Interesting External Papers

The Discount Window: Good or Bad?

The WSJ blog noted some arguments regarding the Fed’s discount window, which the Fed has encouraged the big banks to use, with some obviously orchestrated success.

A very interesting article by Anna J. Schwartz addresses historical misuse of the discount window to prop up insolvent institutions rather than simply provide emergency liquidity. She argues that the discount window should be eliminated … for all my laissez-faire ideals, I find that a little hard to swallow. Her argument rests on the footnoted phrase:

Credit-worthy banks can borrow at market rates, large ones in the Fed Funds market, small ones from their correspondent banks.

That sounds to me like an overgeneralization. When fear takes over, I am more inclined to agree with Larry Neal and his diagnosis of informational asymmettry exemplified, he says, in the Panic of 1825. Few lenders even have the desire to determine creditworthiness – especially if they have potential obligations that they may have to meet – and those few that do may set the “creditworthy” bar uneconomically high.

I agree with her whole-heartedly, however, when she decries the extended provision of credit to an insolvent institution.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : January 31, 2000

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 2000-01-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,446.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,764.3 8 2.00 6.09% 13.8 242M 5.61%
Floater 1,361.8 2 2.00 6.38% 1.2 77M 6.16%
OpRet 1,332.9 32 1.22 6.17% 4.2 78M 6.51%
SplitShare 1,317.8 3 1.66 6.93% 6.3 57M 5.99%
Interest-Bearing 1,343.3 7 2.00 9.07% 10.2 361M 8.98%
Perpetual-Premium 950.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 972.7 12 1.58 6.88% 12.7 150M 6.86%

Index Constitution, 2000-01-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 2000-01-31, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high).

Market Action

August 21, 2007

Another nervous day

Continuing the recent pattern, Yvon Charest, Industrial Alliance’s President and Chief Executive Officer, gave his portfolio managers a kick in the teeth by usurping their responsibilities. They’re just plain flat out buying the ABCP in their mutual funds – there is no indication as to whether the portfolio managers want to sell (and look, I know that’s a pretty good bet, OK? That’s not the point). Mr. Charest’s track record as a portfolio manager was not disclosed; we can expect unit-holders not to care until conflicts of interest are resolved in a way they don’t like and a newspaper headline tells them to care.

If Mr. Charest wants to play at “Portfolio Managers”, there is nothing to prevent him from issuing index-linked PPNs, and doing it all on his own balance sheet. But if there’s to be a separate balance sheet there has to be independence.

There is no indication as yet that anybody besides me thinks this is important; analyst independence is just so 2002.

On the sub-prime front, large bets are being made agains ResCap’s survival – and ResCap is a big player:

At the end of June, ResCap had tapped those [ABCP] markets for about $5.5 billion in financing, according to regulatory filings.

ResCap has about $18.5 billion in committed financing, CreditSights analyst David Hendler wrote in an Aug. 7 note.

Mortgage companies without any sub-prime on their books, such as Ottimo Funding LLC, are experiencing financing difficulties.

The default reports for July have been released and Fitch has placed $92.1-billion under review. Last month they reviewed $118-billion and downgraded $13-billion of it. There are more calls coming out for a review of the ratings agencies, as the politicians seem to have agreed on a convenient scapegoat. There are more calls for increased regulation of banks, as well.

Yves Smith has published a balanced review of the various critiques of Central Bank actions. Put me in the third camp: Realist (although I would prefer “Pragmatist”). The market is faced with a situation in which nobody will even look at riskier or more complicated debt. The central banks must first ensure that the commercial banks can, in fact, make investment decisions with reasonably assured financing. Then they must increase the spread between government and commercial paper to the point where real investors (as opposed to mere dealers) will at least be interested enough to look at it. Finally, once the normal routine of examining credit and making an actual decision between safe-but-low-yielding and riskier-but-higher-yielding securities has been re-established, we can get back to fighting inflation. And don’t worry, once people start looking at risk/reward with a more jaundiced eye, there will be plenty of losers. But if the credit markets lock up and everybody in the world has to dump assets on the market at give-away prices in order to de-lever, we’re talking deflation. And deflation is bad.

