrades that sounded so awful at the beginning of this post lose a lot of their ability to terrify when put into perspective.

Perspective is what’s needed when thinking about sub-prime … and I can’t provide it. I’m not a specialist, and I think a specialist would need a pretty good database to get it. What I really want is a transition study that has dollar figures attached, not just number of ratings. It would be nice, too, if interest rates could be attached to such a study … because, well, gee, the guys in the downgraded class M-6 were getting LIBOR + 350bp (and still are, since the issue is not in default)!

I’ll keep my eyes out, however, and whenever I see something interesting, I’ll post again.

Update 2007-09-18: I became involved in a discussion at Econbrowser in which this issue came up. In the course of the discussion I retrieved a bit more information from the prospectus, which I shall reproduce here:

The following table summarizes certain characteristics of the mortgage loans as of the cut-off date:

Number of mortgage loans……………………3,527
Aggregate principal balance…………..$394,649,130
Average principal balance………………..$111,894
Range of principal balance………$1,041 to $800,000
Range of mortgage rates……………0.00% to 16.50%
Weighted average mortgage rate……………..8.032%
Weighted average combined loan-to-value ratio……………………84.50%
Range of scheduled remaining terms to maturity……….9 months to 361 months

Market Action

August 27, 2007

Another reasonably normal day, bearing in mind that we’re talking about financial markets here and the word “normal” needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

Of great interest to me (I dare not say, “Of prime interest”, for fear of being misunderstood) was the Bank of Canada’s cash management bill, $2.5-billion of one-month bills to be auctioned tomorrow morning. They had to do something! The spread between 1-month bills and one-month CP as of the 24th had widened to 137bp (out 40bp just on the week) which I find just incredible … I mentioned on the 21st that I thought a 60bp three-month Bill/BA spread was amazing.”Cash Management Bill” is simply what they’re calling it – I’m not even sure if they can call it anything else, given that it’s not part of the regular auction routine.

I suspect that all the actual cash will be pushed right back into the money supply as loans against ABCP (maybe indirectly, e.g., National finances all the ABCP it suddenly owns by repo-ing more of its Canada holdings) … but I’m sure only a few people know that for sure at this point.

Bank of Canada deputy governor Pierre Duguay stated:

“Specifically, we are asking ourselves two questions: First, how much greater is the risk to the Canadian economy now posed by developments in the U.S. economy? And second, to what extent would the re-pricing of credit risk lead to a sustained tightening of credit conditions in Canada?”

In other words, they may have to ease considerably just to keep the commercial paper market (and the rest of the corporate curve) where they want it to be. We’ll see! The money-market quality spread has, maybe, stabilized in the US.

Speaking of the US, Brad Setser continues his probing of the current account deficit, Menzie Chinn highlights risks to the US deficit projections and Stephen Cecchetti reviews the Fed reaction to the crisis. He also includes the sentence

The sub-prime crisis made it clear that the rating agencies were doing a poor job of evaluating risks in securities that were backed by sub-prime mortgages.

but does not substantiate the charge that they’re doing a poor job. But that’s another post … and doubtless many more, as actual data start to come in to replace all this guessing.

I hope nobody thinks I’m totally indifferent to the situation, or that I’m carrying a torch for the ratings agencies. It’s just that … I’m not the oldest guy in the business, not by a long shot, but I’ve been around the block. If I had a nickel for every time I’ve been told the world’s about to end (and a dime for each time it was the result of a conspiracy or massive negligence by big institutions) … I’d be too busy with my troupe of dancing girls to bother writing this blog.

A lot of hedgies are going to get wiped out and the sooner the better; a few pension funds are going to play blame the manager; credit squeezes and the sudden conversion of Money Market instruments to term debt a la Coventree may give a recessionary cast to the economy; the US may well enter a recession, since a lot of their deficit-fuelled growth in the past few years has been housing-related and there ain’t gonna be much more of that; a few real companies will probably get weak enough that they get taken over at prices that don’t make long-term shareholders very happy (like just happened to Sachsen, mentioned here on August 20); and we might even see a spectacular flame-out if a big institution’s risk-controls are found wanting  … but I’m not so sure that the solidly investment-grade tranches of sub-prime debt are as bad as they’re made out to be.

What I am sure of, is that if I was a hedgie myself, I’d be bidding … low. And telling the newspapers how awful everything is.

US Equities fell a bit, as did those in Canada. There is concern that the de facto easing will be bad for Treasuries; the Fed Fund Futures are pricing in an immediate ease to 5.00% (the current de facto rate) and another ease to the 4.75% area – and beyond – by November. Canadas had a good day, with a basically parallel shift.

Another quiet, directionless day in pref land. Split shares are getting hit this month … people appear to want direct investments in companies with recognizable names!

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.79% 4.83% 23,170 15.84 1 +0.3289% 1,043.7
Fixed-Floater 4.99% 4.82% 111,071 15.82 8 +0.0003% 1,020.5
Floater 4.93% -0.35% 73,700 7.94 4 +0.0312% 1,037.1
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.13% 79,637 3.16 16 +0.0848% 1,023.0
Split-Share 5.10% 4.93% 95,761 3.96 15 -0.2316% 1,037.9
Interest Bearing 6.21% 6.68% 66,919 4.59 3 +0.3803% 1,039.7
Perpetual-Premium 5.53% 5.20% 94,143 5.78 24 +0.0443% 1,024.0
Perpetual-Discount 5.12% 5.16% 272,353 15.23 39 +0.0423% 970.2
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
LBS.PR.A SplitShare -1.9139% Asset coverage of just under 2.5:1 as of August 23 according to Brompton Group. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.92% based on a bid of 10.25 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare -1.4382% Asset coverage of just over 2.6:1 as of August 15 according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.74% based on a bid of 10.28 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
FIG.PR.A SplitShare +1.3238% Asset coverage of over 2.3:1 as of August 24 according to Faircourt. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.55% (almost all as interest) based on a bid of 9.95 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-31 at 10.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
GWO.PR.I PerpetualDiscount 20,663 RBC crossed 10,000 at 22.21. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 22.25 and a limitMaturity.
SLF.PR.D PerpetualDiscount 19,934 Nesbitt bought a total of 16,300 from “Anonymous” (various Anonymouses? Anonymice?) in five tranches from 22.18 to 22.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.20 and a limitMaturity.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 17,925 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 23.01 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 17,600 National Bank crossed 11,900 at 23.05. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 23.05 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.C PerpetualDiscount 17,300 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.89% based on a bid of 23.00 and a limitMaturity.

There were seven other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : April 28, 2000

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-04-28
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,394.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,839.3 8 1.87 6.25% 13.3 328M 5.53%
Floater 1,312.8 2 2.00 7.22% 12.1 134M 6.94%
OpRet 1,348.4 34 1.27 5.53% 3.8 80M 6.32%
SplitShare 1,377.9 3 1.66 6.22% 6.2 66M 5.77%
Interest-Bearing 1,442.9 7 2.00 8.46% 10.6 233M 8.51%
Perpetual-Premium 1,030.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,054.7 12 1.57 6.40% 13.3 121M 6.42%

Index Constitution, 2000-04-28, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-04-28, Post-rebalancing