Tom Graff seems to be in so-far-so-good camp as well, while James Hamilton applauds the Fed’s methodology thus far.

There is some speculation that the liquidity crisis is over and we can all go home; fortunately there are cooler heads at the Fed:

“Financial market volatility, in and of itself, doesn’t require a change in the target federal funds rate,” [Richmond Fed President] Lacker said at a luncheon of the Risk Management Association of Charlotte. “Policy needs to be guided by the outlook for real spending and inflation.”

And, in boring news about the real economy, the Cleveland Fed reminds us that inflation, while still worrisome, is showing signs of responding favourably to the Fed’s policies of moderate restraint. 

True to form, however, US equities were up on takeover speculation, so it would seem that some are hopeful the whole episode was just a bad dream. Canadian equities followed.

Canadian banks re-affirmed their committment to providing credit support to their own Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) products. I can only imagine they’re having difficulty rolling the paper and are attempting to (i) reduce their conduit’s cost of borrowing, and (ii) keep the assets & liabilities off their own balance sheets. Given that their cost of funding, as measured by the September BAX on the Montreal Exchange has risen to about 4.6% (and I’ve seen them much higher), I’m sure they’re about ready to try anything. Note that the Canadian 3-month WI T-Bills are at 4.00% … that’s an amazing spread – according to RBC, the spread was 30bp on August 10, 62bp on August 17.

US 3-month T-Bills finally increased in yield but the 2-10 curve steepened anyway – so let’s not say it’s over just yet! The Canadian 2-10 spread steepened again and is now at 30.5bp. Hank Cunningham provides some historical context.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.77% 4.81% 23,975 15.90 1 +0.1649% 1,039.4
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 4.87% 116,675 15.77 8 +0.0225% 1,018.4
Floater 4.96% 2.76% 76,645 7.92 4 -0.2038% 1,030.9
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.13% 80,670 3.12 16 +0.0128% 1,022.4
Split-Share 5.10% 5.16% 98,642 4.21 15 +0.1800% 1,037.2
Interest Bearing 6.19% 6.61% 65,771 4.61 3 +0.5860% 1,042.1
Perpetual-Premium 5.54% 5.19% 97,368 6.93 24 +0.1428% 1,022.2
Perpetual-Discount 5.13% 5.17% 284,180 14.96 39 +0.1022% 968.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
SBN.PR.A SplitShare -1.7640% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.84% based on a bid of 10.26 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00.
MUH.PR.A SplitShare -1.0652% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 8.37% based on a bid of 14.86 and a hardMaturity 2008-2-1 at 15.00. Careful, though! At the ask of 15.04, the yield is only 5.57% – that’s the trouble with these very-short-term thingies.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount -1.0342% There go yesterday’s gains! Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 22.01 and a limitMaturity.
MFC.PR.B PerpetualDiscount -1.0148% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.96% based on a bid of 23.41 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount +1.0118% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.08% based on a bid of 23.96 and a limitMaturity.
MIC.PR.A PerpetualPremium +1.1765% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.54% based on a bid of 25.80 and a call 2012-1-130 at 25.00.
RY.PR.A PerpetualDiscount +1.1791% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.01% based on a bid of 22.31 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.5119% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.38% based on a bid of 23.50 and a limitMaturity.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +1.7112% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.09% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.51 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
FTU.PR.A SplitShare +1.7189% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.21% based on a bid of 10.06 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-01 at 10.00.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount +1.7259% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 20.04 and a limitMaturity.
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.8055% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.45% based on a bid of 24.81 and a limitMaturity.
LBS.PR.A SplitShare +1.8664% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.69% based on a bid of 10.37 and a hardMaturity 2013-11-29 at 10.00
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BCE.PR.G FixFloat 37,500 TD crossed 35,000 at 24.40. Closed at 24.03-49, 9×30.
TD.PR.M OpRet 71,704 “Anonymous” bought 19,900 from Nesbitt at 26.25. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.88% based on a bid of 26.21 and a softMaturity 2013-10-30 at 25.00.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 17,900 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.97% based on a bid of 20.25 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.25-34, 20×10; virtually identical to BAM.PR.N, below.
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 15,088 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.03% based on a bid of 20.04 and a limitMaturity. Closed at 20.04-10, 21×10; virtually identical to BAM.PR.M, above.
BAM.PR.K Floater 14,253  

There were five other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : December 31, 1999

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1999-12-31
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,474.6 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,823.5 8 2.00 5.67% 14.4 214M 5.41%
Floater 1,388.5 3 1.69 5.68% 14.2 39M 5.99%
OpRet 1,368.0 30 1.23 5.47% 4.2 63M 6.30%
SplitShare 1,391.0 3 1.67 6.05% 6.4 58M 5.65%
Interest-Bearing 1,428.5 7 2.00 8.28% 10.7 490M 8.44%
Perpetual-Premium 993.7 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,017.3 12 1.57 6.44% 13.2 149M 6.54%

Index Constitution, 1999-12-31, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1999-12-31, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high).

Interesting External Papers

Breaking News from 1825

I mentioned the Panic of 1825 briefly yesterday.

More detail is available from the St. Louis Fed: main article by Larry Neal and commentary by Michael D. Bordo.

The more things change …

These problems started with the Treasury itself, confronted by the difficulties of servicing the huge government debt accumulated during the Napoleonic Wars … They were compounded by the response of the London capital market, which produced a bewildering array of new financial assets to its customers to replace the high-yielding government debt now being retired.

Only as more information came in or as investors began to pull out of higher risk investments and seek safer, better quality assets did price differences begin to show up.

The credit collapse led to widespread bank failures (73 out of the 770 banks in England and even three out of the 36 in Scotland) and a massive wave of bankruptcies in the rest of the economy, reaching an unprecedented peak in April 1826. The Bank of England and the London private banks joined forces for once by blaming both the speculative boom and the subsequent credit collapse on excessive note issue by the country banks. They argued that the ease of note issue had encouraged the more careless or unscrupulous partners in country banks to invest in highrisk, high-return financial ventures such as the Poyais scrip that were being offered on the London capital market.

Asymmetric information is the term applied to the usual situation in which borrowers know more about the actual investment projects they are carrying out than do the lenders. Lenders, knowing this, charge a premium proportional to the uncertainty they feel about the borrowers in question. This situation, in turn, creates an adverse selection problem, in which higher-quality borrowers are reluctant to pay the high interest rates imposed by the market, while lower-quality borrowers are willing to accept the rates and to default if their ventures fail.

The coup de grâce occurs when higher-risk borrowers are asked to provide collateral for additional loans, and the financial collapse decreases the value of their collateral. The outcome is a general wave of bankruptcies.

Update, 2007-09-20: It is interesting to contrast the 1825 bail-out of the banking house of Sir Peter Pole with the 2007 bail-out of Northern Rock. In testimony to parliament, BoE Governor King stated:

U.K. banking laws prevented the central bank from a covert rescue of Northern Rock Plc, which it would have preferred.“The bank would have preferred to have acted covertly as lender as last resort, to have lent to Northern Rock without publishing it,” King told a parliamentary committee in London today. “As a result of the market abuses directive (of 2005) we were unable to carry that out.”

Market Action

August 20, 2007

A nervous day in the market today – best illustrated by the fall in US 3-month T-Bills to 3.09%, down 66bp on the day with a Treasury auction coming in at 2.85%.

A serious affront to analyst/portfolio manager independence was delivered by National Bank in the context of their purchase of Asset Backed Commercial Paper that was sold to certain client or held by National Bank branded money market funds:

As a result, our clients can be reassured that the funds will not hold any ABCP until we are convinced of the quality and liquidity of the paper, whether or not it is issued by a major bank.

National Bank of Canada, mindful of the best interests of the unitholders of the National Bank Mutual Funds, preferred not to have its clients bear the brunt of this uncertainty and therefore decided to initiate the transaction announced today.

Excuse me? National Bank decided? And ABCP won’t be held until “we” (under the National Bank letterhead) are happy about the credit quality?

I may be a little dense, but Morningstar lists the portfolio manager as Richard Levesque and he works for Natcan, which is registered by the OSC as “Investment Counsel/Portfolio Manager”. He is the only one entitled to make decisions regarding fund investments within the context of the fund’s mandate and the mandate is the sole province of the unitholders. National Bank, CEO Louis Vachon, and any miscellaneous bozos from marketting have no say in the matter.

As always, there’s no telling what the real story is (the press release may have been released in unseemly haste and poorly edited with an emphasis on brevity), but I trust that all unitholders, regulators and trade associations will do what they can to ensure they know just who is running the fund, whose interests are held paramount at all times and how much influence National Bank management has over portfolio management decisions.

Some readers will not consider this a major issue. Some readers are encouraged not to come running to me when the interests of mutual funds and their corporate sponsors  become intertwined in a manner they don’t like.

In less important news, a lot of children are being thrown off sleds to the sub-prime wolves. Capital One is taking a big charge to close its Alt-A mortgage unit, KKR Financial is seeking equity after selling a big chunk of sub-primes, and Thornburg sold a whack of mortgage-backeds in a frantic attempt to delever. Solent Capital may be forced to join them, after investors wouldn’t buy their ABCP. In short, the market is working as it should, although fear continues to rule greed: money market funds are piling into those famous 3% Treasury Bills, and SachsenLB needed emergency liquidity of 17.3-billion Euros.

The blame game continues, with calls for more regulation in Europe and America. Blaming the Fed is always popular. I haven’t seen calls for more regulation in Canada yet, possibly because they’re still trying to find something that isn’t regulated.

The WSJ reminds us that all this has happened before. Brad Setser reports on current Fed thinking on how this will all resolve – which doesn’t appear to involve more regulation, thank heavens – while Jim Hamilton looks at low-investment-grade spreads and wonders where all the risk is being priced. My guess is simply that contagion from lower-quality sub-prime, while knocking hell out of higher-rated sub-prime and affecting investment-grade corporates to some degree … simply has run out of steam.

US Equities experienced a few swings, but closed up on the day, followed by their Canadian counterparts.

Treasury news was dominated by the plunge in short-end yields, while Canada continued steepening. I like steepening.

A quiet day for preferreds, although Nesbitt was able to accomplish some crossing in size. The perpetualPremium sector did well, led by BMO.PR.H and CL.PR.B.

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.77% 4.82% 23,889 15.91 1 +0.2479% 1,037.7
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 4.89% 115,887 15.75 8 +0.0161% 1,018.2
Floater 4.95% 2.75% 75,370 7.95 4 +0.0307% 1,033.0
Op. Retract 4.84% 3.99% 81,006 3.12 16 +0.0397% 1,022.3
Split-Share 5.11% 5.04% 99,591 4.21 15 +0.1108% 1,035.3
Interest Bearing 6.23% 6.71% 65,557 4.60 3 +0.1715% 1,036.0
Perpetual-Premium 5.55% 5.23% 98,522 7.31 24 +0.1894% 1,020.7
Perpetual-Discount 5.14% 5.17% 289,421 15.22 39 +0.0467% 967.0
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount -2.9757% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.46% based on a bid of 23.15 and a limitMaturity.
BAM.PR.M PerpetualDiscount -1.4458% Closed at 20.45-50, 2×22. The virtually identical BAM.PR.N closed at 19.70-89, 5×1. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.91% based on a bid of 20.45 and a limitMaturity.
NA.PR.L PerpetualDiscount -1.1667% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.14% based on a bid of 23.72 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.0806% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.45 and a limitMaturity.
ELF.PR.G PerpetualDiscount +1.0909% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.40% based on a bid of 22.24 and a limitMaturity.
CL.PR.B PerpetualPremium +1.1628% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 26.10 and a call 2008-1-30 at 25.75.
RY.PR.E PerpetualDiscount +1.1628% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.94% based on a bid of 22.87 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.A SplitShare +1.1968% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.14% based on a bid of 25.03 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00.
RY.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.2195% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.41 and a limitMaturity.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare +1.4606% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.42% based on a bid of 10.42 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-01 at 10.00.
BMO.PR.H PerpetualPremium +1.7453% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.77% based on a bid of 25.65 and a call 2013-3-27 at 25.00.
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
DW.PR.A Scraps (Would be OpRet, but there are credit concerns) 137,521 ITG bought 10,000 from “Anonymous”. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.12% based on a bid of 21.16 and a softMaturity 2017-3-12 at 25.00.
CM.PR.R OpRet 102,600 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 25.70. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.66% based on a bid of 25.59 and a softMaturity 2013-4-29 at 25.00.
GWO.PR.X OpRet 100,995 Nesbitt crossed 100,000 at 26.85. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 3.57% based on a bid of 26.75 and a call 2009-10-30 at 26.00 … not much of bet on the call being waived, as the softMaturity 2013-9-29 at 25.00 yields only 3.66%. Either way, the bonds look better to me!
BMO.PR.J PerpetualDiscount 57,470 National Bank crossed 18,700 at 22.50, then another 23,600 at the same price. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.40 and a limitMaturity.
RY.PR.B PerpetualDiscount 55,830 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.06% based on a bid of 23.30 and a limitMaturity.
TD.PR.O PerpetualDiscount 18,521 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.98% based on a bid of 24.52 and a limitMaturity.

There were ten other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

Market Action

HIMIPref™ Indices : November 30, 1999

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1999-11-30
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,503.3 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,857.2 8 2.00 5.04% 15.2 245M 5.29%
Floater 1,415.5 3 1.70 5.50% 14.4 46M 5.85%
OpRet 1,374.5 30 1.24 5.27% 3.5 66M 6.29%
SplitShare 1,430.7 4 1.75 5.71% 6.5 65M 5.49%
Interest-Bearing 1,446.5 6 2.00 8.13% 10.6 340M 8.24%
Perpetual-Premium 1,060.9 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,086.1 12 1.57 5.88% 14.0 171M 6.07%

Index Constitution, 1999-11-30, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1999-11-30, Post-rebalancing

Market Action

August 17, 2007

Well, that’s the end of another week-and-a-half! I said the same thing August 10 … I’m gonna start putting in for overtime.

The big news of the day was the Fed cut the discount rate. As the WSJ admirably explains the discount rate is the rate at which financial institutions can borrow directly from the Fed:

Banks were reluctant to access the window because it was associated with a stigma usually reserved for distressed banks. A few years ago the Fed overhauled the discount window to try and alleviate that stigma; the rate was then set one percentage point above the funds rate and subject to far fewer conditions. In spite of that, discount window borrowing has remained paltry.

Discount lending averaged just $11 million in the week ended Aug. 15. Although that was up from $1 million in the prior week it was puny compared to the billions of dollars the Fed has regularly injected into the financial system through open market operations.

There has been some jeering that this is a mere gesture; but some cheering for such a public (and cheap!) jawboning that certainly had an effect on the markets today. The Fed even actively encouraged eligible institutions to take advantage of the cut.

The discount cut sent a message that the Fed will consider Fed Funds Target cuts, which was received loud and clear, although the Fed Funds Futures market seemed a little disappointed that the gesture was only symbolic (what a bunch of cowboys those guys are!). While data for today is not yet posted, the Fed maintained a rate of about 5% in the actual Fed Funds market yesterday, and the low yesterday was 2%, much more reasonable than the recent 0% nonsense. Goldman Sachs changed its prediction again:

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. said the Federal Reserve will cut the overnight target interest rate to 4.5 percent from 5.25 percent this year

Until June, Goldman had expected the Fed to cut rates 75 basis points this year. They changed the forecast in June saying the Fed would hold rates at 5.25 percent through year-end

The analyst’s track record was not disclosed, possibly due to confusion regarding just exactly which track record.

At any rate, this signal was considered to be a sign that the world was not about to come to an end and both American and Canadian equities soared, led by financials.

Not surprisingly, government bonds had a super day, with Treasury two-years dropping 6bp in yield and ten-years 2bp, to bring the term premium to 50bp. Canada followed:

The two-year bond added 12 Canadian cents to C$99.25 to yield 4.188 percent, while the 10-year bond gained 23 Canadian cents to C$96.76 to yield 4.411 percent.

The yield spread between the two-year and 10-year bond moved to 22.3 basis points from 17.2 at the previous close.

The 30-year bond fell 28 Canadian cents to C$109.05 to yield 4.448 percent.

Readers might not fully empathize with my joy at seeing a real-live actual term spread again, after all this time … but believe me, it’s there.

A major – and worrisome – fly in the ointment is that the market for asset-backed paper has dried up and now:

The gap between similarly rated asset-backed and direct- issued paper is 79 basis points, the most since Bloomberg began keeping the indexes in 1999.

Brad Setser explains some of characteristics of ABCP and its relevance to the current kerfuffle. Connoisseurs of the preferred share market will recognize some degree of similarity between the two basic types of commercial paper and the preferred share types of “Operating Retractible” and “Split Share”.

Retail ABCP aversion is very pronounced to the point where not having any is a competitive advantage for Canadian money-market funds.

Sadly, I must leave devotees of the preferred share market in suspense. I have a dinner engagement and prices were not available from the source until about 7:30pm. I’ll update tomorrow … but fear not! Today, while volatile, was actually a pretty good day.

Update, 2007-08-17

Note that these indices are experimental; the absolute and relative daily values are expected to change in the final version. In this version, index values are based at 1,000.0 on 2006-6-30
Index Mean Current Yield (at bid) Mean YTW Mean Average Trading Value Mean Mod Dur (YTW) Issues Day’s Perf. Index Value
Ratchet 4.78% 4.82% 24,863 15.90 1 -0.4934% 1,035.2
Fixed-Floater 5.00% 4.90% 117,738 15.74 8 +0.1520% 1,018.0
Floater 4.95% 2.75% 75,772 7.95 4 -0.3040% 1,032.7
Op. Retract 4.84% 4.05% 80,579 3.19 16 +0.2120% 1,021.8
Split-Share 5.11% 5.02% 100,988 3.98 15 +0.1730% 1,034.2
Interest Bearing 6.24% 6.72% 65,621 4.61 3 +0.6643% 1,034.2
Perpetual-Premium 5.56% 5.27% 99,397 7.42 24 +0.1565% 1,018.8
Perpetual-Discount 5.13% 5.17% 292,508 15.21 39 +0.2532% 966.6
Major Price Changes
Issue Index Change Notes
BNA.PR.A SplitShare -2.4466% Asset coverage of almost 4.2:1 as of March 31, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.56% based on a bid of 25.12 and a hardMaturity 2010-9-30 at 25.00. It should be noted, for those reaching for yield, that an investment in this issue should count against the maximum allocation for BAM, as BAM.A is the underlying security for both the BAM-Split issues and the BAM direct preferreds.
CFS.PR.A SplitShare -2.4390% Asset coverage was a little over 2.2:1 as of August 10, according to CC&L. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.36% based on a bid of 10.00 and a hardMaturity 2012-1-31 at 10.00
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount -2.2055% Inventory blow-out or something else? Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 6.19% based on a bid of 19.51 and a limitMaturity. Quoted at 19.51-74, 4×1, at the end of the day; the BAM.PR.M closed at 20.75-85, 20×10. Who’s bidding for BAM.PR.M?
BAM.PR.K Floater -1.0382% Pays 70% of prime on its par value.
PWF.PR.F PerpetualDiscount +1.0617% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.34% based on a bid of 24.75 and a limitMaturity.
CM.PR.J PerpetualDiscount +1.0753% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.03% based on a bid of 22.56 and a limitMaturity.
CU.PR.B PerpetualPremium +1.1453% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.41% based on a bid of 25.61 and a call 2012-7-1 at 25.00.
BCE.PR.G FixFloat +1.1681%  
POW.PR.B PerpetualDiscount +1.2469% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.55% based on a bid of 24.36 and a limitMaturity.
GWO.PR.E OpRet +1.4308% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.30% based on a bid of 25.52 and a call 2011-4-30 at 25.00.
POW.PR.D PerpetualDiscount +1.4308% Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.29% based on a bid of 23.86% and a limitMaturity.
LFE.PR.A SplitShare +1.6832% Asset coverage of just under 2.7:1 as of July 31, 2007, according to the company. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.74% based on a bid of 10.27 and a hardMaturity 2012-12-1 at 10.00.
BSD.PR.A InterestBearing +2.1858% Asset coverage of just over 1.8:1 as of August 10 according to Brookfield Funds. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 7.36% (mostly as interest) based on a bid of 9.35 and a hardMaturity 2015-3-31 at 10.00.
SBN.PR.A SplitShare +3.38% Asset coverage of slightly under 2.3:1 as of August 9, according to Mulvihill. Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.61% based on a bid of 10.40 and a hardMaturity 2014-12-1 at 10.00
Volume Highlights
Issue Index Volume Notes
BAM.PR.N PerpetualDiscount 114,390 See “Price Movers”, above.
BAM.PR.B Floater 31,731  
SLF.PR.E PerpetualDiscount 30,200 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.04% based on a bid of 22.61 and a limitMaturity.
BNA.PR.C SplitShare 22,960 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 5.68% based on a bid of 22.51 and a hardMaturity 2019-1-10 at 25.00.
BNS.PR.M PerpetualDiscount 20,570 Now with a pre-tax bid-YTW of 4.95% based on a bid of 22.91 and a limitMaturity.

There were fourteen other $25-equivalent index-included issues trading over 10,000 shares today.

HIMI Preferred Indices

HIMIPref™ Indices : October 29, 1999

All indices were assigned a value of 1000.0 as of December 31, 1993.

HIMI Index Values 1999-10-29
Index Closing Value (Total Return) Issues Mean Credit Quality Median YTW Median DTW Median Daily Trading Mean Current Yield
Ratchet 1,526.1 0 0 0 0 0 0
FixedFloater 1,613.8 7 2.00 4.63% 15.9 197M 5.17%
Floater 1,437.0 4 1.77 4.47% 15.2 52M 5.21%
OpRet 1,366.2 32 1.22 5.32% 3.6 57M 6.30%
SplitShare 1,410.6 4 1.50 5.57% 6.8 61M 5.50%
Interest-Bearing 1,453.3 6 2.00 7.97% 10.4 433M 8.20%
Perpetual-Premium 1,180.8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Perpetual-Discount 1,208.9 13 1.53 5.86% 14.1 143M 6.18%

Index Constitution, 1999-10-29, Pre-rebalancing

Index Constitution, 1999-10-29, Post-rebalancing

Errata, 2007-08-24: The credit rating of IQI.PR.A in the Fixed-Floater index is reported incorrectly; it should not have been included in the index as the actual DBRS rating on this date was Pfd-3(high).

Issue Comments

BAM.PR.N : Blow-out sale underway?

It has been a long time coming – and  the fund invested too early, as I can now tell with benefit of hindsight – but as of noonish today, 80,669 shares of BAM.PR.N have traded; it’s currently quoted at 19.46-60, 3×81.

It’s either a blow-out sale or a panic-stricken margin call!

BAM.PR.M has traded 1,700 and is quoted at 20.85-86, 5×18 … so investors can now swap virtually identical instruments and take out $1.25 … although, admittedly, the potential volume that could be done on the M side at these levels is probably extremely limited.